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         This thesis examines party-based Euroscepticism across four different national contexts 
in the period 2011-3 by bringing into focus right-wing populist parties. Understanding 
Europeanization as a label for the impact of engagement with the EU and its practical and 
normative influences on statecraft, policy-making, and the wider society, the thesis looks into 
the Europeanization of narratives of national identity, minority rights issues, immigration and 
citizenship. It discusses the way in which the impact of engagement with the EU is perceived 
as well as the nature of the arguments made against the EU’s involvement in associated 
policy processes. There has been a recent upsurge in Euroscepticism due to a combination of 
economic and political factors, on both the popular and party level in EU countries, as well as 
the increased blurring of the boundaries between mainstream and fringe Eurosceptics. Hence, 
it is important to analyze the precise reasons behind this phenomenon. The discussion focuses 
on “soft Euroscepticism” – the thesis is generally not interested in pondering the generic 
arguments against a country’s membership in supranational entities or shedding light on those 
parties who oppose the underlying values on which the EU project rests. The thesis therefore 
probes the attitudes of parties that – with the recent and partial exception of the PVV in the 
Netherlands – tend to emphasize relatively specific issue-areas as sources of concerns. 
         This work is primarily based on qualitative methods - 32 elite interviews with 
nationalist-populist politicians including key figures such as party leaders (Rolf Schlierer, 
Gheorghe Funar), European Parliament representatives (Barry Madlener) and members of the 
National Parliament as well as of the general party councils (Ventsislav Lakov) in addition to 
detailed analysis of policy documentation and books authored by party representatives – and 
highlights and deconstructs these parties’ grievances attributable to nationalistically-oriented 
concerns. It includes a detailed literature review that clarifies the EU’s impacts and country-
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specific historical and contemporary differences in the four domains affected by 
“Europeanization” (Chapters 1-3) and then in Chapters 4-6 uses original empirical data to 
compare the attitudes of the four parties – Ataka, PRM, REP, and PVV – with regard to the 
issues already introduced. 
         The thesis utilizes theoretical approaches drawn from several disciplines ranging from 
political science to sociology, though it mostly confines itself to those pertaining to core 
group or minority/ethno-regionalist nationalist mobilization, ethnic vs. civic nationalisms in 
Eastern vs. Western Europe, as well as the different role played by EU conditionality in 
relation to the political landscape on the two sides of the continent. Extrapolating from this 
body of research, it develops hypotheses and projections regarding the expected disconnect in 
viewpoints between Eastern and Western parties. 
         The study finds that attitudes towards “Europeanized” issues areas diverge greatly and 
do not necessarily correlate with the extent to which EU membership as a whole is opposed 
by the party. In line with previous research findings, the EU’s capacity to create a super-order 
nationalism that could challenge conventional readings of patriotism is generally not 
conceptualized as a significant threat. However, the interviews did reveal that pre-existing 
transcendent identities – like Latin identity in the case of Romania or the Slavic one in 
Bulgaria - – are perceived as threatened or as being tacitly degraded due to assumed cultural 
biases within the EU. At the same time, the reduced salience of such identities among the 
members of the Western populist parties does not make them more sympathetic to Pan-
Europeanism. EU effects on immigration are predictably rated as manifestly detrimental by 
the West European parties, because they distrust the professionalism of EU agencies and 
networks, dislike the Eastern Europeans’ increasing involvement in making higher-level 
decisions and perceive the EU as more liberally inclined than the national government in this 
realm (with the latter two points especially applicable to the PVV). However, it was 
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interesting that the East Europeans also expressed some disquiet due to the EU’s supposed 
culpability in encouraging emigration of their own citizens and the presumed unwillingness 
of the EU organs to offer them the necessary financial means for combating immigration into 
Bulgaria across the Turkish border. However, contrary to theoretical expectations, the study 
suggests that there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to the populist party’s proclivity 
to regard the EU as an ally of “minority lobbies”, with the PVV (the most Eurosceptic party) 
assessing the relevancy of this aspect as minor, while it is gauged to be of fundamental 
importance by Ataka (less Eurosceptic than the PVV). Among CEE populists, the thesis 
shows how “privileged minorities” like Hungarians and Turks are viewed with alarm due to 
supposedly making use of the EU level in order to advance their secessionist ambitions 
(Hungarians in Romania) or improve their socio-economic prospects at the expense of the 
majority (Turks in ethnically mixed regions of Bulgaria). In short, the thesis establishes that 
there is still a strong dividing line between Eastern and Western populist parties in relation to 
the assessments made with regard to the impact of the EU on European identity, migration 
issues and majority-minority dynamics. 
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General Introduction  
 
         This thesis investigates the determinants behind the Eurosceptic attitudes of nationalist-
populist parties, based in countries that are members of the EU.1 It compares “old” (Western 
European) and “new” (Central and Eastern European) member states with regard to the 
degree to which their expressed reservations towards the EU project could be seen as 
outgrowths of specific manifestations of Europeanization processes. This PhD is not 
concerned with the directly economic causes of Euroscepticism, but instead analyzes the 
objections of Eurosceptic parties to political and cultural aspects of the EU project. In 
particular, it considers their concerns about threats to the identity of “core” (i.e. majority) 
populations. Such threats could emanate from below or above. The main example of the 
former phenomenon is the EU empowerment of minorities (both well-established national 
minorities and immigrant populations). Minority empowerment is often associated with better 
minority representation in legislature or national cabinets, which in turn encourages ordinary 
members of such groups to become more involved in the political process.2 It may be 
confined to the “descriptive stage” (remain on the representational level) or cross over into 
the “substantive stage” (minority representatives are actually able to trigger changes in 
legislation that are favorable to minorities).3 Alternatively, empowerment could remain 
discursive in the sense of legitimating certain minority struggles without necessarily resulting 
                                                 
1
 While the European Union formally came into being following the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on 
1 November 1993 and it achieved a “consolidated and unified legal personality” in the aftermath of the going 
into effect of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, in this thesis I will use the shorthand “EU” to refer to 
both the European Union and its historical antecedents like the European Communities, unless otherwise 
indicated. (in Frank Hoffmeister. Litigating against the European Union and Its Member States – Who Responds 
under the ILC's Draft Articles on International Responsibility of International Organizations?, 2010, pp. 723-
724 and Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union). 
2
 Banducci, Susan A., Todd Donovan, and Jeffrey E. Karp. Minority Representation, Empowerment and 
Participation (2004), p. 534. 
3
 Ibid, p. 538. 
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in any representational dividends.4 Thus, the aim is to discover whether minority groups 
within certain countries have started to be appraised as more or less threatening due to the 
influences of the EU and whether the opportunities for “nationalist expression” of members 
of the majority groups are appraised to have been stifled (or amplified) due to direct EU 
measures or indirect EU influences. The principal example of the former phenomenon is the 
EU promotion of European identity (“Euronationalism”) which may seem to be at the cost of 
national identity.  
 
         The main objects of analysis are the relevant dimensions of Europeanization and 
nationalist-populist parties and politicians. The thesis considers the “objective threats” (actual 
policy of the EU/European institutions in these areas) before moving on to the perceptions of 
Eurosceptic politicians regarding the mutual influences between the EU and nation-states 
(Europeanization). The research is based on interviews about such policies and materials 
presented in the party’s programmes and other relevant works, as well as accounts 
documenting the evolution of their Eurosceptic sentiments. 
 
         A multitude of studies on the origins, effects, and strategies to counter the phenomena 
tied to Euroscepticism have already been undertaken. This abundance is especially 
impressive if one takes into account that this subject matter has only really been on the radar 
of scholars since the early 1990s. In the current age, Euroscepticism does not show any 
indication that it is receding from the EU political landscape. On the contrary, a substantial 
number of nationalist-populist parties, which are conventionally primary exponents of 
Eurosceptic sentiments, have increased their influence in both the “old” and the “new” EU 
                                                 
4
 Jenne, Erin K. Ethnic Bargaining: the Paradox of Minority Empowerment (2007), p. 30. 
 23 
member states.5 At the 2013 legislative elections in Austria, the Freedom Party came in third 
place, gathering 20.7 % of the votes for its most successful showing since 1999.6 Similarly, in 
the eastern and southern parts of the continent, far right parties like the Hungarian Jobbik and 
the Greek Golden Dawn have in recent years significantly elevated their electoral profiles. 
The 2014 European Parliament elections saw Eurosceptic parties achieve unprecedented 
success,7 with the Front National, UKIP and the Danish People’s Party (DF) emerging as the 
number one electoral forces in their respective countries,8 sparking discussions regarding the 
future configuration of alliances in the European Parliament and the continued domestic 
political stability in these states.9 While perceived ethnic threat and distrust of the political 
system remain the main determinants behind citizens’ decision to cast their vote for radical 
right parties, Euroscepticism in itself remains the third strongest explanatory factor.10 
 
         Among ordinary citizens, there has been an increased reluctance to emotionally invest 
in European integration11 and the citizens of the four largest economies in the eurozone 
(Germany, France, Spain, and Italy) have become more distrustful of the EU institutions than 
even the perennially Eurosceptic British.12 The political mainstream has also not been 
insulated from the Eurosceptic turn. In quite a few Western European countries, a relative 
“normalization of attitudes” towards nationalist-populist EU-opposed factions like the Front 
National and a “mainstreaming of extreme right discourses” has become the rule. A notable 
example of this paradigm shift was the aftermath of the 2012 French presidential election, 
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when no exasperation was expressed and there was a curious absence of vociferous protests 
among significant segments of the French population following the electoral gains made by 
Marine Le Pen and the Front National. In Aurélien Mondon’s view, “the French no longer 
found the extreme right particularly disconcerting”.13 Furthermore, there is some indication 
that Euroscepticism among a number of “core” members of the European Union like the UK 
is no longer regarded as merely a rhetorical exercise to curry favour with the electorate, but 
may reflect a willingness on the part of nation-state elites to go all the way and engage in 
concrete actions that could fundamentally change the powers invested in the EU and even put 
its future into question.14  
 
         Accordingly, as Euroscepticism could naturally have adverse effects when it comes to 
the potential for further deepening of the Union or could exacerbate social tensions, it is 
important to evaluate to what extent the EU itself is indirectly responsible for this 
phenomenon. Paul Taggart has characterized “increased Euroscepticism as a corollary of 
increased [European] integration and its accompanying effects on the state”.15 Thus, it is of 
the essence to identify the determinants behind some of the expressed grievances by 
nationalist-populist parties in relation to Europeanization (likely to be magnified in 
comparison to those of liberal and conservative ones) and make comparisons across the 
different national contexts. In accordance with this goal, the thesis compares four nationalist-
populist parties in order to establish how far they espouse common concerns and to discern 
whether there is an East-West divide (two of the parties chosen are from the CEE and two 
from NWE).  
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         The thesis contributes to two bodies of scholarly literature, since nationalist-populist 
parties could be studied in two contexts – firstly because they are members of party families 
within the EU that have a track record of elevating nationalism to the apex of political 
expression and secondly because they also reflect and contribute to the discourses in their 
own nation-states. The East vs. West comparisons are relevant because they have been 
relatively understudied within the scholarship on nationalist-populist parties, especially using 
qualitative methodology. However, a qualitative approach is essential in order to understand 
why parties from across Europe may differ from one another significantly. For example, the 
Bulgarian Ataka, the German REP, the British UKIP, and the Slovakian HZDS are 
sometimes subsumed under the generic heading of “populist radical right” by scholars, but 
the precise nature of their Euroscepticism, i.e. regarding the degree to which they view the 
EU as negatively affecting their electoral prospects or threats to identity, may be markedly 
different.16 Finally, there has been a notable absence of works exclusively focusing on the 
critical evaluation of “minority empowerment” and “Euronationalism” as triggers of 
Euroscepticism, especially in a cross-country comparative fashion.  
         The thesis pays special attention to East-West comparisons. These seem fruitful not 
only because Europeanization has been experienced differently on different sides of the 
continent, but also because the two halves of Europe have very divergent immigration 
histories. Germany and the Netherlands have seen strong immigration waves since the 1960s, 
which has not been the case in Bulgaria and Romania, now source countries of emigration to 
other EU states. One intriguing facet that is compared is the degree to which the historical 
national minorities in these CEE states like Hungarians and Turks provide the same type of 
ammunition to nationalist-populists that the relatively recent settler immigrants offer to the 
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rightist parties in Western Europe. Furthermore, at least since the end of the Second World 
War, there has been an attempt in Western Europe to overcome ethnic nationalism, while the 
process of transforming ethnic nationalist expression into civic ones has not reached the same 
stage in Eastern Europe. More stringent conditionality in the CEE realm has also arguably 
contributed to Euroscepticism in that part of the continent. 
         
         The thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One introduces the main concepts 
used in the thesis and surveys the relevant literature. After looking briefly at the different 
understandings of Europeanization and Euroscepticism, it dedicates more specific attention to 
the literature covering the nature of the Euroscepticism of nationalist-populist parties in both 
Western and Eastern Europe. It explains how key concepts will be used in the thesis and 
identifies the main gaps in the literature which the thesis hopes to fill. Essentially, Chapter 
One prepares the ground for the rest of the thesis by providing some general indications as to 
why nationalist-populist resentments (related to the empowerment of anti-nationalist forces) 
could logically be viewed as attributable to certain Europeanization processes, or whether in 
fact (as the literature reviewed in Chapter One partly suggests) such resentments could (a) be 
based on ill-founded perceptions (since ethno-regionalist actors do not unequivocally benefit 
from Europeanization) and (b) might in fact be linked to a Euroscepticism which stems to 
some extent from causes completely unconnected to the privileging of minorities. Chapter 
Two examines a number of further issue clusters (in addition to minority empowerment, 
discussed in Chapter One). These clusters are highly salient from the standpoint of 
nationalists – new loci of identification challenging exclusively national attachments (Pan-
European nationalism), transformations of citizenship regulations and altered migration 
dynamics. The EU impacts on each of these realms are thoroughly analyzed and it is 
indicated why certain negative trends (if viewed through a nationalist lens) in relation to these 
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three key areas could be blamed on the influences of the EU. Chapter Three introduces the 
four countries that will be analyzed as part of the empirical work. They are characterized by 
divergent experiences of nationalism, different framings of Europeanism throughout their 
histories and various ways in which the interactions between majority and minority groups 
are structured due to certain institutional features and underlying norms. The rationale for 
choosing these four states (as well as the specific political parties to be analyzed) is outlined, 
with some of the reasons revolving around the nature of majority-minority relations and the 
type of Euroscepticism typical of these countries. Chapter Four (the first empirical chapter) 
presents an analysis of the in-depth interviews, focusing on the sections on the perceived 
effects of Euronationalism on each nation-state. Some of these touched upon the matter 
directly (the interrelationship between national and European identity) while others were 
more indirect (i.e. revealed through the respondents’ rationale for opposing EU enlargement 
or views on “core” countries within the EU). As in the previous chapter, additional non-
interview material is included in order to supplement the empirical findings and augment the 
final analysis. Chapter Five (the second empirical chapter) covers the parties’ perceptions of 
the EU influence on immigration and citizenship provisions within countries – disparate issue 
areas ranging from appraisals of the EU agencies’ efforts to aid nation-states in combatting 
immigration  to the undercutting of the primacy of national citizenship regulations are put 
under scrutiny. The section enumerating the EU-attributable immigration impacts strikes a 
balance between interview and written party materials, while the citizenship section has been 
compiled by drawing almost exclusively on data derived from interviews. In the case of the 
CEE countries, brief attention is also devoted to the perceived effects of EU membership on 
current emigration flows as well as future trends. Chapter Six (the final empirical chapter) 
deals exclusively with the analysis of the “minority empowerment” theme, drawing primarily 
on insights gleaned from the interviews, interweaving them with information obtained from 
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other sources. It also briefly touches upon the perceived EU influences on the promotion of 
multiculturalism (regarded as conceptually distinct from minority empowerment by the 
interviewees) within countries. Chapter Seven (the concluding one) brings together all the 
analytical conclusions, discussing the divergences and similarities identified. In particular, it 
draws out the cross-regional (Eastern vs. Western) comparisons that emerged from the 
empirical research. Finally, the chapter sketches out some of the implications in the realm of 
theory and policy that could be manifested as a result of this research. For instance, the 
concluding part of this thesis suggests that it may be worth probing whether there is a 
significant overlap between the ideologies of “mainstream right” and “fringe right” parties in 

















Explanation and rationale for selecting the methodology 
 
         Having provided an overview of the issues that will be put to the test, this introductory 
chapter details the methodology employed in order to provide an answer to the research 
questions. The approach adopted with regard to the field work was a qualitative one and 
mainly involved the administering of semi-structured interviews to members of nationalist-
populist parties (with a supplementary analysis of written documents like party manifestos or 
relevant works authored by party members). I aimed to interview a variety of significant 
party members (ranging from party leaders to representatives at the regional level or in the 
European Parliament) and I believe that I managed to obtain information from a cross-section 
of influential functionaries in the case of each party as well as benefit from a “sufficiently 
diverse sample” (in terms of positions occupied within the party and familiarity with different 
regions in each of the countries in question). The reason for deciding to settle on conducting 
semi-structured interviews as the best way to illuminate the issues that will be explored was 
mainly due to the relative obscurity of the subject matter in question - few party-based 
primary or secondary sources deal exclusively with issues such as “Euronationalism”, 
“minority empowerment” or “promotion of multiculturalism by EU agents” and in any case it 
would have otherwise been difficult to make an accurate assessment of the importance 
attached to the EU influences without receiving input from party members. In addition, semi-
structured interviews enable the researcher to expand on a given question,17 which is essential 
due to the complexity of some of the issue areas touched upon. Also, it was my belief that 
more honest accounts than those likely to appear in official publications could be provided if 
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the proper interview ambience was established in a “closed environment” and this indeed 
turned out to be the case on most occasions. Lastly, semi-structured interviews provide a 
tradeoff between a measure of control retained by the interviewer and opportunities for the 
interviewees to put their own spin on the interaction. They are also suitable research tools 
whenever repeated meetings with the interviewee may not be viable18 and may help put 
interviewees at ease by allowing them to bring to light any particular expertise they possess.19 
Some sample questions are shown below: 
          
General Cluster: What is your general view on your country’s membership in the EU and 
which aspects of EU membership do you deem especially problematic? 
 
Cluster One (EU identity and procedural/normative aspects in relation to nationalism): 
How are you disposed toward EU initiatives that aim to crystallize and strengthen the 
expression of a EU cultural or political identity? Do you regard Pan-European nationalism as 
a threat to traditional nationalism?  
 
Do you think that the EU plays/has played a role in altering the coalition arrangements in 
your country to the detriment of your party? 
 
Cluster Two (Europeanization in the case of citizenship, migration, etc.):  How has your 
country’s membership in the European Union affected the regulation of migration from the 
standpoint of your nation-state? 
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Cluster Three (Perceived Minority Empowerment):  From the perspective of your nation-
state, do you think that the EU has altered the status quo in the case of your core group and 
minority groups? (has it brought about a worsening or improvement in relations between 
them, has it caused members of minority groups to profit more than those belonging to the 
majority?) 
 
(For a full list of questions administered, please see Appendix 1 at the end of the thesis) 
 
         I decided to settle for the term “Pan-European nationalism” or “Pan-Europeanism” 
rather than Euronationalism, as the concept of “Euronationalism” was on occasions found to 
be confusing by the interviewees and “Pan-Europeanism” is potentially a broader term which 
could refer not only to “identity-generating” activities on the part of the EU institutions, but 
also to the altered understandings of identity as a result of the interactions among the EU 
member states themselves (see also Chapter Two for further clarifications). 
 
         A high degree of standardization of the question practices across the different national 
contexts was aimed for, albeit degrees of flexibility was retained, depending on the particular 
party environment, the preference of the interviewee, as well as certain peculiarities of the 
national contexts (i.e. questions of “core states” and “equal treatment within the EU” were 
naturally approached differently and emphasized more in the case of the two Eastern 
European countries). The emphasis was on the agents’ (policy-makers’) perceptions 
regarding the Europeanization dynamics in different realms rather than the “reality on the 
ground” (real objectively documented gains experienced by members of minority groups or 
reduced local citizens’ attachments to the nation-state as revealed for instance through 
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Eurobarometer surveys), and this work attempted to convey the concerns of the various 
interviewees as close as possible. 
 
         The information gleaned from written sources was integrated together with that 
obtained as a result of the interviews and as a researcher I assumed the primary responsibility 
for correctly interpreting the responses of the interviewees.20 Given the time constraints, 
logistics and secretive nature of some of the parties, I decided to discontinue the process of 
data gathering once a point of saturation was reached21 (in my case after eight interviews for 
each party were conducted, clear patterns began to be identified pertaining to the 
respondents’ perceptions of the EU influences on their nation-state).  
 
         The approach which I adopted was largely a deductive one - a number of rough 
preliminary hypotheses based on political science and sociological theories provided the 
blueprint for the research as well as an indication of some of the initial assumptions regarding 
the presumed differences in perceptions between the agents in the two different regional 
contexts (Eastern Europe vs. Western Europe). 
            
         The first guiding hypothesis - developed as a result of the asymmetries in “majority” vs. 
“minority” empowerment examined in Chapter One (i.e. the increased empowerment of 
minorities at the expense of majorities) - was that the majority of nationalist-populist party 
members would express some degree of disillusionment with the EU due to their perception 
that it unduly supports minorities, often at their expense. It is elaborated, expanded upon and 
split into subhypotheses H 1 and H 5 in the concluding part of Chapter Two. As revealed by 
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the empirical work, this did not really prove to be the case among the majority of the 
respondents in the Western European case, but was important to the Romanian and Bulgarian 
parties.  
 
         The second preliminary hypothesis rested on the divergences between the CEE and 
Western European contexts in relation to political conditionality and historical 
understandings of nationalism. With regard to Europeanization, the thesis put forward the 
idea that the specific conditions of EU accession in the CEE realm (like the need for 
institutional adjustments and prominent role of the EU Commission) triggered 
Euroscepticism in that region. In particular, the “imposition of minority” discourse by the EU 
(to use Ralchev’s phrase) through the conditionality mechanisms, is one example of a 
Europeanization development that has specifically targeted the CEE countries. The historical 
downplaying of the need for group rights in cases of historical minorities or the limited 
familiarity with inclusive citizenship regimes is an example of a peculiarly CEE 
developmental trajectory. In essence, the working assumption was that the EU-induced 
minority empowerment grievances were more likely to be forcefully and bitterly expressed 
by CEE populists than their Western counterparts. It reappears in Chapter Two as a slightly 
reformulated H 2. As the empirical investigations demonstrated, this indeed proved to be the 
case, though there was an interesting disconnect between perceptions of normative vs. 
substantive minority gains in the case of two of the countries. Additionally, it was initially 
predicted that ethnic conceptions of nationalism would figure more prominently in the 
pronouncements of CEE populists and this guiding assumption was also sustained. 
 
         The third working hypothesis was that more recently we might be witnessing a process 
of convergence between East and West regarding the ways in which issues pertaining to 
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nationalism are approached, now that the accession process is over for the A10 member-
states and because majority nationalist expression has become more acceptable in Western 
Europe. Karen Henderson (2008) predicts that a certain convergence between the CEE and 
Western European party dynamics in relation to Euroscepticism will occur at some point in 
the future. She remarks that “[eventually it would] become far easier to classify 
Euroscepticism on a pan-European basis”.22 This guiding assumption is further fleshed out 
and is labeled as H 6 at the end of Chapter Two. The thesis attempted to solve one small 
piece of the puzzle in relation to this conundrum and the paper’s conclusion demonstrated 
that cross-Europe party convergence predictions do not really ring true with regard to some of 
the specific sub-strands of Euroscepticism examined.  
 
         In addition, Chapter Two introduces two additional hypotheses (H 3 and H 4) extracted 
from the literature review analysis of EU level interactions with national identity; national 
regulatory mechanisms with regard to immigration; and criteria for citizenship acquisition 
within nation-states. 
         The fact that some hypotheses were proposed before undertaking the actual empirical 
research did not lead to premature closure – I still allowed myself flexibility in interpreting 
the findings and on occasions made references to scholarly studies not cited in the theory 
chapters of the literature review in order to make sense of the incoming empirical data.23 This 
is largely reflective of the reality that PhD research cannot always progress in a perfectly 
linear or top-down fashion, especially given that the serendipity factor needs to be taken into 
account. In fact it may not be advisable to assume that such linearity is achievable.24 
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Barriers experienced as a researcher – logistical, linguistic, cultural, and institutional 
 
         While I was ultimately successful in obtaining insights from a sufficient number of 
influential members of all four parties, there were a number of barriers that needed to be 
overcome. 
 
         The biggest issue encountered was gaining access and “selling” my research by 
explaining my motivation for pursuing such studies in a way that could be related to by the 
politicians from these parties. The difficulties with regard to finding willing interviewees 
were traceable to the busy and at times unpredictable schedules of the politicians, their 
position within the party hierarchy (necessitating the approval of the party leader or other 
senior members in case of lower-ranked functionaries), gatekeeping issues (unwillingness of 
junior members to grant me access to more senior ones), language barriers (applicable to the 
Romanian context and to an extent to the Dutch one), and lack of interest in the topic and 
general reluctance to participate (mostly a problem in the Romanian and Dutch cases). In 
addition, a few members I contacted (2 PVV functionaries, 2 REP representatives, 3 PRM 
politicians) did not feel sufficiently knowledgeable regarding the European Union and its 
impacts on the nation-state, so they advised me to approach their colleagues from the 
respective national parliaments or the European Parliament. I encountered this obstacle quite 
frequently when dealing with the PVV and at times this contributed to creating a vicious 
circle, because European Parliament members are generally difficult to approach and there 
are not as many of them to choose from. However, I was able to eventually resolve these 
issues and find members who were interested in sharing their views, while at the same time 
exhibiting sufficient familiarity with the workings of the EU. 
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         Furthermore, my own position as a student (rather than an academic) equipped me with 
certain advantages and disadvantages. On occasions it worked against me because the 
assumption on the part of the politicians was that I could not assume a “superior” vantage 
point, so the interaction would not result in legitimacy dividends for them or enhance their 
understanding of the underlying issues. On the other hand, I may have had an easier time due 
to being able to portray myself as a relatively naïve student researcher, who did not possess 
ulterior agendas connected to causing additional negative publicity for the party members. 
The “exotic” nature of my request or genuine curiosity may have also worked in my favour. 
It needs to be noted that the disadvantages were certainly most pronounced in the case of the 
PVV party. 
 
         Moreover, my national background also proved to be a double-edged sword – on the 
one hand, it made everything less complicated in the Bulgarian and German cases (in the 
latter instance, the historically amicable relations between Bulgaria and Germany as well as 
the lesser relevancy of the “CEE migration” frame may have played a contributing role). 
From the standpoint of Ataka, this resulted in gains, as I was viewed as a co-ethnic and there 
was thus a greater willingness to lend a helping hand, though one member jokingly implied 
that I was rather Westernized for a Bulgarian. REP members were also quite well-disposed 
towards me (and Bulgaria) and did not appear apprehensive about offering their opinions on 
the issues at hand. By contrast, my “Bulgarian” identity was almost certainly a complicating 
factor with regard to being able to put the Romanian and especially the Dutch politicians at 
ease. In the latter case, it is quite likely that the PVV’s awareness of my national origin may 
have predisposed their party members to view it as odd that I would be approaching them to 
talk about Euroscepticism issues, given the prominent place occupied by the anti-Eastern 
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European rhetoric in party manifestos and the party leader’s pronouncements. It is not out of 
the question that a number of Dutch students were also taken by surprise due to my interest in 
the PVV and felt ill-placed to become intermediaries (one Dutch academic whom I contacted 
remarked that PVV members are notoriously difficult to get an interview with, while former 
VVD-affiliated Dutch politician Jan-Kees Wiebenga who used to be one of my lecturers at 
Leiden University during the 2009/2010 academic year did not have any acquaintances from 
the PVV apart from the party leader and described Wilders as “virtually unreachable”) – this 
is discussed in more detail in the ethics section. 
 
         However, once I gained access to the interviewees, my national identity was not a 
variable that could be said to have significantly affected the nature of the revelations or the 
interview ambience. For instance, while PVV members remained friendly and cordial, they 
did not avoid talking about Bulgarian-related issues. 
 
         Lastly, a few words may be in order with regard to the language matters. As a native 
Bulgarian speaker, I did not have too many issues making translations from English to 
Bulgarian and vice versa and was especially careful that no nuances were lost in translation. 
Similarly, I managed to conduct all my interviews with German members in German. I have 
limited knowledge of the Dutch language (though I studied for a year in Leiden and can 
understand simple written Dutch), but all the PVV members were fluent in English, so there 
were no serious problems here either. Romania was the most challenging country 
linguistically, because familiarity with the English language was noticeably lower among 
PRM members, though the interviews that I conducted in English went smoothly and for the 
rest I managed to get in touch with Romanian university students who helped me out as 
interpreters – they used to be enrolled at local universities as humanities or linguistics 
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students and I made sure to go over all the concepts and questions with them prior to 
conducting the interviews. I also learned some Romanian in order to conduct the research 
(and could draw on my prior knowledge of the French language which is within the same 























Note regarding applicability of findings 
 
         While it would not be viable to discuss the findings in terms of statistical significance, 
as I did not employ any quantitative methods, my use of semi-structured interviews as a 
qualitative method was well-suited for the in-depth investigation of the perceptions and 
precise argumentations of the nationalist-populist members. I feel that the questions were 
sufficiently open-ended to allow the politicians to freely express their views on a variety of 
Europeanization-related topics. While bigger samples are always desirable, this would not 
have been viable in the case of these parties and on most topics the saturation point was 
reached once the sixth or seventh interview was over and obvious patterns with regard to the 
themes analyzed could be identified. In addition, there were no outright contradictions among 
party members with regard to the responses provided – the PRM possibly being the only 
exception with one member (Ţîrnea) describing himself as “Eurooptimist” and another one 
(Funar) labeling himself as “very Eurosceptic”. 
 
         Finally, the ideology of such parties is in a constant state of flux in addition to a 
frequent turnover in personnel. Ataka and the REP in particular have had to contend with 
many defections over the course of the last three years. Therefore it may be wise to consider 
these findings as having shed light only on the period between 2011 and 2013, and - although 









         On the whole, my thesis focused on parties that are viewed as controversial and beyond 
the mainstream in their own countries and also by international actors. While these are not the 
type of parties whose members are likely to be involved in any illegal activities, the nature of 
their rhetoric and policy suggestions cause them to occupy a very particular niche in their 
states of origin. 
 
         Ethical concerns raised by this study largely relate to my obligations to respondents and 
the effects of the research process on them. From the standpoint of academic integrity as well 
as fairness to the interviewees, the accuracy of the information presented is vital. I believe 
that I managed to achieve that, as I have been able to go over the recordings multiple times 
(most interviews were taped) and also succeeded in clarifying any ambiguous 
pronouncements during the actual interviews as well as after they had been concluded. In 
addition, I made sure to thoroughly review any notes taken in the immediate aftermath of the 
few interviews which I was unable to record.  
 
         In terms of the actual questions posed, I made sure to craft them in such a way that they 
were not likely to be regarded as charged, provocative or repetitive and thus trigger negative 
reactions and outbursts that could spoil the interview ambience. During the actual interviews, 
there were no problems with respondents feeling aggrieved or unwilling to answer questions, 
so feelings of rapport were retained with all the interviewees. In the German context, I stayed 
clear of Nazism-related topics, but two of the interviewees broached the subject themselves 
while pondering issues pertaining to “political correctness” in contemporary Germany. I 
refrained from asking direct questions regarding the interviewees’ opinions of what 
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constitutes and who belongs to the “national community” (for instance, whether non-White 
Dutch people are accepted as part of the national community or the majority group and 
whether they subscribe to racial explanations of crime), preferring to obtain such information 
from other sources. Biological racism topics are likely to be viewed as especially sensitive in 
the two Western European contexts and it is conceivable that due to my status as an outsider 
(as well as cultural taboo issues), I would not have received candid answers and would have 
been envisioned as part of the problem. It is not out of the question that I could have been 
perceived as someone who was interested in inserting Eastern European understandings of 
ethnic belonging into a Western European environment. In general, my expectation was that 
minority-related and immigration questions could set alarm bells ringing among interviewees, 
but this did not turn out to be an issue (with the exception of one PVV member from the 
European Parliament, who seemed taken aback by the question). With regard to the pre-
interview stage, I made sure to specify the exact nature of my research and provide an 
indication that the thesis’s emphasis on East-West comparisons in terms of the perceived 
effects of Europeanization. However, I decided to omit any references to “Euroscepticism” or 
“opposition to the EU”, settling for the formulation “EU influences on your nation-state in 
various realms” in order to avoid setting the tone for discussions and branding party members 
as Eurosceptics from the very outset. Such rigid categorizations are as a rule resented even by 
committed ideologues. Similarly, I utilized the concept “patriotism” rather than 
“nationalism”, as the latter term could on occasions be regarded as possessing a chauvinist 
connotation. 
 
         Another ethical issue was connected to offering the interviewees the choice of 
anonymity. Lower-ranked members in the case of the PVV did not want to have their name 
mentioned - it is apparently the case that according to inner party regulations, party leader 
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Geert Wilders needs to grant his permission for any party member’s interaction with 
journalists or academic researchers. The one exception is communication with members of 
“friendly parties” like the Vlaams Belang. It is not out of the question that non-compliant 
functionaries could face expulsions from the party ranks or become outcasts within the party, 
so this was certainly a very understandable request and I made sure to respect it. The same 
problem did not arise in the case of the European Parliament members or regional leaders 
who readily agreed to be mentioned in the thesis. As for the REP representatives, given that 
most of the interviews were arranged in a top-down fashion - after first getting in touch with 
the upper echelons of the party hierarchy (the secretary of the party as well as the actual party 
leader were really helpful in that regard), all the members (with one exception) willingly 
agreed to be quoted and have their names appear on the pages of the thesis. I made sure to 
observe the same protocol in the case of the Ataka and PRM parties, but none of the people 
interviewed requested anonymity (among Ataka representatives, not a single one of them 
deemed it necessary to obtain permission from the party leader and did not appear worried 
regarding the implications of talking to me, while two regional level Romanian members 
consulted with then party leader Vadim Tudor prior to speaking to me). Unfortunately, it has 
been virtually impossible to do follow-ups with most of the members interviewed, though the 
ones that I re-contacted had not reconsidered and were happy to be named in the thesis. I 
made sure to be as up-front as possible and provided the interviewees with my CV, contact 
information and a few sample questions prior to meeting them (except in three instances in 
the Romanian case, when a friend of mine was arranging the interviews). 
 
         It is notable that most members did not want to don the mantle of intermediaries and 
generally did not feel comfortable suggesting other functionaries I could speak to or referring 
me to their colleagues. Similarly, for a combination of logistical and personal reasons, no 
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joint interviews were conducted (all of them were one-on-one). I decided not to pressure 
them and insist on obtaining contact details of other party representatives through the ones I 
had already interviewed, instead going through many alternative routes in making 
arrangements – through e-mail communication, contacting conference organizers (where the 
politicians had appeared to speak in front of an audience), filling out relevant forms on the 
party websites, and so on. I think that this added to rather than detracted from the thesis, 
because the phenomenon of “group-think” was less pronounced given that none of the party 
functionaries had been briefed by their colleagues prior to their actual interaction with me. 
 
         In addition to these ethical considerations pertaining to the nationalist-populist 
politicians, throughout my journey towards completion I became increasingly conscious of 
the need to do proper research with regard to any potential intermediaries’ political ideology, 
occupation, social status, and so on. For instance, on one occasion I asked a highly educated 
Dutch friend who is quite familiar with the Dutch political system for advice in contacting a 
PVV politician. He was kind enough to put me in touch with a former classmate of his who 
had previously been employed within the European Commission. However, it turned out that 
the person in question was not too keen to associate himself with the PVV party in any way, 
shape, or form and refused to approach party members like their press officers, because he 
felt that his academic and personal reputation could be put in jeopardy. In his view, such an 
endeavor would have been futile anyway, as a simple Google search would immediately give 
the game away, because the PVV party members would find out about his “Europe-hugging 
ways” and this would make them suspicious of his motives. I certainly got the impression that 
quite a few of the Dutch university students I was referred to were quite reluctant to “prepare 
the terrain” prior to me speaking to PVV representatives, though I eventually managed to 
obtain some help in that regard. I encountered similar issues in Romania and Germany – 
 44 
some Romanian students were quite apprehensive about contacting the PRM party and 
advised me to drop the matter altogether and concentrate on other parties, while an Eastern 
European family I stayed with in Germany was equally wary regarding any sort of interaction 
with REP representatives (in the latter case, this was not a problem, because the language 
barrier issue was absent) and were adamant that I should not specify (to REP members) that I 
was temporarily residing in their house. While Ataka certainly does not enjoy a good 
reputation in Bulgaria, hardly any of the Bulgarians I talked to were worried about contacting 
them and they were more likely to laugh them off rather than perceive them as a hostile and 
dangerous party. In any case, I did not have to seriously rely on intermediaries in the 
Bulgarian case, given the general ease of approaching Ataka representatives, though it is 
clear that my own compatriots perceived Ataka as somewhat more mainstream than their 
counterparts in the other states. 
 
         One valuable lesson I learned is that the dynamics of approaching populists are 
manifestly different compared to those typical of approaching mainstream parties and I need 
to be more tactful with regard to any requests for assistance in paving the way for an 
interview, because academics and non-academics may feel intimidated heeding such requests 
or be slightly suspicious regarding my motives. In essence, to avoid any misunderstandings 
and causing offence, it is best to be extra careful in selecting intermediaries in the case of 
such parties. I may have allowed certain stereotypes regarding “liberal political cultures” 
(with regard to the approachability of politicians) to creep into my mind, because my initial 
expectation was that I would have a harder time in Eastern than in Western Europe, which 
generally did not prove to be the case. 
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         A few members from the various parties also requested to read the final copy of my 
thesis and I will gladly send it to them once it is completed, so that they get the chance to 
become fully acquainted with the nature of the research. 
 
         All in all, I believe that I managed to respect all fundamental ethical considerations 
while conducting my interviews, and any minor deviations from the originally laid out plan 
did not affect the nature of the findings. 
 
         I now turn to the first part of the literature review, which outlines some of the general 
ways of conceptualizing Europeanization, the party-based transformations caused by the 
















Chapter One – Europeanization as a cause of 




         Chapter One lays the groundwork for the principal subject matter in very general terms. 
It introduces the main concepts used in the thesis and surveys the relevant literature, both the 
general literature on Europeanization and Euroscepticism and the more specific literature 
about the Euroscepticism of nationalist-populist parties. It explains how key concepts will be 
used in the thesis and identifies the main gaps in the literature that this thesis hopes to fill. 
      
1: Europeanization 
 
         If Europeanization is understood to mean the impact of the European Union within 
individual nation-states, “Europeanization research” is a relatively recent undertaking. It 
reflects the reaching of a stage when actual EU institutions are assumed to have achieved a 
degree of permanence. Hence scholars are less inclined to focus on the “Brussels processes”, 
the interplay between European policy-making and European integration. By contrast, in the 
pioneering years (in the immediate aftermath of the creation of the European communities), 
theorists tended to be concerned with finding explanations for the dynamics and outcomes of 
European-level integration processes, with the consequence that the national arena and the 
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domestic effects of the EU tended to be pushed backstage.25 This could arguably be traced to 
the conceptualization of the EU as the preserve of international relations due to the still 
influential realist school of thought, which saw little merit in opening up the “black box” 
(delving behind the façade of a “unified nation-state” and looking more closely into the 
differing interests of various stakeholders at the national level).26  
         The increased level of interest in national level dynamics could also be regarded as a 
natural development due to the amplified role of the EU and the increased sophistication of 
the supranational structures. As Boerzel puts it, with the establishment of the Single Market 
and the European Monetary Union (EMU) propelling the increased delegation of domestic 
competencies to the European level, EU theorists could no longer afford to ignore the effects 
of the European Union on the domestic institutions, policies and political processes of the 
member states.27 Hooghe and Marks draw attention to the “exponential increase in political 
mobilization” around EU issues of citizens, parties and interest groups specializing in 
transnational activities during the years between 1985 and 1995.28  
         In the sphere of politics, in a parallel development, there are grounds to claim that the 
“empowerment of the EU” has coincided with the increased attention paid to issues like 
multiculturalism and migrant integration by national governments and a certain 
“nationalization” of politics in EU member states like Germany and the UK, in the sense of 
more focus on the perceived importance of national identity. Consequently, the EU level 
could no longer be considered as epiphenomenal when it came to debates focused on 
“pressing national issues”, at least from the perspective of nationalist-minded actors. In this 
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regard, a Report of the Group of Eminent Persons of the Council of Europe - from May 2011 
- suggests that a “wave of radical populism” is currently a major feature of the political 
landscape throughout Europe29 and also highlights the increasing role played by the EU 
institutions in provoking such nationalism, e.g. as evidenced by the efforts to develop 
comprehensive strategies when it comes to the treatment of the Roma populations within 
certain EU countries.30 
         The phenomenon of Europeanization is multifaceted and “inter-subjective meanings” 
tend to be attached to it.31 For instance, the term has sometimes been used historically and 
equated with the diffusion of “European culture” through colonialism32 or regarded as 
synonymous with the EU enlargement process33 or with the spread of conflict resolution 
models, associated with the EU’s soft power. However, this thesis will use the term in a 
strictly contemporary fashion and mostly in relation to the impacts of policy processes 
emanating from the EU level.  
         More specifically, a twofold understanding of Europeanization will be employed 
throughout this thesis. On the one hand, drawing on the rational institutionalist approach, 
Europeanization will be conceptualized as the way the domestic impacts of the EU play out in 
terms of redistributing resources among domestic actors.34 In essence, the primary focus will 
be on identifying which actors are empowered due to EU directives, EU changes to party 
structures, and so on, with nationalist-populist stakeholders and their natural opponents – 
ethnoregionalist or minority groups and parties - given special attention. On the other hand, 
by adopting a more normative frame, Europeanization will also be understood as the way in 
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which the EU institutions encourage adherence to EU norms on the part of main national 
actors (e.g. those in government) and how this affects certain concerns that lie close to the 
heart of nationalist-oriented actors.35  
         From a historical standpoint, two rough distinctions could be seen as typifying the study 
of Europeanization processes. The historical institutionalist approach, which is frequently 
adopted in the literature on governance,36 depicts the EU as being dominant over and having 
the capability to dictate to the nation-state.37 Thus, domestic changes in nation-states are 
regarded as responses to adaptive pressures, emanating from the EU level.38 The sociological 
institutionalist approach,39 which in the 1990s was somewhat neglected in the field of 
governance studies,40 places a premium on the examination of the role of “softer” forms of 
EU integration like open coordination methods and benchmarking. Accordingly, it tends to 
downplay the importance of the “hard” and more legalistic EU instruments. The EU is put on 
a more or less equal footing with the nation-states and is described as a moderator or 
facilitator, rather than as a hegemon.41  
 
         In accordance with these approaches, a similar (though not identical) distinction is made 
between the direct and indirect impacts of Europeanization. Europeanization could be rather 
direct if European policies are very prescriptive in their character and urge for the adoption of 
specific measures in order for the national legislation to be in line with the EU requirements. 
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On the other hand, Europeanization could also exhibit rather indirect effects (lack any direct 
institutional impacts) by cognitive reshaping of domestic beliefs and expectations or framing 
mechanisms.42 Dominant domestic advocacy coalitions are sometimes created around EU 
issues and they try to pre-empt European legislation by pressuring national governments to 
make appropriate policy choices.43 The direct impacts of Europeanization are more likely to 
be observed in cases of “positive integration”, for instance environmental protection, health 
and safety work standards, and so on.44 One of the main reasons for that is the need to reduce 
the negative externalities that could affect all members within the Union.45  
         Thus, as elucidated above, for the purposes of this thesis, I will combine both 
approaches and probe the various stakeholders’ perceptions when it comes to both direct and 
indirect impacts of the EU. Europeanization will not be regarded as solely being a top-down 
process - set in motion due to the coercive powers residing in EU structures, but also as a 
bottom-up one – triggered by non-hierarchical EU effects like social learning on the part of 
domestic actors. However, given the broad nature of the topic, I will also draw on other 
theories from outside the EU studies field where appropriate.   
         Another note on my own take on the concept may be in order here. While I 
acknowledge the validity and academic utility of the historical and cultural definitions of 
Europeanization, as outlined above, for the sake of avoiding unnecessary conceptual 
stretching and given my interest in bringing to light the nationalist-populist parties’ appraisals 
of specific contemporary EU policy impacts rather than pondering historical linkages or 
institutional path dependencies, my own definition of Europeanization is modeled the most 
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closely after Olsen’s understanding of the phenomenon as “the central penetration of national 
system of governance”.46 In essence, Europeanization is conceptualized as an ongoing 
process that has explicitly ushered in a sophisticated division of powers (and continues to 
bring about further complexity) between a number of governance levels – local, national and 
supranational – and across policy domains. This definition is consistent with one of my 
principal research interests, which is to account for the exact ways in which the power 
differential between majority and minority groups is perceived to have shifted in accordance 
with specific EU policies on minorities or EU-orchestrated “minority rights regimes”, with 
the nation-state increasingly having been taken out of the equation. In that regard, I treat 
Europeanization as the EU’s gradual supplanting of the role of the nation-state, resulting in 
the blurring of the boundaries between what constitutes “authentic national” and what could 
be labeled as “authentic European” policy. Thus, the dissertation indirectly tests the degree to 
which nationalist-populist members are able to separate “national” and “European” policies 
(and their impacts) within “nationally relevant” fields, and the extent to which this difficulty 
in correctly identifying the generators of policies is in itself a source of frustration for 
populists. As revealed in Chapter Six, the inherent ambiguity as to which actor (the EU or the 
nation-state) is in charge when it comes to the making of policy, is identified by some 
interviewees (e.g. in the German context) as a possible catalyst of minority empowerment 
due to entrenching the perception of a weak nation-state. Another caveat when it comes to my 
own understanding of Europeanization, as implied above, is that I confine it to the realm of 
“high politics” (policy domains that are fundamentally tied to national understandings of 
identity and society and for which populist actors are likely to insist that the nation-state 
remains the sole guardian). As subsequently clarified in Chapter Two, in accordance with this 
aim, I only analyze the transformed playing fields in the case of immigration and citizenship, 
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the durability of national identities in a Pan-European environment and minority 
empowerment. To provide an example of what Europeanization is not (from the standpoint of 
this particular research endeavor), the EU’s transformation of national understandings (on the 
level of the academic community or policy-makers) of what constitutes “best environmental 
practices” is not considered to warrant the label “Europeanization”, as it is not very likely to 
be envisioned as a priority issue area by nationalists and have the potential to inflame public 
opinion, on which nationalist-populist party members could attempt to capitalize.  
         Also, with regard to the multitude of party actors, it is undoubtedly the case that 
Europeanization may have a vastly different connotation – for instance, mainstream parties 
consider a “Europeanized” political grouping to be one which behaves in accordance with 
“European values”, is transparent in terms of its internal decision-making and is politically 
responsible by providing workable policy suggestions, while for the populists a party in 
governance is usually automatically assumed to be “Europeanized” and interested in pursuing 
non-national agendas. Thus, while over the course of the field work, I avoid unequivocally 
referring to the term “Europeanization”, I do tease out some of its manifestations based on the 











2: Europeanization Impacts 
 
         This second section of the chapter looks into the influences emanating from the EU 
level on party and interest group actors, taking account of both institutional and normative 
transformations. The primary interest lies in uncovering the changes ushered in by 
Europeanization from the point of view of stakeholders particularly interested in identity 
issues (promoting the interests of either “core” or “minority” constituents): i.e. the 
nationalist-populist parties and their “opponents”. 
2.1 Europeanization and general influences on political parties 
 
         The effects of the EU on party structures have generally been understudied compared to 
other aspects of Europeanization. The bulk of analyses on this subject matter have emerged 
since the late 1990s. To an extent this is attributable to the “permissive consensus”, seen as 
typifying European integration, as well as the relative weakness of the European Parliament 
or EP (in institutional terms) in previous periods. The term “permissive consensus” is used in 
slightly different ways in the literature, but generally implies the existence of a politically 
passive general public, which has been kept isolated from the EU level developments by the 
national elites.47 I plan to use this term with reference to the CEE countries in the pre-
accession period. The primary EU focus, especially during the first three decades after the 
creation of the European Communities, was on market integration. The EU legal order 
reflected this, as it was chiefly concerned with adjudicating disputes of an economic nature 
between firms.48 Scholars generally cite the Maastricht Treaty as the cut-off point between 
the end of the “permissive consensus” era and the ushering in of the “constraining dissensus” 
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period. The latter is a generic term that captures the increase in trepidations pertaining to 
European integration among national-level actors, including political parties.49 Political 
parties that are in opposition to national governments can feel particularly frustrated by their 
difficulties in influencing decision-making on the EU level. 
         Political parties remain pivotal vehicles for explaining policy processes in the field of 
EU studies. They represent the prime linkage between the institutions of government like the 
European Council, the Council of Ministers and the EP and the national electorate.50 
         As will be further touched upon in following sections of the thesis, political parties are 
different creatures in comparison to interest groups and civil society organizations, and in 
some respects are less influential than the latter vis-à-vis the EU. In Poguntke’s words, 
“national parties do not have direct resources that are generated by the EU and which are 
considered crucial to their existence or core activities”.51 Furthermore, in the case of the EU 
level, interest groups are perceived to have lobby targets that are essentially equivalent to the 
actors they concentrate on at the national level and thus are usually in a position to lobby 
according to the “normal rules of the game”. During the 1990s, a plethora of interest groups 
set up their own offices in Brussels. Despite the rise of lobbying at the EU level, the 
importance of national routes for interest groups has actually been amplified since they 
started to actively engage at the EU level. There are indications that national governments 
have become more responsive to the demands of interest groups. Due to national interest 
groups’ intricate knowledge of the EU environment, they are regarded as valuable 
information-providers about the EU from the perspective of national government staff. In 
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short, national interest groups seeking to influence EU-wide policy decisions are still rather 
likely to direct their attention to national governments – which have access to the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), and governments’ willingness to accommodate 
their concerns has increased.52 
         However, the downside from the perspective of political parties is that for them, unlike 
lobby groups, there is no such natural continuity from the national to the European level and 
they are often forced to switch to another approach in the European context.53 At the EU 
level, political parties are not necessarily as influential as they are in national fora, as in the 
EU they face much stiffer competition. The parties are forced to defend their niche against 
national governments and a multitude of interest groups, as well as the business sector. 
Moreover, the European party groups, which might be expected to provide a common 
platform for like-minded parties to defend common positions, often fail to do so, as they are 
more sharply divided in comparison to their nation-state counterparts due to the different 
national backgrounds of their members and for ideological reasons.  
         Two groups of party actors are gauged to be the most likely to benefit from the process 
of Europeanization of national political parties. Firstly, the “executive bias” of EU decision-
making is seen as reaping dividends for party elites in general. The findings of the 
Europeanization of National Political Parties (ENPP), a three-year research project (2004-
2006) on the EU impacts on national party organization, undertaken by the Keele European 
Parties Research Unit, led to the hypothesis that the privileged position of party elites in 
government vis-à-vis EU decision-making bodies such as the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council, combined with the resources of their national bureaucracy, as well as their 
delegation in the COREPER in Brussels, would translate into greater power (measured as a 
greater autonomy in decision-making and less accountability to the rest of their party). 
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Pridham speaks of the recent creation of a European multiparty elite, which is usually closely 
aligned with party structures on the domestic level.54 Ladrech and Mair identify EU 
influences as having brought about constraints on national policy-making by the limiting of 
policy space available to competing parties, a reduction in the policy instruments at the 
disposal of national governments and a limiting of the policy repertoire.55 Mair cautions that 
the continued Europeanization of the party environment could transform all elections (not just 
the European ones) into second-order contests due to them no longer being likely to be 
regarded as “true national elections”, because of the EU’s pervasive influence over the 
nation-state.56 Pridham advances the argument by drawing attention to the Eastern side of the 
continent and the tendency (during the 1990s) of newly emerged CEE party elites to 
desperately strive for acceptance by transnational party families, and attempt to socialize 
themselves to the EU environment, even if potentially alienating their supporters.57 
Transnational party federations are gauged to have played an especially prominent role in the 
CEE realm in terms of contributing towards programmatic development and campaign 
guidance in addition to ideological shifts.58 In the case of CEE countries, to use Enyedi’s 
formulation, “parties do not simply adapt to the process of European integration: they are part 
of it from the very beginning”59 because the aspiration of joining the EU is seen to have 
predated the actual consolidation of political parties (in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
communist system of governance).60 In essence, the EU membership target brought about a 
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moderation in discourses among CEE parties and contributed to a climate of “permissive 
consensus” surrounding the EU.61 
         In both Western and Eastern Europe, “EU-specialists” (individuals for whom EU affairs 
was their sole or major brief like the Members of the European Parliament or MEPs) have 
also been regarded as beneficiaries of the “greater autonomy/less accountability” equation.62  
         However, despite the further distancing of the party leadership when in government 
from the rest of the party, as outlined above, it appears that intra-party organizational 
dynamics have remained essentially static. ENPP party reviews challenge the assertion that 
the EU has induced an organizational adaptation of any substantial merit. This outcome has 
been attributed to the fact that national parties’ strategic concerns like vote-maximization and 
office-seeking have remained mostly untouched by EU policy debates and struggles.63 The 
impact of the EU on national parties has sometimes been characterized as indirect by 
definition, as the EU is rarely an attractive opportunity structure and parties are not in any 
way legally obliged to interact with the EU institutions or engage in activities at the EU level. 
EU regulations prohibit the transfer of funds to national parties (no matter the source).64 
However, Europe has also inevitably emerged as a new dimension in party competition.65 
         Nonetheless, one might expect that, given their focus on territorial identities and 
minority rights, ethnoregionalist parties (the natural opponents of the nationalist-populists) 
would be more directly touched by Europeanization than other parties. In fact, they have been 
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characterized as the “most actively Europeanized” national parties.66 The next section will 
examine the case of ethnoregionalist parties in particular. 
 
2.2 Europeanization and ethnoregionalist parties 
 
         With the exception of small countries such as Luxemburg or Malta, every European 
state has regionalist parties.67 According to Strmiska (2002), ethno-regionalist parties could 
be viewed as a sub-group of regionalist parties.68 Other types of nationalism could be 
attributable to economic or geographic concerns and not reflect ethnic considerations.69 There 
are many definitions of ethnoregionalist parties, but it can generally be assumed that an 
ethnoregionalist party represents the interests of particular peripheral (often geographically 
concentrated) minorities within a nation-state. Its demands could range from a push for 
outright secession for the region in question to the granting of more rights, e.g. entailing extra 
seats in a National Assembly, financial incentives that could support development projects 
within the region, and so on.70 Some examples of ethnoregionalist parties in Europe today 
include the Südtiroler Volkspartei in Italy (Southern Europe), Plaid Cymru in the UK 
(Western Europe), the Svenska folkpartiet i Finland (Northern Europe),71 and the Romániai 
Magyar Demokrata Szövetség in Romania (CEE).72 Ethno-regionalist parties that are 
considered right-wing and anti-immigrant like the Belgian Vlaams Belang are sometimes 
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regarded as atypical cases and even excluded from analyses.73 The majority of ethno-
regionalist parties fall within the left or centre-left of the political spectrum.74 
         Ethnoregionalist parties are relevant to this thesis because, as already suggested, they 
are arguably rather prominently influenced by Europeanization, and are usually diametrically 
opposed to nationalist-populist parties in terms of their underlying interests in relation to the 
nation-state. The rhetoric of “empowerment” is central to the identity of most such parties75 
and this is likely to attract the wrath of traditional nationalists. Hence they might be expected 
to have certain sympathy with the EU project. 
         Europeanization is commonly held to be quite beneficial for ethnoregionalist parties in 
terms of empowerment opportunities, both in a substantive and normative sense. EU 
programmes are deemed to have reinforced the regions as a relevant decision-making level, 
even in states lacking a tradition of granting regions the opportunity to exercise significant 
competences.76 Moreover, Bartolini has advanced the argument that the EU is gradually 
paving the way for the territorial type of political representation to become more important 
than the nation-wide interest representation one. For instance, having in mind the rise of the 
Euroregions, the theorist maintains that a new form of “subnational territorial competition to 
attract capital and develop resources endogenously” has arisen.77 Neofunctionalists subscribe 
to the same view, as they regard domestic actors like regions or interest groups as gradually 
becoming more successful in circumventing the national government when it comes to EU 
policy-making.78 Thus, Bartolini alludes to the EU being an accomplice to the globalization 
processes, as it is causing the reversal of some of the mechanisms, which were associated 
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with state-building.79 In this regard, the implicit eating away at the foundations of the 
centralized nation-state attributable to the Europeanization dynamics may be regarded as a 
favorable development from the standpoint of subnational or ethnoregionalist party 
adherents.80 
 
         On the empirical level, Lynch’s 1990s research points out that ethnoregionalist parties 
have obtained better results at European elections than at parliamentary elections in their own 
country. The reasons for this could be manifold: like other relatively small parties, 
ethnoregionalist parties benefit from the “second order elections” phenomenon (the tendency 
for less strategic voting on the part of electorates that tends to punish the governments at the 
helm of the country).81 From a purely procedural standpoint, the electoral system in use at the 
European elections is in many cases more advantageous to these types of parties, as the 
electorate of an ethnoregionalist party tends to be territorially strongly concentrated and 
therefore more often controls a relative majority in a number of single-member 
constituencies.82 
 
         In terms of more indirect effects, if one is to assume that the unified nation-state is the 
natural antipode of the ethnoregionalist party and its constituencies, then the weakening of 
the nation-state, which is often ascribed to the processes of Europeanization – as also 
mentioned above, could be deemed a contributing factor to the rise of ethnoregionalist 
activities within countries. The symbolic aspect is frequently emphasized – both 
ethnoregionalism and European integration are seen to concern themselves with the 
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reterritorialization of existing state-based forms of economic, political, and social 
organization, the former maintaining that the regional/sub-state level is the most appropriate 
for territorial organization, while the latter stressing the need for a transfer of competences 
onto the European level.83 
         From a normative perspective, the EU is sometimes depicted as being an intrinsically 
friendlier environment for sub-national groups, as the EU is multicultural and thus lacking a 
single dominant identity.84 In Shore’s terms, pertaining to the European citizenship realm, 
supranational institutions are seen as better-positioned to safeguard the rights of cultural 
minorities and “embody a higher morality as national ones”.85  
         It is also worth pointing out that some of the discourses common within the EU could 
be eagerly co-opted by party officials from ethnoregionalist parties to provide legitimacy for 
their own claims. For instance, ethnoregionalist parties are seen as having the potential to 
capitalize on the broad political commitment to the principle of subsidiarity (which can be 
interpreted as encouraging regional-level governance),86 as engendered by the EU. 
         Nonetheless, a number of arguments have also been raised to contest the assumption 
that enthnoregionalist parties benefit from Europeanization. The EU is sometimes regarded as 
a threat to regional empowerment. European integration, often seen as a vehicle of economic 
globalization, could further peripheralize some marginal regions and reinforce stronger ones. 
In addition, EU competition policy prohibits state subsidies to ailing industrial sectors that are 
located in certain regions.87 European integration could also pose certain political and 
constitutional challenges to the more historical regions within the state. In Whitehead’s 
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conception, the wish to homogenize all European structures may cause countries that possess 
features of asymmetrical federalism (e.g. Spain and Belgium) to change the degree of 
authority allocated to certain regions. Thus, the fact that a standardized concept of 
subsidiarity would be forced upon states could engender disappointment for certain regions 
that are likely to lose their privileged position.88 
         However, the arguments outlined above are not sufficient to cast doubts on the strong 
counter-evidence regarding the beneficial impacts of the EU. As summed up by De Winter: 
“the opportunities for the development of ethnoregionalist parties and the empowerment of 
the ethnoregional populations they represent outweigh the constraints that Europeanization 
poses”.89 An examination of the general sentiments of members of ethnoregionalist parties 
towards the European Union further corroborates this viewpoint. 
 
         There are some divergences between ethnoregionalist parties when it comes to the 
attitudes displayed towards the EU project.  
         Still, according to De Winter, in 1984 the ethno-territorial parties had the most 
unabashedly pro-EU attitudes of any party family. Ray’s data confirms De Winter’s findings 
and analyzes ethnoregionalist attitudes over a longer time frame – his research reveals that 
between 1984 and 1996, the ethnoregionalist party family displayed the greatest degree of 
pro-Europeanness of any party family, averaging 5.82 on a 7-point scale (with “1” 
corresponding to “strongly opposed to the EU” and “7” corresponding to “strongly in favour 
of the EU”). The regionalists were also gauged to be the most homogeneous party family in 
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terms of standard deviations of their EU attitudes.90 More recent studies have confirmed that 
ethnoregionalist parties tend to be consistently pro-EU.91 Analyses of CEE minority and 
ethnoregionalist parties have demonstrated that they are also highly supportive of the EU 
despite being quite diverse ideologically and they are typically more pro-EU than the party 
average for their countries. However, a minor disconnect persists, with party elites being 
more sympathetic to European integration than their actual electorates.92 Some of the 
evidence suggests that ethnic minority parties in CEE countries are more likely to alter their 
behaviour in order to portray themselves as responsive to EU measures (for instance, by 
creating the impression that they do not solely push for minority-specific demands) than their 
counterparts in “old” member states.93 Ethnic parties in the East have been gauged to have 
benefited in both tangible and intangible ways from Europeanization, for instance through 
their enhanced legitimacy due to participating in European Parliament elections and the 
actual funding secured.94 
         Furthermore, some natural barriers when it comes to the potential for solidarity between 
ethnoregionalist parties that are based in “old” (Western European) member states and those 
operating within “new” (CEE) countries exist. A noticeable anti-enlargement slant has been 
part of the political philosophy of some West European ethnoregionalist party visionaries, as 
the territorial expansion of the EU has been associated with a slowing down of the continued 
deepening of the EU, providing an opportunity to the nation-state to return to the forefront 
and again occupy the front stage.95 The EFA has commonly subscribed to such a brand of 
Europessimism, maintaining that the EU would return to being an intergovernmental 
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organization after the 2004 enlargement. It regarded the CEE states as true “nations with a 
state” (nationally homogeneous) and thus the number of countries characterized as 
constituting fertile grounds for ethnoregionalist activities would shrink from 1/3 of the EU 
members (5/15) to 1/5 or even less.96  
 
2.3 The EU and minority rights organizations 
 
         While the main focus of the thesis will be on party stakeholders, a brief account of 
Europeanization dynamics in the case of interest groups with a pro-minority agenda is helpful 
at this point given that non-party actors of that nature are deemed as being likely to display an 
even higher degree of immersion in the EU environment (and are likely to be more dependent 
on EU actors, as elucidated by Poguntke in the introductory passage of this subsection). In 
addition, there is of course a certain commonality in the goals pursued by party and non-party 
actors, which implicitly (or explicitly) claim to be advocates of non-core interests. Some 
would expect that ethnoregionalist parties would regard pro-minority organizations as natural 
allies due to the latters’ similar aims of attaining equality of status with the “core” national 
group. However, it appears that ethnoregionalist factions are often at loggerheads with 
organizations representing the interests of other ethnic minorities, as for example seen in the 
case of Spain.97 
         There are two main schools of though regarding the potential of Europeanization to 
enhance opportunity structures for organizations interested in the protection of minority 
rights. 
         On the one hand, state-centred theorists tend to be skeptical of the role of the European 
level in decision-making affecting minority groups, emphasizing instead the continued 
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importance of the national level when it comes to the making of claims on behalf of such 
organizations. As Geddes succinctly put it: “the organizational behaviour of different 
[minority] ethnic groups is still strongly structured by national political frameworks and/or 
the nature of local opportunities; despite a great deal of talk about new European 
opportunities, there is a clear underinvestment in the European level, or worse, the EU 
remains remote and uninteresting, indeed irrelevant, to these ethnic groups’ self-perceived 
interests”.98 In this regard, Eising advances the claim that European multilevel governance 
possesses a certain “built-in tendency to work to the disadvantage of weaker interests”.99 
Kohler-Koch and Eising also confirm this, noting the presence of a correlation between weak 
domestic access and weak access to European structures, essentially implying that any 
representational deficiencies on the national level also tend to manifest themselves on the 
European level (“obstinacy thesis”).100 
         In addition, theorists like Brubaker tend to prioritize certain aspects pertaining to 
national culture, domestic institutional lock-ins, and so on. For instance, in the case of the 
former, he sees deeply embedded national self-definitions of citizenship as being key in terms 
of shaping responses of nation-states to minority claims and the potential for more egalitarian 
outcomes (frequently contrasting the more civic understanding of France versus the more 
ethnic one of Germany in the 1990s and comparing naturalization rates between the 
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countries).101 In the case of the latter, institutional environments and structural arrangements 
within specific states that are deeply entrenched are regarded as significant by experts that 
emphasize the salience of institutional constraints.102 For example, national constitutions 
“lock-in” certain divisions of powers and these usually persist for many years and cannot be 
easily altered at the whim of a particular statesman or faction. They also set the tone for the 
way in which the EU directives go through the process of implementation.103 Also worth 
mentioning is Andrew Moravcsik’s “gatekeeper notion”, stressing the supremacy of nation-
states in international deliberations and general decision-making, and downplaying the 
importance of entities that operate without the “blessing” of the nation-state.104 
         On the other hand, theorists who subscribe to the post-national view tend to emphasize 
the erosion of the boundaries of the nation-state and lend credence to the notion that a post-
national citizenship, based on universal human rights, as well as transnationalism, has 
emerged, which constitutes a significant outlet for minority claims. In a nutshell, while not 
completely downplaying the role of the state, the post-nationalists see it as having to a large 
extent lost its control over policies pertaining to minorities within its borders. In this vein, in 
Sandholtz’s conception, the benefits of Europeanization for minority organizations and 
similar entities are twofold. First, there is an increase in the number of potential allies, i.e. 
supranational institutions like the EU are conceptualized as potential coalition partners of 
groups representing ethnic and regional minorities, which face frustrations due to a lack of 
responsiveness from local or national governments. Secondly, the emergence of a multitude 
of networks, also dubbed as the “Brussels complex”, essentially entails the creation of 
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various political arenas that centre on the negotiation of common issues.105 All in all, ‘multi-
levelness’, which is seen as typifying the EU, is regarded as conducive to the formation of a 
vast array of interest groups. This is attributable to the understanding that political regulation 
in multilevel systems is more permissive of pronounced inter-regional differences in interest 
group organization (relative to unitary states). In addition, some potential for influencing the 
nation-state is also identified – e.g. there is the possibility of “trickle-down” or “boomerang” 
effects pertaining to national politics whenever an organization successfully engages at the 
supranational level.106 
         As an addendum, the “golden middle” notion is sometimes emphasized when it comes 
to the potential for domestic organizations to make use of Europeanization – essentially, 
national organizations would be ill-advised to be primarily dependent on funding by their 
national governments, as it could compromise their autonomy, but at the same time, if they 
do not receive any government monetary transfers at all, their capacity to carry out their tasks 
could be imperiled.107 
         From a purely normative standpoint, certain effects of Europeanization should not be 
understated. Europeanization (operating through the creation of “European regimes”, centred 
on minority rights and anti-racism, for instance) is seen as encouraging social learning among 
domestic actors (from the national down to the local level).108 In the case of CEE states, an 
impositional understanding of Europeanization through conditionality, because of the CEE 
countries’ inability to influence the acquis communautaire and the requirement that they 
adopt and implement them in full prior to accession, has led to considerable improvements in 
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the situation of national minorities within “new” member states (as some chapters of the 
acquis specifically deal with aspects relevant to minority rights protection).109 However, there 
are a number of caveats – in Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s conception, conditionality is 
seen to be more effective in the case of states with a realistic prospect of full membership.110 
A certain slide-back effect pertaining to compliance has also been observed in the post-
accession stage (once the membership reward was granted).111  
         Overall, it appears as if non-party entities are more explicit in acknowledging and 
giving credit to the EU as a benefactor when it comes to the advancement of their claims.112 
Arguably, ethnoregionalist parties are much less ready to recognize the positive impact of the 
EU and the way it aids their causes.  
 
2.4 The EU and the expansion of minority rights 
 
         While between 1946 and 1989 “minority questions” tended to be neglected in European 
political thought and the great powers generally did not play a decisive role in upholding 
minority rights by exerting pressure on “rogue” states,113 minority-related issues in the 
contemporary world have gained in importance. A. King and B. Schneider utilize the term 
“awakening of minorities” to capture the increased activism on the part of members of 
minority groups since the early 1990s, seen to be an outgrowth of global, regional, military-
strategic and other factors.114 Some of the previous sections have briefly alluded to the EU’s 
impacts on the rights of ethnic and cultural minority groups within nation-states, especially in 
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the case of CEE countries. However, it is essential to take a more thorough look at the precise 
instruments that were at the EU’s disposal during the accession negotiations, the dynamics 
between the different candidate states, the interconnections with other EU issue areas, as well 
as some of the more recent developments within this domain in order to account for the need 
to examine the nationalist-populist actors’ views on the minority situation within certain 
member states through the prism of EU processes.  
         The concept of “minority” is quite difficult to unpack and remains a contested one. For 
instance, national minority groups (e.g. Hungarians in Slovakia) often prioritize gaining a 
degree of autonomy from central government while immigrant minority groups (e.g. Turks in 
Germany) are generally interested in the implementation of measures that would provide 
them with additional opportunities for societal participation.115 In a very broad sense, 
“national minorities” could be conceptualized as ethno-cultural communities that are within 
the same state as one (or more) larger and/or more dominant nations and are rather well-
established.116 Immigrant minority groups lack a long history of cohabitation with members 
of the majority (in terms of longevity of coexistence with “core” groups) and often settle 
within a specific state in accordance with certain immigration policies.117 Sasse and 
Thielemann note that the concept of “ethnic minorities” sometimes encompasses migrant 
groups, for instance in the case of the UK.118 Nonetheless, in contemporary Europe recent 
migrants are often excluded from access to minority rights. 
         “Minority rights” constitute a rather heterogeneous category, but tend to possess two 
features in common: they add to the civil and political rights tied to citizenship (at least in the 
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case of liberal democracies) and they serve the purpose of providing the conditions for the 
accommodation and recognition of distinctive identities and needs of minority groups.119 
Socio-economic rights of minorities are sometimes closely tied to the privileges emanating 
from national citizenship, but could be quite expansive and include rights to subsidized 
housing or eligibility for civil service occupations.120 Cultural and symbolic rights are no less 
fundamental from the standpoint of minority groups. They could be multifaceted and include 
aspects like exemptions from laws that are unduly burdensome, because they conflict with 
cultural practices and special provisions for their better representation within institutions of 
government.121 
 
         Throughout much of its existence, the EU has preferred to display support for “human” 
as opposed to “minority” rights, though this philosophy has been rapidly changing since the 
early 1990s. One of the stated functions of European integration is the modernization of those 
aspects of societies, where reforms are difficult to implement, in part because of certain 
entrenched positions on issues like human rights.122 Human (and by extension minority 
rights) are sometimes depicted as “elite interests”. In this regard, the EU is characterized as 
an organization that is not too exposed to popular fears and concerns and is accordingly seen 
as possessing more room to maneuver than member states when it comes to improving the 
plight of minority groups.123  
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         As for the actual EU mechanisms for triggering changes with regard to minorities in the 
member states’ legal provisions, they tend to be varied, but also not always sufficiently clear 
or consistent with each other. 
         It is contested whether the EU foundational principles, as provided in Article 6 of the 
TEU, actually include respect for and protection of minorities. Article 6 (1) makes a reference 
to the principles of "liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
and the rule of law...”, but it is arguable whether minority rights could be subsumed under the 
heading “human rights and fundamental freedoms”.124Article 6 (2) of the TEU provides that: 
"[t]he Union shall respect fundamental rights”, as guaranteed by the European Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), Article 14 of which 
refers to the principle of non-discrimination based on an “association with a national 
minority”. However, the emphasis on the national constitutional traditions of member states 
as a point of reference when it comes to upholding human rights (like those pertaining to 
minorities) is at times seen as casting a shadow on the preeminence of supranational legal 
principles.125 
         In a legal sense, it has been suggested that Article 13 of the EC Treaty could be drawn 
upon by the Council in situations necessitating the adoption of measures protecting persons 
belonging to national minorities against discrimination.126 In addition, Article 151 of the 
consolidated version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community stresses the 
importance of protecting regional and national diversity, including the preservation of 
minority cultures.127 
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         Some theorists regard the EU’s treatment of minority issues as generally having 
progressed in a linear fashion. During the first phase (encompassing the period between the 
1960s and 1990s) minority questions were essentially a non-issue on the EU’s radar. For 
example, the EEC (European Economic Community)-Turkey (1963), EEC-Malta (1970) and 
EEC-Cyprus (1972) Association Agreements, as well as those with Hungary and Poland 
(1991) did not include any references to minority protection.128 During the second phase (in 
the aftermath of the 1993 Copenhagen summit) minority issues were referred to in a general 
fashion by the EU. For instance, the European Association Agreements between the EU and 
Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (1993) included a general insistence to 
“respect human rights, including those of minorities”.129 In a joint declaration with the US in 
1991, EU member states affirmed that one of the principal obstacles to the attainment of 
democracy and a high level of economic development in Eastern Europe was “dealing with 
ethnic diversity and the rights of persons belonging to national minorities”.130 References to 
the plight of minority groups became more specific after 1995, following the signing of the 
Association Agreements between the EU and the Baltic states. The EU began to pressure 
these countries for the adoption of concrete measures (e.g. the provision of school instruction 
for Russian pupils in their own language).131 
         The increased focus on minority issues by the EU since the early 1990s has been 
primarily attributed to its concern regarding the impact of minority issues on the international 
security and stability of the CEE region (and by extension the Western European countries as 
well).132 In particular, the crisis in Yugoslavia may have contributed to the fostering of 
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linkages between minority protection and the EU’s external policies striving for “conflict 
prevention”.133 In 1991, the then EU member states founded the Badinter Commission, with 
the aim of providing expert advice regarding some of the legal queries arising out of the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia, an outgrowth of which was the “Declaration on the Guidelines on 
Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union”. This declaration 
included a number of provisions pertaining to the fair treatment of minorities, essentially 
elevating “minority protection” to one of the preconditions for the recognition of 
statehood.134 The Stability Pact project, pioneered by France in 1993 and largely operating 
within the auspices of the EU, encouraged EU member states to craft bilateral agreements, 
addressing border and minority issues.135 However, while it helped raise the profile of 
minority issues and led to the signing of a number of bilateral treaties, it did not deliver many 
measurable results, primarily due to the absence of control and punitive mechanisms, and a 
lack of specific deadlines, as well as the paucity of financial support.136 
         As stipulated in the previous sections, in the run-up to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, 
the EU encouraged member states to conclude bilateral agreements between themselves, 
notably to guarantee minority rights. The Copenhagen political criteria made a clear 
distinction between human rights and the respect for and protection of minorities.137 The EU 
also pressed CEE countries to review their internal policies regarding their minorities. With 
the beginning of official negotiations, the EU Commission started releasing regular reports 
(initially named Progress Reports and later referred to as Regular Reports) to analyze the 
extent to which the reforms implemented were in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria.  
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The first of these reports were distributed in 1998 and specifically mentioned minorities.138 
The EU accession conditionality has been credited as “undoubtedly having played a positive 
role” in relation to the status of minority groups in CEE countries.139 Mahler and Toivanen 
point out that there was a new willingness on the part of key political actors in candidate 
countries to “forcefully speak in favor of minority rights” in order not to negatively affect the 
membership prospects for their countries.140 Melanie Ram also distinguishes between the 
degrees of difficulty when it came to kick-starting reforms in countries lacking the prospect 
of membership and those with the status of candidate states, with the latter progressing much 
more rapidly.141 In the case of Romania, Ram identifies a link between the increased 
protection of minority rights and the gradual turn towards a multicultural society.142 The 2003 
Comprehensive Monitoring Reports on the 10 candidate countries’ preparations for 
membership touched upon discrimination in employment and social isolation affecting 
minorities. This is regarded as a paradigm shift, as the implication was that protection of 
minorities was no longer solely a political criterion, but was also tied to membership 
obligations like certain standards in employment and social policies.143 
 
         The requirement of respect for and protection of minorities has been quite prominent in 
the EU accession conditionality, but the EU’s capacity to monitor it internally (especially in 
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the post-accession phase) has frequently been called into question.144 EU membership results 
in a relaxation of the pressure to ensure respect for and protection of minorities in general and 
also leads to more lax assessments of the degree to which the standards of the European 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities are observed.145 A related 
issue stems from the likelihood that a country’s minority policies could actually turn out to be 
on a collision course with certain EU norms. For example, successful policies enhancing the 
status of minorities may have to be based on the notion of affirmative action, which could 
conflict with the EU non-discrimination principle or a number of freedoms underpinning the 
internal market.146 
         Another downside is attributable to the lack of consistency with regard to the 
overarching minority standards applicable to CEE candidate countries.147 In the pre-accession 
phase, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities served as an 
important guiding principle for signatory states in this realm, but in practice it provided them 
with a lot of leeway in terms of determining what their “national minorities” were.148 For 
instance, Slovenia afforded national minority status to Italians, Hungarians and Roma people 
within its borders, but refrained from extending the same privilege to the more numerous 
communities of Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats. In Hughes and Sasse’s terms: “At best EU 
conditionality made minority protection a salient issue in the political agenda of the [Central 
and East European countries], but the fact that the EU had little to offer in terms of clarifying 
the issue, substantive measures and policy practice, allowed historical domestic precedents to 
                                                 
144
 Hillion, Christophe. Enlargement of the European Union – the Discrepancy between Membership 
Obligations and Accession Conditions as regards the protection of minorities (2003), p. 740. 
145
 Hillion, Christophe. The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and the European 
Union” (2008), p. 13. 
146
 Ibid, p. 14. 
147
 Johnson, Carter. The Use and Abuse of Minority Rights: Assessing Past and Future EU Policies towards 
Accession Countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (2006), p. 29. 
148
 Ibid, p. 32. 
 76 
resurface.”149 The same applied to some “old” member states - up until at least the mid 2000s, 
Germany recognized Danish and Sinti people as minorities and denied the same status to 
those from Turkish and Polish descent.150          
         Moreover, while minority issues were a significant item on the agenda when it came to 
the membership negotiations with CEE states, during the same period the EU abstained from 
providing a similar emphasis for its existing members. For instance, the Amsterdam Treaty 
illustrates the differences with regard to the minority-related burdens imposed on “new” and 
“old” member countries. It transposed each of the conditions contained in the Copenhagen 
Criteria into EU primary law - with the sole exception of the minority protection condition.151 
European NGOs concerning themselves with minority issues have lambasted what they deem 
as the hypocrisy of the EU in this particular domain. Concern for minorities is primarily 
gauged to be “an export article rather than one for domestic consumption”.152 
         Furthermore, the issue of supposed double standards in relation to the EU’s treatment of 
minority issues has not been absent from the debates focused on comparing the different 
candidate countries. Schwellnus describes minority protection conditionality as exhibiting 
significant divergences across accession countries. He distinguishes between two main 
camps. The first one included Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. The EU 
requirements pertaining to these countries have been viewed as all encompassing, with the 
Commission advocating the wide inclusion of minorities in all spheres of life as well as 
cultural autonomy on certain occasions.153 The second camp consisted of Latvia and Estonia. 
In addition to what has been regarded as “toleration of established discrimination” in these 
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two states, the Commission has been gauged to have been much more attentive to reports 
produced by international organizations (like OSCE) when assessing the minority situation 
within these countries.154 Specifically, when referring to the Magyar minority living in 
Slovakia and Romania, the Commission utilized the term “Hungarian minority”, while when 
focusing on the minority groups in Estonia and Latvia the preferred term was “Russian–
speaking minority”.155 The latter designation has been interpreted as being narrower in its 
meaning, essentially only recognizing Russians in these states as “linguistic” (rather than 
ethnic) minorities.156 In short, when it came to these constellations of countries the EU 
adopted different structural approaches, emphasized divergent standards in relation to the 
linkages between citizenship and minority status and did not describe minority self-
government in a uniform way.157 
         During the course of accession negotiations, geopolitical aspects also appear to have at 
times been dominant over normative ones. By early 2000, despite the existence of 
discriminatory legislation within Estonia and Latvia, a significant improvement of relations 
between Russia and these states had occurred, which allowed the EU to proceed with the 
membership negotiations. “Once [international] stability had been achieved, the importance 
of minority protection became secondary.”158 In addition, the attention directed by the EU at 
the plight of certain minorities has been regarded as disproportionate relative to the lack of 
emphasis on similarly disadvantaged groups. For instance, concerns over future Roma 
migration from CEE states to Western European countries have been deemed as significant 
triggers for the EU officials’ preoccupation with Roma issues in the Regular Reports.159 
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         From a normative standpoint, the scant attention paid to minority issues when it came to 
the drafting of the unratified Constitutional Treaty (with political figures like Peter Baltzs, a 
Hungarian member of the European Convention, being among the few who insisted on the 
inclusion of references to minorities in Articles 1 and 2 of the Draft Treaty) has been 
interpreted by some scholars as evidence of the EU’s reluctance to recognize “minority 
protection” as a core value of the Union.160  
         Nonetheless, the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009 has 
continued the trend towards the recognition of minority protection as one of the overarching 
principles of the EU and has contributed to the mainstreaming of minority rights in EU 
law.161Article 2 of Title I (Common Provisions) defines respect of the rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities as one of the values of the EU.162 The EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights has become a legally binding document (Article 6.1). Thus, its 
provisions dealing with discrimination on the basis of one’s membership in a minority group 
are now obligatory for all member states and could actually be enforced.163 The Lisbon 
Treaty has arguably bridged the gap between EU internal minority policy and pre-accession 
conditionality, reducing the likelihood of a setback in reforms in this field once membership 
is attained by a candidate state.164  
 
         This brief overview sets the stage for determining how the dynamics arising out of EU 
policies in the realm of minorities (some of them significantly improving their plight and/or 
imposing different burdens on member states) play out into the rhetoric of nationalist-populist 
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actors in East and West. The impacts of the EU on the situation of minorities within “new” 
member states may at times be ambiguous, but the EU is certainly acknowledged as an entity 
that takes such matters seriously and decisively shapes some of the norms in this realm. At 
the same time the inconsistencies associated with EU policies in this field (due to geopolitical 
factors and the different views of member states – some like Belgium and the Netherlands 
were interested in controlled accession of the CEE countries and focused on practical matters 
when it came to conditionality, while others like Finland and Austria subscribed to “legal and 
historical justice” interpretations as a guiding principles in their dealings with “new” member 
countries)165 are bound to cause indignation among political actors with nationalist clout who 
feel that their countries have been subjected to the imposition of a vast array of new rules. 
The minority rights framework, which is part of the Copenhagen Criteria, is of course a key 
feature of the EU enlargement. In the aftermath of the CEE countries’ accession to the Union 
in 2004, theorists like Hillion have started to draw attention to the emergence of a new form 
of “nationalization” of EU enlargement policy. Member states are seen to have become less 
scrupulous in making use of EU enlargement for their own domestic political processes.166 
The extent to which this prevailing climate could discredit EU policies related to enlargement 
and cause nationalist parties in CEE and Western European states to rediscover past 
grievances pertaining to the enlargement dynamics (and particularly to the minority measures 
“imposed” by the EU) needs to be further scrutinized. What is undoubtedly the case is that 
the EU has become another key international actor when it comes to advancing both socio-
econonomic and cultural/symbolic minority righs, in a substantive and normative sense. 
 
         Accordingly, such transformations engendered by the EU are likely to create concerns 
among nationalist-populist party members. People belonging to a majority group are quite 
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likely to be opposed to the granting of minority rights because they regard them as negatively 
affecting their own privileges and the power that they hold. A 2002 study of 13 countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (conducted by Evans and Need) confirms the perhaps intuitive 
supposition that members of minority groups are much more likely to be supportive of the 
extension of minority rights than those belonging to the majority.167 Vermeulen and Slijper 
(2003) maintain that there are three principal arguments that are raised in the context of 
minority rights debates and discussions of multiculturalism. These arguments center around 
the benefits associated with cultural diversity, the need for the existence of social equality 
and equal opportunities as well as the maintenance of state cohesion and unity.168 As 
nationalist-populist actors who belong to majority groups are likely to see cultural diversity in 
negative terms, they are also inclined to regard the extension of minority rights as 
undesirable.169 From the standpoint of nationalist actors, cultural diversity and the existence 
of group rights are bound to create new identity-related issues, increase the chances that 
conflicts could arise, reduce social cohesion, and weaken the unity within a society.170            
 
         Minority rights are also sometimes considered difficult to reconcile with democracy. 
For instance, theorists like Kymlicka who are generally sympathetic to the plight of 
minorities refuse to endorse special rights for groups that voluntarily immigrate to a 
country.171 Thus, the perception of the EU as another unwelcome layer that compromises the 
principles of democracy due to not allowing the nation-state to be fully in charge of 
immigration policy may be particularly strong when it comes to minority rights as well.  
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         As argued in the previous sections of the thesis, the political conditionality and the CEE 
countries’ lack of sustained traditions of enhancing minority rights due to the legacies of 
totalitarian regimes are some of the reasons to adopt the hypothesis that “EU minority 
empowerment” would be deemed more significant by nationalist-populist actors in countries 
that were newcomers to the EU family.  
 
         Marc Weller (2008) made an observation along those lines soon after Romania and 
Bulgaria joined the European Union. His contention is that within the recent EU members 
from CEE, the crunch issue is the existence of “a fear that minority representative groups 
might deploy the rights granted to them in order to mount a destabilizing political campaign 
against the central state. This might lead to demands for territorial autonomy, or perhaps even 
secession….”.172 In addition, Weller points out that political matters surrounding minorities 
are especially volatile due to the absence of predictability, as there is “still no coherent 
minorities policy within the EU and minority issues remain intensely controversial”.173 
 
         When it comes to particular minority populations within CEE countries like the Roma 
people, the consensus is that they have generally drawn benefits due to the greater focus on 
minorities.174 In Peter Vermeersch and Melanie H. Ram’s estimation, “the majority of 
activists lobbying for Roma rights would wholeheartedly agree that the Roma would not have 
emerged on the agenda of the Central and East European countries had their situation not 
been brought up as an important issue by the EU.”175 Maria Spirova and Darlene Budd (2008) 
identify the Roma-specific policies originating from European Commission proposals as 
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significant contributory factors towards the reduction of the disparities between Roma groups 
and members of the majority populations in countries like Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria and Romania.176  
 
         There have also been a number of cases in which the imposed isolation of nationalist-
populist parties attributable to EU-level functionaries has in indirect ways bolstered the 
situation of minorities and their helper organizations. One less well-known fall-out from the 
Haider controversy in Austria (in relation to EU pressure on the governing coalition of the 
country) concerned the entrance into politics of the Islamic Faith Community in Austria in 
2000. This organization, which is today an influential player when it comes to the promotion 
of Muslim minority rights, managed to use the “strategic window” (during which a delegation 
of EU experts or three-man Commission were sent to Austria) to stake a claim for 
establishing itself as an important entity within Austrian society.177 
 
         Thus, issues pertaining to minority rights tend to be combustible and interact with 
nationalist-populist concerns regarding perceived democratic deficit problems emanating 
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3: General Dimensions and Causes of Euroscepticism 
 
         The previous subsection was mainly focused on the nature of EU-engendered 
transformations and the corresponding strategies adopted by parties and interest groups, while 
relegating the examination of actual changes in attitudes, introduced by the EU dynamics, to 
the backstage. Accordingly, this subsection will attempt to fill this gap by scrutinizing the 
determinants of Eurosceptic attitudes, and providing some insights into the degrees to which 
they could be attributable to Europeanization dynamics. 
 
         As outlined previously, Euroscepticism continues to be as relevant as ever. Hartleb, in a 
2012 article, cautions that the European project has recently “reached a critical point” and 
draws attention to the spread of a “new Euroscepticism”, which is not solely attributable to 
the effects of the 2008 financial crisis.178 Some of the ominous signs that Euroscepticism is to 
remain a salient feature of the European political landscape were already in the picture in 
2006 when slightly less than half of EU citizens (according to a Europabarometer surveys) 
expressed approval for their country’s membership in the Union.179 Right-wing Eurosceptic 
factions were in the spotlight during the 2009 EP elections, with the PVV amassing 17 % of 
the vote in its debut appearance in European elections and three Eurosceptic parties in Austria 
(the Freedom Party, the Alliance for the Future of Austria and “Dr. Martin’s list”) together 
surpassing the share of the votes gained by the two governing parties.180 The same 
phenomena have not been absent in the Nordic countries as well, with the True Finns 
receiving 20 % of the voters’ share in the April 2011 Finnish Parliamentary elections. Finland 
is one example of a country in which the nature of debates on the European Union has rapidly 
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moved from the “non-controversial” to the “highly contested” box.181 Since 2010, right-wing 
populist parties have seen representation in all the national parliaments of the Nordic 
countries and “isolation strategies” directed at such parties have not always been deemed 
politically viable by the more mainstream ones.182  
 
3.1 Euroscepticism – evolution and dimensions of the term 
 
         The term Euroscepticism is relatively recent to the field of European studies. It was 
coined in the 1980s by the British media, attempting to capture the essence of the adversarial 
relationship between the Margaret Thatcher government and the European Commission, 
which plagued this period.183 However, as early as the 1960s, British Labour leaders like 
Hugh Gaitskell and James Callaghan adopted positions that from the contemporary 
standpoint could be deemed to warrant the Eurosceptic label, although the meaning attached 
to this notion was arguably different at the time (with a lesser emphasis on the EU as an 
institutional structure) and thus the use of the concept to refer to the attitudes espoused in the 
early yeas of the EU project has sometimes been characterized as anachronistic.184 
         In terms of the main reasons for the neglect of the Euroscepticism phenomenon in early 
scholarship pertaining to the EU, one could point out to some of the gaps inherent in a 
number of the traditional European integration theories that were influential during the 
pioneering phase of European integration and shaped the “permissive consensus” climate. For 
instance, adherents of neo-functionalism tended to downplay the importance of public 
attitudes towards the EU, while those within the federalist camp were inclined to view mass 
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public support for the EU (and respectively the political parties’ benevolence towards the EU 
project) as a given.185 
         As for the underlying nature of Euroscepticism, the term does not easily render itself to 
any clear-cut definitions. A distinction is often drawn between “hard” Euroscepticism 
(unyielding, almost non-negotiable opposition to the essence of the EU project itself) vs. 
“soft” Euroscepticism (opposition and distrust of specific EU measures, the current direction 
in which the EU is heading, etc.) Szczerbiak and Taggart are seen as the pioneers when it 
came to this categorization. However, there is arguably not so much a dichotomy, as a 
continuum. Parties that could be considered to be exhibiting “hard” Euroscepticism are 
sometimes expediently reclassified and given“soft” Eurosceptic labels depending on the 
national context, the degree to which the EU feels like sending a warning to a country, and so 
on.186 Alternatively, Kopecký and Mudde develop a four-fold typology. The Euroenthusiasts, 
who support both the ideas of European integration and the general practice of integration, 
and the “Eurorejects”, who do not accept either, represent the two extremes. Occupying the 
middle ground are the“Eurosceptics”, who support the idea of a united Europe, but disagree 
with the general practice of integration, and “Europragmatists”, who tend to be against the 
idea of the EU, but may support some practices of European integration.187 This typology is 
based on the distinction made between diffuse and specific support for European integration, 
with the former regarded as concerning itself with the ideas behind European integration, 
while the latter perceived as focusing on the actual practices connected to European 
integration.188 
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         It is also worth pointing out that there has been a certain negative connotation attached 
to the term “Euroscepticism”, perhaps to an even greater extent in the CEE context relative to 
the Northern and Western European (NWE) one. The pro-European stance of political parties 
in the “new” EU member and candidate states is thought to have assumed the status of a 
normative theme – a general rule that inevitably affects the behaviour of political actors. 
Crossing certain boundaries by virulently criticizing the EU was regarded as having the 
potential of imperilling their prospects of being perceived as “normal” political actors (at 
least in the pre-accession phase).189 In CEE states, attaining EU membership was regarded as 
vital for the promotion of national development and semblances of “national assertiveness” 
only started to be displayed by mainstream parties during the final stages of the EU accession 
negotiations.190 There was perceived to be a natural fit between the economic policies 
advocated by the CEE reformers and the requirements surrounding the granting of EU 
accession.191 In addition, even ambiguous pronouncements regarding the desirability of EU 
membership tended to carry a negative connotation in the early years after communist rule, as 
they were seen as indicating allegiance to the communist political system and the Soviet-type 
structures.192As a counterstrategy, certain factions like the Movement for the Reconstruction 
of Poland (ROP) strove to evade the “Eurosceptic” label, instead proclaiming themselves to 
be occupying a “pragmatically Eurorealist” or simply “Eurorealist” niche. In essence, the 
“yes, but..” or “conditional Euroscepticism” is frequently perceived to be the strategy that 
could be safely embarked upon by party actors in order not to face undue isolation from the 
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political game.193 It was only after 1998, however, that the strong symbolic dimension to EU 
membership started to wear off and Eurorealism began to creep in.194 
         All in all, Euroscepticism remains a slippery concept, as there are many gradations to 
the feelings of distrust of and opposition towards the EU project and in addition national 
contexts are bound to influence the degree to which a particular faction is conceptualized as 
having the markings of a Eurosceptic. 
         Gary Goertz also provides a helpful definition of Euroscepticism in terms of setting 
certain temporal boundaries for the concept. Although Euroscepticism is sometimes used 
broadly and equated with all expressions of opposition to or distrust towards the EU project, 
Goertz emphasizes the need for a degree of durability in the attitudes/sentiments towards the 
EU as a whole (or towards key policy areas and developments, associated with the EU 
project). Essentially, Euroscepticism is not to be regarded as a fleeting phenomenon and 
spontaneous anti-EU declarations. Very issue-specific complaints (that do not touch upon 
core domains of the EU) are not to be automatically tarred with the Eurosceptic brush.195 
         At the secondary level, Goertz identifies a certain multidimensionality as typifying 
Euroscepticism, distinguishing between four broad constitutive domains. Ideological 
Euroscepticism is tied to evaluations of European cooperation that are based on underlying 
values, for example the distinction between the post-materialists and materialists, developed 
by Inglehart, with the former being identified as possessing a greater capacity to identify with 
a more abstract project, transcending the nation-state, like the EU.196 Similarly, differences in 
party ideologies, based on their position within the left-right political spectrum, could be 
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important to take into account. Secondly, the utilitarian strand of Euroscepticism involves 
making judgments on the EU on the basis of the degree to which economic goals have been 
perceived to be attained. The often vociferous debates pertaining to the perceived democratic 
deficit of the EU could also be subsumed under the scope of this understanding of 
Euroscepticism.197 For example, Peter Mair (2007) concerns himself primarily with 
democratic legitimacy issues relevant in the context of the EU, as evinced by the insufficient 
powers afforded to the members of the EP.198 The third strand is represented by sovereignty-
based Euroscepticism and it reflects trepidations that nation-state sovereignty is being 
destroyed and national identities are being weakened. Essentially, the nation-state itself is 
viewed as a sui generis entity that is worth preserving and it is believed that the affective 
support projected for it could not be replicated at the EU level. The last subset is dubbed 
“principled Euroscepticism” and could be seen as corresponding to the “hard 
Euroscepticism” box, as described by Szczerbiak and Taggart, essentially entailing the 
rejection of the very idea of the EU and likely of similar supranational projects.199 
         Alternatively, there is the option of studying Euroscepticism by drawing on different 
levels of analysis – the citizen (micro), the discourse (macro), and the party level 
(intermediate).  
         On the one hand, there have been attempts to gauge citizens’ attitudes towards the EU 
project (with these not necessarily overlapping with any party or faction affiliation), for 
instance with the aid of Eurobarometer surveys. Haesly (2001), for example, has supported 
the notion of the UK falling within the box of the “most Eurosceptic countries” and also 
drawn attention to the divergence in the degree of Euroscepticism exhibited by the English 
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(approaching the higher values) and the Scots and Welsh (closer to the lower values).200All in 
all, factors like age, education, and other demographic characteristics, are generally taken into 
consideration when it comes to discussions of Euroscepticism at the level of citizens.201 On 
both sides of the continent, members of lower social strata are more likely to express 
Eurosceptic sentiments, while the opposite tends to apply to people who are better educated 
and have high calibre jobs, reaping dividends from the free movement of people and 
goods.202 Furthermore, non-urban cohorts like farmers who are quite reliant on EU subsidies 
tend to be more Eurosceptic than their urban counterparts.203 Younger people are also likely 
to be more well-disposed towards the EU than older ones.204  
         Measuring the relative saliency of identity vs. economic factors is also deemed as 
important when it comes to citizens. For instance, Hooghe’s and Marks’ research stresses the 
preponderance of identity concerns over economic ones in terms of the extent to which they 
could account for Eurosceptic feelings. In this regard, exclusive feelings of national identity 
or nationalist orientations that reject any semblances of double loyalties are seen as being 
positively correlated with a higher degree of Euroscepticism.205 However, Grabbe and 
Hughes have pointed out that overemphasis on economic aspects as the reason to join the EU 
has also been regarded as constituting a stumbling block to support for further integration. 
Countries like the UK, Sweden and Denmark that are assumed to have joined the EU chiefly 
for reasons connected to the reaping of economic dividends have been judged to have 
experienced higher long-term Euroscepticism than those states in which political reasons 
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played the predominant role.206 By contrast, states that are regarded as having primarily 
benefited due to the EU’s efforts directed at the promotion of democracy, in addition to the 
encouragement of economic growth (like Spain, Portugal and Ireland) have been discovered 
to be much more effective when it comes to relegating fears pertaining to national identity 
losses to the backstage – essentially, citizens are no less conscious of the potential national 
identity threats engendered by the EU project, but are nonetheless more likely to 
overwhelmingly support their country’s membership in the club in comparison to states like 
the UK. This is due to the perception of EU-created utilities in the political as well as the 
economic realm.  
         The symbolic threat posed by minorities and immigrants is likely to influence support 
for EU integration in a negative fashion. Some studies suggest that symbolic threat (ethno-
cultural indicator) tends to be a much more robust predictor of hostility to integration than 
perceived threat to group resources (economic or utilitarian indicator).207 This issue is 
discussed in more detail below. 
          In addition, citizens’ attitudes towards the EU have evolved over the last decades, 
testifying to the dynamic nature of this research field. As already suggested, Euroscepticism 
has increased in recent years, but research in the 1990s indicated that Euroscepticism was on 
the decline. For instance, Citrin and Sides’ studies revealed that a 10 percentage point 
increase in the dual attachment of citizens (likelihood to identify with both their respective 
nation and the EU) characterized the period between 1991 and 1999, which naturally also 
resulted in a corresponding decrease in the saliency of exclusive national identity 
conceptions.208 
                                                 
206
 Henderson, Karen. Exceptionalism or Convergence? Euroscepticism and Party Systems in Central and 
Eastern Europe (2002), p. 111 (citing Heather Grabbe and Kirsty Hughes. Central and East European views on 
EU Enlargement: Political Debates and Public Opinion, 1999, p. 190). 
207
 McLaren, Lauren M. Identity, Interests and Attitudes to European Integration (2006), pp. 146-147. 
208
 Citrin, Jack and John Cides. Can Europe exist without Europeans? Problems of Identity in a Multinational 
Community (2004), pp. 52-53. 
 91 
         Looking at discourses is another approach towards measuring Euroscepticism, and 
attitudes towards the EU project more widely. The discourse perspective on Euroscepticism 
focuses on the way certain narratives pertaining to the EU are crafted within national contexts 
and thus feed into the parties’ and general public’s discourses on the EU, potentially 
intensifying or reducing Eurosceptic sentiments. There is a tendency to see certain narratives 
as deliberately constructed, frequently with the EU in mind, as in the case of the mass media. 
However, such conceptions of history could also be a result of implicit undercurrents and 
natural developments and not involve any stakeholders belonging to academic or media 
communities.  
         Díez Medrano’s (2003) landmark study, focusing on Western Europe, is an exercise in 
contrasts between Germany, Spain, and the UK when it comes to the ways in which debates 
about the EU are conducted. For example, the author confirms that the redemption theme - 
given the WWII historical antecedents - is still rather relevant in Germany and that it 
structures debates on the EU, often laying the groundwork for a relatively sympathetic 
portrayal of the EU. By contrast, in the UK there is frequently a marked emphasis on the 
perceived bellicose nature of the EU, as revealed by the language invoked by the UK at 
different EU summits (e.g. the propensity to utilize words like “invasion” when debating EU 
legislation).209 In any case, nationalist stakeholders will try to paint themselves as embodying 
certain notable struggles of their national community and as following in the footsteps of 
influential historical predecessors. 
         
         Another agent influential in the creation of certain national discourses potentially 
detrimental to EU-permissive attitudes is the community of historians, with the UK being a 
vivid example in this regard. For instance, historians like Arthur Bryant, who also actively 
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lobbied against a “yes” vote in the 1975 EU referendum, and George Trevelyan have been 
accused of overemphasizing British exceptionalism, essentially driving a wedge between the 
EU and the UK by stressing British uniqueness and its need to seek its own destiny outside of 
the confines of the EU.210  
         The discourse perspective on Euroscepticism could be helpful in terms of being able to 
predict future national trajectories when it comes to the notion of Euroscepticism. For 
instance, it is often assumed that in countries like Denmark, where military neutrality is 
conceptualized as one of the hallmarks of the country’s national identity, any EU steps in the 
direction of enhanced military cooperation could provide fertile grounds for an increase in 
Eurosceptic sentiments.211 The discourse perspective pertaining to Euroscepticism also offers 
some insights into the CEE context, although of a different nature. In the CEECs, pro-EU 
attitudes are often seen as attributable to the underlying assumption that the process of 
acquiring EU membership represents a return to the position the state would have been in if it 
had not been under communist yoke. Thus, the EU’s conditions are not viewed as the 
external imposition of alien norms, but as a desirable return to a natural state. On the flip side 
of the coin, opposition to EU membership is most expressed by those who believe that their 
country would have undergone a markedly different process of development from Western 
Europe if it had been able to chart its own political course since the early 1950s.212  
         Furthermore, De Vreese and Semetko’s studies (2002) have revealed that exposure to 
news media reporting strategically about the Danish 2000 referendum on the EMU 
contributed to an increase in citizens’ levels of cynicism, which triggered more potent forms 
of Euroscepticism. In short, the media landscape and the conventions of reporting on EU 
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affairs, shaped by the underlying national motifs, could go to some lengths in explaining the 
emergence and/or strengthening of Eurosceptic views.213  
         In addition, Anderson (1998) stipulates that the phenomenon of proxy-based 
Euroscepticism (projecting feelings towards domestic institutions like national parliaments 
and governments towards the EU) is very real, especially when there is a paucity of specific 
knowledge pertaining to the general functioning of EU institutions.214 The research regarding 
the cueing effect of national institutions when it comes to expressed attitudes towards 
supranational ones remains somewhat contradictory, though some additional evidence exists 
that a low level of trust in national political institutions is associated with increased support 
for the European Union. For instance, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) and Sanders et al. (2013) refer 
to the “substitution effect”: EU institutions are assumed likely to successfully perform a 
replacement function due to the weakness or ineffectiveness of national institutions.215 
Kitzinger (2003) also confirms that some semblance of such a “substitution effect” exists, but 
cautions against overemphasizing the connections between trust in the national institutions 
and support for the EU as a whole. Instrumental considerations may also cause citizens to be 
hesitant to display support for the EU project, as this could be misinterpreted as approval of 
the inadequately performing national government and only serve to legitimize it.216  
         One particular element of “bad governance” – corruption – has been characterized as a 
“highly salient” issue in “new” EU member states and the argument has been advanced that 
in the minds of many [CEE] citizens this leads to a lesser likelihood to regard the erosion of 
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national sovereignty as a significant risk (and thus causes them to be more receptive towards 
EU institutions).217 What is relevant to the previously outlined notion of “national discourses” 
is to consider that in certain countries cynicism towards the effectiveness of domestic 
institutions like parliaments and governments is deeply ingrained and has long-term historical 
antecedents. In Bulgaria, to take one example, proxy-based Euroscepticism (attaching blame 
for the ineffective performance of the national government to the EU structures) is arguably 
not as prominent a phenomenon as in other CEE states, as there is a lesser likelihood of 
seeing “national” and “supranational” institutions as similar with regard to the way they are 
constructed. The cynicism and distrust is almost exclusively directed at national institutions, 
with issues like a high prevalence of corruption being regarded as almost endemic to the 
country in question and the EU level is actually conceptualized as playing the role of the 
“good cop” in terms of patiently trying to “cleanse up” the state apparatuses in question.218 
         Drawing on Easton’s framework of regime support, Euroscepticism could also be 
viewed as exhibiting anti-authority (opposition to EU public officials), anti-regime (suspicion 
manifested towards underlying EU norms), and anti-community (premised on negative 
attitudes towards other EU member states) elements.219 
         Arguably the most relevant theoretical lens, for the purposes of this thesis, focuses on 
Euroscepticism within the party-based microcosm. Essentially, it looks into the explanatory 
factors behind the opposition to (or favorable disposition towards) the European project when 
it comes to major and fringe party actors. Two main strands of thought seem to dominate this 
literature. On the one hand, taking account of cleavage theories, some analysts like Marks 
and Wilson hold inner party ideology as the most significant predictor of attitudes towards 
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the EU. “The new issue of European integration is assimilated into pre-existing ideologies of 
party leaders, activists and constituencies that reflect long-standing commitments on 
fundamental domestic issues”.220 In order to cement their argument, such authors point out 
that communist or radically nationalist actors tend to be unabashedly Eurosceptic, as the EU 
is seen to be fundamentally at loggerheads with their ideological underpinnings – e.g. the 
priority placed on an independent course of development (such as economic autarchy) by 
many staunchly nationalistic actors.221 Marks and Wilson, however, do not see certain 
ideological proclivities as set in stone. For instance, they note the transformation of the 
attitudes of social democratic parties (towards a more benign opinion of the EU) during the 
1980s and 1990s. This is attributable to the EU’s efforts to provide a social policy cushion to 
the initiatives concerning themselves with the internal market.222  
         Consistent with the assertions introduced above, Vasilopoulou has postulated that there 
are two primary opposing dyads when it comes to party orientations – the socialist-capitalist 
one and the authoritarian-libertarian one (also conceptualized as the Gal/Tan antipode).While 
the Left/Right dimension revolves around different philosophies pertaining to economic 
redistribution and welfare, the Green/Alternative Libertarian (Gal) and 
Traditionalist/Authoritarian/Nationalist (Tan) dimension encompasses attitudes towards non-
economic issues like those of a cultural nature.223 In a nutshell, parties that hold strong 
affinities for authoritarian values and cluster with pro-socialist factions, are regarded as 
inherently more Eurosceptic than those that cling to libertarian values (e.g. pertaining to inner 
party hierarchies) and are supportive of the capitalist or neo-liberal economic model.224 This 
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applies to both the Western European and CEE contexts in roughly equal measure. However, 
populist right and conservative party families tend to be slightly more diverse in the CEE 
realm, while liberal and radical left party families are likely to be more coherent and unified 
(relative to their counterparts in the West).225 Henderson maintains that it is quite likely that 
these differences between the CEE and Western European realm will gradually be eroded, as 
a “programmatic convergence” with the parties in the “old” member states is bound to occur 
at a certain point in time.226 For instance, the policy programmes and campaigning techniques 
of the CEE parties will eventually become rather similar to those of their colleagues in the 
West.227Also, their ideological orientations will start to align with each other, e.g. there would 
be a neat fit between the positions of CEE and Western conservatives when it comes to 
general issues like degrees of economic openness.228 
         Alternatively, theorists like Bartolini (2001) see conflicts about European integration as 
being largely independent from and actually transcending domestic political cleavages: he 
associates party politics with a process of boundary closure that shaped the development of 
the modern state, but regards the principle of European integration as “providing an opening 
of national socio-economic systems that disrupts the traditional lines of political conflict”.229 
Similarly, scholars such as Taggart tend to downplay the ideological grounding of party-
based Euroscepticism, emphasizing the salience of party strategies. In this regard, the 
mainstream-fringe dynamic is explored, with the former actors being regarded as strategically 
pro-European due to their incentive to enter governments (or the upper echelons of power), 
while the latter are perceived as displaying a much higher likelihood of entering the 
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Eurosceptic fray due to their need to sharply differentiate themselves from mainstream actors 
and garner the votes of more narrow segments of the electorate. “Parties that are peripheral to 
political systems are more predisposed to using Euroscepticism as a mobilising issue than 
parties more central to political systems”.230 
         In addition, there is some merit to the contention that even if lacking genuinely pro-
European orientations, parties in government tend to regard European integration as better 
equipping the country to deal with issues like political efficiency.231 In Scharpf’s view, 
nation-states have to a large extent become dependent on European solutions in order to be 
able to manage the “spillover” problems caused by the previous successes of European 
integration.232 Sitter also suggests that when Eurosceptic parties aspire to participate in a 
governing coalition, they are expected to modify or avoid Euroscepticism because of its 
potential electoral cost. For example, due to these parties’ inevitable involvement in the 
shaping of the integration process in the previous years, they run the risk of accusations of 
hypocrisy should there be a sudden volte-face in their positions on the EU issue. The same 
applies to mainstream opposition parties, whose past actions have inevitably been closely 
intertwined with the EU integration process.233 In this regard, it also has to be noted that there 
appears to be a tacit consensus that party elites remain important players in terms of their 
capacity to shape public opinions towards EU integration. 
         A rational actor perspective, as put forward by inter alia Simon Hix sees opposition to 
the EU as quite fluid, with parties tending to adjust their strategies (and purported attitudes 
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towards the EU), based on contextual factors like the degree to which they see themselves as 
empowered thanks to the new playing field created by the EU. Essentially, Hix stipulates that 
Eurosceptics could very easily be converted into EU supporters, should they see a sufficient 
number of benefits to their closer embeddedness into the EU structures.234 Concretely, Sitter 
and Bátory posit that small agrarian parties are likely to adopt a radically Eurosceptic stance 
only if a multitude of conditions are met – European integration conflicts with their 
overarching ideologies and identities; the interests of their target electorate are seriously 
threatened by integration; the pressures of coalition politics do not outweigh the predicted 
dividends that could be gained by mobilizing the dissatisfaction of their supporters when it 
comes to the EU project.235Also, a party’s general assessment of European integration does 
not necessarily overlap with the “pattern of Euroscepticism” displayed by it, as there are a 
number of intervening variables that have to be taken into account like the concrete issues 
emerging out of the European integration processes that have to be engaged with.236 
             
 
         Throughout the thesis, I draw on the highly relevant distinction between “hard” and 
“soft” Euroscepticism, with the underlying aims of the dissertation propelling me to 
exclusively consider parties falling within the framework of “soft” Eurosceptics. Before 
taking a look at the divergences between Eastern and Western Euroscepticisms, one further 
note is required to minimize any confusion as to my own preferred use of the term.  
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         My personal definition of party-based “soft” Euroscepticism revolves around the 
satisfaction of the following criteria: 
a) Opposition to the current trajectory and direction of EU integration (in brief, 
parties that are adamant that there needs to be “less EU”); 
b) Emphasis on “renegotiating”, “overhauling”, “restructuring” or going back to a 
previous configuration of the European Union – for instance, the making of 
statements on the desirability of returning to the “old” EU prior to the 
Mediterranean enlargement in the case of the PVV237 or the perceived need for 
the altering of the geopolitical orientation of the European Union, as 
evidenced by the “remake the EU by closely involving Russia” rhetoric 
engaged in by Ataka,238 which has at the same time refrained from explicitly 
indicating any support for Bulgaria’s participation in a hypothetical “Eurasian 
Union”. This willingness to entertain the thought of working to peel back what 
are regarded as the worst excesses of the EU and thus seeing it as somewhat 
redeemable instead of settling for an outright rejection is one of the main 
differences setting such parties apart from the “hard” Eurosceptics. 
c) Acceptance (in theory) of a strong role for the EU in at least one “core 
domain” – even the PVV, which now feels at home in “hard” Eurosceptic 
territory and extols UKIP’s philosophy on the EU, frequently acknowledges 
that countries need to be able to trade without too many restrictions and EU-
like entity serving as a facilitator is needed to attain this aim.239 Thus, the 
notion of economic interdependence is not conceptualized as a negative by 
definition and has some sort of an inherent value. 
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d) Exclusion of what are conventionally regarded as single-issue parties with 
anti-EU leanings. To take one example, the AfD is presently still at this stage 
and in some respects fits the definition of a “soft” Eurosceptic, but while there 
is unshakable intra-party consensus when it comes to its opposition to the euro 
currency, the party is plagued by a high level of programmatic incoherence 
and a lack of a clearly articulated vision or ideological consolidation with 
regard to the role of the EU in other policy domains.240 Given that the thematic 
scope of my dissertation goes way beyond single issue areas, such a party 
would possibly not be the most appropriate to analyze for the purposes of the 
dissertation241 (though as I mention in the last paragraph of the party selection 
rationale section, consulting with some experienced figures within the ranks of 
the AfD with prior membership in other Eurosceptic parties could have indeed 
added to the revelations made by the REP politicians), which is part of the 
reason I do not yet see it as belonging to the category of full-fledged “soft” 
Eurosceptics.  
         The section covering the reasoning behind the party selection will demonstrate how all 
the four parties under scrutiny show (or have for prolonged periods in their recent existence 
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3.2 Some peculiarities of CEE Euroscepticism 
3.2.1 Underlying conditions in Central and Eastern Europe  
 
         As already stated, there is a degree of variation between the reverberations of 
Europeanization in the case of the EU “newcomers” and the EU “old” member states. Causes 
include factors connected to the new member-states themselves but also derive from evolving 
EU policy. The presence of a number of underlying conditions in the CEE context, 
outgrowths of the Soviet-like system of governance, but also of the general trajectories of 
national development, have to be acknowledged before attempting to estimate the degree to 
which the EU policies directed at this region have been different in comparison to those that 
were intended for other “new” EU members like Greece and Portugal in the more distant 
past.  
 
         In the aftermath of the communist system’s collapse, the CEE countries were shaped by 
up to four simultaneous transitions – in some cases from being a constituent of a federal state 
to national independence; and in all cases from one party dictatorship to democracy, from a 
planned economy to a capitalist one, and from a largely autarchic economy to an open one.242 
In the case of the states that emerged from under the communist shadow, the EU has been 
gauged to have caused setbacks pertaining to the first transition, in the sense of restricting the 
playing field with regard to the freedom to adopt nationally minded policies. Accordingly, as 
early as the mid 1990s, the Hungarian Smallholder Party issued a warning regarding the risks 
of weakening national identity should Hungary enter the EU prematurely.243 The 
supranational community has been evaluated as being supportive with regard to the second 
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transition, and has significantly influenced the latter two ones (the nature of economic 
transformations).244 Economic causes of Euroscepticism were often paramount in the case of 
quite a few CEE states, especially in the mid-to late 1990s. For instance, in the late 1990s, 
there was a significant downward trend in popular acceptance of EU membership in Poland, 
to a large extent because of economic concerns like the effects of EU policies on farmer 
subsidies and the sale of agricultural lands to non-Polish citizens.245 Arguably, the pro-
Americanism of countries like Poland  and the Czech Republic may have aligned with the 
fears related to economic issues due to these countries’ realization that the United States had 
started to noticeably outpace Europe in terms of productivity with regard to the market-
oriented sectors of the economy.246  
         The normative impacts of the EU are also not to be understated, with the “return to 
Europe” slogans providing the impetus (“enabling impact”) for the efforts of reform actors in 
these countries, and essentially allowing pro-EU stakeholders to sell certain policy measures 
to their constituents even in the absence of short-term or visible utility gains. Essentially, the 
“return to Europe” frame is frequently seen to have struck a chord with the electorate in CEE 
countries and consequently few autarchic-minded nationalists would have benefited much 
from a ubiquitously anti-EU position.247 Furthermore, there are some tacit indications that 
smaller states like Hungary, in contrast to Poland, were more open to EU accession, as even 
staunch nationalists in such countries found it easier (at least in the 1990s) to identify a 
significant security dividend to EU membership.248 
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         In addition, in the early phase (and in some cases still persisting to this day) of post-
communist transformation, the party systems in the CEE region were much more fragmented 
and less institutionalized than those in their Western counterparts, the inner party structures 
were quite hierarchical, and there was an absence of strong civil societies operating within 
these states.249 The participation of the regional and local elites and institutions of the CEE 
states during the period leading up to the 2004 EU enlargement was marginal; the governing 
national elites were the ones in control and were by far the most involved when it came to 
negotiations.250 There was a “significant fragmentation of norms between national and sub-
national elites”, as these two stakeholders were not exposed to Europeanizing influences to 
the same extent and tended to view the benefits of enlargement in different ways.251 Regional 
development agencies that were established as an outgrowth of the enlargement process did 
not play an active role in fostering connections between the different elite levels, as they were 
usually skeletal structures and remained plagued by corruption.252 One could arguably speak 
of an implicit division of labor between national and sub-national elites, with the latter 
devoted to managing the immediate transition issues without dedicating much thought to the 
reverberations arising out of European integration.253   
         The overarching type of nationalism associated with CEE is another variable that could 
potentially help account for the specific issues encountered in the East in connection with the 
adoption of EU standards. Civic nationalism is premised upon the citizens’ identification with 
fellow members of the nation-state based on adherence to common political principles or 
institutional mechanisms. Ethnic nationalism tends to emphasize the role of ethnic categories 
                                                 
249
 Lewis, Paul G. The EU and Party Politics in Central and Eastern Europe: Questions and Issues (2006), p. 8. 
250
 Hughes, James, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon. How Deep Is the Wider Europe? Elites, 
Europeanization, and Euroscepticism in the CEECs (2008), pp. 191-192. 
251
 Ibid, pp. 192-197. 
252
 Ibid, p. 195. 
253
 Ibid, p. 205. 
 104 
of belonging which are in turn constructed by aspects like common descent and language.254 
Civic nationalists are as a whole less preoccupied with imagined threats to one’s nation than 
their ethnic counterparts, i.e. when it comes to proclivity to emphasize the need to retain 
“ethnic purity” and exclude outsiders from one’s cultural circles.255 
         Some theorists like Liah Greenfeld depict Eastern European culture in the 19th century, 
the period between the two world wars, as well as in the aftermath of the communist collapse 
as very much shaped by ethnic nationalism.256 Brubaker echoes this sentiment, characterizing 
CEE nationalisms as exhibiting “nationalizing” tendencies, in essence favoring “majority” 
nations at the expense of “minority” ones.257 Similarly, Bøllerup and Christensen describe the 
national revivals in Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the dissolution of the USSR as 
premised on “strong ethnic foundations in the form of ethnies”, with the solid ethnic bases 
viewed as one of the factors conducive to the rapid increase in the popularity of national 
movements,258 though Schulze also maintains that the ethnic nationalist fervour did not 
undermine the liberal and democratic components of these movements.259 By contrast, the 
Western European domain is characterized as a playing field for civic nationalists. A 
common argument stipulates that in countries like England and France, the political 
definition of the nation tended to overlap with existing political boundaries and the inclusion 
of more and more people was seen as a natural manifestation of nationalism. By contrast, in 
the 19th century, many CEE states gradually carved themselves out of collapsing empires and 
needed to construct a distinct national identity as a way to justify their preference for 
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sovereign/independent national course of development. In short, many CEE countries arose 
out of movements for self-determination and this necessitated a greater degree of exclusivity 
in the definition of the boundaries of the nation.260 They were also not in a position to pursue 
imperial policies (unlike their Western European counterparts) and thus the state did not 
manage to displace the nation in terms of symbolic weight.261 In Brubaker’s terms, “Eastern 
European nation-states were never a neutral arena of group interest conflict. Historically the 
“core nation” has been considered to legitimately own the polity.”262 With regard to more 
recent developments, Debeljak characterizes the CEE states as having emerged out of the 
Soviet sphere of influence with a lesser degree of familiarity in dealing with globalization 
processes and a “fresh” feel for nationalism – “whereas Western Europeans have discussed 
the decline of the nation-state within the context of globalization for quite some time, Eastern 
Europeans actually hopped on the last car of the last train of nationalism as a legitimate 
movement toward a nation-state”.263 While the countries in the West are seen to have made 
use of the opportunities offered by an erosion of national boundaries, since the early 1990s 
those in the CEE realm were tempted to engage in a rather different exercise – the assertion 
and consolidation of national boundaries in order to expunge the memories of Communist 
transnational domination.264At the most extreme, public debates in CEE Europe at times saw 
the surfacing of viewpoints which effectively whitewashed the crimes of wartime right-wing 
regimes that had collaborated with the Nazis as in the case of Croatia and Slovakia.265 In an 
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ironic twist, the higher degree of cultural homogeneity in the CEE countries than in the “old” 
EU members (or the lack of significant experience with multiculturalism), may have been 
used as “cannon fodder” by nationalist-populist actors in these countries in a different 
fashion: an issue which will be explored in depth in later chapters of this thesis. For instance, 
Ralchev has coined the notion of “imposition of a minority discourse” by the EU to refer to 
the pressure on the CEE governments and general society actors’ (through conditionality 
mechanisms or normative influences) to “socialize” themselves and implement positive 
policy measures pertaining to minorities (e.g. in the case of the Roma, which had for a long 
time been neglected by the mainstream).266 The relative lack of visibility of minority issues 
prior to the start of the process towards EU accession is one aspect that has been seen as 
typifying the CEE experience. For instance, in the early 1990s, it has been affirmed that there 
was quite a bit of a common ground between staunch conservatives and liberal-democrats in 
Central and Eastern Europe pertaining to the possible repercussions of granting substate 
autonomies or significantly increasing “group rights” of minorities.267 In the CEE context, 
there was also the entrenched perception that minority nationalisms would better be swept 
under the carpet, and that they would gradually fade away as a result of processes like 
modernization and improvements in the national economy.268 In the early 1990s, in the 
majority of CEE states, ethnic minorities were deemed to have either been marginalized or to 
have been assimilated. The legacies of Soviet (and, in part, earlier German domination) are 
thought to have played a part in this and posed problems for the EU’s liberal and democratic 
approach towards ethnic minorities.269 
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         In this regard, there is one aspect that neatly separates the “new” CEE states’ and the 
“old” Western states’ constitutions – the intensity of affirmation of the countries’ core 
national identities. According to 2005 figures compiled by Kubiš, while the number of 
references to the country name or nationality in the old member states constitutions is 
relatively low, ranging from 12 in the Danish constitution to 86 in the various informal 
sources of the UK constitution like the statutory laws, in the new member states only the 
Czech Republic and Latvia have a comparable record (45 and 42 respectively). The level of 
affirmations of nationality in the other accession states ranges from Estonia (107) to Slovakia 
(399).270 The reluctance to engage with minority issues (or the much higher likelihood to 
regard them through a security prism in comparison to in Western Europe, especially in cases 
of fears of secession) in the early post-independence (or post-Soviet) stages is not to be 
downplayed given the continued salience of certain entrenched national identities.271 
 
         Alternatively, the existence of a sharp divide between the “Eastern” and “Western” 
brand of nationalism is regarded as dubious. For instance, Western European nationalism is 
also viewed as actually being quite exclusionary on ethnic grounds. Such arguments often 
focus on 19th century imperialism and conceptions of Western “racial” superiority.272 Some 
Western countries like Ireland, Spain, Belgium, Germany and Greece only became part of the 
“true Western nationalism” (civic) camp in the years after 1945.273 Peter Sugar maintains that 
nationalism originated from Western Europe; however, he argues that when it entered Eastern 
Europe, it gradually became similar to the most aggressive and chauvinistic nationalisms of 
Western Europe. As the Eastern European nations were influenced by Orthodoxy and did not 
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experience the Renaissance, the Scientific Revolution and the Reformation, their relative 
backwardness caused them to attach a greater meaning to nationalism than in its “birth 
place”.274   
         Doubt is also cast on the assertion that ethnic and civic nationalism represent two 
sharply opposing poles. Instead, individual nationalisms are seen as containing a mixture of 
‘ethnic’ and ‘civic’ constituents. In both cases, a form of collective identity is being 
constructed and “thick”, “emotive” elements are present in civic nationalism as well, as value 
differences are sometimes equated with cultural divergences and there are still possibilities 
for excluding “others” on seemingly trivial grounds.275 In addition, insofar as there does seem 
to be more evidence of ethnic nationalism in CEE, the preponderance of populist discourses 
in some CEE states could merely reflect the polarization and loss of credibility of traditional 
“moderate” parties, resulting from the rapid social and economic transformations, 
characterizing the post-communist periods.276  
         To sum up, there is not much in the way of consensus with regard to the degree to 
which there are divergences in the way nationalism is manifested and interacts with 
Europeanization in the Eastern and the Western parts of the continent. It may be fallacious to 
assert the existence of a schism between the two regions with regard to prevalent types of 
nationalism. Later chapters of the thesis will explore the extent to which there is actual 
evidence for such a divide. 
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3.2.2 The perceived over-readiness of political parties in CEE to “Europeanize” as a 
cause of Euroscepticism 
 
         One impact of Europeanization that may be specific to the CEE context is linked to the 
parties’ relationships with the electorate. In some respects the distance between CEE party 
actors and the other sections of society has increased in comparison to the early 1990s period. 
This has occurred despite the EU’s intention to avoid such a development. In Ágh’s 
conception, the European Party Internationals or EPIs have strongly influenced the CEE 
parties, with many of them showing a willingness to “overadjust” to the European party 
families’ demands, often ignoring the conditions on the ground or the expectations of their 
constituencies.277 In this sense, Ágh speaks of a “weak conversion function from social 
cleavages to party political profiles” in the case of mainstream CEE parties (like the BSP in 
Bulgaria in the late 1990s), with many of them easily becoming unflinching supporters of EU 
membership and losing touch with their fringe (usually less politically moderate) 
electorate.278 Sceptics are thus likely to decry what they see as a collusive turn in the party 
system due to all parties supposedly speaking the same language (similar to ‘Eurospeak’ in 
the European Parliament) and not being in true competition with each other.279  
         The context in which this distancing between party leaders and the electorate has taken 
place is the “over-particization” that occurred in the aftermath of the Communist collapse.280 
The political scene was essentially monopolized by parties and instrumental motivations like 
vote-seeking tended to be ascribed to all types of collective actions – the oversatiation with 
political organizations contributed to the fostering of a climate of alienation from politics and 
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low trust in democratic institutions. The traditional weakness of meso-level structures like 
civil society organizations (a remnant from the Communist times) has also not been rectified 
to a sufficient degree.281 For instance, unlike in Western European countries, organized civil 
society in CEE was hardly involved in the EU accession process, often settling for 
consultation functions.282 In a nutshell, a representation-participation paradox is deemed to 
have plagued many CEE countries, with accession being largely an elite-driven enterprise, 
hardly catering to the demands of and succeeding in familiarizing citizens with the main EU 
issues. Essentially, the “external” or façade Europeanization (in terms of the parties’ 
accommodation to EU partners and the expected patterns of “Western behavior”) has not 
really been complemented by “internal” Europeanization. This means that parties have been 
somewhat reluctant to forego their informational advantage pertaining to the prerequisites for 
EU accession or reform their internal organization and have tended to keep civil society 
actors in the dark with regard to the negative externalities of EU accession. Thus, they have 
made it more difficult for the latter to defend the interests of their constituencies and 
increased the likelihood of a post-accession dip in Euroenthusiasm.283 In this regard, Cas 
Mudde has advanced the argument that European integration is much more likely to enter the 
domain of “conflictual politics” in the CEE region than in the NWE region.284  
         
3.3 Nationalist-populist parties, Euroscepticism, and effects of Europeanization 
 
         There are a multitude of typologies when it comes to parties falling within the “right” 
and “far right” side of the political spectrum. Ignazi makes a rough distinction between the 
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“old” or “traditional” right, essentially encompassing parties that have some ties to Nazi or 
Fascist ideology, albeit often peripheral, and the “new” right. These are, in essence, post-
industrial parties, which are not averse to adopting extreme positions on issues like 
immigration and are further to the right than conventional conservative forces.285 The NPD 
(National Democratic Party of Germany), clearly espousing a biological conception of the 
German nation, is frequently cited as ticking the “old rightist” box, while the Front National 
(FN) of France, subscribing to an arguably more inclusive brand of nationalism, is deemed to 
be a good example of an entity falling within the latter category.286 The Lega Nord (LN) is 
also frequently cited as a new rightist populist party, but it represents a special case, as it 
tends to intertwine anti-establishment grievances with ethnoregionalist affinities and is thus 
arguably not a nationalist faction in the conventional sense.287 
         An alternative understanding of rightist actors is put forward by Betz. The German 
theorist utilizes the generic concept of right-wing populist parties and essentially tars parties 
like the NPD and the FN with the same brush, as he regards them all as being at loggerheads 
with the current democratic system in Western European democracies. This is because, 
although they refrain from directly attacking the foundations of the state or questioning the 
legitimacy of the state’s monopoly on the use of force, they are clearly not at ease with the 
dominant paradigms within these countries when it comes to matters like multiculturalism, 
the premium placed on individual vs. collective rights, and so on.288  
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         Rightist actors in the CEE context have generally been much more guarded in their 
pronouncements pertaining to the EU project than their Western counterparts. The much 
higher visibility of “soft” (rather than “hard” Eurosceptics) in the CEE case (relative to the 
Western European one) could arguably partly be tied to the paucity of what have been 
dubbed “protectionist nationalists” in the “new” EU member states.289 In essence, issues 
pertaining to immigration have not been perceived to be as highly salient in the CEE context 
(by nationalist-populist factions) and connected to the influence of the EU, as post-
communist states have not on the whole been regarded as being attractive destinations for 
immigrants from the rest of Europe or from other continents.  
         At the same time, the “post-EU-accession syndrome” has led to the deployment of soft 
Euroscepticism as an instrument of regaining national assertiveness and as an expression of 
the ordinary citizens’ disappointments because of the unfulfilled economic expectations in 
the aftermath of accession.290 In the context of the economic crisis, some CEE citizens who 
are increasingly disillusioned with their country’s membership in the EU’s supranational 
community, also express disappointment that the notion of “two-speed” or “multi-speed” 
Europe has now become a reality rather than merely a rhetorical exercise. The increasingly 
sharp divide between “core” and “periphery” countries is assumed to negate the whole 
purpose of the journey towards membership, as accession was supposed to bring all countries 
on roughly the same path towards development.291 
 
         In the Western European realm, it has to be mentioned that in the case of most “new” 
(rather than traditional) rightist actors – returning to Ignazi’s classification - opposition to the 
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EU has hardly been a cornerstone of their underlying ideology from a historical standpoint. 
For instance, the combination of a common internal market with barriers against the influx of 
people from outside the EU (at a time when the EU was confined to Western members) was 
perceived to be largely in line with the right-wing agenda. A major paradigm shift could be 
deemed to have occurred with the ratification of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). In 
essence, it appears to have rung warning bells for rightist actors, as the EU came to be seen as 
posing a major threat to the continued existence of the nation-state. To take one example, in 
the case of France, there was a marked rise in Eurosceptic sentiments in the months following 
the ratification of the TEU. The Rally for the Republic (RPR) party was especially vociferous 
in its criticisms, regarding the further envisioned moves towards European integration as part 
of a conspiracy to disarm the nation-state.292 In Germany, the Social Democratic Party of the 
Democratic Union (DU) unabashedly invoked comparisons between Maastricht and the 
Treaty of Versailles, seeing the coming to an end of German history, arguably borrowing 
from Fukuyama’s “end of history” rhetoric,293 with the EU seen as the embodiment of a 
permanent liberal order. 
         In Sørensen’s terms, the type of Euroscepticism toyed with by nationalist-populist 
actors in the aftermath of Maastricht was characterized by certain divergences, based on the 
peculiarities of the political culture typifying the specific nation-state – for example, social 
and democratic Euroscepticism could be regarded as having solidly gained ground in France 
in the aftermath of ratification of the TEU, while in UK case, to take another instance, 
sovereignty-based Euroscepticism has been even prominent than in France since the early 
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1990s.294 Some other rightist parties, which markedly shifted their rhetoric towards the EU in 
the 1990s, include the German REP and the Austrian Freedom Party (FP).295 
 
 
4: The concept of populism and parties in the CEE and NWE countries 
 
4.1 Characteristics of populist parties 
 
         As summarized by Jan Jagers, populism could be conceptualized in three principal 
ways: as an organizational form; as a style; and as a “thin ideology” in its own right. The 
“organizational form” understanding of populism regards it as a highly centralized type of 
party organization, in which a charismatic leader pulls the strings.296 In essence, this is an 
attempt by populists to escape from institutional complexities (through the emphasis on more 
direct channels of communication, as represented by the prominent role of the party 
figurehead) and to favorably compare themselves with the more bureaucratically inclined 
mass political (non-populist) parties.297 The political style definition of populism refers to the 
type of communication that is characteristically employed by members of populist parties. 
For instance, simplistic and direct language is preferred, the breaching of certain taboos (i.e. 
when it comes to the topics explored) is generally regarded as desirable and bombastic and 
inflammatory pronouncements are seen as potentially useful under certain circumstances. 
However, features like charismatic leadership and a clear demarcation of hierarchies are not 
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exclusively confined to populist parties. 298 Conspiratorial thinking also tends to pervade 
populist discourses, especially those on the extreme right of the political spectrum299 and the 
emphasis on emotive aspects coupled with the central role played by a charismatic leader 
could lead to a tendency to conflate unrelated phenomena in an illogical fashion.300  
         However, Rooduijn maintains that such a conception of populism is insufficient by 
itself, as it focuses too much on the procedural aspects to the neglect of the substantive facets 
inherent in the term.301 In order to make up for such an omission, Canovan’s understanding of 
populism as a “thin ideology” is introduced. This relatively recent notion implies that 
populism is not as refined as “full” ideologies like liberalism and conservatism. Thus, it does 
not offer (though it may pretend to offer) an all-inclusive perspective on the political world, 
instead preferring to restrict itself to the examination of a confined range of subjects (e.g. 
immigration).302 This conception also alludes to the opportunist nature of populists, who are 
always ready to exploit new opportunities whenever “hot” topics emerge and are quite 
flexible when it comes to fostering new alliances. 
         Taggart suggests that populist and anti-establishment parties are more likely to emerge 
and perform better in countries whose party systems are more cartelized – those in which 
there is a strong tradition of inter-party cooperation and accommodative strategies between 
party actors are common. The Netherlands and Germany are both generally considered to be 
highly cartelized, while the UK and Greece are located on the opposite side of the 
spectrum.303 Notably, the electoral resilience of the status quo opposing UKIP in British 
political life – possibly due to its ability to depict itself as offering an alternative to both the 
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conservative political mainstream and the far right British National Party (BNP) – bucks this 
trend.304 
         The rather generic nature of the term “populism” could be quite useful, as it allows for a 
multitude of anti-systemic party actors to be put together, despite their different historical 
antecedents, brands of nationalism, positions adopted on economic issues, and so on. For 
instance, the label of populism could be seen to encompass the extreme right factions, which 
are characterized by aggressive conceptions of nationalism, as well as fascist underpinnings, 
and the reactionary right ones, which cling to aristocratic and religious values, but have no 
obvious radically nationalist precursors from a historical standpoint.305 
 
         While populism is conventionally understood as implying a critique of the role of the 
nation-state elites, it also opposes denationalization, as identified by Loch and Heitmeyer.306 
In this regard, populism has a vertical dimension, which is connected to the inclination to 
separate oneself from established political institutions and refrain from unnecessary 
cooperation with mainstream parties as well as a horizontal one – typical of right-wing 
populists, as it lays premium on the separation from outsiders like foreigners and criminals 
belonging to one’s own ethnocultural group.307 Denationalization is associated with a 
dwindling of the power of the nation-state, as well as at the more extreme end, a near removal 
of references to the national community on the discourse level, with the EU project seen as a 
vivid example of such processes.308  
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         The emergence of a new cleavage linked to denationalization – the 
“integration/demarcation” one, which juxtaposes those who are inclined to defend the 
maintenance of national borders against those who promote the opening up and by extension 
the integration of the national community into supranational structures like the EU, provides 
a degree of legitimacy to populists, as they are to an extent seen as toeing a valid historical 
line.309 
 
         Even if there is a lot of common ground between the overarching aims and the rhetoric 
employed by the NWE and CEE populists, a number of relevant divergences, especially 
related to historical contexts, are worth discussing. 
         The legacies of the communist period are seen to have affected the development of 
populist sentiments. On many occasions, members of the communist upper echelons became 
opportunists by adopting the populist mantle and paving the way for the establishment of 
staunchly nationalist factions.310 Terms like façade or hybrid democracy, suggesting the 
acceptance of democratic procedure on the surface, but also an eagerness to shatter its 
foundations in practice, were adopted to characterize the policies typifying the leadership of 
populists like Mečiar.  
         However, it has to be affirmed that inter-country divergences when it came to the 
manifestations of populism were quite significant. A number of factors have been identified 
as key in preordaining the development of strong populist factions or preventing their 
emergence: the type of the communist regime in the last period before its collapse; the form 
of resistance against communism that was employed; the degree to which the initial stages of 
the market transition process were deemed a success; the nature of elite relations (e.g. with 
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regard to the degree of combativeness and accommodativeness); and the presence of serious 
leftover issues from the communist period pertaining to the status of national minorities or 
certain constitutional arrangements.311 
         Arguably, the general political cynicism partly attributable to the semi-totalitarian 
nature of the communist regime has also resulted in a greater willingness to subscribe to an 
anti-intermediaries (opposed to meso-level institutions like parliaments or trade unions) 
populism rather than simply an anti-elite one (opposed to national governments) in 
comparison to Western Europe; in essence, the intermediary organizations are believed to be 
overly responsive to political guidance from prominent politicians or influential business 
people.312 
         Still, country-specific explanations have been much more frequently advanced than in 
Western Europe to account for the nationalist trajectories and prospects for success of 
populist factions.313 For example, between 1990 and 1998, nationalist-populist parties had a 
fringe presence in Hungary and there was a lack of political forces that openly raised 
questions regarding EU membership.314 This situation has been attributed to Hungary’s 
peaceful transition, which was led by intellectuals, the absence of prominent populist leaders, 
as well as the relatively permissive brand of communism, which created a less polarized 
atmosphere during the period of transition.315 
         Albeit not clearly corroborated by other sources, Bochsler’s research points towards a 
more symmetric nationalist dimension in the CEE countries in comparison to that in their 
Western European counterparts. This implies that the rise in the fortunes of a populist party 
usually tends to be a reaction to the (perceived) increase in influence or visibility of an ethnic 
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minority party.316 For example, the Bulgarian Ataka was seen to have made major inroads in 
the electoral arena at a time when the media and some of the mainstream parties became 
more eager to discuss the role in the political life of Bulgaria of the Turkish minority party, 
Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF).317 In addition, there is probably a certain merit 
to the contention that in the CEE context there has been less of a stigma attached to the 
participation of openly nationalist-populist parties in government coalitions than in the 
Western one. Western European populist parties are frequently depicted as “secondary 
competitors”, but this has not universally been the case when it comes to the CEE region, as 
evidenced by the fact that parties like the Slovakian HZDS were able to govern their 
respective countries.318 
         However, there also appears to have been some degree of convergence between the 
CEE and Western contexts in the years immediately preceding the former states’ accession to 
the EU with regard to the tactics adopted by the mainstream parties in their interactions with 
populists, as testified for instance by the moderate Bulgarian parties’ unwillingness to 
cooperate with Ataka in the 2005-2007 period319 and the political ostracizing of factions like 
the Polish Self-Defense party at the regional level in Poland between 2002 and 2004.320 
 
         Right-wing populism in Western Europe is starkly associated with a strong criticism of 
the phenomena associated with globalization, especially when it comes to the new centres of 
political decision-making, and lays a marked emphasis on the national identity question and 
the drawbacks of socio-cultural heterogeneity. The 1999 political manifesto of the Austrian 
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FP is frequently seen as prototypical with regard to the overarching concerns of the Western 
European populists in relation to the EU – the EU is portrayed as imperiling the proper 
economic development and as a paragon of political corruption, while the possibility of CEE 
countries’ accession is framed as a cultural threat.321  
         Specifically, when it comes to the identification of parallels between the processes of 
globalization and Europeanization, the emphasis on the notion of “integration by stealth” is 
quite typical. The EU is regarded as being in a seemingly endless state of expansion (either 
due to the incorporation of new members or the increase in its competences) and is 
conceptualized as “heavy-handed transmitter or accelerator of globalization”.322 The “stealth” 
aspect implies that distant “elites” like EU politicians and EU affairs specialists are the 
masterminds who keep the ball rolling in the integration, usually outside the gaze of the 
general public.323As for the actual impact of Europeanization processes on populist factions, 
it is quite difficult for it to be properly measured, but the EU is without doubt frequently 
viewed as a “particular prism, which reflects more global trends at work also elsewhere”, e.g. 
when it comes to the imposition of constraints on nationalist discourses.324 
         More concretely, as it pertains to political entities, Kitschelt subdivides populists in 
Western Europe into three types. The new radical right (which has a presence in France, 
Denmark, Norway, and Belgium) is seen to represent a mixture of neoliberal, xenophobic and 
socially conservative beliefs. Anti-statist populists tend to operate in countries like Austria 
(becoming influential in the late 1990s) and remain in the neoliberal camp, but are somewhat 
less xenophobic and not as socially conservative. Welfare chauvinist populism is seen to be 
typical of German rightist factions like the German Republican Party (REP), where 
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xenophobia and social conservatism still reign supreme, but are also accompanied by a sharp 
critique of neoliberal policies.325  
         The relationship between populists and mainstream parties in the West is still a point of 
contention. Kitschelt (1995) sees populists as being fundamentally at loggerheads with 
established parties and their politics of consensus.326 Ignazi challenges this assertion, noting 
that minor inclinations to turn to the right on the part of moderate conservative parties 
actually serve to boost populist activity. In his view, during certain periods mainstream 
parties put controversial issues like immigration on the agenda, but are unable to accord them 
continued priority, especially once they have taken the reins of power. The populists then 
take up the baton and start to focus on such issues, for which openings had been provided by 
the mainstream parties. In this regard, it could be argued that there is no sharp break between 
populists and mainstream conservative stakeholders, but it is all a matter of gradations (i.e. 
when it comes to the degree to which a party engages with certain issues).327 However, it also 
has to be emphasized that since the 1970s, there has been an exponential increase in the 
influence of governing parties, i.e. due to their enhanced control over resources, which has 
been dubbed by Blondel as an “invasion of the state by the parties”.328 Thus, the differences 
in terms of control over public space between governing and opposition parties, with populist 
factions usually falling within the latter camp, have been markedly amplified, providing 
further legitimacy to the populists’ claims of the existence of fundamental divergences 
between “establishment” and “non-establishment” parties.329 As populists tend to romanticize 
the “common person” as being pure in spirit and especially loyal to the national 
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community,330 the increased distancing of the elites and their enhanced ability to “control the 
polity” (presumably allowing them to advance agendas that are to the detriment of the 
commoner) engender suspicions among them. 
         With regard to the actual factors behind the willingness of mainstream actors to concern 
themselves with matters that are usually promulgated by populists, the normal pathology 
thesis stipulates that they could be tied to the existence of a state of crisis within the country. 
Under normal conditions within Western democracies, the demand for the adoption of 
populist measures is assumed to be quite low, so the growth in populist activities is not 
regarded as part of the regular modus operandi of politics.331 As outlined in the introduction 
of the thesis, it is dubious whether this still applies today given the political climate in a 
number of Western European states that has made it more socially acceptable for mainstream 
parties to accommodate populists. 
         In the concluding part of this section, I set my sights on providing some further pointers 
regarding the type of definition of populism employed in the thesis and its relation to the 
main leitmotifs in the dissertation. For the sake of the overarching aims of the dissertation, I 
consider a party to be populist if it fulfills two main criteria: 
 
a) an anti-establishment and anti-elite orientation in terms of rhetoric utilized, a 
striving to create or appropriate new policy frames when it comes to issues of 
national salience and a problematic interaction with mainstream parties that is 
plagued by frequent conflicts and either rules out any form of coalition-
making or predisposes eventual coalitions towards instability; 
b) a tendency to view the majority group as unduly burdened by the illegal or 
anti-constitutional actions of ethnic, cultural, linguistic and/or sexual 
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minorities (often assumed to be tolerated by the elites) and an inclination to 
think in terms of permanent or fixed cultural categories and regard inherent 
differences in identity as major fault lines that cause friction between 
majorities and minorities. 
 
Coming back to point a), the four parties that I have chosen to analyze (see rationale for 
selection of parties section) also portray themselves as distinct from their mainstream 
counterparts, preferring to be recognized as having the markings of “irregular parties” or even 
departicized popular movements. One example of that is the unique structure of the PVV 
which is technically a one-man party, while those conventionally regarded as members, are 
actually associates and lack any official membership ID cards or the right to form youth 
wings. This first dimension of my definition of populism is essential, as on the level of the 
mainstream across the four national contexts the Europeanization of policy areas is generally 
(or was up until relatively recently) not a combustible issue in debates (see also the country 
specific sections of the dissertation). Thus, populist parties are quite attentive to EU-level 
decisions that affect domains connected to nationalism, as they do not want to miss their 
chance to construct a new policy frame and challenge what they view as an elite cartelization 
of politics. 
 
As for point b), I emphasize the minority-majority dichotomy (remaining on the symbolic and 
emblematic level or reflecting real economic or cultural tensions within the wider society) as 
part of my definition of populism, because of my interest in the Europeanization of minority 
issues and the need to eliminate parties such as the AfD (with a lack of a clearly developed 
stance on ethno-cultural matters and arguably an elevated focus on economic determinism) 
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from the pool of case studies. For example, the PVV derives a lot of its popularity (and 
possibly its credentials as an anti-establishment party) from its ability to portray itself as a 
successor to the late Pim Fortuyn’s Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) (see sections on post-Maastricht 
system developments and majority-minority dynamics in the Netherlands) and expose the 
supposed cultural incompatibilities between Christian and Muslim Dutch. Similarly, the 
PRM’s conspiratorial thinking appeals to the segments of Romanian society that are wary of 
the Hungarian communities’ historical and contemporary influences on their society and are 
especially perturbed by the mainstream Romanian parties’ seeking out of Hungarian coalition 
partners. The section on the choice of party selection offers further explanations as to the 
links between the ethnicization or culturalization of issues and the core identities of these four 
parties. 
 
         Lastly, in accordance with my goal of retaining objectivity, I stick to the term 
“populist” rather than “far right”, “radical right”, and so on, because perhaps to a larger 
extent than the other concepts it could under certain contexts be regarded as possessing a 
neutral connotation and even represent a yearning for a more sophisticated and purer form of 
democratic system within a state.332 
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4.2 Containment of nationalist-populist parties 
 
         The strategies for limiting the electoral appeal of Eurosceptic populist parties, 
especially at the level of national government and the EU, have not been extensively studied. 
Formal institutional constraints may affect the political opportunity structures in the case of 
such parties, but they are unlikely to have a significant effect on the nature of their policies.333          
         The highly prominent Jörg Haider affair (triggered by the January 2000 suspension of 
bilateral links with Austria by EU member states after the FP was included in the newly 
formed Austrian government) was deemed to have partially discredited the EU, especially 
with regard to the perceived legitimacy of the supranational community. While one of the 
main critiques of the EU sanctions concerned their contested legal basis, the potential 
occurrence of a “backfire effect” in terms of actually encouraging unmodulated sympathy 
voting for populists, was regarded as more worrisome (within the Austrian context itself, but 
also in terms of sending shock waves through other countries).334 
         However, research also suggests that long-term dividends could be reaped by the 
exclusion of rightist populists from participating in government, even if the short-term effects 
could lead to an empowerment of such factions. The main claim in this regard is that 
populists could face major difficulties if they permanently remained in opposition, as they 
increasingly start to be regarded as irrelevant in the long run. The successful imposition of a 
cordon sanitaire (involving all the major mainstream parties) could convince populist 
constituents to vote for more moderate “copy” parties, which take up some of the less radical 
                                                 
333
 Almeida, Dimitri. Approaches to the study of party responses to European integration (2012), p. 35. (Citing 
Charles Lees. The political opportunity structure of Euroscepticism: institutional setting and political agency in 
European Polities, 2008, p. 47) 
334
 Howard, Marc Morje. Can Populism be Suppressed in a Democracy? Austria, Germany and the European 
Union (2000), pp. 25-26. 
 126 
promises of the rightist populists.335As aptly put by Rummens and Abts, “a sustained strategy 
of containment combined with an attempt to provide democratic alternatives for unsatisfied 
voters will, in the end, convince extremist voters that their vote is, indeed, a wasted one”.336 
The decline in the fortunes of the Belgian Vlaams Blok and its successor Vlaams Belang 
which manifested itself at the 2009 regional and European elections has been partially 
attributed to the quarantine line imposed by its mainstream competitors.337 
         Still, such success stories are far from universal, with the institutional contexts within 
specific countries (i.e. thresholds for entering parliament) remaining important determinants 
regarding the potential for populist parties to recuperate from their forced isolation. Strategies 
of sustained isolation may not necessarily turn out to be as successful in countries like Italy or 
the UK as they have proven to be in Belgium.338 
         In the CEE realm, transnational party organizations and European political parties 
played on the relative inexperience and craving for legitimacy of CEE parties and imposed 
conditions on those which desired membership – ideological compatibility, democratic 
conditionality, and pro-EU commitment. In such a way, conformist pressure was exercised 
when it came to Eurosceptic parties and sometimes splits within their ranks occurred due to 
inner party conflicts over the degree to which they could adjust.339Also, perceptions of 
nationalist-populist factions on the part of TPOs tended to be quite personalistic, as 
demonstrated by the serious difficulties encountered by Mečiar in the early 2000s when he 
tried to rebrand his previously Eurosceptic HZDS as a pro-EU party; the controversial Slovak 
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politician faced lukewarm reactions and was unable to pave the way for his party’s 
acceptance into the European Democrat Union (EDU).340  
         Populism, as already suggested, is a complex phenomenon that renders itself to many 
different definitions, is not always an outgrowth of Europeanization processes and does not 
always correlate neatly with Eurosceptic sentiments. Also, the exact relationship between 
institutions (e.g. majoritarian vs. proportional electoral system) and the presence and relative 
potency of party-based Euroscepticism has so far not been precisely identified and may 
exhibit different manifestations depending on the national context.341 While populist parties 
within and between European countries tend to be far from uniform with regard to 
organizational structures, degree of charismatic leadership, pre-eminence of exclusive 
nationalist rhetoric, as well as governance experience, there are bound to be commonalities 
pertaining to the way in which they are impacted by their countries’ enmeshment in the EU 
structures. Identifying the nature of Europeanization dynamics in the case of a select number 
of such parties, as well as the degree to which they are inclined to allocate blame for any 
downward trends in their fortunes to the supranational structures, will be one of the principal 
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         Chapter One introduces the skeleton of the subject matter, starting off with some of the 
principal conceptualizations of Europeanization. 
         With regard to Europeanization, two main distinctions are emphasized – between an 
impositional understanding of Europeanization (historical institutionalism) and a less 
coercive one with a normative focus (sociological institutionalism). In relation to the CEE 
context, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier’s analyses of political conditionality are referred to 
– the external incentives model stresses the superior bargaining position of the EU and the 
way in which it induces compliance on the part of member states (and also rests on some of 
the assumptions of “club theory”). Hooghe and Marks are cited in relation to the notion of 
“permissive consensus”, which is seen to have generally persisted up to the early 1990s in 
the case of Western European states, but to have continued to typify the political landscape 
in CEE countries up to the late 1990s or early 2000s, with “national interest” 
pronouncements on the part of CEE governments remaining residual up to this point in time.  
         Turning to the impact of Europeanization specifically on political parties, Chapter 1 
suggests, following Poguntke and Pridham, that in practice political parties can feel frustrated 
by their lack of influence at the EU level and that only party elites and “EU specialists” are 
empowered by Europeanization. (In this regard, Pridham advances the argument that during 
the 1990s the newly emerged CEE party elites desperately strove for acceptance by the 
transnational party families, eagerly attempting to socialize themselves to the EU 
environment, but thereby potentially alienating their supporters). As for party organisation, 
overall, the literature suggests that the EU has had remarkably little impact on the 
organisation of national political parties.  
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         By examining the specific case of the EU influence on ethnoregionalist factions, 
drawing on studies conducted by Bartolini, De Winter, Sandholtz and others, the thesis sheds 
light on the general reduction of the nation-state’s monopoly on commanding the allegiance 
of its citizens and the way new openings have been provided to sub-national actors as a result 
of Europeanization processes. In a sense, there are marked parallels with the potential effects 
of “Euronationalism” on national solidarities (examined in Chapter Two), but a suborder 
category (the region or locality) rather than a super-order (EU super-state) was put under 
scrutiny. Chapter One then moves on from political parties to focus on the mechanics of 
Europeanization and pro-minority organizations. On the one hand, state-centred theorists 
such as Favell and Geddes or Moravcsik tend to be sceptical of the role of the European level 
in decision-making affecting minority groups, emphasizing instead the continued importance 
of the national level. On the other hand, ‘post-national’ theorists like Sandholtz posit that, 
thanks to Europeanization, minority organizations are largely in a position to insulate 
themselves from the oversight of the state and operate effectively on the EU level. On the 
whole, the literature suggests that non-party entities representing minority interests are more 
explicit than political parties in acknowledging and giving credit to the EU as a benefactor 
when it comes to the advancement of their claims.  
         The chapter then introduces Euroscepticism, the central concept of the thesis. As 
already suggested, nationalist-populist actors object to different strands of Europeanization 
(both redistribution of resources and norm diffusion) and this suggests that they exhibit 
varying forms of Euroscepticism. It is therefore helpful to consider Szczerbiak and Taggart’s 
distinctions between principled and more strategic opposition to the EU project, as well as 
the three types of Euroscepticism identified by Kopecký and Mudde and the four dimensions 
discussed by Goertz. 
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         As for country-specific manifestations of Euroscepticism, Medrano’s analyses of the 
framing of national debates on EU issues and the influence of historical antecedents on the 
portrayal of the EU show the importance of taking into account national historical baggage 
when examining the concept. This provides extra justification for the comparative approach 
adopted in the thesis. (Chapter 3 introduces the historical background and discourses in the 
case study countries.)  
         The most relevant theoretical lens, for the purposes of this thesis, focuses on 
Euroscepticism within the party-based microcosm. Vasilopulou’s Gal/Tan contrasts regarding 
the ideological core of certain party families and their proclivity for expressing Eurosceptic 
sentiments are juxtaposed against Taggart’s strategically grounded Euroscepticism, stressing 
the differences in attitudes between mainstream and fringe parties. Divergences between CEE 
and Western Europe in relation to Euroscepticism are compared and contrasted. With regard 
to the causes of Euroscepticism, the chapter makes use of Ágh’s studies regarding the 
perceived readiness to “over-Europeanize” of certain CEE elites (provoking a Eurosceptic 
response); Brubaker’s critiques of the supposedly inherently conflictual majority-minority 
relations and more ethnically based nationalisms in CEE states (relative to Western European 
states); Debeljak’s insistences that the CEE states emerged out of the totalitarian systems as 
rather ill-equipped to function in a globalized or Europeanized environment, as well as 
Ralchev’s arguments regarding the forceful EU attempts to redefine the ways in which CEE 
countries deal with minority issues, in order to flesh out some of the divergences in points of 
departure between Eastern and Western populists.  
         However, the literature suggests that, overall, rightist actors in the CEE context have 
generally been much more guarded in their pronouncements pertaining to the EU project than 
their Western counterparts. The much higher visibility of “soft” Eurosceptics in the CEE case 
could arguably partly be tied to the paucity of what have been dubbed “protectionist 
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nationalists” in the new EU member states. In essence, issues pertaining to immigration have 
not been perceived to be as highly salient in the CEE context and connected to the influence 
of the EU, as post-communist states have not on the whole been regarded as being attractive 
destinations for immigrants from the rest of Europe or from the developing world. (This is 
discussed in more detail in Chapters 2-3 and provides a foreshadowing for H 3 elaborated in 
the concluding part of Chapter Two). 
         Moving on from Euroscepticism, Chapter One looks at the concept of populism. As 
summarized by Jagers, populism could be conceptualized in three principal ways: as an 
organizational form; as a style; and as a “thin ideology” in its own right. The rather generic 
nature of the term “populism” could be quite useful, as it allows for a multitude of anti-
systemic party actors to be put together, despite their different historical antecedents, brands 
of nationalism, positions adopted on economic issues, and so on. This section of Chapter 1 
compares the particular characteristics of nationalist-populist parties and their Euroscepticism 
in old and new member states, finding that country-specific explanations have been much 
more frequently advanced in Central and Eastern than in Western Europe to account for the 
nationalist trajectories and prospects for success of populist factions. However, Bochsler’s 
research points towards a more symmetric nationalist dimension in the CEE countries in 
comparison to that in their Western European counterparts. This implies that the rise in the 
fortunes of a populist faction usually tends to be a reaction to the (perceived) increase in 
influence or visibility of an ethnic minority party. This tendency is not clearly corroborated 
by other sources but the empirical chapters of the thesis will address this issue in an attempt 
to fill this gap in the literature.  
         The final section of the Chapter explores the small literature on how nationalist-populist 
parties can be contained (given that one of the aims of the thesis is to suggest how nationalist-
populist parties might be reoriented in a more pro-EU direction). 
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         Essentially, Chapter One prepares the ground by providing some general indications on 
why resentments (related to asymmetries in relation to the empowerment of anti-nationalist 
forces) among nationalist-populist actors could logically be viewed as attributable to certain 
Europeanization processes. While the chapter casts a wide net and does not delve into 
specificities, it also suggests that such asymmetries appear to be more pronounced in the case 
of CEE states. However, it only scratches the surface with regard to the analyses of the 
concrete issues that are deemed important by such parties. The next chapter, attempting to fill 
this gap, then turns to the specific subsets of issues, which are deemed likely to be at the 
forefront of nationalist-populist concerns, and from a theoretical standpoint, analyzes the 
degree to which the EU is likely to be seen as exercising a pacifying or a threatening 













Chapter Two – Specific issues that are likely to trigger 




         Chapter Two focuses on the matters that are likely to be at the heart of nationalist 
concerns and examines the parameters of the interactions between the EU and nation-states 
with regard to the various understandings of identity, the formal rules outlining belonging to 
the national community and the nature of national border controls. It discusses Europe in 
general, with only brief reference to the case study countries, which are explored in detail in 
Chapter Three. 
         As the agents who will be the main subject of this work tend to operate with “nationalist 
currencies”, there is a need to examine the way the EU level touches upon and potentially 
restructures some core areas of their ideology. Moreover, it is possible to argue that in the 
case of all types of Euroscepticism, nationalist concerns are always likely to lurk beneath the 
surface; in fact Euroscepticism has been characterized as a “mutated form” of a more zealous 
nationalism.342 In Eichenberg and Dalton’s conception, European integration has shifted from 
“market making to polity building”; in essence, identity factors have overtaken economic 
ones in accounting for attitudes towards the EU.343 Anthony Smith identifies the abstract 
ideals of “autonomy, unity and identity’ as constituting some of the lynchpins of all 
nationalist ideologies.344 In this regard, the changes to nation-state citizenship policies 
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triggered by EU processes could be deemed as threats to national autonomy (as the nation-
state is no longer assumed to be solely in control when it comes to citizenship matters). 
Similarly, migration could be regarded as posing threats to national unity, for instance due to 
“diluting the national community” by introducing “ethnic outsiders”. The assumption is that 
the state’s capacity for closure (partial or otherwise) is essential for ensuring the continued 
distinctiveness of ethnic or cultural groups.345 Also, the increasing role of Europe as a new 
point of identification (a novel reference point for the national community) could be seen as a 
threatening development from the nationalist standpoint, especially those with a proclivity 
towards exclusive conceptions of the nation. For these reasons, this chapter looks at the EU’s 
potential to create a new and competing type of nationalism (Euronationalism) as well as EU 
constraints on the citizenship and migration policies of the nation-state.  
 
1: “Euronationalism”: EU identity building 
 
         One aspect of Europeanization, which could be potentially relevant when attempting to 
understand the mindset of nationalist-populist actors, and their opposition to the EU project, 
is the EU’s capacity to concoct a form of Euronationalism that could be strong enough to 
compete with or even displace the traditional state-centered (and to a lesser extent regionally 
based) nationalism. Euronationalism (which may alternatively be labelled Pan-European 
nationalism) could be conceptualized as an inherently contradictory term that captures many 
divergent real or purported manifestations of the EU identity-generating activities. Generally 
the concept of Euronationalism tends to be associated with the writings of Hedetoft on the 
relationships between national and European identity or is defined vis-à-vis Atlanticism, with 
the United States constituting “the other”, while Pan-European nationalism is a shorthand for 
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a wider variety of ideologies and political processes that focus on the linkages between the 
national and the European. Both terms are somewhat imperfect and could invite confusion if 
utilized in an overly generic sense. 
         At its most innocuous, Euronationalism could be seen as describing the implicit 
containment of conventional nationalism – in Hedetoft’s terms, “all the [EU] nations have 
entered into commitments that influence the orthodox identity structure of national identity, 
by inviting their citizens to invest their calculations for the future not only in relation to their 
own political sovereign, but also to [supranational] institutions formally superior to it.”346 In a 
sense, the partial surrender of sovereignty, due to the nation-states’ membership of the EU, 
shepherds political figures into engaging in discussions relating to European identity and 
intra-European solidarities, even if politicians would generally prefer to only embrace 
national identity discourses.347  
         More threateningly from a nationalist perspective, Euronationalism could be regarded 
as the rival sentiment (supra-nationalism) arising out of or leading to the potential creation of 
a European super-state at some stage in the future.348 By the early 1970s, the cataclysms of 
WWII were no longer regarded as being freshly etched in the minds of the populace. Thus, 
political actors felt the need to deliberately begin to craft a symbolic dimension of the 
EEC,349 a process of identity-building which became much more marked with the 
establishment of the European Union and the creation of European Union citizenship. The EC 
had already adopted the symbols of nationhood, the flag and anthem, in 1985. The motto 
‘United in Diversity’ came into use in 2000 and the Euro was launched as a common 
currency in the Eurozone in 2002. There are also many EU-sponsored activities that try to 
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promote a sense of common identity. Glendening and Shore draw attention to the “persistent 
attempts to manufacture European identity and consciousness by modern communications 
technologies, intermediary “front organizations”, and other familiar nation-building 
strategies, some specifically aimed at the “cultural reprogramming” of European youth” on 
the part of the EU.350  
 
         From the standpoint of traditional nationalists, pan-nationalism is not always regarded 
as a counter-principle to nationalist thought.351 Some parties like the Christian Democratic 
Union (CDU) in Germany tend to value the EU and thus campaign vigorously against the 
inclusion of “borderline European” countries like Turkey, while encouraging the deepening 
of emotional attachments between EU states.352 Essentially, they cater to the logic, perhaps 
unintentionally, that the EU could serve as a larger nation-state, providing a unifying cultural 
framework among European people.353 In this regard, Delanty envisions the possibility of “a 
European ethnos emerging around an identity based on exclusion, a supra-nationality, where 
the reference point is non-European”.354 Back, Crabbe and Solomos see the development of a 
strong EU identity as disempowering in the case of “hyphenated Europeans” (i.e. those 
belonging to non-white minorities). The theorists maintain that such minority groups could 
find it quite difficult to lay claim to the common European identity, frequently alluded to by 
Eurocrats, in part due to the emphasis on the ancient historical links between Europeans as a 
core feature of this identity. In a worst case scenario, they could view European identity as a 
term that is redolent of colonial systems of racial classification, only having the potential to 
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exacerbate the sentiments that they lack a “European cultural passport”.355 It can be argued 
that the EU adheres to an exclusionary mode of identity, as evidenced by the rather restrictive 
European immigration regime.356   
         However, some nationalists even within Europe could also criticize Euronationalism for 
being exclusionary. They are likely to resent suggestions such as Karl Lamers’ idea of a “core 
Europe” that would be more deeply integrated (integrating at a different speed) than “non-
core” members.357 Similarly, as early as the year 2000 Joschka Fischer, then Foreign Minister 
and Vice Chancellor of Germany, outlined “an institutional distinction between a kernel part 
of the EU or a gravitational centre leading the way to a European federation and a broader set 
of EU members that are also to be part of the club, but remain more loosely connected to the 
other EU members”.358 Such understandings, even if not reflecting majority views or 
necessarily shaping current policies, may nonetheless continue to breed suspicion among 
newcomers like the CEE states. One practical manifestation of these internal divisions among 
EU members was the apparent disconnect between the legal status of the “EU citizen” and 
the incomplete rights of citizens of newly acceded Eastern European countries to make use of 
the labor mobility provisions under Article 39 EC (due to the reluctance of most “old” 
member states to open their labor markets immediately after the 2004 enlargement).359 
 
         Another reading of Euronationalism also suggests that there is at times a markedly 
geopolitical slant to the concept, with its antipode being perceived to be Atlanticism; 
                                                 
355
 Grillo, Ralph. European Identity in a Transnational Era (2007), p. 79 (citing L. Back, T. Crabbe, and J. 
Solomos. The changing face of football racism, identity, and multiculture in the English game, 2003). 
356
 Kostakopoulou, Theodora. Citizenship, identity and immigration in the European Union – between past and 
future (2001), p. 7. 
357
 Gueldry, Michel R. France and European integration – towards a transnational polity? (2001), p. 3. (citing 
Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers, Überlegungen zur europäischen Politik/Thoughts on European Politics, 
1994). 
358
 Mummendey, Amélie and Sven Waldzus. National Differences and European Plurality: Discrimination or 
Tolerance between European Countries (2004), p. 60. 
359
 Shaw, Jo. The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union – Electoral Rights and the Restructuring 
of Political Space (2007), pp. 351-352. 
 138 
Euronationalism is thus conceptualized as the development of an independent EU economic 
or geopolitical bloc that could compete and challenge USA dominance in certain key areas.360 
Potentially this could be seen as undesirable by nationalists who identified their country’s 
interests as being best protected by close alliance with the USA. 
 
         In Duchesne and Frognier’s views, European identity is not a nationalist creation but a 
new type of strictly political allegiance, which has entered the stage in the context of the 
decline of national identities.361 In addition, it is frequently claimed that the EU is 
“uncompromisingly anti-nationalist” (if one is to look at the motivations of Jean Monnet and 
other founding fathers) and thus any attempts to help create an entity that could rival the 
nation-state in terms of its potential to draw affective support, would be unfaithful to the EU 
project’s explicitly recognized vocation - curbing the nationalist excesses of the past.362 With 
regard to the on the ground behavior of EU actors, Shore confirms that nationalism is a term 
which is largely avoided among European commissioners (to take one example), who have a 
strong tendency to be forward-looking and prefer not to prioritize reflections on the past.363 
         From a practical standpoint, leaving any idealistic qualms aside, it is doubtful whether 
the EU could ever be capable of evoking emotive support to the same extent as the nation-
state. Scholars of nationalism like Anthony Smith tend to regard supranational entities like 
the EU as being “impotent” (especially relative to the nation-state), as they do not have the 
same mobilization tools, such as common myths of origin and burning historical memories, 
as nation-states.364 Smith posits that “national identity is perhaps the most fundamental and 
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inclusive” of all collective identities in the modern era.365 Brubaker also regards nation (as 
well as ethnicity and race) as social and cultural structures that possess a status in popular 
consciousness which is almost unrivalled.366 Thus, the contention is that there could be no 
future for an EU identity unless the EU became a carbon copy of the nation-state, which is at 
this stage not really a conceivable development.367 For such a scenario to become a reality, a 
Pan-Europeanist movement would have to successfully unify European nation-states into a 
cultural and political community by drawing on agreed upon “European patterns of 
culture.”368 Tassin follows a similar line of argument and compares the European Union to a 
multi-ethnic state that does not possess a “cohesive common original identity”.369 To sum up, 
supranational identity formation (in terms of an overarching European culture) would 
necessitate some sort of social engineering and is far from a natural process, which 
essentially means that such an endeavour is not worth embarking upon, as it is likely to be 
doomed from the outset.370  
 
         In addition, Edye (1997) posits that because of its lack of a common language, the EU 
is missing one of the main components of common culture, which in turn is one of the 
building blocks of ethnic nationalism.371 The absence of great strides when it comes to 
European cultural policy initiatives has also sometimes been cited as a testament to the 
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“weakness” of the EU in terms of its capacity to provide cultural frames of reference.372 
Furthermore, the “lightness of symbolic structure” in the case of the EU is another guarantor 
against the emergence of a potent EU identity.373 As the EU category lacks a strong set of 
characteristics, it is gauged to be unlikely to challenge existing national identity elements.374 
European citizenship is still weak when it comes to one particular type of normative 
conditioning – it does not provide avenues for “symbolically performing fundamental duties” 
(like serving a European army).375 On the level of the general public, there is evidence 
suggesting that citizens of European countries find it difficult to crystallize the qualities that 
characterize a member state of the EU.376 Drawing on Donald Campbell’s framework, this 
could be attributable to the EU’s presumed low degree of “entitativity” (the perceived reality 
of a group’s existence) due to the absence of clear geographical boundaries (it is open to 
further enlargements) and paucity of “common fates” between the members.377As for the EU 
institutions, discourses in the European Commission tend to be characterized by “Eurospeak” 
(a common language arising out of the day-to-day embeddedness into a multicultural 
environment), but at the same time commissioners maintain strong links with their co-
nationals and the likelihood to resort to national stereotypes in cases of perceived differences 
when it comes to working habits is quite high.378  
         All in all, the fears that Euronationalism will substitute for traditional nationalism are 
unlikely to be at the forefront of nationalist concerns, but it is nonetheless worth exploring to 
what extent related trepidations form part of the nationalist-populist rhetoric. 
                                                 
372
 Gordon, Christopher. Great expectations – the European Union and cultural policy: fact or fiction? (2010), 
pp. 105-108. 
373
 Grillo, Ralph. European Identity in a Transnational Era (2007), pp. 77-78. 
374
 Breakwell, Glynis M. Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union 
Institutions (2004), p. 35. 
375
 Sobisch, Andreas. The European Union and European Citizenship (1997), pp. 85-86. 
376
 Breakwell, Glynis M. Identity Change in the Context of the Growing Influence of European Union 
Institutions (2004), p. 35. 
377
 Castano, Emanuele. European Identity: A Social-Psychological Perspective (2004), pp. 43-44 (citing Donald 
Campbell. Common Fate, Similarity, and other indices of the status of aggregates of person as social entities, 
1958). 
 141 
2: Changing definitions of citizenship 
 
         The issues surrounding the granting of citizenship - seen as an official validation of 
one’s membership within a nation-state - have often been at the forefront of debates launched 
by nationalist actors. Dominique Schnapper regards citizenship law as an example of a 
“direct translation of a country’s conception of itself as a nation”.379 Citizenship controversies 
are thus likely to generate significant emotional baggage not solely for  nationalists, but also 
for those on the left side of the political spectrum, as demonstrated by the recently ignited 
controversy following the granting of Russian citizenship to French actor Gérard Depardieu 
by Russian President Vladimir Putin. For instance, the French Prime Minister Jean-Marc 
Ayrault summed up Depardieu’s decision to give up his French citizenship as “pathetic and 
unpatriotic”380 and some of the subsequent societal level debates have revolved around the 
notion of “French exception” and the “particular cherishing of citizenship within France as a 
mark of one’s belonging to the national family’.381  
 
         Accordingly, it is essential to briefly explore some of the ways in which the EU 
influences national citizenship procedures. Citizenship procedures encompass three 
dimensions: the principles that govern the right to citizenship (jus sanguinis, jus soli, and jus 
domicili), the hurdles imposed (minimum length of residence, citizenship tests, etc.) if 
naturalization is permitted as well as the degree of receptiveness to dual citizenship. A 
‘permissive/liberal citizenship regime’ could involve an abandonment of strict attachment to 
jus sanguinis, with ethnocultural or racial descent no longer being the only prerequisite for 
becoming a citizen of a country or according one special primacy in terms of expediting the 
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procedures surrounding the acquisition of citizenship. Consequently, such a regime is also 
likely to be characterized by looser regulations pertaining to naturalization in terms of the 
temporal framework or the level of cultural or historical knowledge expected of new 
immigrants. Lastly, a liberal citizenship regime is likely to take hold in a country that has 
managed to disassociate itself from a strict adherence to ethnic nationalism; thus it should 
allow for dual nationality, because ethnic identity is not essentialized and it is deemed natural 
for an individual to have multiple ethnic and national loyalties. 
         Since the early 1990s (and in an indirect way even prior to that), the EU level has 
managed to shatter some of the nationally entrenched illiberal citizenship paradigms. 
         For instance, it is notable that according to the literature on comparative citizenship, 
what has been observed over the last few years is a convergence of the citizenship rules 
throughout the countries of the EU. For instance, Jöppke draws attention to several such 
trends, including the weakening of naturalization rules and the increased toleration of dual 
citizenship, as well as the elimination of overtly racist rules.382 
         In particular, some of the Amsterdam Treaty provisions and subsequent EU directives 
addressing discrimination against ethnicity and religion have been regarded as path-breaking 
in opening up new frameworks for inclusive citizenship within member states.383 
Consequently, the Law on Aliens, passed by the Greek Parliament in 2001, reduced the 
minimum period of legal residence as a precondition for naturalization by 5 years and 
eliminated the minimum period of residence for third country nationals born on Greek soil.384 
The new legal framework, together with further reforms in 2010, has been credited with 
ushering in an element of jus soli in Greek citizenship norms, essentially paving the way for a 
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qualitative change with regard to the relations between foreigners and the Greek state.385 The 
active role played by the European Commission in the immigration domain in aftermath of 
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty is likely to have had some influence on the 
Greek legislative measures.386As for Germany, it exhibited a number of similarities with the 
Greek case, with the first decisive de-ethnicization policies in the realm of citizenship 
beginning in 1992 (see Chapter Three).387 In Groenendijk and Heijs’ view, the Council of 
Europe meetings in the 1990s served to put Germany on the spot and played a role in paving 
the way for the country’s gradual acceptance of dual nationality.388 By the same token, in the 
Dutch case, the awareness that the negative attitude towards dual nationality was being 
questioned in the Council of Europe (within the Committee of experts on nationality) 
influenced the nature of national debates in 1984 and provided a boost to the lobbying 
activities of migrant organizations.389 
         In a normative sense, Europeanization is also gauged to have challenged the meaning 
and practice of citizenship, with new demands for the protection of social and cultural 
practices raised by minority groups serving to widen its content.390 In Soysal’s conception, 
postnational citizenship undercuts the primacy of state, because thanks to it migrants and 
third country nationals are entitled to certain rights and protections that are to be granted by a 
state other than their own.391 As an outgrowth of this reliance on various states to ensure the 
protection of rights, European citizenship could become a lynchpin for abolishing the 
                                                 
385
 Ibid, p. 11. 
386
 Ibid, p. 14. 
387
 Jöppke, Christian. Citizenship between De-and Re-Ethnicization (2003), p. 9. 
388
 Hansen, Randall and Patrick Weil. Introduction: Citizenship, Immigration and Nationality: Towards a 
Convergence in Europe? (2001), p. 13. 
389
 Groenendijk, Kees and Eric Heijs. Immigration, Immigrants and Nationality Law in the Netherlands, 1945-
1998 (2001), p. 163. 
390
 Siim, Birte and Judith Squires. Contesting Citizenship (2008), p. 3. 
391
 Kostakopoulou, Theodora. Citizenship, identity and immigration in the European Union – between past and 
future (2001), p. 95 (citing Yasemin Nuhoğlu Soysal. Changing Citizenship in Europe: Remarks on Postnational 
Membership and the National State, 2001, p. 67). 
 144 
hierarchy between different loyalties of national citizens.392 By the same token, it has been 
noted that discussions on EU citizenship supplementing national citizenship have had a 
conditioning effect, as they made the idea of Europe becoming a multicultural society appear 
more credible and also helped foster a more accepting attitude towards less strict provisions 
for the acquisition of nationality.393 In this regard, Magnette has pointed out that there has 
been a feedback loop between the EU and national governments when it came to the 
evolution of these citizenship rules.394 As Marshall succinctly puts it in relation to the 
relevant effects of Europeanization: “The traditional link between rights [pertaining to 
citizenship] and territory has become much looser: for most civic and social rights, the 
filtering role of nationality has been neutralized.”395 Ostensibly, the development of a policy 
of civic integration was moved to the EU (intergovernmental) level at the initiative of Nicolas 
Sarkozy, (then) French Minister of the Interior. Consequently, in March 2006, the interior 
ministers of the six largest EU countries (the G6) agreed to pursue the idea of an “integration 
contract”, using the French model as a starting point.396 The European Convention on 
Nationality (ECN) has also played a major role with regard to providing a normative 
influence on EU member states in the domain of nationality matters.397 
         In addition, another important authority in the area with regard to helping put forth the 
notion of “embedded liberalism” within the citizenship domain is vested in the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). For instance, in the realm of education, the ECJ has generally been 
gauged to have gone a long way towards granting students the right to study in other member 
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states under the same conditions as those of their nationals (essentially enabling “foreigners” 
to enjoy certain privileges, even if they are lacking “citizenship credentials).398  
         It is also worth noting that there is a strong positive correlation between the degree of 
permissiveness of the procedures governing the acquisition of citizenship within a country 
(citizenship regime type) and the level of tolerance of the general population when it comes 
to minorities and “outsiders”.399 Permissive citizenship regulations are a recipe for increased 
minority activism (touched upon in section 4 of Chapter 2), as they provide greater 
opportunities for political involvement on the part of newly arrived immigrants and create a 
greater number of political role models for them. Thus, it is not far-fetched to assume that the 
citizenship changes within countries that were ushered by the EU could have a major 
conditioning effect (on both majorities and minorities) and reduce the polarization between 
majority and minority groups. 
 
         There is some merit to the contention that the EU through the development of a 
supranational citizenship has played an important role (if only confining itself to pulling the 
strings behind the stage) in refurbishing national citizenship laws, changing the legalist 
climate within states, as well as altering patterns of governance within countries especially 
when it comes to majority-minority power-sharing. Citizenship issues have the potential to 
inflame political debates and are frequently intricately tied to the power differentials between 
majority and minority groups.400 Illuminating the extent to which nationalist-populist party 
stakeholders were inclined to reflect on such issues through the prism of the EU, and the 
degree to which they described themselves as aggrieved in relation to purportedly EU-driven 
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metamorphoses in the power relations between majority and minority actors, was one of the 
investigative aims during the course of the field work.  
 
 
3: Migration developments 
 
         Unpacking the identity dimension of Euroscepticism when it comes to nationalist-
populist parties also entails examining some linkages between migration and EU governance. 
Migration is a fundamental issue, as it is at the cross-section of both Europeanization (with 
the EU frequently gauged as having massively impacted on the nation-state’s policies 
regarding the “inclusion and exclusion of outsiders” and seen as a catalyst of globalization) 
and nationalism. Migration represents an intrinsic challenge to the seamlessness and 
permanence of the already constructed “national community” from the perspective of rightist 
actors. “Migration brings to the definition of nationalism and national allegiance the 
possibility of ambivalence: multiple allegiances may co-exist, drawing attention to the 
porosity of borders and the permeability of cultures.”401 
 
         As a starting point, if one is to assume that parties serve as filters and/or conduits of 
public opinion, it has to be pointed out that public views on immigration in the EU sphere 
tend to be restrictionist. For instance, Kessler and Freeman affirm that the general tendencies 
within the EU, and the developed world as a whole, could be characterized as reflecting a 
“majoritarian anti-immigration sentiment”.402 
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         Generally, the degree to which there is a fit between these public attitudes and the 
positions adopted by party actors - the extent to which voter preferences are reflected in 
political outcomes like the type of legislation that is passed - is in part determined by the 
institutional structures within the specific countries. In terms of the factors promoting 
responsiveness of political actors, states that have proportional representation systems, 
relatively low electoral thresholds, and an absence of strict judicial review (with the implicit 
assumption that courts are the defenders of minority rights against majoritarian excesses), are 
seen as conducive to the existence of a high degree of transferability of public sentiments to 
the party domain, which would entail that there would be no major hindrances to the 
undisturbed existence of staunchly anti-immigrant factions.403 In essence, parties with more 
radical agendas, representing fringe interests, are better positioned to gain access to the upper 
echelons and there are fewer institutional constraints when it comes to coalition-building.404    
         The institutional environment aside, parties also tend to be strategically motivated when 
it comes to tackling the immigration question – thus, immigration issues could be deliberately 
downplayed if there is a certain incentive to maintain the status quo, for instance in the case 
of parties in government that are constrained by international obligations pertaining to 
immigrant rights, or overemphasized - for example, if an opposition faction is inclined to put 
a government on the spot in order to appeal to a particular voting constituency.405  
         In addition, innate features like the ideological underpinnings of parties also influence 
their attitudes towards immigration questions. Some scholars like Milner and Judkins stress 
the potency of partisan cleavages, with left-leaning parties assumed to be naturally pro-
immigrant, while their right-leaning counterparts are judged to be intrinsically opposed to 
immigration, irrespective of specific national histories or the existence of certain structural 
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constraints. The reasons for the divergences when it comes to the positions likely to be taken 
on the immigration issue are tied to the premise that there are different sources of political 
capital.406 Alternatively, some theorists are skeptical of the notion that immigrant groups are 
regarded as significant constituencies of the parties on the left. In essence, it is stipulated that 
immigrants are politically passive or simply unable to vote due to restrictions connected to 
their inability to obtain citizenship.407 In addition, the contention that left-leaning parties tend 
to be generous on migration issues is perceived as dubious, as such factions are regarded as 
being conscious of the risks of short-term backlashes or of the perils associated with 
alienating “core” constituencies like the working class, which are assumed to generally 
perceive immigration waves as threats to livelihoods.408 
         In the early years of the European project, migration was seen as an issue that was 
largely epiphenomenal to other developments. In the aftermath of WWII, migration tended to 
be viewed in a positive light, due to being perceived as being an important vehicle for the 
economic reconstruction of Europe.409 The coming into force of the Single European Act 
(SEA), which signaled the completion of the internal market, ushered in an era of 
securitization of migration within the EU domain. This implied an increasing attention to the 
security of external frontiers of the EU to counteract the increasing permissiveness within the 
EU area itself, as exemplified by the provisions on the free movement of people.  The 
Terrorism, Radicalism and Violence (TREVI) groups, the Schengen Treaties, as well as the 
European Union Police Office (Europol) have been identified as fostering linkages between 
migration and the security nexus.410 In Bigo’s terms, when it came to agencies like Europol, 
migration was almost invariably analyzed as part of a continuum, with crime and terrorism 
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representing other spikes of the same machine.411 With regard to some of the concrete 
measures, reflecting the dominance of the securitization framework, one could cite the 
introduction of carrier liability, which was pioneered by the 1990 Schengen Agreements and 
the establishment of conditions for migration control as a prerequisite to the deepening of 
relations between countries at the peripheries and the EU, as stipulated by the Seville 
Conclusions.412 
         The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks are gauged to have entrenched the tendency to 
link migration to security concerns.413 
         Nationalist-populist actors are not satisfied by EU attempts to control migration and 
voice concerns regarding the empowerment of unaccountable officials and migration experts 
at the EU level at the expense of national-level controls. One example of the EU’s lack of 
effectiveness in controlling migration is the flourishing of circumvention strategies for the 
purposes of recruitment of low-skilled laborers within the EU, with market intermediaries 
and legal advisory firms being the puppeteers, often benefiting from the transnationalization 
of migration.414 
 
         The migration issue could be seen as especially contentious, as it could serve to 
illuminate the existence of rifts between different EU members, frequently attributable to 
differing national interests due to variations in endogenous factors like geographic location. 
The free-rider problem has been identified as plaguing some of the initiatives aiming to tackle 
illegal migration. In Samuelson’s conception, “it is in the selfish interest of each person to 
give false signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given collective activity than he really 
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has”.415 Notably, as Southern EU states have been forced to rigorously monitor their borders 
out of pure necessity, some of the migration flows to the North have dwindled as a result of 
their efforts. In essence, countries beyond the Southern European region have benefited by 
the latters’ provision of a public good or a positive externality (through migration control).416 
The European Commission launched the concept of integrated border management in 2002, 
which intended to create a financial burden-sharing mechanism between all member states, 
premised on the idea of solidarity between countries. However, the degree of willingness to 
cooperate exhibited by North European countries has been gauged to have been rather 
meager so far, especially in the pioneering years, essentially derailing the effectiveness of 
common initiatives.417 Similarly, the common EU agency Frontières extérieures (Frontex), 
which came into existence in 2005 with the aim of bringing together EU initiatives relevant 
to the enforcement of external border controls, has not succeeded in generating enthusiasm 
among most EU member-states, particularly when it comes to maritime patrol operations.418 
In autumn 2013, the issue of ‘free-riding’ by North European states and Frontex 
underfunding moved to the forefront of public concern in Europe after the drowning of 
hundreds of African migrants in the Mediterranean. 
         Interestingly, free-rider issues (in the domain of counterterrorism) have also cut across 
the East-West divide (rather than the South-North one) within the EU, especially in the 
aftermath of the 2004 enlargement. In the post 9/11 climate, it became increasingly evident 
that there were markedly differing threat perceptions and significances attached to counter-
terrorist efforts among “old” and “new” EU member states.419  
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         While the “fortress Europe” rhetoric has traditionally been assumed to refer to the EU 
countries’ attempts to guard against non-European immigration and is frequently thought to 
possess anti-“Third Worldism” undertones, the fall-out from the 2004 EU enlargement, 
especially the actually experienced (or projected) immigration waves, has become a major 
concern for Western European Eurosceptics. 
         Formal economic studies suggest that the economic impacts of the enlargement on the 
“old” EU members could be seen as ambiguous, but certainly without markedly negative fall-
outs. For instance, Boeri and Brücker maintain that the general effects of the 2004 
enlargement on labor markets have not been significant.420 In the case of the UK and Ireland, 
long-term dividends attributable to the increased migration from CEE have been identified – 
for instance, the filling of certain labor gaps in the low-skilled sectors of the economy.421 In 
the Irish situation, migration has tended to reflect demand and has not had serious 
displacement effects.422 Still, by 2011, according to figures supplied by the Department for 
Work and Pensions, as many as 1.5 million Eastern European workers had gained some sort 
of employment in the UK, a much higher number than that suggested by the conservatime 
estimates.423 While the impact of the new migrants on the unemployment rate and wages 
within the UK has generally been regarded as negligible, Blanchflower and Lawton (2008) 
suggest that the relative wages of those falling within the “least skilled” category may have 
been adversely affected.424 In this regard, MacKenzie and Forde (2009) report that CEE 
citizens in low-wage sectors of the economy have been quick to adjust their expectations and 
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“Westernize” in the sense of making demands for higher wages and improved conditions in 
the workplace.425 On the psychological level, the fear of unemployment is also seen to have 
increased as a response to the immigration flows from the new members.426  
         In the comparative literature Eastern European migration patterns have been depicted as 
quite different from those typical of the post-colonial migrants and the asylum-seekers. 
Eastern Europeans have been characterized as regional “free movers” rather than 
“immigrants” due to their tendency to shun long-term permanent settlement within a specific 
Western European country and their willingness to engage in circular migration in 
accordance with market forces.427 However, it would be fallacious to regard the distinction as 
anything close to an absolute one, because a sizeable number of CEE citizens do not 
participate in circular migration and have made the UK or other Western European countries 
their permanent home.428  
         In a symbolic and practical sense, EU citizenship has been rated as highly beneficial for 
CEE member citizens (with some minor exceptions pertaining to the granting of full social 
rights),429 as a privatized CEE migration regime (premised on market forces and the 
immigrants’ own agency) is gauged to have largely replaced a state-controlled one.430 Thus, 
Piotr Kaczyński maintains that the Western European states were suddenly forced to come to 
grips with the new possibilities pertaining to the freedom of movement afforded to their 
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Eastern cousins (who were well-prepared to make use of them) and this contributed to some 
of the more apocalyptic pronouncements.431 
 
         In this regard, Western Euroscepticism traceable to the 2004 enlargement has abounded. 
For instance, the 2005 French rejection of the EU Constitutional Treaty was largely rooted in 
French citizens’ opposition to the most recent enlargement.432 The “race to the bottom” motif 
has also been prominent in Eurosceptic discourses within Germany, Austria, Denmark, as 
well as in other states, with concerns pertaining to a newly emerging form of permissiveness 
when it comes to taxation (flat income taxes are typical for Eastern European states) and 
general labor standards.433 Surveys in these countries have consistently put fears of 
unemployment due to Eastern migration among the top concerns. Jumping on popular level 
discourses focusing on the threat to employment posed by CEE migrants,434 populist parties 
like UKIP and the PVV, especially within the framework of the EU economic crisis, have 
also made issues pertaining to the impacts of Eastern European migration an important part of 
their manifestos. The highly publicized Roma expulsions in France have been analyzed in the 
context of immigration fatigue in Western European countries. The “Roma frame” has been 
characterized as being “effective as a fulcrum for depriving migrants of their 
Europeanness”.435 
 
                                                 
431
 Kaczyński, Piotr Maciej. The Fifth Enlargement of the EU: Five Years On: the Case of Poland and the Czech 
Republic (2008), p. 9. 
432
 Barysch, Katinka. East versus West? The European Economic and Social Model after Enlargement (2005), p. 
6. 
433
 Ibid, pp. 7-8. 
434
 Ciupijus, Zinovijus. Mobile central eastern Europeans in Britain: successful European Union citizens and 
disadvantaged labour migrants? (2011), p. 544. 
435
 Fox, Jon E., Laura Morosanu and Eszter Szilassy. The Racialization of the New European Migration to the 
UK (2012), p. 689. 
 154 
         On the other side of the fence, the process of enlargement, as well as the accompanying 
changes in migration dynamics, has also opened new doors to Eurosceptic sentiments in the 
“new” EU countries.  
         Consistent with the previously outlined tendency at the EU level for countries to strive 
towards the transformation of the EU into a gated community, new EU member states have 
born the brunt of EU conditions imposed in the realm of migration. In this regard, 
Vermeersch draws attention to the fact that it took a while for the adaptation costs suffered by 
the candidate countries to be reciprocated by the gaining of access to the markets of the “old” 
Western states. The latter were allowed a seven-year transition period before fully opening 
their markets. Ireland, the UK, and Sweden were the only member-states to open their labour 
markets in 2004 and other countries gradually followed suit, with Austria and Germany 
preserving restrictions until April 2011. At the same time, new member-states were expected 
to create barriers between themselves and their CEE neighbours. For instance, in 2000, 
Slovakia introduced a visa requirement for Ukrainians as part of the implementation of the 
Schengen acquis. This was gauged to have resulted in a drop in the border crossings from the 
Ukraine.436 
         When it comes to critiques of migration, nationalist-populist actors are rarely explicit in 
terms of allocating blame to the EU itself, with national governments and governing 
coalitions often bearing the brunt of the criticism. While the EU has arguably not been very 
successful (or actually intended to) usurp the functions of the states in this domain, migration 
issues are nonetheless an important part of the arsenal of Eurosceptic actors.  
         As established in some of the previous sections, immigration is frequently an issue that 
falls within the scope of “high” politics and is of prime importance from the perspective of 
nationalist-minded actors in EU countries. In the realm of migration, and in other areas that 
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are touched upon by EU law, the impacts of institutions like the ECJ in terms of their 
capacity to contribute to the entrenchment of certain norms within national frameworks, 
frequently with a preponderance of a relatively “liberal” slant, are often cited as significant in 
terms of steering the way towards uniform legal patterns. 
         With regard to the two Western European countries that will be analyzed in detail in the 
upcoming chapters (Germany and the Netherlands), the nature of their migration patterns has 
been affected to a significant extent by their membership in the EU. For instance, in the case 
of the Netherlands, since 2005, the number of immigrants has consistently increased, with 
inflows from the newly acceded CEE countries a major contributing factor to that.437 In 2011, 
22 % of all immigrants originated from Eastern European countries, with Poles constituting 
the most numerous group.438 Between 2007 and 2011, immigration from other EU countries 
(mainly from the CEE part of the continent) to the Netherlands increased by 37 %.439 
Germany is also one of the more popular destinations for both non-EU and intra-EU 
immigrants, receiving 23 % of third country nationals arriving in the EU and 21 % of other 
EU countries’ migrants in 2010.440 Alongside Spain, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom, 
it has the largest foreign-born population, though this is exceeded by the Netherlands in a 
relative sense.441 
 
         In terms of the ability of these two countries to shape EU policies in the realm of 
migration, both the Netherlands and Germany have been identified as trend-setters within the 
EU with regard to the adoption of more restrictive reforms in issue areas like family 
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migration.442 It also has to be stipulated that the Netherlands’ turn to a more closed 
immigration policy in the mid 2000s has been in part inspired by new “exclusionary trends” 
at the EU level in relation to immigration during that same period443 and perhaps also by 
“informal Europeanization” (exchange of member state policy practices).444 Chapter Three 
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Chapter Conclusion and Framework of Analysis 
 
         The previous chapter conclusion brought the main exploratory framework to the 
forefront, but Chapter Two identified a number of additional questions of importance to the 
research. They were reexamined during the course of data collection and data analysis.  
 
         Chapter Two continued along the same path as Chapter One in bringing to light certain 
power asymmetries applicable to both CEE and Western European states that could be 
traceable to Europeanization dynamics. Chapter One touched upon the decreased influence of 
the rank and file of segments of national parties not dealing closely with EU issues, the 
enhanced difficulty of espousing Eurosceptic positions in the case of government parties, as 
well as the presumed normative and instrumental dividends reaped by ethnoregionalist parties 
and interest groups involved in the promotion of minority rights. It also provided an overview 
of Euroscepticism and related phenomena, staying faithful to the comparative dimension and 
acknowledging that the different baseline conditions in Eastern and Western European 
countries have affected the discourses adopted, the electoral performances and the degree of 
mainstreaming of Eurosceptic parties. In terms of asymmetries related to EU-induced right-
wing party disempowerment, a small part of the chapter was also dedicated to the strategies 
utilized for containing radical parties and the “endorsement role” of the European Union. 
Chapter Two developed the topic by focusing on other possible asymmetries arising out of 
Europeanization that could lead nationalist-minded actors to express anti-EU grievances. It 
looked into EU-induced threats to the exclusive national identity conception both in theory 
and and in practice by examining EU influences in the realms of national identity, citizenship 
policies, and migration dynamics. In relation to Pan-Europeanism, the chapter introduced a 
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variety of theoretical conceptualizations and meanings, demonstrating how the EU has certain 
tools at its disposal that allow it to be an “identity-generator” and make it possible to redefine 
the relationship between the European and the national. With regard to citizenship, it was 
shown how the EU in both direct and indirect ways has been a significant player in bringing 
about a convergence between national citizenship regulations. In terms of migration and the 
role of the EU level, this chapter drew attention to some of the main criticisms surrounding 
the EU involvement in this realm related to the lack of effectiveness of its main instruments 
and implied that its approaches to handling migration-related issues could also stoke rivalries 
between specific countries or regions within the EU. The chapter primarily emphasized EU 
impacts that cut across both the CEE and NWE domains, but also provided some indication 
of CEE-specific or Western European-specific effects. For instance, it highlighted the 
economic impacts of intra-EU migration and the stark differences in the assessments 
regarding its threat potential between Easterners and Westerners. 
         The actual framework of analysis (based mainly on the specific material introduced in 
Chapter Two) consists of the following assumptions, which account for the preliminary 
hypotheses that are outlined as part of a diagram (please see below). 
 
         With regard to Euronationalism or Pan-Europeanism, the main expectation is that 
across both the CEE and Western European contexts, there will be a tendency to play down 
the transformative role of the EU and emphasize the durability of national identities. The 
reasoning behind this rests on the generally non-intrusive character of the EU cultural 
policies (culture-related measures occupy a relatively small part of the acquis 
communautaire),445 the continued willingness of the majority of nation-state citizens to 
identify primarily with their own countries, as well as a certain reluctance to concede that the 
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EU have secured for itself an aura of legitimacy that could rival that of the nation-state. As 
for the cross-regional dimension, it is anticipated that CEE nationalists would be more 
concerned about the Pan-European frame due to a number of factors. They include the 
salience of the “return to Europe” theme among societal actors in the aftermath of the 
transition from communist one party rule and the adoption of increasingly “Europeanist” 
profiles on the part of mainstream parties in order to be recognized as actors receptive to EU 
membership. On top of that, the higher degree of distrust with regard to domestic 
institututional structures and the generally lower level of economic affluence in Eastern 
Europe as compared to the developed West may cause concerns among nationalists that their 
compatriots would be more receptive to embracing a non-national identity. In addition, as the 
literature on nationalism in CEE and Western European countries demonstrated, national 
identity in the case of the latter is more likely to be defined in exclusionary terms (in 
accordance with the tenets of ethnic nationalism) or be associated with vulnerabilities (due to 
peculiar historical experiences related to foreign powers’ domination). 
 
         In short, while any subjective opinions of the effects of Pan-Europeanism on national 
identity are deemed unlikely to contain elevated threat perceptions, such sentiments are 
deemed more likely to be expressed by CEE populists. 
 
         As for immigration dynamics, the literature analyzed in this chapter so far steers one 
towards the opposite conclusion. Given the objective realities (Western European countries 
are above the EU average in terms of economic indicators like GDP and socio-political ones 
like HDI, which makes them immigration recipient states) and the willingness of populists to 
carve out a niche for themselves in exploiting anti-multiculturalism themes (despite the EU 
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effects on the promotion of multiculturalism being conceptually distinct compared to those in 
relation to immigration), Western European nationalist-populist members are expected to be 
more likely to identify EU influences in this domain as problematic in comparison to their 
Eastern counterparts. In addition, as established in Chapter Two, Eastern European countries 
have generally not adopted decisive stances regarding the South vs. North antagonisms 
pertaining to immigration controls, so they have remained somewhat epiphenomenal to some 
of the intra-EU rivalries connected to immigration. In addition, the higher proclivity of 
populists to emphasize short-term rather than long-term horizons is another reason why 
Western European populists are seen as more likely to express concerns regarding the EU 
role in this issue area (the most recent EU enlargements are fresh in the minds of policy-
makers and countries like the Netherlands and Germany are feeling the effects of intra-EU 
migration). 
         In essence, from a nationalist-populist standpoint, immigration remains a fundamental 
issue when it comes to ensuring preservation of the national community; however, it is much 
more likely to be analyzed through an EU prism on the Western part of the continent than 
among Eastern European populists. This begs the question of whether Eastern European 
populists express concerns about the opposite phenomenon, i.e. emigration. The existing 
English language scholarship does not focus on this issue, but it may be anticipated that 
closer examination of populist agendas in CEE would uncover disquiet about emigration. 
 
         Pertaining to citizenship, the expectations are mixed – on the one hand, as stipulated in 
the literature, convergence among citizenship rules in a liberal direction has been much more 
expedient and noticeable in the case of the “old” Western European states. On the other hand, 
despite Eastern European countries not having been as of yet that significantly affected by 
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EU legislation and “informal policy transfer” in this sphere, their historical experience with 
citizenship procedures has been characterized by a high premium accorded to ethnic-based 
criteria, so any EU-induced uniformity with regard to citizenship provisions would be more 
likely to be viewed as a “paradigm shift” rather than a continuation of past national practices. 
Thus, it is anticipated that both CEE and Western European populists would display a 
roughly similar level of concern with regard to EU influences on citizenship regulations. 
However, in a general sense, this is not expected to be a significant trigger of Euroscepticism, 
mainly because of the highly technical nature of citizenship debates as well as the lesser 
degree of familiarity with regard to the role played by the EU in this domain. 
         In short, the EU-incuded impacts of citizenship are not conceptualized as likely to raise 
alarm bells among nationalist-populist members and roughly equal attention to this issue will 
be dedicated across both contexts. 
 
         In the case of minority empowerment, the analyses made in Chapter One suggest that 
CEE and Western European populists are quite likely to regard the EU as complicit in 
advancing minority agendas; even if is not deemed to have been successful in a practical 
sense, it is likely to be conceptualized as an ally of minority interests from a normative 
standpoint. This is attributable to the enhanced role of minority lobbies within the EU 
structures (where they encounter a higher number of like-minded actors compared to at the 
national level), the EU’s commitment to minority rights through specific legislation, the EU’s 
generally positive effects on the election strategies of ethno-regionalist factions, as well as the 
EU’s role in isolating openly or covertly anti-minority parties from the mainstream. At the 
same time, the EU effect on minority empowerment is assumed to be much more pronounced 
and overt in the case of Eastern Europe (due to the special emphasis of minority rights as part 
of the accession process interacting with a national and political culture that is more receptive 
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to highly assimilationist policies in relation to ethnic minorities). Specific expert analyses (for 
example, see the works of Waller and Galbreath) also confirm that minorities in Eastern 
Europe tend to be more aware of newly acquired rights due to the influence of the European 
Union. In this regard, nationalist-populist actors in CEE countries are deemed likely to be 
aware of such factors and be more inclined to point the finger at the EU when it comes to 
discussing the “elevated status” of minority groups. From a practical standpoint, this is 
compounded by specific cultural and political stigmas in relation to discussing “majority” and 
“minority” groups in “us” vs. “them” (antagonistic) terms – they are assumed to be more 
pronounced in the case of Eastern European populists in whose countries authorities are less 
likely to be concerned about restricting the scope of “protected speech” and the media are 
somewhat more inclined to emphasize the distinctions between majority and minority groups. 
 
         In this regard, EU-induced “minority empowerment” is assessed as being quite likely to 
be viewed as problematic across both regional contexts, with the caveat that the EU influence 
is more likely to be overestimated among CEE nationalists. 
 
         The following diagram summarizes the main hypotheses developed as a result of the 
Chapter One and Chapter Two literature reviews. It strives to illuminate the linkages between 
the superorder categories (the twofold understandings of Europeanization – substantive and 
normative), the six hypotheses that were crafted and the questions that were posed during the 
course of the field work (subdivided into specific clusters). In this way, the shift from the 
theoretical to the empirical is also highlighted. 
 
         The first three hypotheses could be seen to fall within the overarching understanding of 
Europeanization as a distributor of resources and transformer when it comes to the status of 
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certain actors and entities (like nationalist-populist parties and minority groups). For instance, 
Hypothesis 2 suggests that nationalist-populist members may express grievances because of 
EU-induced specific changes in national legislation being conceptualized as favorable to 
minority groups. The remaining three hypotheses are in line with the depiction of 
Europeanization as a norm promoter or catalyst for shifts in values (effects that cannot always 
be precisely measured). For instance, Pan-Europeanism (if it is defined as an increased 
attachment to Europe as a political space rather than one’s country) could be regarded as an 
outgrowth of changes in citizens’ mentalities because of trickle-down effects (from the 
“Europeanized” elites to the ordinary people). 
 
         The U-turn arrow serves as a reminder that the two rough typologies of Europeanization 
cannot be analyzed in a vacuum and do not remain totally separate – there is a crossover 
between the Europeanization as a “norm promoter” frame and the Europeanization as 
“substantive benefits” frame when probing the EU impacts on specific issue areas – for 
instance, transformations in citizens’ attitudes may over time lead to the passing of new 
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agency status changer) 
H 1: Nationalist-populist 
members are disillusioned with 
the EU, as they perceive that it 
unduly supports minorities, 
although their Euroscepticism is 
mostly unconnected to such 
perceptions. 
H 2: Minority empowerment in a 
socio-economic sense or in terms of 
legislation changes is more likely to 
be viewed as an EU-related issue on 
the eastern side of the continent due 
to the effects of political 
conditionality and historical 
understandings of nationalism. 
 
H 3: Immigration and citizenship 
are perceived as being outside 
the control of the national 
government, especially on the 
Western side of the continent, 
with the EU conceptualized as an 
important player in this realm. 
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(norm and discourse 
promoter) 
H 4: Pan-Europeanism is 
unlikely to be regarded as a 
threat despite the EU’s conscious 
or unconscious efforts in 
promoting a transnational 
identity. 
H 5: Minority groups across both 
sides of the continent are 
believed to perceive the EU as an 
ally and draw on a “normative 
cushion” from the supranational 
community. 
H 6: A certain process of 
convergence is beginning to take 
place between CEE and Western 
European parties in relation to 
the ways in which minority, 
immigration and citizenship 
issues are discussed. 
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          Chapters One and Two served to provide a number of general clues regarding the 
likelihood (based on both theoretical and empirical factors) for certain core nationalist 
domains to be viewed through an EU-inspired lens, while at the same time making important 
distinctions between CEE and Western European populists’ presumed attitudes. Chapter 
Three delves into concretics by looking into each of the four countries’ experiences with 
Europeanism, immigration, citizenship and regulation of majority-minority relations as 




















Chapter Three: Country Profiles 
 
Introduction and Rationale for Inclusion of the Case Study Countries 
 
         Chapter Three provides some essential background information for the empirical 
chapters which follow. It examines the nationalist trajectories peculiar to the four selected 
countries, attempting to illuminate the degree to which civic or ethnic conceptions of 
nationhood have been preponderant over different historical periods. It also looks into the 
evolution of their strands of Euroscepticism in the contemporary period (starting with the 
early 1990s), with the changes in party structures highlighted in the case of countries 
undergoing massive system changes, i.e. due to their emergence from a communist party rule. 
Consistent with the avowed interest in identifying the extent to which Europeanization 
developments affect nationalist-populist actors’ perceptions of minority stakeholders, the 
relations between majority and minorities, characteristics of the countries’ immigration 
regimes (where relevant), as well as potential points of conflict between core and non-core 
groups are also detailed. In a final section, Chapter Three introduces the four parties whose 
views are discussed in the empirical chapters of the thesis. Additional statistical information 
about the parties, such as membership size and electoral fortunes, is provided in Appendix 2. 
         The rationale for choosing the four countries is multifaceted. In the states that are to be 
analyzed, Euroscepticism is hardly a historical part of the “modus operandi” of the countries’ 
political and national cultures, but is much more fluid and likely to be clearly tied to shifts in 
migration dynamics and perceived slights to nationalist symbols. Thus, I avoid casting too 
wide a net when it comes to different facets of Euroscepticism and have deliberately omitted 
the countries that are traditionally depicted as falling within the camp of “perennial 
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Eurosceptics”. In this regard, Great Britain constitutes a prominent example in the sense that 
its Euroscepticism is often regarded as being built into the political culture.446As aptly put by 
Graham Watson, British MEP: “In UK public debate you have never had a great deal of 
support for European integration. Enthusiastically pro-European speeches by British 
politicians are better to be made outside of the territory of the UK, as Lord Digby Jones 
[former Minister of State for Trade and Investment] found out the hard way. In essence, there 
is a lack of acceptance in public debate that the European Union is good by definition”.447 In 
contrast, Germany and the Netherlands were among the pioneers in the establishment of the 
European communities and have consistently been regarded as Euroenthusiasts since the 
early stages of the development of the EU communities.  
         With regard to the Netherlands, “the discourse of “limits”- highlighted in the [case of 
the Dutch Eurosceptics], if lacking a strong positive vision of the European integration 
project, is nonetheless, by definition, firmly situated within that project, in opposition to a 
British debate still often marked by a more fundamental questioning of the project itself.” 448 
It has only been in recent years that Germany and the Netherlands have begun to change their 
tune and Euroscepticism has marked its presence on the political stage in a more visible 
manner. The sharpest decline in German support for Europe occurred in the aftermath of 
unification and Schieder maintains that since the early 1990s, “the view that Germany has a 
strong European vocation is no longer securely anchored in public opinion”.449 From a 
comparative standpoint, overall opposition to the EU among party families is slightly more 
pronounced in the Netherlands than in Germany.450 
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         The same applies to the CEE states with the increases in Eurosceptic sentiments largely 
manifesting themselves during critical juncture periods - just prior to or in the aftermath of 
EU accession, while in the preceding years support for accession was consistently high. 
Arguably, if one is to attempt to identify a general common ground between the four 
countries under scrutiny, it could be found in the degree to which the EU has shaped their 
national and political cultures – no matter whether such Europeanization has occurred 
through impositional or non-hierarchical means. While Germany and the Netherlands have 
not been subjected to the markedly top-down conditionality, which encouraged 
transformations in Bulgaria and Romania, both have been (albeit for different cultural and 
historical reasons) naturally receptive to EU measures and arguably demonstrated a certain 
penchant for accommodation in interactions with the EU.451 
         In addition, in accordance with the thesis’ focus on ethnic majority-ethnic minority 
empowerment dynamics attributable to Europeanization, the countries that have been selected 
are not ethnically homogeneous and are characterized by a high degree of attention paid to 
interethnic issues. Influential settled minorities (Hungarians and Turks) are capable of 
evoking threat perceptions among members of the majority groups in Bulgaria and Romania. 
The Hungarians and Turks are sometimes depicted as “imperial minorities” because during 
previous historical periods they were among the core groups of former imperial powers 
(Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire respectively) that controlled Romania and 
Bulgaria.452 For instance, over the course of the1848-1849 civil war in Transylvania that 
pitted Romanian and Hungarian nationalists against each other, the latter generally remained 
faithful to the Austrian emperor, and such events are still etched in the Romanian collective 
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consciousness.453 At the same time, the multicultural environment in the two “old” member 
states has sparked essentialist debates in recent years (especially when it comes to Islamic vs. 
core groups), as evinced by the Leitkultur discussions in Germany and the marked shifts in 
Dutch multicultural discourses and policies since the early 2000s. 
         Furthermore, while the countries are rather diverse when it comes to political cultures, 
degrees of affluence, as well as geopolitical influence, there is the potential to test the extent 
to which the seemingly preponderant ethnic nationalism in the CEE context really translates 
to a greater inclinations to view the EU as a threat in terms of the empowerment of natural 
opponents – ethnoregionalist factions. Moreover, of the cases selected, Bulgaria arguably 
represents a more moderate tradition of nationalism (relative to Romania), while the same 
relationship exists between the Netherlands and Germany, with the latter being closer to the 
“ethnic” side of the ethno-civic continuum.  
         I also pondered the inclusion of alternative countries in my case studies, but eventually 
decided against it. France is one country in which influential nationalist-populist parties 
operate, and where issues of interethnic harmony permeate the political discourses. However, 
similarly to the UK, France, despite its place at the heart of the European project, is often 
seen as a progenitor of generic Eurosceptic movements, as represented by what has been 
identified as its distinctive “souverainiste” discourse, especially after 1992.454 In parallel to 
the British case, at different historical junctures both the mainstream left and the mainstream 
right in France are gauged to have engaged in deliberate obtrusiveness when it came to the 
process of European integration. In Aylott’s terms, a supervening party management strategy 
(implying an agreement to disagree, which has “cushioned” the impact of EU issues on inner 
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party cohesion) has been relatively rare in the case of France.455 To an extent, the 
Scandinavian or Nordic bloc also demonstrates “in-built” or unflinching Euroscepticism, 
which was one of the factors that influenced me not to include Scandinavian case studies. 
Mainstream parties within Scandinavian countries have frequently clashed over the question 
of European integration and general EU matters have often had the potential to turn into 
powder keg issues.456 The Scandinavian countries are thought to have been resistant to 
regional cooperation from a historical standpoint and have displayed a marked reluctance to 
recognize the power of supranational authorities, for instance when it came to formulations of 
security policies.457 In addition, EU membership itself has been viewed as representing a 
marked paradigm shift from an identity standpoint in the case of the Nordic countries. 
Frogner has drawn attention to the psychological and cultural burdens ushered in by EU 
membership in the case of countries like Sweden due to the very close alignment between 
Nordic identity and certain social standards in realms like the environment, which became 
increasingly subject to EU regulations, leading to problematic shifts in social policy.458 
         Lastly, I tried to retain a sense of realism and kept my eyes peeled for factors like 
logistics and purely administrative considerations. My knowledge of the Bulgarian language 
and (perhaps) better feel for the intricacies of the institutional and party environments served 
me well when it came to the actual field work that was undertaken. Similarly, my fluency in 
German worked to my benefit when immersing myself in the German party environment. 
While my knowledge of Dutch was less advanced, I had lived in the Netherlands for a year 
and was well aware that English was in many respects a “lingua franca” in the Dutch context, 
so any barriers arising out of lack of fluency in Dutch turned out to be negligible. In short, it 
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is my belief that this balancing exercise between the purely academic and the more technical 







         Bulgaria together with Romania secured accession in 2007. Despite emerging from 
communist party rule as one of the CEE countries with the lowest GDP, as well as being 
characterized by the substantial presence of settled ethnic minorities (Turkish and Roma 
people constituting the largest groups and together accounting for close to 15 % of the 
population), it has managed to avoid embroilment in any of the nationalist conflicts, which 
arose out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia and affected the fortunes of the majority of 
Western Balkan states. However, the two years preceding EU accession were accompanied 
by an increase in populist activities and the emergence of a fully-fledged Eurosceptic party, 
Ataka, which however has as yet been unable to become part of a Bulgarian government. 
 
1.2 Bulgarian nationalism  
 
         The evolution of the concept of a “nation” in the Bulgarian national context is regarded 
as rather complicated. Both civic and ethnic understandings of the national community have 
been present in Bulgarian history; post-communist governments have been consistent in 




subscribing to a civic interpretation of the Bulgarian nation, as also established in the 
Bulgarian constitution. 
         Filipov maintains that in the case of Bulgaria strong elements of “national self-
identification” (in the modern sense) were to be found as early as the 9th or 10th centuries, 
thus prior to the transition from feudalism to capitalism, with the Bulgarian state possessing 
elements of a “nationalizing entity”.459 During the National Revival period (which has been 
traced to at least the mid 18th century, with Paisius of Hilendar one of the major figureheads), 
the whole process of “renationalization” appeared to be non-reflective and sparked few 
disagreements among Bulgarian scholars regarding the precise contours of the Bulgarian 
identity: the Bulgarian ethnie was seen as encompassing the ethnocultural areas of Misia, 
Thrace and Macedonia, with the Muslim-influenced Bulgarians left out of the definition.460 
Essentially, the whole period between the start of the Bulgarian National Revival and the end 
of WWII was characterized by the preponderance of primordial and strongly ethnically based 
conceptions of the Bulgarian nation. The common Bulgarian language, blood ties, as well as 
belonging to the Christian religious and cultural traditions were seen as constituting necessary 
components of a unified Bulgarian national identity. In these years, Bulgaria failed to develop 
a coherent national programme for the unification of all Bulgarians of different faiths.461  
         One of the factors behind the predominance of this exclusionary form of nationalism 
could be tied to the role of Islam and Christianity in the years of the Ottoman yoke, with 
these two religions serving to a large extent to “ethnically differentiate” between Bulgarians 
and “others”.462 Christianity was juxtaposed against Islam by its representation of the 
“conquered” or “vanquished” nation, while Islam was seen as the essential building block of 
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the oppressors.463 In addition, the pro-German orientations of the Bulgarian foreign policy 
doctrines since the end of the 19th century have also been gauged as a contributing factor for 
the continuation of this trend, as they encouraged the Bulgarian elites to toe an ethnic line 
when it came to their understandings of nationalism.464  
         At the same time, a brand of “democratic nationalism” has been seen as typifying the 
Bulgarian experience after the country secured independence in 1878, stressing the 
possibilities of brotherly coexistence with other nations, as well as including an admission 
that clear demarcations between nations could not always be identified.465 Thus, like in many 
other communist nations, in the 1944-1989 period the Bulgarians were easily swayed by the 
communist elites when it came to accepting the merits of the “Leninist” understanding of 
nationhood, implying the rejection of tribal, ethnic or racial bonds as building blocks of 
nations.466 Quite fittingly, in the early communist years, some of the Bulgarian elites helped 
“breathe life into” the concept of a separate Macedonian identity, not appearing to regard it as 
an assault on the indissolubility of the Bulgarian identity.467 Still, in the 1980s the country 
(under Todor Zhivkov’s leadership) saw the orchestration of aggressive ethnic assimilation 
campaigns directed at the Bulgarian Turks and Pomaks, which culminated in the “National 
Revival” process of 1984-1985.468 In the years after the collapse of Communism, the civic 
conception of Bulgarian nationhood tended to occupy Bulgarian historiography. In 1995, 
Bliznakov, in his work “10 Theses of the Bulgarian” affirmed that “anyone who self-
identifies as belonging to the Bulgarian nation is to be considered as such”, discarding the 
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salience of precisely established ethnic origins, religious ties and “family memories”.469 A 
clearly civic understanding of nationhood has been unambiguously enshrined in the 
Bulgarian Constitution since the early 1990s, in contrast to some other CEE countries like 
Slovakia, where the way the fundamental principles of the state were worded left more room 
for “ethnically exclusive” conceptions.470 Contemporary readings of Bulgarian nationalist 
tradition continue to emphasize the relevance of the blend between ethnic and civic 
elements.471 
         Pertaining to the question of the potency of the European identity, “Europeanism” 
(alongside Bulgarianism and a feeling of belonging to the “Slavic vortex”) has been 
described as the third primary element of the Bulgarian national ideology since the 
proclamation of national independence.472 The inclination to find a place for Bulgaria within 
the family of European nations is regarded as a remnant of the National Revival years, but 
there was also a certain negative connotation attached to this aspiration in the period between 
the two world wars, with the “cultural assimilation” frames, as well as the “ethnocultural loss 
of identity” ones being dominant.473 According to Boyadzhieva, there have been two waves 
in the Europeanization of Bulgaria: the first one (between the end of the 19th century and the 
beginning of the Second World War) has been depicted as “spontaneous” while the second 
one (“contemporary Europeanization” after WWII) incorporated a greater element of agency 
into it.474 Within Bulgarian historiography, the beginning of Europeanization has generally 
been traced to the French Revolution and at times has been viewed as entailing the imposition 
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of “Western lifestyles” on the “spiritual East”.475 The “Europeanization” of the Ottoman 
Empire which began in 1839 with the the implementation of more liberal reforms with regard 
to the economy and the administrative system contributed to the intensification of the 
National Revival processes on the territory of Bulgaria and the ripening of the conditions for 
well-organized revolts against Ottoman rule.476 After 1878, Europeanism in Bulgaria was 
almost universally associated (by traditionalists and modernists alike) with the “strategic and 
intelligent use” of foreign cultural exemplars.477 In an interview in 2005, historian Andrey 
Pantev expressed his conviction that during Stefan Stambolov’s tenure as Prime Minister 
(1887-1894), Bulgaria for the first time succeeded in “establishing a foothold in the European 
family of nations” and the striving towards Europeanization began to be conceptualized as 
sharply opposed to the “Russianization” of the country.478 Since the turn of the century, 
German cultural exchanges have been characterized as one of the main facilitators when it 
came to the spread of Europeanism/European identity in Bulgaria,479 with pro-German 
sentiments continuing to be prominent in the period between the two world wars,480 though 
on both the elite and popular levels Bulgaria remained “sympathetically neutral” rather than 
genuinely fascist oriented.481 
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         While Europeanism has generally been recognized as neatly co-existing with the 
Bulgarian identity, it has also faced some stiff challenges in academic circles and on the 
popular level. Prior to Bulgaria achieving independence, it acquired a negative stigma among 
some nationalist Bulgarians due to the tendency of a number of pro-Western European 
Bulgarian intellectuals to express the belief (in the years preceding liberation from the 
Ottoman yoke) that Bulgaria would only be able to prosper if it remained simultaneously 
within the political confines of the Ottoman Empire and the cultural confines of the West.482 
One major source of anti-Europeanist sentiments has been the Bulgarian Orthodox church. 
The influence of religion on Bulgarian social and political life increased in the aftermath of 
the country’s liberation from Ottoman rule and “European social mores” tended to be viewed 
with suspicion by the church elders.483 During the communist era, Pan-Slavism was put on a 
pedestal, which further contributed to anti-Europeanism and such sentiments generally 
worked to the advantage of the communist regime.484 Russophilia retains its popularity in 
certain nationalist circles - pro-Russian nationalists subscribe to the view that Bulgaria has 
managed to secure for itself Russia’s everlasting goodwill, which is labeled as the country’s 
“greatest historical achievement”.485 In the course of the later years of communist rule, there 
was an underlying feeling among pro-European intellectuals that Bulgaria had been left to its 
own devices (by Western Europeans) in its efforts to “Europeanize”.486 Consequently, on the 
general societal level, the early 1990s were characterized by considerable sympathy for 
European models; such sentiments were however in part a reflection of the creeping nihilism 
and eagerness to throw away all the remnants of communism. Krasteva recalls the opinion of 
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a university student interviewed in 1992: “In Bulgaria, there was a tendency to ascribe 
normality to all other countries with the exception of our own and identify with any type of 
foreign entity”.487 In addition, this outpouring of support for Europe has been attributed to the 
“syndrome of desperately sought modernity” and the importance placed on throwing off the 
chains of economic backwardness488 as well as recognition of the core EU countries as 
bearers of civilization, where Bulgaria had seemingly fallen short.489 At the same time, in the 
early 1990s Europe was conceptualized as somewhat more distant in comparison to the 
Central European countries - the official and popular level rhetoric in Bulgaria centered on 
“finding the path to Europe”; the “return to Europe” notion did not feature as commonly in 
discourses as for example in Czechoslovakia or Hungary.490 Thus, considerable efforts would 
be invested in order for European aspirations to become reality. 
 
1.3 Parties and Europeanization in the aftermath of the communist collapse 
 
         During the communist years Bulgaria was characterized by a high degree of symbiosis 
between the party and the intelligentsia (unlike most of the other CEE countries), which is 
gauged to have encouraged the Communist Party to embrace a form of “communist 
nationalism” and tap into post-1878 nationalist discourses.491 Nonetheless, academics 
consistently regard Bulgaria as the country whose political system modeled itself the most 
closely after the “Soviet center”.492 
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         As a whole, post-communist interactions with parties from other European states and 
the membership in party families are gauged to have been highly conducive to the process of 
maturation of national parties in Bulgaria and served to enhance their legitimacy.493 For 
instance, in Spirova’s conception, the PES managed to play a key role in engendering a 
change in the attitudes of the BSP (the Bulgarian communist successor party) towards the 
EU. In the early 1990s, the BSP was universally distrusted in Western Europe, as it was 
thought to be following in the footsteps of its predecessors in terms of persisting in being 
anti-integrationist and non-democratic with regard to its structure; accordingly, PES initially 
preferred to extend a helping hand to some smaller leftist parties in Bulgaria and spurred the 
more pro-European members of BSP to splinter from the “mother party” and set up their own 
formation.494 The reformation of BSP, accompanied by a shift towards markedly pro EU 
positions, occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and it was only following the 
completion of this turnaround process that PES decided to recognize it as a possible future 
partner.495 The EU proddings arguably strengthened the hand of those BSP members who had 
reached a realization of the necessity of “ideological cleansing” and encouraged more 
moderate politicians to withdraw their support from the influential leaders like Zhan Videnov 
who remained resistant to abrupt changes in the party’s ideological profile.496 According to 
political analyst Ognyan Minchev, despite legitimating itself in the eyes of European parties, 
prior to the emergence of Ataka, BSP was manifestly more successful than its centre-right 
counterpart (SDS) in “re-appropriating the full spectrum of nationalist political discourses” 
by drawing on its predecessors’ part in the anti-Turkish assimilationist campaigns as well as 
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its continued dabbling with implicitly anti-Western (and by extension anti-EU) “defensive 
Russophilic and provincial nationalism”.497 
 
         Furthermore, European party foundations and institutes like the German Friedrich Ebert 
Foundation and the Goethe Instutute deserve credit for making contributions in terms of 
setting up seminars, conferences, and discussion forums in order to help with the honing of 
election strategies of Bulgarian parties.498 Consequently, being an outgrowth of the Bulgarian 
parties’ ideological evolution, as a result of their emulation of the European party families’ 
tenets, since 2001 the Bulgarian party system has generally been evaluated as neatly fitting 
the Western model of organization meaning more unified political actors on the left side of 
the political spectrum and greater fragmentation on the right.499 Also, since the late 1990s, an 
undeniable “permissive consensus” regarding EU membership characterized the party 
environment in Bulgaria.500A further testimony to the existence of a permissive consensus 
pertaining to EU membership in Bulgaria are the classifications by Taggart relevant to the 
late 1990s and early 2000s – in this theorist’s categorization of various political parties within 
diverse countries, not a single one in Bulgaria was thought to warrant the label of a “hard” or 
even a “soft” Eurosceptic.501  
         Ataka, which was formed in 2005, was arguably the first party in Bulgaria since the fall 
of communism that openly contested the legitimacy of the Turkish minority party MRF and 
its increasing participation in the upper echelons of the political system, bringing forth an 
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ethnic slant to issues like corruption.502 Still, the type of nationalism exhibited by Ataka, 
despite the generally bombastic rhetoric that was adopted, appeared to be in line with the 
more inclusive (civic) rather than an exclusive (ethnic) conceptualization. For instance, it has 
claimed to recognize as a member of the Bulgarian nation anyone who speaks Bulgarian and 
identifies with Bulgarian culture, refraining from equating a single ethnie with the Bulgarian 
nation-state.503 The EU influence has to be considered if one is to uncover the factors 
conducive to the rise of populism within Bulgaria, culminating with Ataka’s successful first 
showing at the national elections in the summer of 2005 (see Appendix 2). Analysts like 
Krastev and Andreev saw the overlapping party profiles and accommodative attitudes of the 
two principal Bulgarian parties in the early 2000s (to an extent attributable to the passive and 
active leverage of the EU) as having given the impression of an “agenda exhaustion” and 
“elite collusion” to the general public.504 Following these developments, the National 
Movement Simeon II (NMSS) was the first beneficiary of the populist drift in Bulgaria, 
winning the elections in 2001 on a largely populist-based platform.505 However, its rule 
turned out to be disappointing due to a downturn in economic fortunes and unresolved 
corruption issues. As it was a markedly pro-EU movement, its brand of pro-EU populism was 
discredited and consequently the next elections provided new openings for Ataka, which 
chose the right movement to employ Eurosceptic rhetoric.506 Arguably, Ataka’s success also 
reflected a general disillusionment on the part of citizens due to some negative juvenile 
delinquency trends associated with post-communism as well as the decline in the fortunes of 
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the traditional centre-right in Bulgaria that had begun in the early 2000s.507 References to the 
sordid realities of the “vulgar Bulgarian transition” (connected to the perceptions that many 
criminal characters have been able to profit from the “new capitalism” and have become 
influential in the banking and political sectors) are commonly included in Bulgarian political 
commentary.508 However, despite its electoral success in 2005 Ataka had no chance of 
joining a governing coalition. There have been strong indications that the Europarties played 
a significant role in persuading their mainstream Bulgarian party counterparts not to allow 
Ataka to exhibit a belief that it could find itself in a position at the helm of the country.509 
 
1.4 Ethnic harmony issues in Bulgaria 
          
         An acute sense of vulnerability has been identified as a strong feature of Bulgarian 
nationalism, attributable to close to five centuries of being a constituent part of Ottoman 
Empire, as well as the subsequent loss of core historical territories like Macedonia and 
Thrace. Other Eastern European countries like Poland with a higher degree of ethnic 
homogeneity (post-1945) have been characterized as displaying a much higher level of 
national self-confidence than Bulgaria and thus have been gauged as less likely to react with 
alarm to religious practices of ethnic minorities.510 Furthermore, Soulet characterizes Poland 
as having a “solidly grounded identity”, while Bulgaria arguably falls into the camp of the 
countries with “mutated identities” due to the perception of many citizens that the country has 
usually failed to come strong during periods of adversity and has frequently been on the 
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“wrong side of history”.511 However, despite (or possibly because) of such experiences, 
traditions of toleration have tended to be ascribed to Bulgarian nationalism, especially in 
relation to the treatment of national minorities.512 Galabov, referring to the first decades of 
the 20th century, maintains that the love of freedom constitutes an essential part of the 
Bulgarian mentality and has shaped the attitudes towards minority groups within Bulgaria. “If 
one is a politician and does not desire to be popular, one of the easiest ways to achieve that is 
to encourage the persecution of minorities”.513 While political scientist Boris Popivanov 
maintains that in 1990 Bulgaria appeared especially susceptible to sliding into ethnic conflict 
(moreso than most of the other post-socialist states),514 the Bulgarian ethnic model has since 
then generally been regarded as representing a success, especially given that the country 
managed to avoid the bloodshed and political chaos, which befell its neighbour Yugoslavia 
due to its inability to find a blueprint that could properly balance out ethnic claims. The 
Communist Party of Bulgaria actually set the stage for its adoption in late 1989 when it 
abandoned its heavy-handed assimilationist campaigns and allowed the Bulgarian Turks to 
use their Muslim names.515 The nature of the Bulgarian model of ethnic relations was 
frequently lauded by Bulgarian scholars during the 1999 Kosovo War in order to distinguish 
Bulgaria from its neighboring states and emphasize the country’s perceived right to lead the 
way in terms of helping reclaim the phrase “unpredictable Balkans” by attaching a positive 
connotation to it.516  
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         However, a more nuanced examination reveals many grey areas when it comes to 
Bulgarian policies towards minorities prior to and in the aftermath of the communist collapse. 
While in the 1950s and 1960s Bulgaria was one of the countries that was the most faithful in 
following the “proletarian internationalist” philosophy in the realm of ethnic minorities (for 
instance, due to the governments’ efforts to elevate the profile of the Turkish minority in both 
a socio-economic and cultural sense),517 the rights granted to Turks in Bulgaria have 
sometimes been unfavourably compared to those guaranteed to Hungarians in Romania, 
especially during the most oppressive periods, and in the early 1990s public attitudes towards 
minority rights are gauged to have been more “unflinchingly antagonistic” in Bulgaria than in 
its northern neighbor.518 Elster has deemed Bulgaria’s post-communist constitution to be one 
of the most illiberal in the CEE region, as it did not recognize the existence of minorities in 
the country and banned political parties formed along ethnic or racial lines, although the 
MRF was allowed to slip through the cracks by the Bulgarian Constitutional Court (BCC).519 
In addition, the language rights of minorities when it came to instruction in public schools 
were found to have been severely compromised up until the early 2000s.520 All in all, 
evaluations of the Bulgarian policy evolution in this domain have suggested that since the 
beginning of the 1990s the country has moved from a state policy that intended to eliminate 
ethnic differences towards (recently) a minority rights regime that offers non-territorial 
cultural minority rights. However, the Roma, and especially ethnically ambiguous groups 
(from the standpoint of the Bulgarian state) like Macedonians and Pomaks have rarely 
managed to reap dividends from the granting of such rights.521 When it comes to majority 
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attitudes towards the minority, surveys have revealed that minority rights remain unpopular 
among Bulgarians, with almost one third (as of 2005) opposing the presence of minority 
representatives in the Bulgarian National Assembly (BNA).522 As for EU conditionality, it 
has been identified as having played a significant role in the realm of minority rights, with the 
EU gauged to have actively “shepherded” Bulgaria when it came to the majority of the policy 
changes after 1997.523 Even prior to membership, the European Union in general and the 
European regional policies in particular exerted a very significant influence on the economic 
and administrative development of minority or mixed regions in Bulgaria.524     
         In 1990, the MRF, which was acknowledged as the main party representing the interests 
of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, was officially established. Despite some initial 
constitutional challenges, as mentioned in the above paragraph, it received full legal 
recognition in 1992.525 The MRF has generally been gauged to have been a responsible and 
moderate actor in the Bulgarian political field. Its leader, Ahmed Doğan, has been credited 
with significantly elevating the profile of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, making its 
participation in politics relatively “socially acceptable” from the standpoint of the majority 
population.526 The MRF has as a rule refrained from espousing revanchist attitudes due to the 
National Revival process and made sure to stay clear of any semblances of secessionist 
claims for provinces with substantial Turkish populations like Kurdzhali.527 In the EU realm, 
it has also attempted to follow this pattern. In both the 2007 and 2009 EP elections, MRF 
submitted multiethnic party lists. Its European electoral platforms tended not to contain any 
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demands and policies which explicitly mentioned the ethnic Turk community.528 Besides, in 
contrast to those counties in CEE with sizeable Russian or Hungarian minorities, minority 
kin-states have not played a major role with regard to minority rights policies in Bulgaria.529 
         Nonetheless, implicit challenges to the MRF’s legitimacy and the entertainment of 
suspicions pertaining to the degree of its influence on the upper echelons of power have been 
a recurrent phenomenon of Bulgarian politics, especially since the early 2000s. 
Bozhkov cautions that the 23 years since the collapse of communism have seen Bulgaria at 
its most vulnerable in the post-Ottoman era, in part because of Turkey’s successful 
“ethnicization” of issues pertaining to the Bulgarian Turks and the Roma (some of the 
Muslim Roma embrace a Turkish identity).530 Alternative ethnic parties that represent the 
interests of the Turks in Bulgaria like the National Party Freedom and Dignity that was 
formed in December 2012 by former MRF member Kassim Dal have also stoked fears on the 
part of members of the ethnic majority due to being associated with subversive tendencies; 
for instance, Dal is believed to be supportive of the assumed Neo-Ottomanist Recep 
Erdoğan.531 In addition, those Bulgarians who do not regard Russia as a natural ally of 
Bulgaria because of their belief that a common Slavic kinship was artificially created 
between the two countries during the communist era or lingering suspicions pertaining to 
Russia’s “true motives” for securing Bulgaria’s liberation,532 associate the increase in pro-
Turkish activism in the country with a swelling of the ranks of “Russophiles” in Bulgarian 
society and an undesirable strengthening of the Russian influence on the country.533 This is in 
part attributable to their belief that a significant number of Bulgarians will feel backed into a 
                                                                                                                                                        
527
 Genov, Nikolay. Radical Nationalism in Contemporary Bulgaria (2010), pp. 37-38. 
528
 Spirova, Maria. The EP Elections as an Arena for Ethnic Minority Representation: Evidence from new EU 
Member States (2010), p. 19. 
529
 Rechel, Bernd. Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe (2009), p. 84. 
530
 Bozhkov, Veselin. Петвековният геноцид (Five centuries of genocide) (2013), p. 450. 
531
 Markova, Genka. Interview with Iskra Baewa, 17 August 2013. 
532
 Ivanov, Roumen. Българската народност XIX - XXI век (The Bulgarian ethnic identity from the 19th to the 
21st century) (2013), pp. 289, 295. 
 187 
corner and vote for parties with a “pro-Russian agenda” rather than those that are “genuinely 
Bulgarian” as a way of choosing the lesser evil and encouraging Russia to retain its hold on 
Bulgaria in order to provide a check on Turkish attempts to threaten Bulgarian nationhood. 
From the perspective of these exclusively pro-Western Bulgarians, Bulgaria is presumed to 
still be very much within the Russian sphere of influence despite the façade of 
Europeanization.534 
         As for the immigrant situation in the country, in the first years of the democratic 
transition in Bulgaria (and up to the end of the 1990s), immigration issues were of very low 
salience in political discourse. In the early 2000s, immigration matters timidly entered the 
political discourse when a small right-wing party, Saint George’s Day, attempted to develop 
different categories, distinguishing between “good” and “bad” foreigners in its rhetoric. As 
mentioned above, it was only in 2005 when the first extreme party – Ataka - managed to pass 
the 4 % threshold and enter Parliament. However, there has been up to now no strong 
inclination on the part of this party to employ security-related language when it comes to 
migration,535 though this has changed slightly given Ataka’s dissatisfaction with the handling 
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         Romania is a country which falls between the geographical regions of southeastern and 
Central Europe. Since the country’s founding in 1859, its borders have changed substantially, 
and they remain in dispute by nationalists in Romania and neighboring countries. Most 
importantly, Transylvania was acquired from Hungary after World War I and lost temporarily 
to Hungary in WWII, while Bessarabia was annexed by the USSR after World War II to 
become the main constituent part of the Moldavian SSR, now Moldova. Together with its 
southern neighbour Bulgaria Romania successfully acceded to the European Union in 2007, 
evading the threat of postponement contained in the safeguard clause for the country and thus 
completing a long journey towards membership. This state has been plagued by some 
tensions in the realm of inter-ethnic relations, in part attributable to the violent transition from 
communism, and national-populist factions within the country have frequently occupied the 
spotlight. 
 
2.2 Romanian nationalism 
 
         As in Germany, Romanian literature in the 19th century has been blamed for paving the 
way for the birth of the ideological radicalism typifying the years between the two world 
wars.538 During the 18th and 19th centuries, the Romanian national movements consolidated 
the meaning of the nation as ethnic, bestowing citizenship based on a common culture, a 
common history and a common language. The Romanian national doctrine of “Greater 
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Romania” was reiterated on numerous occasions – in 1821, 1878, 1918 (“România Mare”), 
1941 (“Fourth National Doctrine”) and in 1948 (“National Programme for fostering 
Socialism”).539 In this regard, the struggle to unify the three historical provinces of Moldavia, 
Wallachia and Transylvania has represented an overarching motif and a common bond 
between the different generations of Romanians.540 Since the formation of the Romanian 
nation-state in 1859, Romanian laws were largely premised on the jus sanguinis principle 
when it came to the opportunities granted to non-Romanians for acquiring citizenship. This 
strong emphasis on the ethnic roots of the Romanian nation in part contributed to the 
flourishing of less tolerant attitudes towards minority groups or “internal outsiders”. For 
instance, scholars generally agree that over the course of the early 20th century the four 
primary strains of anti-Semitism (religious, racial, economic and political) were more 
pronounced in Romania than in neighboring countries like Bulgaria or Serbia.541 In this 
regard, while the evidence suggests that Bulgarian Jews were frequently depicted as members 
of a religious minority and did not have to contend with deeply ingrained anti-Semitism,542 in 
Romania Jews were to a large extent conceptualized as an ethnic minority (a potentially much 
more exclusionary category) and did not undergo significant assimilation.543 The communist 
years did not usher in any significant changes, with the 1971 “Law on Romanian Citizenship” 
preserving the importance of blood and common descent.544 In short, there has been a 
remarkable durability and continuity to the definition of what constitutes a Romanian, from 
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the interwar period to the communist one, with an ethnic understanding remaining at the 
forefront545 and little support for civic ideas of national identity.546 
 
         In addition, it has been claimed that Romania’s particular geographical location – it is a 
culturally Latin nation (with its Roman roots being referred to in historiographies) that is 
largely surrounded by Slavic states, has perpetuated an insular mentality and triggered an 
obsession with the language component of Romanian identity.547 
         During the early years of communist rule, a minority of communist representatives like 
Lucretiu Patrașkanu were eager to implement staunchly nationalistic policies, intending to 
pursue “national uniformization”, but it was overruled by anti-nationalist party members.548 
Especially during the 1950s, national minority rights were well-respected, with the Hungarian 
minority being granted its own autonomous region, in which Târgu Mureş was the main 
city.549 The 1960s saw a shift in the direction of “Romanianization” with minority cultural 
spaces gradually being shut down: for example, serious restrictions were imposed on the 
teaching of Hungarian.550 Aggressive nationalist posturing reached more cataclysmic 
proportions in the mid to late 1980s, which marked the last years of the Ceauşescu reign. 
Revisionism in Romanian historiography became rampant, with the historical links between 
Transylvania and the Romanian core being overemphasized, coupled with a vitriolic rhetoric 
aimed at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.551 While some elements of Pan-Slavism 
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entered Romanian academia in the 1950s,552 it needs to be noted that Leninism never 
developed as strong a following in Romania as in other Eastern European countries, to a 
degree because of its association with Russia, a country that was not regarded as a positive 
influence by the majority of Romanians.553 Most historians subscribe to the version that a 
Marxist regime is unlikely to have taken root in Romania without the credible show of force 
of the Red Army looming in the background.554 Political Anti-Semitism in Romania was in 
part an outgrowth of concerns pertaining to Soviet Russian irredentism and the perceived 
Jewish influence within Romanian left-leaning parties.555 In the early 1920s, the Romanian 
Communist party endorsed the Soviet Union’s claim as the “rightful proprietor” of the 
province of Bessarabia in accordance with the self-determination principle, which contributed 
to a plummeting of the party’s legitimacy – membership figures did not exceed 2000 people 
throughout the interwar period.556 Thus, the Romanian communist leadership is seen to have 
lacked the political astuteness and sophistication of its counterparts from other Eastern 
European countries and was even less successful than them in convincing the majority of the 
population to be proactive in paying lip service to Soviet ideology.557 Genuine popular 
support for the Communist Party remained quite low in the post-1945 years.558 Verdery 
maintains that the unique (for Eastern European standards) “symbolic-ideological mode of 
control” adopted during the Ceauşescu years eventually created potent nationalist discourses 
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that actually undermined the credentials of Leninism.559 In essence, in Romania Communism 
merged with nationalism (with the expression of patriotic sentiments monopolized by the 
regime) to an impressive degree, especially compared to most other Central and Eastern 
European countries.560  
         The tone of discussions regarding Europeanism in Romania has inevitably been affected 
by the relatively negative social representation of modernization in Romanian history. In the 
late 19th century, the conservative group Junimea (youth) rallied against “imported Western 
institutions”, dismissing them as constituting “forms without content”.561 In the first half of 
the twentieth century, Nicolae Iorga, the influential Romanian intellectual and politician, as 
well as his follower Nae Ionescu, were skeptical of the adoption of modern political 
institutions in Romania and regarded them as incompatible with Romanian traditional 
society.562 Ionescu unabashedly condemned “Westernization”, while those like Iorga were 
more measured in their attitudes, affirming the need not to downplay the potential of 
domestic institutions. His dislike of the 1866 Romanian constitution (which significantly 
reduced the rights enjoyed by peasants in Romania) stemmed from his idealization of the 
“peasant society” and the fact that he conceptualized it as a borrowed model that “was made 
by an excellent tailor, used, however, to cut clothes for different bodies than ours [those 
belonging to the Romanians].563  
         The theme of modernization as representing a “denial of the Romanian self” was taken 
up by “New Generation” students following in the footsteps of Ionescu.564 Even some 
intellectuals like Emil Cioran who saw sticking to anti-modernism as a self-defeating 
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endeavour depicted modernization in somewhat negative terms, for instance characterizing it 
as a “necessary rape” that would force the Romanian nation “into transformation”.565 In this 
period both nationalists and pro-Westerners saw Orthodox Christianity as inseparably linked 
to issues of modernization, regarding it as intrinsically at loggerheads with the adoption of 
modern innovations.566  
         However, despite the tendency to at times combine the negative stigma attached to 
modernization with a rejection of the West, positive Western frames of reference (especially 
in terms of the country’s Latin heritage) are far from absent in Romanian discourses. By the 
late 18th century, Latinism (due to the language and cultural links) had assumed popularity 
among the Romanian intelligentsia and self-identifying as Latin began to be regarded as 
honourable.567 The Latin (culturally Western) frame of reference also tied in nicely with the 
ethnic nationalist understandings of the nation (due to the premium placed on the unique 
Daco-Roman heritage of the Romanians) and provided ammunition for the distancing from 
historical rivals like the Slavs and the Magyars assumed to belong to non-Western 
civilizations. In the early years of the 19th century, Romania and France strengthened their 
ties, with quite a few Romanian students pursuing their studies at French universities.568 
During the Ceauşescu years, the Dacian roots of the Romanians tended to be extolled at the 
expense of the Roman ones, but in the 1990s, following the collapse of the communist 
regime, the Roman (Latin) component of Romanian identity gained traction once again, for 
instance when it came to tourism promotion efforts.569 This shift in nationalist discourses was 
to a degree reflective of a concerted strategy to tout the Western pedigree of Romania, so that 
the country could receive economic aid and position itself firmly within the European 
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(Western) sphere.570 The contemporary emphasis on the Western components of Romanian 
identity arguably represents an attempt to sever the ties with the “destitute East” and 
counterbalance its (perceived) negative image among Western Europeans.571 
         In contrast to its southern neighbour, Bulgaria, the anti-orientalist theme in Romania 
does not resonate as strongly with large sections of the population and the years under 
Ottoman domination did not create an intellectual and cultural distancing from the West to 
the same extent. The territories inhabited mostly by ethnic Romanians (Wallachia and 
Moldavia) that had accepted the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire managed to constantly 
exchange ideas with the Western parts of Europe due to their strong links with Poland, 
Hungary, and Transylvania.572 While Romanian nationalism has not been regarded as 
intrinsically less hostile to Turkey than the Slavic ones, in the aftermath of its declaration of 
independence Romania has generally been spared some of the Ottoman-related challenges 
pertaining to the integration of Muslim minorities that have typified the experiences of the 
other Balkan countries.573 Turkish influences have nonetheless tended to be treated in a 
somewhat negative fashion in Romanian historiography (for instance, as evidenced by the 
depictions of the Orient by prominent early 20th century writer and sociologist Dimitrie 
Drăghicescu),574 with anti-Turkish sentiments quite commonly expressed by Romanian right-
wing sympathizers in the interwar years.575 The communist period did not bring about 
significant instances of historical revisionism in relation to the Ottoman legacy. Among 
contemporary Romanians, however, attitudes towards Turkey are overwhelmingly positive. 
According to Eurobarometer surveys from 2006 covering the opinions of EU citizens from 
the 27 EU member states, there are only four EU countries in which the majority of public 
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opinion is supportive of Turkey’s EU accession. Romania comes in first place, with 78.3 % 
of Romanians expressing approval of Turkey’s potential membership.576 
 
         At the party level, since the early 1990s, the different nationalist discourses of 
“reformists” and “traditionalists” have been pitted against each other.577 Reformists have 
tended to wed nationalist discourses to European themes. For instance, Traian Băsescu has 
drawn comparisons between the creation of a “Greater Romania” and the “uplifting times” 
and “positive changes” attributed to EU accession. References to Romania’s cultural 
commonalities with Europe abound when it comes to the nationalist palette of the 
“reformists”. On the other hand, “traditional” nationalists like Tudor are generally reluctant to 
manufacture feelings of common history between Romania and Europe, emphasizing a very 
nation-bounded identity. In addition, creating opposing dyads in relation to minorities, i.e. by 
invoking negative self-identifications with groups like Hungarians, is an inherent feature of 
their type of nationalist expression.578  
 
 2.3 Parties and Europeanization in the aftermath of the communist collapse 
 
         The late Ceauşescu years had the effect of largely extinguishing the memory of 
Romania as the most Western-oriented Warsaw Pact member during the late 1960s and the 
1970s.579 The thawing of relations between the USSR and the West in the 1980s also 
diminished Romania’s role of interlocutor between the two blocs, which may have 
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contributed to Ceauşescu’s increasingly bellicose behaviour, e.g.in relation to the 
Hungarians.580 Transitologists like John Higley also assert that the violence surrounding the 
change of regime in Romania in 1989 inevitably affected the course of the transition towards 
democracy, mostly in a negative fashion.581 Political parties in Romania were gauged to have 
faced serious difficulties in bringing about the creation of a solid democracy.  
          “Rather than converging around clearly defined doctrines and programs of action, 
[Romanian political parties] were “centred around a few prominent personalities and 
disproportionately focused their attention to the domestic infighting.”582  
          In the 1990s civil society remained quite weak, perhaps not only due to the Communist 
legacy, but also because of Romania’s lack of historic precedents of democracy, as opposed 
to other CEE states like the Czech Republic.583 In addition, missing the first train towards EU 
accession by not being given the green light for the 2004 “big bang” enlargement is deemed 
to have sent some shock waves through Romanian society, prompting the population to 
extend support to the radically nationalist Greater Romania party, which eventually came 
second in the 2000 Presidential elections.584 The PRM was formed in 1991 and combined a 
strongly nationalist orientation with a degree of nostalgia for the communist era (see 
Appendix 2 for additional details). Nonetheless, while the Romanian elites were ambiguously 
disposed towards EU membership in the initial post-communist years, the vast majority of the 
population was very favorable towards the possibility of accession to the Union. Surveys 
carried out in 1995 revealed that 97 % of Romanians were willing to embrace membership in 
the EU, the highest figure in Europe at the time, and similar levels of support persisted 
                                                 
580
 Gallagher, Tom. Theft of a Nation – Romania since Communism (2005), p. 64. 
581
 Higley, John and J. Pakulski. Revolution and elite transformation in Eastern Europe (1992), pp. 8-10. 
582
 Ibid, pp. 6-7 (citing Steven D. Roper. Romania: The Unfinished Revolution, 2000, p. 109). 
583
 Ibid, pp. 8-9. 
584
 Ibid, p. 8. 
 197 
throughout the 2000s, the electoral success of populist parties like Greater Romania 
notwithstanding.585  
         In the pre-accession period, Romanians were characterized as more likely to be 
receptive to Western models and “best practices” than the Bulgarians, both on the elite and 
the popular levels, with the latter more inclined to succumb to EU-nihilism.586  The pre-
accession period in Romania did not feature any thorough debates focusing on the merits of 
the decision to join the European Union, with almost unconditional support offered by civil 
society and the elites.587 The Romanian Orthodox Church, despite some reservations 
pertaining to the perceived inability of the EU to treat Romania as an equal, has also been 
generally supportive of the integration path pursued, maintaining that courtesy of Romania 
the EU would get proper exposure to the “real” (Orthodox) Europe.588 Romanian elites have 
also tended to refrain from adopting a defensive posture in relation to the EU in their electoral 
manifestos. There has been only limited talk of a “Romanian national model” that could be 
threatened by European integration.589 With regard to the passing of reforms to bring the 
country closer to EU membership, Romania is judged to have been a relatively “reluctant 
transformer”. However, it was also quite reactive to EU conditionality, expediently taking 
action to reform when put on the spot by the EU institutions.590 Still, there has been a post-
accession downturn in Euroenthusiasm in Romania, attributable to the loss of potency of the 
symbolic appeal of the EU and disappointed economic expectations. In addition, decreased 
attachment to the European frame is attributable to the perception of a reduction in the 
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efficiency of the political institutions in Romania in the aftermath of membership.591 While 
the 2005-2008 timeframe in Romania saw a relative abatement in activity among hardcore 
nationalists, the strong showing of the PRM at the 2009 elections is thought to have brought 
about a new “nationalization” of political discourses in the country and renewed the appeal of 
populism as a political tool.592 
 
 2.4 Ethnic harmony issues in Romania 
 
         As alluded to previously, the region of Transylvania, which is inhabited by many 
Hungarians, has often been at the forefront of issues pertaining to nationalist and 
ethnoregionalist policies. Settled minorities in Romania have tended to congregate in specific 
regions and constitute “compact masses” - Banat is another such example with its ethnic 
composition having been largely made up of Romani people and ethnic Germans.593 In the 
period prior to the outbreak of the Second World War Romanian fascist parties like the Iron 
Guard are assessed to have exhibited a level of anti-Semitism almost comparable to that of 
the actual Nazi party in Germany and unleashed pogroms on the Jewish population.594 In 
relation to the Hungarians, there is also a legacy of violence (albeit to a lesser extent), tied to 
the years of WWII – on 12 September 1944, the Hungarian administration in Transylvania 
was replaced by a Romanian one and Romanian nationalist factions like the Avram Ianku 
Haiduts were implicated in the mass killings of ethnic Hungarians.595  
                                                 
591




 Manchev, Krastyo. История на Балканските Народи – Том 4 (A History of the Balkan People – Volume 
4) (2006), p. 317. 
594
 Brustein, William I. and Ryan D. King. Balkan Anti-Semitism: The Causes of Bulgaria and Romania before 
the Holocaust (2004), p. 432. 
595
 Manchev, Krastyo. История на Балканските Народи – Том 4 (A History of the Balkan People – Volume 
4) (2006), p. 318. 
 199 
         While Romanian foreign policy in the 1990s was universally regarded as “moderate”, 
centrist and leftist Romanian parties have generally refrained from criticizing Romanian 
factions that display a willingness to take pot shots at the Hungarian minority and encourage 
the reawakening of “Greater Romania” discourses.596 In the 1990s, the post-communist 
government and more nationalistically inclined opposition parties frequently held similar 
views when it came to the “Hungarian question” and militarist doctrine.597 In the pioneering 
stages of the negotiations with the EU, especially during the Vãcãroiu administration (1992-
1996), Romania also displayed marked reluctance to acknowledge the link between its 
treatment of ethnic minorities and its membership in the supranational community, frequently 
asserting that ethnic minority measures that affected those residing in Romania were solely 
the prerogative of the nation-state and could not be subject to the judgments of an external 
arbiter.598  
         The first important step towards minority rights in post-communist Romania was a 
constitutional guarantee in 1991 of a seat in parliament for all national minorities. A Council 
for National Minorities was established in 1993 as an advisory body to the government. It 
consisted of representatives of ethnic minority organizations and had the aim of monitoring 
the observance of minority rights. Kettley has stressed that the first Romanian Constitution 
after the changes from communism had a number of disputed points – the stress on 
sovereignty based on the unity of the Romanian people (ethnic definition of the community) 
and mono-lingualism served to alienate the Hungarian political elites within the country.599 
As the first Romanian governments were closely aligned with nationalist parties, 
breakthroughs in the granting of cultural and territorial autonomy to Hungarians only started 
                                                 
596
 Ibid, p. 323. 
597
 Niessen, James P. Romanian Nationalism: an Ideology of Integration and Mobilization (1995), p. 297. 
598
 Angelescu, Irina. Punching Below its Weight? Europeanization and Romanian Foreign Policy (2011), pp. 14-
15. 
 200 
to happen after the 1996 general elections when a Hungarian minority party – the Democratic 
Union of Hungarians from Romania (DUHR) – joined a government coalition.600  
         Local level obstacles have often persisted in negatively affecting legislation relevant to 
the needs of Hungarians.601 The Hungarian minority in Romania is concentrated in specific 
territories, so local governance structures have been identified as key when it comes to 
promoting Hungarian rights.602 Sharply voiced concerns on the part of majority actors due to 
the possibility of “fragmentation of state sovereignty” have frequently accompanied 
Hungarian demands for institutional autonomy.603 During the 1990s, most minority parties in 
Romania have been characterized as single issue ones due to promoting almost exclusively 
minority interests.604 Discourses touching upon Romanian centralization have been associated 
with an ethnic Romanian definition of the state. Romanian nationalists tended to emphasize 
the need for “hard centralization” as a safety valve against Hungarian challenges to the 
territorial integrity of the state. On the other hand, Romanian and Hungarian moderates were 
more likely to prioritize “civic regionalism” and pressure for the creation of trans-ethnic 
parties in regions like Transylvania.605 In 1995 Romanian nationalists demanded that DUHR 
be declared an illegal organization. (DUHR had established the Council of Hungarian Mayors 
and local councillors, which was seen as an initiative to bring about the declaration of ethno-
territorial autonomy for Hungarians).606  
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         On a more optimistic note, in the early 2000s, Romania had already made huge strides 
in the adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation607 and in addition it has 
tended to faithfully heed EU suggestions pertaining to the improvement of the plight of the 
Roma.608 Since the mid 1990s, the mainstream Romanian parties and the Romanian elites 
have tended to take a laissez-faire approach with regard to the use of the Hungarian language 
in regions with a high concentration of ethnic Hungarians, in stark contrast to the attitudes 
towards minority languages displayed by their counterparts in Slovakia and Estonia.609 
         It is also notable that ethnoregionalist parties, representing the interests of the 
Hungarian community, have also been rather prone to aggressive activism (arguably much 
more so than their Turkish counterparts in Bulgaria if one is to compare across countries) on 
the EU plane. After the collapse of the communist system, the Hungarians were actually the 
first to establish a political party in Romania (in December 1989) and the DUHR has been 
regarded as one of the most stable and resourceful ethnoregionalist parties in the CEE 
region.610 Based on Rudolph and Thompson’s 1985 classifications, Zariski provides a 
confirmation regarding the high degree of assertiveness displayed by DUHR – drawing on 
their distinctions between “ethnoterritorial movements” he depicts the Bulgarian MRF as an 
“output-oriented” (moderate) party, while the DUHR is labeled as “anti-authority” (thus 
falling within a more extreme category).611 Arguably, one contributing factor to the tendency 
of the Hungarians in Romania to be more outward looking was their especially close and 
amicable relationship with their kin state (or more accurately their external national 
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“homeland”, to borrow Brubaker’s terminology) Hungary.612 In addition, since the 1990s 
they have been quite attentive to developments in Hungary, as the Hungarian economy 
consistently performed better than the Romanian one, while the same did not apply to Turks 
in Bulgaria, as there was no sharp divergence between the level of economic development of 
Bulgaria and Turkey.613 The relative legitimacy of the outward looking faction within DUHR 
(led by László Tőkés) compared with the inward looking one gradually increased (it made 
sense to consider connecting Transylvania separately with the Hungarian economy) 
throughout the 1990s and early 2000s,614 but this had the unfortunate effect of compromising 
the efficiency of DUHR’s cooperation with mainstream parties in Romania.615  
 
         Official level discourses on immigrants in Romania post-1989 have been characterized 
by an avoidance of the key issues (no serious attention has been dedicated to the existence of 
immigration flows in Romania), while on the popular level there has been a tendency to 
impute a criminal identity on foreign settlers,616 with the media focusing on the negative 
aspects of immigration flows.617 Nonetheless, in recent years (2007-2009) Romania has been 
one of the countries that have approved refugee and asylum applications at a much higher 
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         One of the founding Six members of the EU, the Netherlands has long been among the 
most influential countries within the Union and its system of governance and policy styles 
have been deemed a natural fit with those of the supranational community. Since the 1990s, 
there has been a temporal overlap between the increased questioning of the multicultural 
model within the Netherlands and the rise in Eurosceptic sentiments as well as the 
redefinitions of discourses pertaining to the EU. The recent successful showings of populists 
have continued to cast doubts on the accuracy of the “model Europeanizer” label attached to 
the Netherlands. 
 
3.2 Dutch nationalism 
 
         The process of formation of a single Dutch nation has been traced to the 12th century, 
with the enduring wars against the Spanish kingdom in the early to mid 17th century creating 
a number of complications and enhancing the divisions between two halves of the 
Netherlands, based on religious affiliation: Protestantism (Calvinism) characterizing the 
northern parts and Catholicism typifying the southern Netherlands, which remained tightly in 
Spain’s grip (and in 1713 fell under Austrian control).619 Religion has been identified as the 
most important single factor when it came to the historical processes shaping the creation of a 
Dutch nation, though economic aspects are not to be downplayed.620 Dutch national 
consciousness and nationalism have been regarded as being closely connected to the 
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Protestant identity, even if one is to assume that there was a degree of distinctiveness to the 
northern Netherlands prior to the Reformation processes.621 In the 1880s, the liberals in the 
Netherlands played their part in increasing national sentiment by emphasizing the House of 
Orange and the institution of the monarchy as unifying symbols that would reduce the 
faultlines between those belonging to different religious traditions.622 The turn of the 20th 
century saw popular nationalism within the Netherlands reach its zenith, in part bolstered by 
the Boer War (1899-1902), which resulted in the springing up of various cultural revival 
societies for the preservation of the Dutch language and “national character”.623 However, the 
lack of decisive support offered by the Dutch government to the Boers eventually contributed 
to the sinking in of the realization that the Netherlands was essentially a small state and 
reduced patriotic fervour. Unlike other countries involved in the Great War (such as Germany 
and France), Dutch nationalism is thought to have “peaked too early” and is assessed not to 
have undergone a jingoist phase – for instance, it has lacked the craving for expansionary 
wars.624 One of the viewpoints still popular to this day is that the Second World War 
experiences did not significantly alter the nature of the nationalist trajectory within the 
Netherlands.625 
 
         In addition to the historically rooted religious cleavages, Dutch society is significantly 
divided by class cleavages. The opposition between the middle and lower classes in the 
Netherlands has been characterized as being more potent and historically entrenched than in 
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the majority of the other European countries. The Dutch bourgeoisie is assumed to have 
become the most powerful social group in the country as early as the foundation of the 
Netherlands Republic in the early 17th century (rather than since the apex of the Industrial 
Revolution).626 
         The formation of the Dutch nation-state has been labeled as a demotic or elite-driven 
process due to the pervasive role of national elites and the relatively limited influence of mass 
movements.627 The Constitution of 1848, which was largely modeled after Thorbecke, 
guaranteed many liberties such as freedom of religion and educational 
opportunities.628Another significant development – consociationalism, also dubbed as 
verzuiling or pillarization in the Dutch context, was an outgrowth of the 1917 Constitution 
and is deemed to have officially persisted until 1967.629 The process of pillarization 
essentially strengthened and provided a permanent seal to the segmentation of Dutch society 
in compartments consisting of Protestants, Roman Catholics, and Socialists/Liberals.630 The 
mid 1960s are generally acknowledged as the cut-off point, which marked the serious decline 
of pillarization, attributable to processes like modernization and a growth of public activism 
bypassing the elite level. The elites within the pillars had been the ones in charge when it 
came to the negotiations of general policies applicable to the Dutch state.631 This decline of 
these socio-religious cleavages within Dutch society in the late 1960s is seen to have 
removed the last obstacles for the ushering in of tolerance and pragmatism as the hallmarks 
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of Dutch national identity.632 Furthermore, Naziesque parties with an essentialist 
understanding of Dutch ethnicity never achieved any substantial popularity in the 
Netherlands and went through many splinterings and mergers;633 consequently, the post-
WWII era also gradually saw the entrenchment of the civic conception of Dutch citizenship. 
While the Dutch Nationality Act of 1892 was mainly based on the jus sanguinis principle, so 
that immigrants could only obtain Dutch citizenship through naturalization, in 1953, all 
immigrant children of third generation residents became automatically entitled to 
citizenship.634 
         As for Europeanism and Dutch identity, it would be perhaps fair to say that the 
perception of a natural fit between the Dutch and European identities has not always been 
part of the common consciousness. Up until the early 1940s, the Dutch general public’s 
interest in foreign policy was less pronounced in comparison to that in many other European 
countries. The idea of “European unity of thought” did not really resonate with large 
segments of Dutch society. For instance, there was little debate generated by and few 
conferences were organized to discuss Pan-Europe (1923) by Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi 
(an Austrian pioneer of European integration) and the Dutch politicians from the country’s 
foreign ministry that he tried to enlist in order to “spread the message” rarely gave him the 
time of day and displayed scepticism regarding his vision of a Common European Customs 
Union.635 However, by the end of the Second World War massive enthusiasm for the idea of 
European integration started to develop. Societal groups and unofficial think tanks like 
European Action assessed European federalism as a harbinger of true freedom and regarded it 
as an alternative way for the national community to rejuvenate (something which could not 
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really be achieved within the confines of the nation-state).636 The European federalism 
movement in the Netherlands became more prominent in 1948 and its key policy 
programmes emphasized cultural unity, the need to find a solution to the problematic 
interactions between large and small states within Europe and the benefits of European 
economic cooperation.637 Conceptualizations of European unity within the Netherlands also 
tended to go hand in hand with support for the notion of a “common humanity united within 
one world state”.638 European integration tended to be associated with the creation of a new 
order within Europe that would contribute to strengthening the importance of international 
law.639 It has been claimed that the Second World War dispelled the illusions that the 
Netherlands was a “Middle Power” that could be in a position to maintain its neutrality and 
successfully pursue its national interests within the current international order. 640  
         Cold War dynamics also contributed towards reorienting Dutch policy from the 
premium placed on narrow concerns (such as the Indonesian question) to embracing 
discussions focusing on European cooperation.641 In the aftermath of the Second World War, 
despite the overtly pro-European unity shift in Dutch foreign policy, there were concerns 
among members of Dutch governments regarding the political and military repercussions 
arising out of European unity (the significant economic benefits notwithstanding).642 Two 
main Dutch schools of thought were prominent at the time. The first one regarded the 
Netherlands as a maritime country that “should not be bottled up [through the EU] with 
countries having a more continental background”. The second one emphasized that from the 
standpoint of Dutch national interests it was desirable to retain a balance between its 
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neighbors and thus there was support for British accession into the Community.643 Until 
1948, there was also hope on the part of quite a few Dutch politicians that a European 
community could serve as a bridge between the United States and the Soviet Union.644 
Subsequently, the terms “Europe” and “Western Europe” started to be regarded as 
synonymous within Dutch society, with non-democratic states like Portugal and Spain 
initially being excluded from the picture.645 The emphasis on moralism rather than political 
pragmatism among Dutch foreign policy-makers in the 1950s has been regarded as conducive 
to the country’s staunch opposition to Communism and the tendency to label those lacking 
enthusiasm for European integration as “sinners”.646 However, the social revolution of the 
mid 1960s that manifested itself through a wave of liberalism, as evidenced for example by 
the rapid abandonment of staunch conservatism within the Dutch Catholic Church, somewhat 
compromised the legitimacy of Dutch elites and brought about a dwindling of the appeal of 
European integration (as well as of American foreign policy initiatives) for the members of 
the younger generations in the Netherlands.647 During that period, parties lacking strong 
religious roots gradually started to become more influential within the Dutch political 
system.648 As summed up by Heldring: 
 
         “They [moralism and idealism] had become stronger than before, but no longer 
projected themselves on anti-communist crusades or European supranationalism, but rather 
on …. distant causes such as Vietnam, Southern Africa, Chile, etc.”.649  
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         Essentially, the “idealistic” phase (from the perspective of the general public) when it 
came to European integration in the Netherlands is thought to have persisted between 1950 
and 1965.650 
 
3.3 Post-Maastricht party system developments 
 
         The Netherlands has consistently been regarded as one of the most federalist of the EU 
member states, implying a willingness to support the deepening of EU integration and a 
strengthening of the role of the supranational institutions.651 Its political culture has 
frequently been lauded for its open-mindedness and receptivity to EU models.652 However, it 
is notable that since the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the Netherlands, where the 
intergovernmental negotiations surrounding the treaty were actually held, has seen the largest 
increase in Euroscepticism among EU countries.653 There has been a widening of the gap 
between the turnout at national and European elections since 1979, with this disconnect 
picking up pace in the 1990s.654 Eurobarometer surveys indicate that in the mid 1990s only 
27 % of Dutch citizens characterized themselves as being “interested in EU politics”.655 Party 
politics in the Netherlands have been depicted as constituting a par excellence example of the 
shift from a “permissive consensus” to a “constraining dissensus”, as the cheerful pro-
European tone of EU-related debates gradually gave way to Eurosceptic rhetoric.656 The PVV 
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which was officially founded by Geert Wilders (a VVD party defector) in 2006 has 
established itself as the new face of Dutch Euroscepticism and also challenged the role played 
by traditional conservatives in the Netherlands. In 2009 and 2010, it was at one point the 
most popularly supported Dutch party according to polling information (for further details see 
Appendix 2 and Appendix 3). However, it was by no means a pioneer in the transformation 
of the Dutch political landscape. In the early 2000s, an ideological precursor to the PVV 
secured an important breakthrough, contributing to the abolition of taboos in political 
discourses and offering a platform of “new realism” that combined progressive views on 
sexual minority issues (sexual freedom is sometimes conceptualized as a typically Dutch 
trope)657 with a staunch opposition to immigration in general and Islamization in particular.658 
On 11 February 2002, Pim Fortuyn, a politician with a prior membership in left-wing 
groupings who had been expelled from the Leefbaar Nederland (LN) party for comments 
made against Islam, established the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF).659 Support for the new party 
skyrocketed in the three months preceding the 2002 Dutch general election and subsequently 
the LPF obtained 26 seats and 17 % of the vore in the Second Chamber of the Dutch 
Parliament (Fortuyn was assassinated nine days before election day).660 While the LPF’s 
electoral appeal significantly dwindled following the quick collapse of the coalition 
government of which it had become part and it was formally disbanded on 1 February 2008, 
its legacy would prove to be long-lasting compared to previous right-wing players in Dutch 
politics such as the Centrum Democraten (CD).661 On the level of the wider Dutch society, 
the charismatic Fortuyn demonstrated that a party whose ideology is very much in line with 
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the underlying cultural norms in the Netherlands when it comes to human rights and gender 
roles, could attain resounding success by  uncompromisingly adopting right-wing rhetoric 
with regard to cultural outsiders.662 With view to the Dutch populist party environment, it 
served as an ideological inspiration for the PVV, while its mistakes in party-building and 
problems with weak institutionalization, which doomed it to remain a “flash party”, provided 
exceptionally valuable learning experiences for Wilders.663 The secrecy and rigidity of 
hierarchies within the PVV party have been justified as necessary664 on the grounds of the 
decline and eventual folding of the organizationally and behaviourally chaotic LPF.665  
         In addition to concerns about immigration, the Dutch U-turns in the attitudes displayed 
towards the EU have been traced to the reemergence of “traditional national interest” 
discourses. Politicians like Fritz Bolkenstein started to raise concerns regarding the country’s 
meekness when it came to the “defending of its corner” within the EU arena, with a perceived 
lax enforcement of EU budget deficit requirements in the case of “big” states like France and 
Germany constituting one of the impetuses.666 Beginning in the early 2000s, discourses 
promoting the imposition of limits when it comes to the future development of European 
integration began to feature prominently in the rhetoric of both mainstream and fringe parties. 
The Dutch national governments have started to emphasize that the national character 
(eigenheid) of the Netherlands should be protected in a new EU that is “bigger and pushy”.667 
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One major concern raised across the party spectrum has been tied to the possibility of a loss 
of Dutch influence within the EU in the near future due to the power yielded by the larger 
states.668 Analysts such as Cuperus have stipulated that the highly publicized 2005 Dutch 
rejection of the proposed European Constitution was intricately tied to considerations about 
the EU and was not necessarily attributable to a spillover of the disillusionment with the 
governing forces within the Netherlands. Some of the prominent themes that were identified 
by the anti-EU disposed voters touched upon notions like the “betrayal of Europe” (the EU 
being conceptualized as a rampant globalization vehicle to the detriment of the traditional 
European social model) and the “razor blade of uniformization” (connected to the fears of the 
creation of a superstate).669 In 1990, perceptions of ethnic threats in the Netherlands were not 
closely intertwined with Euroscepticism. By contrast, studies from 2008 suggest that feelings 
of ethnic threat have become the strongest predictor of Euroscepticism.670 Verkaaik opines 
that the new nationalism in the Netherlands is different in comparison to previous forms, as it 
primarily targets “internal migrant others”, with Muslims being the particular focus.671 
Proclamations regarding the existence of a misfit between the multicultural EU and an 
emerging monocultural understanding of the Dutch nation have started to come to the 
surface, with factions more moderate than the PVV willing to espouse such positions.672 In 
line with these tendencies, far rightist politicians have also increased their influence in the 
political fray. Due to the rise in the influence of populist figureheads like Geert Wilders and 
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Rita Verdonk, a Dutch network described 2008 as “the year of populism” and the threat of 
populism to the tenets of Dutch democracy has been appraised as being quite serious.673  
 
3.4 Majority/Minority dynamics pertaining to immigration 
 
         The Netherlands has a long tradition of immigration, to a large extent because of the 
well-developed economy and the religious freedoms afforded to immigrants. For example, 
between 1600 and 1800, 5 to 10 % of the Dutch citizens were born outside the territory of the 
Netherlands.674 The first post-WWII immigration wave (from Indonesia in and after 1949) 
and the third one (following the declaration of independence of Suriname in 1975) did not 
trigger serious debates regarding citizenship and the immigrants from these states were 
generally able to effortlessly obtain Dutch nationality soon after their arrival.675 Thus, until 
the late 1970s, immigration tended to be a low salience issue, with the presence of 
immigrants framed as only a temporary phenomenon (this was indicated by the label attached 
to them (mainly those from Mediterranean countries) – gastarbeider (“guest workers”)).676 
The immigrants were essentially encouraged to maintain and cling to their own cultural 
identity.677 The 1979 “Ethnic Minorities” report was influential in highlighting the reality that 
many of the immigrants were actually there to stay and turned out to be a catalyst for policy 
reorganization – a form of official multiculturalism, premised on group-based emancipation 
and equality in the legal domain was launched.678 The late 1980s and early 1990s saw the 
emergence of strong criticisms of this approach, some of them arguing that the notion of 
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“identificational integration” was compromised and immigrants exhibited preferences for 
sticking to their own enclaves.679 In the 1990s, an Integration Policy, which stressed the 
importance of civic integration programs for newcomers, was at the forefront of the 
government’s efforts to tackle immigration issues, and there was an increasing politicization 
of migration.680 In the early to mid 1990s, the increased scepticism regarding immigration 
and integration also coincided with a “crisis of solidarity” in the Netherlands, with the Dutch 
social model facing serious challenges due to the number of social security contributors 
declining significantly – at the time, the Netherlands occupied one of the bottom spots in 
Europe with regard to the number of social security payers relative to those making up the 
ranks of the beneficiaries from social funding schemes.681 Acute concerns surrounding 
immigrant integration started to abound after the turn of the millennium, to an extent due to a 
number of violent incidents involving immigrants such as the murder of prominent filmmaker 
Theo van Gogh by a Dutch-Moroccan in 2004, and helped initiate “New Style” integration 
policies.682 In addition, as outlined in the previous section, the emergence of the LPF as an 
influential (albeit short-lived) party in the Netherlands was instrumental in altering the policy 
boundaries on immigration – Fortuyn’s ability to skillfully entangle suspicions towards Islam 
with the themes of personal freedom683 and portray the majority Dutch as vulnerable 
minorities themselves due to being at the mercy of groups espousing backward cultural 
values and misguided liberals, caused a shift in the focal point of the debates regarding the 
type of integration to be pursued.684 In this regard, “neo-assimilationist” measures like 
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compulsory integration packages for both newcomers and old comers became increasingly 
prominent.685  
         It has to be mentioned that the insistence on keeping intact certain designated 
categories, based on ethnic roots, may be having a polarizing effect on intergroup dynamics. 
Notions like allochtoon, which refer to anyone who has at least one parent not born in the 
Netherlands, are still being juxtaposed against those like autochtoon (native).686 Various 
studies have suggested that immigrants of Turkish or Moroccan descent are the most likely to 
find it challenging to gain acceptance within the Dutch mainstream and are also susceptible to 
evoking threat perceptions in relation to the maintenance of Dutch identity and culture.687 The 
self-image of the Dutch as a tolerant and multicultural nation has sometimes been challenged 
due to the understanding that even prior to the increase in nationalism in the mid 2000s, the 
liberal establishment in the Netherlands subscribed to an essentialist notion of culture and a 
marked disparity in economic standards between neighbourhoods populated by immigrants 
and native Dutch was retained.688 
 
         Recently, there has been a substantial influx of migrants from CEE and this has had an 
impact on public opinion as well as the populist agenda. As described in Ch. 2, official 
policies towards immigrants from outside the EU have become less receptive, with the EU 
level providing the blueprint,689 with the exchange of successful member states practices 
through a “demonstration effect” also playing a substantial role.690 
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         Germany, another founding member of the EU, has been shaped by a tumultuous 
nationalist history and at one point in time was the harbinger of values diametrically opposed 
to the core EU principles. In the aftermath of WWII, it gradually evolved into a poster child 
of the EU and has been characterized as a country in which the “national interest has fused 
with the European one”.691 However, while offering a difficult institutional environment for 
nationalist-populist parties, it has not been spared the Netherlands’ forceful engagement with 
multicultural issues and Eurosceptic forces are no longer content with keeping a low profile. 
 
4.2 German nationalism 
 
         Germany is commonly regarded as being the first country to adopt the quintessential 
ethnic model of nationalism. Hans-Ulrich Wehler (1987) maintains that the birth of “modern 
German nationalism” could be traced to the period between “1789 and 1815”, while other 
theorists like Hartmut Boockmann puts Germany in the same camp as other “modern 
nations” that rose from the ashes as early as the Middle Ages.692 The traditions of the German 
Romantic movements provided the intellectual fuel for the ruling elites within Prussia and 
Austria, who were the pioneers in employing ethnic nationalism in their pursuit of the goal of 
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unification of the German-speaking populations in Central Europe.693 One milestone event 
pertaining to the entrechment of mass nationalism within Germany was arguably the1840 
Rhine crisis (triggered by the then French Prime Minister Adolphe Thiers’ statements that 
France could annex the left bank of the Rhine) during which the German general public 
exerted pressure on their various governments to adopt a very belligerent stance against 
France.694 Prior to that point in time, German nationalism has been gauged as exhibiting 
“liberal” features, while after the early 1840s a romantic strand of nationalism with Völkisch 
elements started taking shape.695 The German path to national unity and the creation of a 
national identity was heavily premised on the German Kulturnation (cultural nation), which 
ushered in the myth of the ethnic community of Germans (Volksnation) in the aftermath of 
the 1871 unification.696 The German Kulturnation was seen to encompass those who spoke 
the German language and internalized the values of humanistic Bildung (enrichment).697 
Thus, German nationalism included both political and cultural layers, with the latter 
exhibiting a cultural bias, German culture being deemed as possessing superior value 
orientations when juxtaposed against the perceived materialism of the other Western 
civilizations.698  
         The premium placed on ethnicity would also cross over into the legal realm. Brubaker 
sums up the dominant ethnic paradigm with regard to citizenship in Germany as follows: 
“The German definition of the citizenry as a community of descent, restrictive toward non-
German immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union, reflects the pronounced ethnocultural inflection in German self-
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understanding”.699 The logic of ethnicity affected citizenship provisions in the aftermath of 
German unification, in part due to the need to justify the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine (a 
strong emphasis was placed on the region’s German culture and ancestry).700 The Reichs- und 
Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz (Germany’s first national citizenship law of 22 July 1913) 
established that German citizenship could only be acquired based on descent and not via 
territoriality.701 This 1913 law was actually not amended in 1949, when the separate German 
states were established, as it made it easy to maintain legal ties with the East Germans.702 
         In terms of some of the long-term structural antecedents for the shocking excesses 
which came to characterize the Nazi regime, the delayed national unification and 
industrialization, as well as the lack of a bourgeois revolution and parliamentarization are 
seen as some of the stepping stones for Nazi ideology being able to successfully take roots in 
Germany.703 Prior to the First World War as well as in its aftermath, Europeanism (in the 
sense of Europe constituting its own civilization juxtaposed against Oriental ones) was 
articulated by prominent thinkers in Germany like theologian Ernst Tröltsch, who followed 
the Kantian tradition, and regarded such conceptualizations as a way of providing a check on 
European colonial rivalries and state nationalism.704 During the Nazi period, despite some 
elements of Pan-Europeanism (generally only emphasizing similarities between Germany and 
Western European as well as some Southern European states) appearing in the official 
rhetoric as well as the establishment of close relations between Germany and like-minded 
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regimes in CEE states like Hungary and Romania,705 Europeanism was frequently associated 
with decadence and deemed alien to German culture by chief ideologues like Propaganda 
Minister Joseph Goebbels.706 Pan-Europeanist proclamations generally did not reflect a 
strong attachment to Europe as a cultural space, but largely served instrumental ends.707 In 
this regard, “Aryanism” could be conceptualized as selective or restricted Europeanism, as 
the supposedly common roots between Germans and Western European people like the 
[Ancient] Greeks were overemphasized,708 while Eastern European ethnic groups like Poles 
were vilified by the Nazi leadership and were subjected to extreme dehumanization709 or in 
the case of Russians had their scientific achievements downplayed and credited to “Germanic 
strains” supposedly present only in the upper classes.710 According to Pervushin, Hitler 
showed a preference for “Pan-Aryanism” rather than German nationalism, desiring the 
integration into a common political framework of all “Aryan people” and not necessarily 
insisting on Germans constituting the core of such a “grand project”.711 
         The defeat in WWII seemed to sound the death knell for the bellicose and virulent 
brand of nationalism that typified the Nazi years. The division of the country led to the 
development of different historical forms of historical consciousness in the case of East and 
West Germany in terms of efforts to come to terms with the past.712 The West German 
conception of the German nation evolved in the direction of a civic-territorial one, with an 
emphasis placed on non-ethnic aspects like Verfassungspatriotismus or constitutional 
patriotism. The West German notion of what constituted the “other” came to be represented 
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by Germany’s own rabidly nationalistic and militaristic history.713 In marked contrast, in East 
Germany, the German nation as an ethnic entity remained the frame of reference for national 
identity.714 The GDR was viewed as a political structure that was to be of relatively short 
duration, as a future pan-German socialist nation (imagined in ethnic terms despite the 
pretences of Socialist Internationalism) would come to replace it.715  
         In contrast, up to the late 1980s, in West Germany national (generic German) 
consciousness had been relegated to the backstage – the feeling of belonging to the West 
German state, the specific region or province, and the European Community exerted a 
stronger emotional pull on the collective psyche.716 This confidence in referring to future pan-
German designs in the case of East Germany could be attributed to the less pervasive feelings 
of moral guilt in comparison to those typical of its Western counterpart. The Eastern German 
state portrayed itself as having proudly emerged on the side of the “historical victors” in the 
aftermath of WWII after facing victimization by the Nazis.717 In this regard, it has been 
claimed that GDR displayed marked deficiencies when it came to constructive engagement 
with the Nazi legacy,718 with the sharp rise in radical right extremism in the 1990s arguably 
seen as a manifestation of this negligence on the part of the state authorities.719 
         In a number of respects, German reunification could be seen to have proceeded quite 
smoothly despite the vastly different systems of governance between the FRG and the GDR. 
For instance, in the case of East Germany, prominent communist functionaries were generally 
regarded as easily dispensable, especially relative to their counterparts in other Eastern bloc 
states, as much of the country immediately became integrated with the West German 
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institutions in the aftermath of unification.720 In the aftermath of the mergers between East 
and West German sister parties in 1990, the East Germans represented only an insignificant 
part of the total membership.721 Still, there were a number of important cultural differences 
when it came to understandings of party practices. Eastern Germans (no matter their actual 
political affiliation) were generally supportive of the consociational approach to democracy 
(implying the participation of all principal parties and groups in the decision-making process) 
and frowned upon the more oppositional one endorsed by the West Germans.722  
         On the discourse front, reunification seems to have expediently created a blend between 
the East German and West German traditions of Vergangenheitsbewältigung (dealing with 
the past), with historiographical discourses since the early 1990s tending to focus on the 
“return to normalcy” theme, as well as the recreation of a benign “inward nationalism”, 
which would better equip the Germans to resolve the new economic and foreign policy 
issues.723 In the aftermath of unification, patriotism (rather than nationalism) attained an aura 
of legitimacy and increased in visibility, while only a small minority of Germans continued to 
emphasize a preference for an exclusively cosmopolitan identity.724 In 1984, two thirds of 
Germans were supportive of increasing the pace of European integration, but this percentage 
declined to 10 % in 1990, with the possibility of the adoption of a common currency being at 
the forefront of grievances.725 However, the rise of nationalism in Germany in the early 1990s 
(especially in the new Federal states in the east, where people consistently reported higher 
levels of patriotism and ethnocentrism)726 did not indicate a strong willingness to challenge 
the European frame, but was more the result of the social and economic turmoil following the 
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collapse of communism.727 To an extent the realization among Germans that their country 
was able to “successfully sell” its unification to the outside world (present it as a non-
threatening event) due to its embeddedness into the supranational structures could be 
regarded as a contributing factor to the lack of a strong shift in attitudes.728 The argument has 
been advanced that Helmut Kohl was eventually rather successful in discrediting the critics of 
a single currency by appealing to the sentiment that “good Germans” had to support the Euro 
as any “good European” should do. Kohl was very conscious of what he saw as the need for 
the “Europeanization of the nation-state identity” in Germany.729 
 
4.3 Post-Maastricht party system developments 
 
         As a whole, Germany was not notable for its Euroscepticism in the years prior to 1989. 
The FRG has traditionally been considered a compliant agent when it came to its interactions 
with other EU members. In the post-war years, Germany enjoyed a stable elite consensus 
around the European project and there was a broad cross-party agreement over the 
desirability of pooled political sovereignty. The presence of a compliant media, a permissive 
consensus among the general public, as well as an ingrained reluctance among the political 
class to engage in populist politics on the issue of the EU bolstered such an EU-permissive 
general stance.730 While the “permissive consensus” among the general public has not always 
implied a very enthusiastic endorsement of the EU project, the absence of plebiscites and 
referendums in the FRG has been credited with keeping the European issue a relatively 
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residual one.731 German unification, however, affected, albeit in subtle forms, the former 
cross-party consensus on Europe. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) briefly considered 
adopting a more sceptical attitude towards Europe in the mid-1990s,732 while the leftist PDS 
party remained critical of many fundamental aspects of the integration process. The Christian 
Democrats’ regional sister party, the CSU, has also been more ambiguous in its 
pronouncements regarding the EU. It also developed close links with the Haider party in 
Austria.733 Right-wing parties in Germany (even if only enjoying fringe status) have been 
depicted as remaining irritants in the German political field, with their positions on Europe 
having the potential to influence debates touching upon Germany’s place in a united 
Europe.734 In this regard, die Republikaner (founded in 1983) used to have close connections 
with the CSU and despite being characterized as firmly planted in right-wing territory, are 
currently not subjected to judicial monitoring and have managed to keep a certain distance 
from the parties with Neo-Nazi leanings, so their brand of Euroscepticism is arguably capable 
of making inroads into the mainstream (for more information see Appendix 2). All in all, a 
combination of factors in Germany has guarded against the emergence of party-based 
Euroscepticism as an enduring and influential phenomenon – the presence of institutional 
constraints, the low salience of EU issues in public opinion, and the political centre’s success 
in setting forth the parameters of European debate.735 However, surveys from 2010 indicate 
that Euroscepticism is on the rise in Germany.736 Hellmann uses the term “de-
Europeanization” to refer to the gradual “domestication” of German European policy and as 
shorthand for the increasingly problematic patterns of interactions between Germany and the 
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EU.737 The strongest current narrative in Germany is the discourse for a limited and 
consolidated Europe.738  
 
4.4 Majority/Minority dynamics pertaining to immigration 
 
         Sustained recruitment of foreign workers in West Germany started in 1955 and 
increased significantly after 1961. Up to 1973, all the stakeholders involved (from the 
German state to the “guestworkers” themselves) firmly believed that these arrangements 
would only be on a temporary basis and measures for their integration into German society 
were not considered.739 Paradoxically, in the early years of immigration, the only legislation 
that covered this area was a remnant of the Nazi Germany years. The 1965 Foreigner Act 
placed the onus on immigrants by stipulating that they were to prove “they deserved 
hospitality” and “did not harm the interests”of the FRG.740 The end of worker recruitment in 
1973 did not stem the population flows into the German state, as family reunions began to 
take place. The temporary migration started to transform itself into a settlement process.741 
By the mid 1980s, Germany had lost considerable control over entry, especially in the case of 
family members of migrant workers.742 Nonetheless, until 1998, the official government 
position generally reflected an insistence that “Germany is not an immigration country” and 
some of the official guidelines stressed the importance of support for voluntary return in the 
case of immigrants. Up until the 1980s, immigrants were generally not viewed as active 
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citizens in civil society. In Thränhardt’s view, adopting anti-immigrant stances was not seen 
as particularly risky from a political standpoint not only by right-wing parties, but also by 
more moderate ones.743 Mainstream parties were also gauged not to have gone to great 
lengths to include the immigrant population in their daily activities.744  
         Between 1990 and 1999, more than 4 million new immigrants with a non-German 
background settled in Germany, which exceeded the corresponding numbers for the USA 
during the same period.745 During the same period, 2.3 million ethnic German immigrants 
arrived in the country, mainly from former USSR states.746 In 1998, a centre-left government 
took the reins of the country and initiated new laws for immigration, integration and 
citizenship, eradicating the jus sanguinis tradition of granting citizenship.747 Since January 
2000, children of non-German parents who have legally resided in the country for a minimum 
of eight years are automatically awarded citizenship.748 The new government explicitly 
acknowledged the immigration situation in Germany and expressed support for the 
integration of newcomers.749 It is notable that at the time the CDU, which stood in opposition, 
did its best to put the new government on the defensive when it came to its Ausländerpolitik 
(foreigners’ policies), launching accusations that “German cultural identity” could be 
compromised.750 However, in the subsequent two years, the centre-right factions CDU and 
CSU also changed some of their stances in this domain, recognizing a need for “controlled 
immigration”.751 The 2005 Immigration Act marked an assimilationist turn in German 
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immigrant integration policies, as it ushered in a new focus on integration courses for 
immigrants, prioritizing the acqusition of German language skills.752A new frame was 
introduced, stipulating that the teaching of immigration courses is to be conceptualized as a 
social service and immigrants were to be viewed as “customers” or “consumers”.753 Since 
2007, there has also been a more active involvement of the local municipalities in the 
integration of immigrants (especially Muslims), with a high degree of success attained in 
cities like Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Berlin, and Munich.754 The Leitkulturdebatte (“debate on the 
existence of a leading culture within Germany”), which emerged out of the above outlined 
tensions, has continued to resurface and has been tied to a desire to maintain the ethnic 
boundaries between “Germans” and “immigrants”.755 Proponents of the existence of a 
“leading culture” have been accused of tacitly attempting to create a new form of overarching 
cultural identity for the Germans, which would on the surface replace the “blood and soil” 
conception of the nation, but actually retain many of its exclusionary facets.756  
         Germany’s lukewarm stances regarding the prospective Turkish membership in the EU 
are also not to be divorced from the generally negative evaluations of the degree to which 
Turks in Germany have been able to internalize core German values.757 The German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel’s October 2010 remarks on the deficiencies of multiculturalism 
within Germany, which served to revive some of the old debates, could possibly be better 
understood by taking into account the initial polemics surrounding the introduction of the 
Leitkultur notion. On the strategic front, one should also not lose sight of the fact that 
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mainstream parties like the CDU have also been quite capable of co-opting the voters holding 
more extreme views on immigration and the viability of democracy.758 
         As mentioned in Chapter 2, Germany has also been a major receiving country for 
migrants from CEE. This continued after the 2004 enlargement, despite the fact that Germany 
imposed transitional restrictions on access to its labour market for the full seven years it was 























5: Party Selection Rationale 
 
         The previous section identified the rationale behind the country selection, examining 
the nature of nationalist expression within specific states, the relations between majority and 
minority groups and the features of Europeanization in the period between 1990 and 2011. 
The following paragraphs provide a brief introduction to the particular political parties within 
the countries that were chosen for the purposes of analysis, and indicate why they deserve 
further scrutiny in view of the overarching aims of the thesis and its attempts to both address 
the hypotheses set out in Chapter Two and also uncover aspects of Europeanization-
engendered Euroscepticism which were not apparent from the literature survey.  
 
         Firstly, the four parties in question – the Bulgarian Ataka, the Romanian PRM, the 
Dutch PVV and the German REP – fit the bill of “consistently Eurosceptic” factions and EU-
related issues feature prominently in the pronouncements of party leaders and appear in the 
party manifestos. Ataka was established in April 2005 (as a result of a merger of a number of 
smaller political organizations – the NMSF, the BNPP, and the UPF) by Volen Siderov with 
the support of SKAT TV (a Bulgarian nationalistic TV news anchor).759 It has generally been 
thought of as toeing a soft Eurosceptic line, e.g. in the first years since its establishment it 
vigorously pressed for a renegotiation of Bulgaria’s accession treaty with the EU, but has not 
displayed intrinsic opposition to the country’s membership.760 The PRM was founded in 1991 
by Vadim Tudor and from the very beginning it carved itself an ultra-nationalistic niche.761 
Together with Ataka it was one of the influential members of the short-lived ITS (Identity, 
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Tradition and Sovereignty) political group in the EP, which had a reputation as a gathering of 
staunchly Eurosceptic politicians with far right sympathies.762 Formed in November 1983 by 
Franz Handlos, Ekkehard Voigt and Franz Schönhuber, the REP was an outgrowth of the 
dissatisfaction of some German traditional conservatives with Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s 
“moral turn” and the reaching out to East Germany by members of the CSU.763 In the period 
between 1992 and 2001, it underwent frequent changes in its membership and was subject to 
monitoring at the behest of German courts. The party has experienced a reorientation in a 
moderate direction since the early 2000s, but opposition to the current form of EU integration 
has been at the cornerstone of its ideology.764 In some respects the PVV followed a similar 
route. It was established in February 2006 by Geert Wilders, a former member of the VVD (a 
party characterized as liberal and in favour of free market principles), who had become 
embroiled in serious disagreements with other VVD representatives over their opinions on 
Turkey’s potential accession to the EU. 765 Compared to its German counterpart, however, it 
has tended to be even more unabashedly Eurosceptic. For instance, it has been characterized 
as “fiercely Eurosceptic” in the Dutch national context relative to “timidly Eurosceptic” 
parties like the Dutch Socialist Party.766  
         Thus, while the four parties may occupy the political fringe and may not have any 
realistic prospects of taking the helm of their countries (especially by themselves), they 
nonetheless tend to carefully follow EU-related developments and are likely to be informed 
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about the core EU domains (even if they might subsequently choose to distort some of the 
insights they receive through EU channels). In addition, in terms of their positioning within 
their party system, none of these parties could be considered “hard” Eurosceptics (though 
some of them may shun the label of “soft” Eurosceptics), so their critiques are more likely to 
touch upon specific EU impacts on the nation-state rather than on an intrinsic opposition to a 
country’s integration into a supranational structure, which is in accordance with the aims of 
the thesis. The Greater Romania party has proven somewhat elusive to classify, but Taggart 
and Szczerbiak recognize it as fitting the definition of a “soft Eurosceptic”.767 As for the 
German REP, the party is generally acknowledged to have turned to Euroscepticism in the 
aftermath of the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty (described as “Versailles without a war” 
by then party leader Schönhuber). It still does not fit the label of a hard Eurosceptic party, 
with the desire for a return to the German Mark and anti-immigrant discourses playing a 
major part in shaping its opposition to integration into the European Union.768 Blagovesta 
Cholova, in a 2007 article, written at a time when it is generally agreed that Ataka reached 
the peak of its anti-EU sentiment, concurred with the “soft Eurosceptic” label for Ataka, 
drawing on Taggart and Szczerbiak’s methodology.769 Similarly, the PVV has been rated as a 
right wing populist party rather than a “pure Eurosceptical force” (without a right-wing 
populist agenda), in contrast to parties like UKIP.770 However, since around July 2012, the 
party has actually been advocating for the Netherlands’ withdrawal from the EU, so it 
remains to be seen whether this total rejection of the EU is just a temporary phase or will 
actually become a defining component of its identity.771 It also has to be taken into account 
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that right-wing parties are not unlikely to promote an economic Europe (at least to a larger 
degree than left-wingers), so this fits together with my expectation that they would be likely 
to express criticism of the EU’s involvement in non-economic realms.772  
 
         Secondly, all of these parties tend to take a heavy-handed approach to minority issues 
and while majority-minority relations may not always constitute an idée fixe from the 
perspective of party visionaries, opposition to the population increase of members of specific 
cultural or ethno-religious groups, and/or their presumed gains in influence, are frequently 
referred to and identified as principal concerns. Both Ataka and the PRM are at least partially 
left-wing in their economic orientation and prominent members have been accused of 
collaboration with the communist regimes in their countries, and this possibly has a 
connection to their attitudes towards minority empowerment. Interestingly enough, minorities 
in both countries played a role in paving the way for the toppling of the communist system – 
the Hungarian minority protests in Timişoara that began on 16 December 1989 represented 
the first phase of the Romanian Revolution,773 while Zhivkov’s crackdown on the Turks in 
Bulgaria in the late 1980s discredited him with the Soviets774 and his own foreign minister 
Petar Mladenov, who eventually orchestrated a coup from above, ousting him from his 
position in November 1989. However, the civil society demonstrations in both countries that 
saw a high turnout of members from the majority ethnic groups were even more decisive in 
convincing communist hardliners to relinquish power. 
         In addition, these parties have tended to reap dividends during periods of increased 
societal tensions and/or transformations in the general discourses pertaining to minority 
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groups by positioning themselves at the forefront of debates and portraying themselves as the 
only legitimate defenders of the national community. 
 
         For example, the Ataka party has referred to the “treasonous acceptance of European 
minority rights legislation” due to its purported anti-Bulgarian character.775 Accusations of 
the privileging of a specific minority group (ethnic Turks) through the concerted efforts of the 
MRF and Bulgarian governments, often at the expense of ethnic Bulgarians, feature 
prominently in Ataka proclamations.776 It also has to be stipulated that while in the 1990s 
there were only sporadic references to Bulgarian nationalism in Bulgarian political 
discourses, since 2005 it is gauged to “have entered the vocabulary of everyday interactions 
in a very visible way” and this has also increased the dissonance between the Bulgarian and 
the Turkish communities.777 Anti-Hungarianism has sometimes been described as a hallmark 
of PRM’s ideology778 and the party frequently touches upon themes like territorial integrity 
and the respect for the rights of ethnic Romanians residing in foreign states.779  
         The PVV is staunchly opposed to the Islamisation of the Netherlands (its November 
2006 parliamentary elections campaign referred to the “tsunami-like” nature of this 
phenomenon) and fears related to immigration are tied to the increase in the number of 
members of ethno-religious groups in the Netherlands that are overwhelmingly Muslim.780 
         The REP faction also appears to be particularly distrustful of one particular section of 
society – those of the Islamic faith (its opposition to Turkish accession is a major component 
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of its criticism of the continued EU enlargement).781 It has also been quick to involve itself in 
the Leitkultur Debatte that re-emerged in Germany (triggered at the elite level) in late 
2010.782 
         Lastly, these four parties have been difficult to classify, running the gamut from 
“slightly to the right of centre-right” to “radical right” depending on the scholars in question 
or the methodology used. (see Appendix 3 for some suggested placings on the political 
spectrum.) Examining the parties’ stances on specific Europeanization-related issues could 
provide some helpful guidance when it comes to future attempts at positioning them within 
the spectrum. 
         There has been no real agreement between scholars on whether Ataka ticks the 
“political left” or “political right” box.783 It is also contested to what extent its understanding 
of Bulgarian nationhood is traceable to an ethnic (as opposed to a civic) nationalist 
preference784 or whether it assigns a priority to anti-globalism rather than nationalism.785 
Similarly, the PVV has been characterized as exhibiting some features of a “racialist” or 
“racial revolutionary” party,786 but at the same time the degree of its personnel overlapping 
with “extreme right” parties in the Netherlands has been gauged to be limited.787 The way it 
was formed and its party history have been judged as untypical compared to those of 
conventional “extreme right” factions.788 The German REP has sometimes been depicted as 
essentially a centre-right faction with some minor radical elements, while other scholars label 
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it as a member of the “neo-racist right” akin to the Front National.789 While the Greater 
Romania party has been frequently depicted as a brash proponent of ethnic nationalism, as a 
typical Romanian communist successor party, it has been gauged to exhibit ideological 
flexibility.790 
         In essence, the four parties are roughly comparable with regard to their anti-elite 
discourses, distrust of the manifestations of EU integration, the typically nationalistic 
components of their grievances and the importance allotted to monitoring majority-minority 
dynamics within their countries. During the course of the research, the Eurosceptic 
Alternative for Germany (AfD) was established,791 but given that I was already in the 
writing-up phase when it came to the thesis and was attempting to meet the academic 
deadlines, it was unfortunately not viable to travel to Germany and try to conduct interviews 
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 Chapter Conclusion 
 
         The four countries that will be the focus of the empirical work fit the bill with regard to 
the principal investigative aim of the thesis. They represent divergent nationalist paths and, in 
the case of the two Western European states, different traditions when it comes to the way 
EU discourses are approached. In recent years, the EU issue has become a contested one and 
has been at the forefront of political debates within all of these countries. All four countries 
are characterised by relative disparity in ethnic make-up – Germany and the Netherlands are 
usually described as multicultural societies, while the settled minorities in Bulgaria and 
Romania frequently occupy the spotlight when it comes to political issues. Moreover, the 
countries’ location within Europe makes them natural candidates for participating in frontier 
control initiatives within the EU.  Hence, nationalist-populist actors in these states do not find 
it difficult to steer discussion in the direction of “minority issues”. In such a politically 
turbulent age, in which there has almost been a fusion between the nation-state and the EU in 
many policy areas, it is essential to explore the extent to which grievances related to non-core 
groups tend to be “filtered” through the EU when raised by nationalist-populist actors. One 
also needs to identify the precise reasons why the EU might at times (and within specific 
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Chapter Four: European (Union) identity construction and 




         Chapter 4 is the first of three chapters analysing the empirical data gathered from 
interviews and party documents. It explores complaints about the EU in general, as opposed 
to country-specific cases of citizenship/migration policy and minority empowerment 
(discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). More specifically, Chapter 4 addresses the increasing role of 
Europe as a new point of identification. As Chapter 2 suggested, it might be assumed that this 
was not likely to be a major cause of Euroscepticism, since attempts to promote EU identity 
seem unlikely to pose much of a threat to national identities in Europe. Theorists specializing 
in the study of nationalism such as Anthony Smith do not regard it as likely that 
Euronationalism could become a viable alternative to traditional nationalism, which is based 
on language and other cultural and ethnic links.793 Indeed, the emotive potential of EU 
identity was hardly regarded as a threat by the interviewees. 
 
         Nonetheless, the interviews revealed four more specific sources of discontent with the 
EU's identity-building project and its attempt to impose a certain identity on Europe. 
According to interviewees, Europeanization jeopardises pre-existing pan-national affinities 
and the EU discriminates against certain clusters of nations within Europe; Europe’s cultural 
identity has been dangerously redefined to include Islam; as an emerging foreign policy actor, 
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the EU may eclipse the Atlantic alliance; and the EU attempts to suppress nationalism among 
member-states.  
 
         The first of these grievances (the EU challenge to pre-existing pan-national identities) 
to some extent relates to the idea - discussed in Chapter 2- that certain member-states are 
supposedly more highly valued and ‘core’ to the European project than others and that the 
European identity constructed by the EU is a Franco-German one. Hence southern or East 
Europeans feel disparaged and disadvantaged within the EU. However, the finding that pan-
national identities are so important to nationalist populists could not have been anticipated 
from the literature surveyed in Chapter 2. Intuitively, one might suppose that nationalist-
populist actors detested all foreigners and would not feel strong affinities with any other 
nations. Their proclivity towards very exclusive conceptions of the nation would suggest a 
reluctance to see similarities between themselves and others. Instead, it seems that the 
interviewees share mainstream views within their countries, in other words that their own 
sense of national identity nests within other identities (Slav, Latin, former Atlantic power) as 
identified in Chapter 3. It is these identities that are threatened by Europeanisation. The 
historical narratives pertaining to each country still shape the standpoint of nationalists in 
each state and predispose them to view the EU membership (and identity building) in an 
intrinsically negative light.  
 
         The three remaining grievances were more predictable, given the findings of other 
scholars already discussed in Chapter 2. The chapter discusses how interviewees complained 
about the content of the new ‘Europe’ constructed by the EU: an enlarged Europe containing 
a Muslim (‘Islamist’) and East European presence. Subsequently the chapter focuses on a 
different understanding of Europeanisation by discussing objections to the EU developing a 
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unified foreign policy capable of opposing Atlanticism and projecting its own identity in 
international affairs. Finally, Pan-Europeanism will be discussed in relation to the perceived 
stifling of the expression of nationalist sentiments as well as what is seen as the ostracism of 
nationalist-populist parties by their mainstream counterparts, which constrains their freedom 
to maneuver within their own political systems. As suggested in Chapter 2, Euronationalism 
could be seen as describing the containment of conventional nationalism. The four countries 
are not treated at equal length in each section, since different aspects of Europeanisation 
proved to provoke different degrees of Euroscepticism among the various parties and in 
recent years Ataka and the PVV have been more privy to the higher-level political 
developments in their respective countries than their German and Romanian counterparts. 
 
         A “manufactured European (Union) identity” can be a difficult concept to understand, 
and there is no single widely accepted term for the EU’s attempt to create a new and 
competing type of ‘nationalism’. As mentioned earlier in the thesis, for this reason the 
interviewees were invited to comment on ‘pan-European nationalism’. This appeared to be a 
reasonably obvious and familiar term, and therefore more suitable than ‘Euronationalism’, 
the label used in Chapter Two. Both terms are used in Chapter Four. 
 
Pre-existing pan-national identifications as a reason to resist the imposition of EU 
identity   
 
         National identity could rarely be considered in isolation and frequently interacts and 
overlaps with competing or complementing identities. This is especially true of countries that 
from a historical standpoint have been at the crossroads of different civilizations and have 
pursued non-isolationist foreign policies, as in the case of the Balkans or Central Europe. 
 239 
 
         In the case of the Ataka party, there is a marked inclination to position Bulgarian 
identity within the Eastern European or Slavic cultural and religious tradition. The cultural 
and historical commonalities between Bulgarians and other Eastern European people are 
emphasized by Ataka members, even if at the same time it is stressed that in the 
contemporary world it is not necessarily a badge of honor to proclaim that you originate from 
an Eastern European country.794 Another reason for this affinity with Eastern Europe is tied 
to religion, with the distinctiveness of the Eastern Orthodox faith regarded as a unifying 
motif, but also a validation of the Bulgarian self-conceptualization as one of the most ancient 
nation-states in existence.795  
 
         Russia tends to be portrayed by Ataka members as the East European country most 
influential in Bulgaria’s history, a country that has enjoyed a special relationship with 
Bulgaria throughout the ages.796 They attribute this sentiment to Russia’s prominent role in 
promoting Slavic culture, its contributions in bringing about the end of Ottoman rule in 1878 
as well as the consequences of the last two world wars, during which the Bulgarian decision 
to fight as part of an opposing alliance to that of Russia resulted in the country finding itself 
on the losing side of the war.797 Considerations like trade are also intertwined with more 
symbolic ones, with Russia mentioned as having been one of the main trading partners of 
Bulgaria over the course of many generations.798 
 
         While it was not directly claimed that after EU accession Brussels had steered Bulgaria 
away from pursuing close relations with Russia, the striving towards EU membership among 
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Bulgarian elites was associated with a downplaying of Russia’s role in Bulgarian history.799 
In that regard, the upper echelons of Bulgarian society are accused by Ataka members of 
believing the false mantras that only by distancing the country from Russia could it become a 
fully-fledged EU member.800 In essence, mainstream Bulgarian political parties are blamed 
for over-emphasizing the conflictual elements in the relationship between Russia and 
Bulgaria in order to please the EU.801 Thus, in an indirect way the EU is assumed to set the 
tone for important discussions of societal issues, and Bulgarian parties are deemed overly 
attentive to perceived or imagined EU cues, which from the standpoint of Ataka complicates 
the country’s relationship with Russia.  
 
         Accordingly, the 20 Points of Ataka’s Programme Scheme express support for an 
enhanced openness to the East (in particular, improvements in Bulgarian-Russian relations), 
even if such a course of action could potentially go against the supposed duties of EU 
membership.802 
 
         In addition to the intricate ties to Eastern European cultures, Western European 
overarching values with which the EU project is imbued are regarded as being at loggerheads 
with those espoused by Eastern Europeans, in a historical and contemporary sense. One of 
Siderov’s works from the early 2000s (The Power of the Mamons) offers unrelenting 
criticism of the historical developments in Western Europe since the early modern period and 
juxtaposes them against the historical paths undertaken by Eastern European countries. One 
of the boldest assertions is that the Protestant faith associated with figures like Luther, Calvin 
and Zwingli has given rise to the immediate precursors of [communist] totalitarianism and 
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fascism, which became influential ideological movements in the mid 20th century. It is also 
emphasized that contrary to most historical works (thought to deliberately misrepresent 
reality), the period between the 12th and 18th centuries was relatively peaceful in Eastern 
Europe in comparison to in the Western part of the continent, with the casualties incurred due 
to the Irish famine in the mid-19th century and the Thirty Years’ War being cited, as well as 
more recent cases like the admission of the Norwegian Lutheran Church that hundreds of 
Roma people were sterilized in Norway between 1933 and 1977. The “West” is characterized 
as “lacking true [Christian] faith and easily swayed by materialistic concerns” and is in 
essence regarded as “less moral” than the “East”.803 Siderov admonishes the West for 
purportedly having treated the Eastern Orthodox states with contempt throughout the ages 
and maintains that such attitudes continue to persist in the present day, condemning the 
bombing of Serbia by NATO in 1999 and the allegedly specific targeting of Eastern 
Orthodox places of worship.804 He also refers to statements made by American political 
scientist and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski that “following the end 
of communism, Eastern Orthodoxy has become the last enemy of the West”. Siderov also 
expresses indignation at Samuel Huntington’s contention that “a Westerner would have an 
easier time establishing rapport with a Soviet communist than with an Eastern Orthodox 
nationalist”.805 
 
         This emphasis on the historically conflictual relationship between the Eastern European 
and Western European parts of the continent feeds into contemporary concerns attributable to 
EU membership. For instance, the Ataka leader expresses doubts the sincerity of the 
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“rejoining the European family of nations” rhetoric that is employed at the EU level. It is 
stipulated that the EU does not really stand to benefit from an economically affluent and 
sufficiently competitive Bulgaria806 and the loyalty to the free market principles within the 
EU will only exacerbate the underlying differences between European countries and will not 
be conducive to helping Bulgaria pull out of its economic predicament.807  
 
         While the pro-Eastern vs. pro-Western frames occupy an important place in Ataka’s 
rhetoric, there has been a slight mellowing of these sentiments in recent years. Siderov, in his 
newest work, which touches upon Bulgarian nationalism, is highly critical of Pan-Slavist 
theories, for instance those adopted by Czech historian and diplomat Konstantin Jireček.808 
He emphasizes the similarities between Pan-Slavism and Pan-Sovietism809 and sees a 
stronger emphasis on the Thraco-Illyrian origin of the Bulgarians (rather than the Slavic one) 
as desirable. His reasoning is that the ethnogenesis theory that ascribes a dominant role to the 
Thracians also assumes that the Bulgarians are the descendants of the 
autochthonous/indigenous population of the Balkans rather than successors of more primitive 
nomadic tribes that settled the Balkans in the 7th century,810 and thus it is more conducive to 
fostering national pride in the case of his co-ethnics. There appears to be an acknowledgment 
that contemporary Russia would be less interested in creating its own alternative to the 
European Union (unlike in the 1990s). The Russian ambassador to Brussels, Vladimir 
Chizhov, on 10 November 2006, in an interview for вестник Капитал (Kapital newspaper), 
jokingly utilized the concept of a “Trojan horse” of Russia in the EU when speaking about 
Bulgaria, emphasizing that he attaches a positive connotation to this phrase and believes that 
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Bulgaria could be something along the lines of an inner representative of the Russian 
viewpoints within the Union.811 
 
         These slight shifts in discourses have however solidified the belief that the European 
Union is in some respects discriminatory towards Russia. Consequently, a number of 
respondents lament that the EU does not realize that its real duty is to bring true European 
countries (including Russia) together and not go off on tangents by wasting resources to woo 
Turkey to join. In essence, the EU is assumed to be exerting an inordinate effort to make 
Turkey a member, while refraining from paving the way for Russia and Ukraine, as Ukraine 
and Russia are regarded as Europeans par excellence, unlike Turkey.812 
 
         Western values associated with core countries of the European Union are not always 
viewed in a negative light (reflecting widespread admiration for Western values among 
ordinary Bulgarians). For instance, when discussing national identities, some Ataka members 
like Monev and Punchev (without prompting) express a view that Western cultural mores are 
almost totally opposed to the “Oriental values”, some elements of which still need to be 
expunged from the Bulgarian national character.813 Thus, unlike Bulgarian playwright and 
patriot Dobri Voynikov who tends to vociferously reject the need for “Western cleansing” of 
an “Orientalized” national psyche as an example of pernicious “foreign worshipping”,814 
some Ataka members (at least in theory) see some merit to engaging in such an “exercise”. 
The theme of “Oriental traces” when it comes to the Bulgarian mentality is especially 
sensitive and the anti-Orientalist motif has even been utilized in media campaigns targeting 
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religious sects and cults, with preachers belonging to unfamiliar religious denominations 
compared to Ottoman Janissaries due to purportedly being able to transform impressionable 
youths into automatons.815 However, Monev laments that under the EU influence it is only 
the “consumerist values associated with Western Europe” that are being adopted rather than 
those Western cultural tenets that are indeed worthy of emulation.816 The EU is deemed to 
have transformed Western mentalities in such a way that they are now “way past the ideal 
point”.817 The Bulgarians’ receptiveness to excessive consumerism has been associated with 
the precarious economic situation of the country prior to membership and the fact that once it 
actually joined the Union, membership provided a sharper focus on Bulgaria’s backwardness, 
as the country now saw itself as the poorest in a club of 27, while prior to that it was 
somewhat less inclined to compare itself with other European countries when it came to 
matters like national income.818 Furthermore, Western values are regarded as too pervasive 
(because of their association with progressiveness), so the effects of an over regulative EU on 
a rather flawed national psyche (Bulgaria is regarded as being too receptive to foreign models 
in a historic sense) are viewed as pernicious: 
 
“We were being commanded by the Americans anyway [prior to EU membership], despite 
them not possessing any legal authority, so it is much worse now that there are EU directives 
and a competing EU legal order.”819 
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         In any case, it is emphasized that Bulgarians need to learn to see through the EU core 
countries’ supposedly superior ability to present a sanitized image of themselves. As claimed 
by Punchev:  “I have seen pushing and shoving as well as other physical confrontations 
breaking out in the national parliaments of Western European countries…it is not fair to 
always speak of the “bad Easterner”.820 
 
         Pan-Europeanism is also conceptualized as problematic due to potentially erasing the 
distinctions (in the mind of Westerners) between neighbouring countries like Bulgaria and 
Serbia. The assumption is that Bulgaria and Serbia will no longer be regarded as separate 
entities with unique nationalist histories once the latter joins the supranational community.821 
  
         The value placed on embedding Bulgarian identity within the Slavic realm creates 
problems in embracing a form of Pan-Europeanism that is shaped by a supranational 
community of which Western European countries like Germany and France constitute the 
core. While in some respects the membership in the EU is associated with a recognition of 
Bulgaria’s rightful place within the European family of nations, as a result of the myriad of 
factors outlined above such as not being able to gain membership as an “equal” (in a cultural 
and economic sense), it is an imperfect conclusion of Bulgaria’s journey towards 
rediscovering its true European place. 
       
         As for the PRM party, European identity in relation to the Romanian one also tends to 
be underemphasized, with a preference displayed for the somewhat narrower category of 
Latin or Southern European identity. One of the reasons cited for this attitude has to do with 
objective geographical factors. As Romania is the only Latin country in a region that hosts a 
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number of Slavic states, and the only other non-Slavs, the Hungarians, have a special (rather 
conflictual relationship) with the Romanians, there is a natural inclination to feel a common 
bond with culturally Latin countries rather than immediate neighbors.822 At the same time, 
Romanian identity is regarded as “fundamentally Western”, because there is sufficient 
common ground between the Romanians and the Italian, French, Spanish and Portuguese 
people, who have been among the pioneers when it came to the emergence of Western 
culture. The language component of Romanian identity is deemed especially salient, as the 
country was one of the very few formerly communist ones in which a Latin language was 
spoken.823 In addition, some members also put forth the interpretation of Romania actually 
constituting the birthplace of Western culture and even the dated history of humanity as a 
whole, with the Carpathian arch representing the beginning of the cultural history of 
humanity.824 
 
         In addition to cultural and historical factors, the preference for associating the country 
with the Latin realm is also attributable to reasons connected to its perceived underlying 
mentality. The notion of “Latin” tends to be juxtaposed by Greater Romania party members 
against that of “Germanic”, with the latter conceived of as a torch-bearer when it came to 
industrialization. For instance, the PRM members’ contention is that Romania’s character is 
still that of a predominantly agricultural country, as it was only developed industrially during 
the communist years and the perception is that the industrial mentality of the Romanian 
people is still in its pioneering phase.825 This romanticized reading of Romania’s identity is 
consistent with some of the publications stressing the preeminence of rural nationalism and 
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“Romanian villagers being the purest representatives of European civilization”.826 In that 
regard, discipline and the typically Romanian mentality are seen generally not to go hand in 
hand and there is a tendency to regard countries like Bulgaria as quite distinct from Romania 
due to being instilled with technocratic values (like the Germans) to a much larger extent than 
the Romanians.827 
  
         This self-conceptualization is also attributable to a suspicion of the EU manifested in a 
more tangible way. For instance, a number of PRM publications draw attention to the 
purported Nazi roots of the European Union. Walter Hallstein, who is dubbed as the 
“architect of the Brussels EU” and labelled himself as a “kind of Prime Minister of Europe”, 
is revealed to have been a staunch defender of the Nazi legal tradition. It is implied that the 
creation of the EU represents the “third attempt to conquer Europe”, with underlying German 
machinations being the major catalysts for the speeding up of the processes surrounding 
European integration. This is confirmed by Mihăescu who maintains that “Germany is 
currently attempting in a seemingly peaceful way to implement what it did not succeed in 
doing between 1939 and 1945”.828 An even more extreme interpretation is put forth by Funar 
who maintains that the founding of the EU has the aim to destroy and help sink into oblivion 
the ancient Geto-Dacian language (contemporary Romanian) which is characterized as the 
progenitor of all European languages and of which the “higher-ups in Europe” are assumed to 
be envious.829 While Latin identity is thought to “probably be not valued enough within the 
European Union”, it is Eastern Europeans who are seen to bear the brunt of the criticisms for 
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everything that goes wrong in the Union and are forced to deal with the stigma of being 
inferior citizens.830  
 
         The drafting of the Treaty of Lisbon is assumed to be a consequence of a sustained 
effort by prominent political figures like Angela Merkel and Nicholas Sarkozy to deliberately 
make a mockery out of the will of the people, given that the Constitutional Treaty had been 
rejected in France and the Netherlands.831 Thus, the envisioning of the EU as a somewhat 
German project does not tie in effortlessly with the Romanians’ avowed preference for links 
with fellow countries that possess a Latin mentality.  
 
          Fârşirotu emphasizes that in 1995 Romania was the country with the “smallest amount 
of Euroscepticism possible” and the PRM reflected these sentiments during round-table 
discussions on European integration, but now this is no longer the case because the EU has 
been inclined to treat Romania as a second-class member and almost like a slave.832 
Mihăescu echoes the sentiment of Romanians feeling excluded from Europe, with the 
rationale that Eastern European countries are not given the encouragements to recapture their 
past glories, but are viewed as little more than “excellent markets for the junk that Western 
Europe produces”.833 One salient point that is expressed in this context has to do with the 
professed belief that Romania cannot really rely on an influential country within the 
European Union which could be considered a true friend and guide it along the way. It is 
implied that Bulgaria has Germany as a major player that is sympathetic to it, while the 
Central European countries also have strong links with the Germans, but countries like Italy 
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and Spain that are culturally similar to Romania are suffering from the economic crisis and 
are not in a position to shape proceedings within the EU as much as would be appropriate.834  
 
         These identity considerations also shape scepticism when it comes to the EU in more 
concrete ways. For instance, from the standpoint of PRM representatives, the distribution of 
EU funds in Romania has not proceeded smoothly. Due to the EU supranational order, rules 
in Romania regarding the distribution of money are gauged to have become much too 
complicated, as “in instances when money changes hands too many times, this helps create 
the right atmosphere for the thriving of corruption.“835 The underlying assumption is that in 
2007 most Romanians were still not fully cognizant of the exact meaning of terms like 
“capital market” and “industrial competition” and were suddenly thrown in at the deep end of 
a new economic system not reflective of the Latin-like values.836 Essentially, living in a 
bureaucratic state is identified as a negative corollary of the Latin mentality and the EU has 
aggravated matters instead of providing a solution to the underlying issues.837 Furthermore, in 
the cultural realm, Mihăescu sees it as unfortunate that Romanian artists continue not to be 
too keen on “singularity”, preferring to mirror European art, much of which he argues is like 
“international marmalade”.838 Given that “real value could only emerge from national 
specificity”, it not unfathomable that the future could see Europe become a “bland and boring 
entity” whose inhabitants will be too similar to each other.839 Accordingly, there are plenty of 
reasons to feel moral panic when it comes to the EU, but not due to the pessimistic economic 
situation, but the “crisis of values” that is currently plaguing the Union.840 Nationalist parties 
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are thus purported to be the only agents capable of defusing the threat of “amalgamation of 
national ethnographic traditions” that are associated with the European Union.841 
 
         In essence, the South European or Latin locus of identity is still quite significant from 
the standpoint of those who consider themselves true Romanian patriots. This is why they 
display somewhat negative attitudes with regard to the elite endeavor of pursuing EU 
membership. 
 
         Moving on to the PVV party, only affinities with the Western frame of reference, 
including Western European and culturally Western “new world” countries tend to be 
displayed. Western identity is viewed as incorporating Judeo-Christian cultural elements and 
transcending the European one. The reasons for these sentiments are consistent with those 
explored in the country chapter on the Netherlands and are tied to the perceptions of cultural 
commonalities between the Dutch and other Westerners, as well as the maritime identity of 
the state. For instance, it is emphasized that geographical proximity does not necessarily 
breed familiarity and the mentality of Dutch people is much closer to the Canadians’ than to 
that of people like the Greeks. In addition, it is stressed that under normal circumstances it is 
not common for the Dutch to refer to themselves as Europeans.842 Van Berkel maintains that 
“there is a shared history between Spain and the Netherlands, more than between Europe as a 
whole and the Netherlands”.843 Other PVV members also prefer to speak of common features 
between the Netherlands and specific countries in Europe like Spain and Germany rather than 
position the Netherlands within a European category of belonging.844 As will be explained in 
greater detail below, there is a strong tendency to regard Western and Eastern European 
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countries as quite distinct in terms of mentalities.845 Thus, the examination of PVV 
sentiments reveals that previous national coexistences and rivalries are viewed as having 
brought about some commonalities between Western countries, but there is no need to invoke 
Europe as a locus of identification.846  
 
The very limited acceptance of the notion of an overarching European identity is perhaps best 
summed up by Van der Kammen: 
 
         “I do not believe in a European nationality, I believe in national identity. Europe is a 
continent and that is the way it should be. There should be no mentioning of the larger 
European nationality. Everyone’s own nationality puts one in a specific context. Someone 
from Germany – we already know that he or she is someone who lives in Europe.”847 
         In fact, many PVV members are also adamant that “Dutchness” is the only possible 
category of belonging, to the exclusion of any other like the generically Western ones.848 For 
instance, Van der Stoep regards Dutchness as hardly being dependent on interrelationships 
with other categories of meaning and maintains that trying to place Dutch identity within 
nested ones is a futile exercise.849 Somewhat along those lines, Koertenoven regards the 
positioning of Dutch national identity and the identification of its “natural allies” as more 
contested than in the French and British cases.850 Thus, the PVV generally finds the 
insistence on embedding the Netherlands within Europe as actually detracting from rather 
than adding anything to Dutch nationalism. This could partially explain why PVV members 
are quite confident that Dutch nationalism is more indomitable and more difficult to suppress 
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than Eastern European nationalisms. There is a striking difference between the PVV 
interviewees’ attitudes and the national pride displayed by some PRM and Ataka members, 
which is at least in part derived from their countries’ contributions to the cultural enrichment 
of Europe (for instance, Funar maintains that the Carpathian-Danubian-Pontic area where 
Romania is located is the cradle of European civilization,851 while Ţîrnea exclaims: “I thank 
God that I was born a Christian, a Romanian and a European. These 3 gifts are like gold, 
myrrh and frankincense”).852 
 
         A further testimony to the absence of affinity for a generic European (Union) identity in 
the PVV is provided by the party’s “commemoration” of 9 May as Europe (Schuman) Day. 
The party members display the colors of the Dutch flag, paying tribute to the unity and 
independence of the Dutch state, but do not refer to any EU symbols or credit the EU for 
fostering a climate of tranquility within the continent. Instead, they emphasize that from this 
day on it has “forcefully provided the impetus for the creation of a United States of 
Europe”.853 
 
         One salient issue seems to be the erosion of the Netherlands’ historical role as a 
Western, imperial power. Although it might seem surprising that this is blamed on the EU,   
a number of related concerns emerge quite prominently. Some party members hint that the 
Netherlands is gradually becoming submerged on the international front due to the 
preeminence of the EU and is no longer in the spotlight in the same way it was in the past: 
 
         “You do not need the EU to put your name forward and to be highly appreciated in 
international relations; people do not see the Netherlands any more, they see the European 
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Union and its two faces – Sarkozy and Merkel, the Dutch foreign minister is virtually 
unknown throughout the world”.854  
 
         As the European Union is perceived to have brought about the erosion of the 
Netherlands’ international profile, the PVV members lament that their country is probably of 
less importance to the world compared to before. One manifestation of that is the current state 
of the Dutch economy. While it was previously evaluated as being the envy of others, the 
economic crisis in Europe is seen not only to have affected the country’s economic prospects, 
but also the reputation of the Netherlands as a whole in a negative fashion. The reasons for 
that are traceable to the club dynamics characterizing the EU and the general tendency of 
outsiders to "equate the general reputation of a club with that of its weakest link.”855 
 
         Drawing from the above outlined concerns, Pan-Europeanism is conceptualized as 
another exercise in hypocrisy on the part of the Union due to the fact that the propping up of 
less developed economies is being conducted under the wing of solidarity. In a sense, the 
fundamental issue from the PVV standpoint is that there has been a paradigm shift in 
mentalities since the 1950s and 1960s, with the current interests of member states (both 
Western and Eastern) in relation to the EU being solely premised on the reaping of economic 
dividends from it. The EU is essentially gauged to have transformed itself into a big state, but 
with no real understanding on the part of its members as to why they continue to be part of 
it.856 
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         Thus, it is clear that the lack of willingness to identify with Europe on the part of the 
PVV magnifies the perceptions of economic losses due to EU policies in the economic realm 
and there is a corresponding concern that the Netherlands’ reputation (beyond the EU) has 
been affected in a negative fashion. As a later section of this chapter will reveal, this 
emphasis on international reputation is consistent with the Netherlands’ interest (from the 
PVV standpoint) to prioritize the establishment of close relations with the United States and 
emerging power blocs like ASEAN and MERCOSUR that are beyond the European 
continent. 
 
         To conclude: the PVV, unlike Ataka and Greater Romania, holds an extremely 
minimalist understanding of European identity. Europe is largely viewed as simply a 
geographical space or a continent. However, some PVV members believe strongly in their 
“Western” identity. Thus, in contrast to the Bulgarian and Romanian cases, the absence of 
important nesting identities that are in conflict with the EU project (due to the EU originating 
as Western community-building) would seemingly imply that the nature of European 
integration would not be associated with serious challenges to Dutch national identity. 
However, this is not completely true. Focus on the historical role of the Netherlands as an 
imperial power seems to provide a competing identification, which is at odds with the EU 
identity-building project (since the EU now eclipses the Netherlands on the world stage) and, 
as will be revealed in subsequent sections,there are also additional reasons why PVV 
members are sceptical about Euronationalism. 
 
         As for the attitudes expressed by the REP party, interviewees refrain from positioning 
Germany exclusively within the “Western” European camp with regard to their 
understanding of its identity, preferring to label Germany as a prototypically European 
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country that continues to be entrusted to serve as a bridge between the various countries on 
the European continent.857 
 
         However, some interviewees do appear to regard the potential strengthening of a 
European identity accompanied by the nature of the connected “nationalism” as a threatening 
development. As Gärtner puts it:  
 
“Pan-European nationalism is a threat to all states…each country has its own mentality and 
these differences between the countries constitute the essence of Europeanness”.858  
 
         In a similar fashion to the sentiments expressed by the PVV members, Dagenbach 
emphasizes the “Europe of the Fatherlands” thesis, which maintains that countries in Europe 
could work together in domains ranging from the economic to the military one, but the final 
decisions should always rest with the nation-state and a country should be able to extricate 
itself from the whole process of its own volition (just like in the case of German provinces, 
which are not always commanded by Berlin when it comes to certain policy realms). He is 
thus wary that the type of false Pan-Europeanism persisting within the EU (through economic 
redistribution from affluent to improverished states) has actually increased suspicions 
between European countries.859 In this context, Gärtner expresses his disappointment that 
countries like Greece still point fingers at the Germans rather than the EU when expressing 
dissatisfaction due to their countries’ precarious economic situation, so in that respect EU 
integration has actually reduced the prospects for cooperation between likeminded nationalist 
actors in different European countries.860 In this regard, the rhetoric of the REP party appears 
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quite similar to that of former British foreign secretary Malcolm Rifkind who has urged for 
Europe to develop a “partnership of nations”, based on the democratic legitimacy of national 
parliaments rather than what he called “unloved” European institutions.861 In a theoretical 
sense, the REP members’ attitudes towards Pan-Europeanism are largely reflective of the 
Gaullist vision, according to which a genuine European identity is to be resisted or in the 
worst case scenario accommodated as a “thin” identity overlaying deeply rooted national 
identities.862 
         Among REP members Pan-Europeanism is associated with Euroscepticism due to a 
multitude of negative impacts, most of them within economic domains. The high degree of 
sympathy for intra-European cooperation expressed by REP functionaries does not translate 
into a validation of the utility of the type of Pan-Europeanism promoted by the EU. 
 
         Hence the REP is not comparable to the other three parties, whose Euroscepticism 
derives partly from a preference for viewing national identity in the context of a larger, sub-
European, cluster of nations, or, in the Dutch case, a Western/global identity. Overall, the 
opinions expressed by interviewees from all four parties regarding the linkages between 
national and more overarching identities are consistent with the history and the particular 
national trajectories of the countries in question, as examined in Chapter Three. However, the 
revelations pertaining to Pan-Europeanism and the potential threats emanating from it are 
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Europeanization equated with redefining ‘Europe’ to include Islam/Eastern Europe 
 
         The discussion so far has centered on general populist understandings of the nature of 
the linkages between Pan-Europeanism and national identities, with the arguments raised 
concentrating on the relations between European countries. This section will focus on one 
significant facet of Pan-Europeanism that deserves close scrutiny: the EU’s ability to present 
perceived culturally incompatible countries or cultures as part of the European fold and thus 
affect core domains from the standpoint of nationalists. The cultural “others” empowered by 
Pan-Europeanism supposedly to the detriment of core EU countries within the Union include 
Eastern Europeans (in the case of the PVV) and Muslims. In the case of the latter group, there 
has been a historical tendency to use their religion (Islam) as a yardstick for defining the 
boundaries of “Europeanness.” The quip “Charlemagne, without Muhammad, would have 
been inconceivable” is reflective of the importance of the anti-Islamic frame as a useful tool 
to solidify the bonds between European nations.863 In particular, with reference to 
contemporary deliberations, the discussions surrounding Turkey’s possible accession have 
been depicted (according to Aaretti Siitonen, a member of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs) as a “proxy for the wider debate on European identity”.864 
 
         Countering the spread of Islamism is a high salience endeavour for the Ataka party. A 
separate subsection of the Programme Scheme covers different techniques to prevent the 
“Islamization of Bulgaria”, among them tighter regulations when it comes to granting 
permission for construction of mosques, new bills that provide further recognition of the 
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Bulgarian language as the only official one in the country, as well as a law that recognizes the 
preeminence of the Eastern Orthodox tradition in Bulgaria.865 
 
         In that regard, it is hardly surprising that “true” European identity is viewed as 
exclusionary and unable to coexist with the Islamic one. Turkey is characterized as an 
intrinsically non-European country, as it lacks any European credentials or values.866 As 
Turkey occupies a small part of Europe and is culturally alien to Europe, its natural place is 
assumed to be the Middle East.867 Thus, Ataka feels that its preoccupation with reducing the 
influence of Islamism within Bulgarian society is not reciprocated by the EU-level structures. 
For instance, as mentioned previously, in the Bulgarian context the EU is accused of 
inappropriately extending the boundaries of Europeanism by attempting to include Turkey, 
making it an official candidate for EU membership, while purportedly neglecting truly 
European countries like Ukraine and Russia.868 Another problem associated with the EU 
influences is that, by compromising the reputation of Pan-Europeanism because of failed 
cultural initiatives at the EU level, the EU is seen as actually not conducive to strengthening 
intra-European bonds against Islam. For example, the EU is thought to promote secular rather 
than Christian values, thus potentially reducing the common ground between European 
people, which could be counterproductive in terms of them being able to provide a check on 
aggressive and expansionist Islamism. In this context, Punchev cites Switzerland as an 
example of non-EU member that has been quite adept at keeping its Christian roots intact (by 
enforcing a minaret ban) and its commitment to Pan-Europeanist values is assumed to have 
increased in recent years due to its non-membership in the EU’s supranational community.869 
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         In sharp contrast to the functionaries from the other three parties, PRM members do not 
generally regard European identity as mutually exclusive with the Turkish one. A degree of 
solidarity with Turkey is displayed due to the assumption that Turkey (just like Romania) 
tends to be unfairly scapegoated and treated like an “other” by the EU.870 PRM politicians 
assert that any opposition to Turkish membership is not emanating from within Romania, but 
is the work of the major players like the Netherlands and France.871 For instance, Funar 
maintains that the potential membership of Turkey will not affect Romanian national interests 
in a negative fashion and does not regard the EU’s willingness to embrace Turkey as a 
betrayal of the “true ancient history of Europe”.872 Similarly, Fârşirotu draws attention to the 
common roots of Abrahamic religions and the intricate similarities between Christianity, 
Islam and Judaism, as all of these religions have originated together.873 Europeanism is 
sometimes juxtaposed against Orientalism, with a negative connotation attached to the latter, 
but the term appears to be used to characterize the “national character” of the Hungarians 
(rather than the Turks) in a negative fashion.874 The attitudes of PRM politicians towards 
Turkey are somewhat surprising given that the party models itself on the right-wing 
Romanian nationalists who gained traction in the country during the interwar years and were 
ill-disposed towards any attempts to minimize the cultural differences between Romania and 
Turkey (as mentioned in the Romanian section of Chapter Three). Thus, Pan-Europeanism as 
promoted by the EU does not really affect the party members’ opinions on Islamism within 
the Romanian context. 
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         In addition to a staunch opposition to Turkey entering the supranational community, the 
PVV expresses concerns pertaining to the “slippery slope” phenomenon (since a potential 
Turkish accession is seen as likely to encourage countries like Algeria and Morocco to follow 
suit and also submit an application for membership). For instance, the party expresses alarm 
at the proposal of Commissioner Stefan Füle that the EU is to open its internal market to 
Maghreb countries, stressing that cooperation between European and North African states 
should not go beyond free trade.875     
 
         From the standpoint of the party, Pan-Europeanism is depicted as especially threatening 
because of the issues it creates when it comes to opposing Islamization in a general sense, not 
only pertaining to Turkey or the Arab states. Geert Wilders has referred to the notion of 
“Europeanization” in some of his speeches, describing it as a “major threat”. He defines 
“Europeanization” as an ideology which staunchly defends the merging of sovereign nation-
states into a Pan-European federation or super-state as a false guarantee against the 
emergence of a totalitarian regime.876 The concern is that legally and politically the 
Netherlands could become a province in the European super state, were a European 
constitution to be adopted.877 In relation to the subject at hand, Wilders maintains that the 
emphasis on “uniformity” (implying the reduced importance of national identities at the 
expense of an overarching religion, achieved mainly through violent conquest) is one of the 
inherent traits of Islam. Following a convoluted logic, he advocates this as another reason 
why nation-states within Europe should shun “grand EU designs”: 
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“Uniformity is not characteristic of the West; it is a feature of Islam, which eradicated the 
national identities of people it conquered while striving to create a supranational Caliphate. 
Islam threatens the survival of all free people”.878 
 
         With a particular reference to the Dutch state and Islamic values, Arabist Hans Jansen 
(whose writings have laid the groundwork with regard to altering Wilders’ views on Islam, 
specifically pushing him to attach the label of a “totalitarian ideology” to it),879 refers to the 
EU having fundamentally altered the mentality of Dutch people and having made them less 
aware of their strong willpower: 
 
         “Before the Netherlands became part of the European multicultural utopian state, this 
country actually knew at least three mottos – “I will stand firm”, ”[I will] struggle and 
emerge”, “[I will] be loyal to the fatherland”.880 
 
         In essence, a European Union consisting of countries lacking strong national identities 
is deemed likely to have citizens that are less politically active in opposing the spread of 
Islam. The future evolution of the EU system of governance could cause the European 
supranational community to begin to resemble an Islamic system of government. Thus, by 
weaving together a number of narratives pertaining to Islam, Wilders and his ideologues 
introduce a more marked symbolic component to the PVV grievances in relation to the EU, 
characterizing the EU project as serving to emasculate national identity and having the means 
to destroy certain national pillars. The PVV leader’s (as well as some other PVV members’) 
tendency to favor the United States in the realm of geopolitics whenever its principal aims 
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clash with those of the EU (discussed later in this chapter) could also be attributed to his 
belief that the USA constitutes a potentially more important bulwark against Islamization. It 
is worth noting that experts on Islam and Turkey like Serbian philologist and orientalist 
Darko Tanasković actually take the opposite view, characterizing the US political 
establishment as being on average more receptive to Turkey than its European (EU) 
counterpart, maintaining that “US political thought” tends to be unreasonably optimistic 
regarding Turkey’s ability and willingness to provide a check on the expansion of radical 
Islam.881 
 
         The REP party representatives also profess unqualified opposition to Turkey entering 
the Union (with only Dagenbach expressing some degree of sympathy for the Kemalist 
principles and a belief in the potential of Turkey to go back to its days as a secular state). The 
EU’s tendency to regard Turkey as a viable candidate for membership is an example of the 
unwelcome tendency of supranational level officials to overstretch the concept of 
Europeanness to a degree that it is rendered meaningless.882   
 
         As for anti-East European attitudes in Western Europe: a negative attitude to newly 
defined super order European solidarities is also very apparent in PVV attitudes towards EU 
eastern enlargement. ‘Europe’ as redefined after eastwards enlargement is associated with 
crime, intolerance and corruption, lowering standards of behaviour across the continent. Such 
views among PVV members are reflective of the recent swing towards anti-Polish sentiment 
among the party hierarchy. The controversial PVV website that was launched in early 2012 
(in order to collect Dutch complaints against the “criminal” behavior of citizens of CEE 
countries residing in the Netherlands) resulted in an open letter written by ambassadors of 
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these countries addressed to Dutch political party leaders and has generated some discussion 
on the EU level.      
         All the party members interviewed staunchly oppose any further enlargements of the 
EU. The accession of new member states is associated with the “further loss of control” from 
the standpoint of the Netherlands.883 This is attributable to the tendency to equate the 
expansion of the EU’s geographical boundaries with the ushering in of cyclical processes, 
which create uneven exchanges between “more developed” and “less developed” European 
countries. It is emphasized that the EU never demonstrated a capacity to learn from the 
economic debacle as a result of the lowering of standards when it came to giving the green 
light for the membership of Greece, Spain and Portugal.884  
 
         In this regard, PVV members cite statistics pertaining to the rise of organized crime in 
Western European countries and its corresponding decrease in CEE states.  These trends are 
supposedly seen to have become particularly evident in the aftermath of the 2004 and 2007 
enlargements.885 In the case of The Hague, the significant upsurge in crime attributed to CEE 
nationals is also gauged to have contributed to environmental stress.886  
 
         Issues pertaining to Eastern European countries have a special salience in relation to 
Pan-Europeanism because of the perceived incompatibility in mentalities. In addition to their 
countries lacking the proper economic acumen and level of development, Bulgarians and 
Romanians are assumed to have picked up certain traits that separate them from Western 
Europe due to the long periods of time spent under the Russian sphere of influence. It is 
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emphasized that given that there is still a divide between Western and Eastern Germany, it 
would not be far-fetched to assume that the gulf between Western and Eastern Europe is 
enormous. As elucidated by Van der Stoep: “It is not only about money, you know, you need 
to have a certain mentality before you become a member if trouble is to be avoided.”887   
 
         The problem of conflicting mentalities and moralities also conjures up practical 
conundrums when PVV members are forced to operate on the EU level.  PVV representatives 
(particularly those at the higher levels) are likely to categorically discount the possibility of 
sustained cooperation with similarly minded parties from Eastern European countries.  This is 
mostly due to the PVV’s perception that even nationalist-minded Eurosceptic parties from the 
CEE region are likely to react aggressively to the suggestion that their country should not be 
a member of the EU and also due to the PVV’s belief that there is a lack of an overlap when 
it comes to core values.  
 
         Nationalist parties from Eastern Europe are regarded as anti-Semitic and brash in their 
rhetoric. In particular, Van der Stoep recalls his embarrassment and the inability to have a 
constructive conversation when meeting with a Bulgarian EP member from Ataka due to the 
“unbelievably high levels of anti-Semitism displayed by the person in question”.888 Thus, 
communication failures are decried as an obstacle to any PVV alliance with CEE populists889 
and some members like Kortenoeven raise doubts whether the so-called “Eurosceptics” in 
Eastern Europe are actually truly opposed to their country’s EU membership.890 Similarly, 
Madlener affirms that on many occasions nationalist parties from CEE states “bring it upon 
themselves” (referring to their imposed isolation from mainstream parties in their own 
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countries) due to the radicalism in their pronouncements and inability to tread carefully 
around issues affecting minorities.891 The PVV’s affinity for Judeo-Christian values does not 
translate into supportive attitudes towards Serbia in relation to the Kosovo issue (unlike the 
positions of some of their colleagues from other Western European parties that have 
nationalist credentials), as displaying solidarity with Serbia implies that lip service will be 
paid to radicalism.892  
   
         Van der Stoep sums up the issue of Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans not 
being on the same wavelength: 
 
         “In Eastern Europe the extremes have always been more extreme and this has been 
accepted. Like in Africa, there have been imposed borders in the case of certain nationalities 
[in the eastern part of the continent] and this has created very combustible situations. In 
Western countries, the roots of nationalist concern are different and are tied to relatively 
recent developments like the unwelcome promotion of multiculturalism”.893 
 
         In this regard, a PVV press release appears to take issue with the “ethnic ties” or 
primordialist principle, based on which Bulgarian citizenship is awarded (referring to the at 
times speedy procedures surrounding the granting of Bulgarian citizenship to individuals of 
Bulgarian descent born in Macedonia, Moldova and Ukraine).894 Thus, the PVV implicitly 
appears to give the nod to the civic form of nationalism over the ethnic one, expressing 
suspicion over the viability of the jus sanguinis principle, on which the granting of Bulgarian 
citizenship seems to be premised.  
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         The presumed inability of Eastern Europeans to diligently exercise immigration control 
is also tied by PVV members to the supposedly stark differences in mentalities with Western 
Europeans, especially with regard to the wide prevalence of corruption. As corruption is 
conceptualized as intrinsic to the upper echelons of society in such countries, it is deemed 
nonsensical to trust these states’ policy-makers in the Schengen area.895. Van der Stoep 
recalls the accusations he faced of being “too hard on Poles” when visiting the country while 
at the same time Polish negative attitudes towards Belarusian illegals are thought to have 
been swept under the carpet by his Polish hosts.896 
  
         While surveys regarding levels of trust between EU member countries generally suggest 
that distrust is attributable to a lack of confidence in a country’s economic prowess rather 
than an inherent lack of trustfulness of the inhabitants,897 from the standpoint of the PVV the 
latter dimension appears to be at least as salient as (if not more so) than the economic one. 
 
         Rather paradoxically, PVV Euroscepticism and hostility to Europeanization (in the 
sense of broadening the definition of Europe) derives partly from a perception that East 
Europeans have not managed to Europeanise (in the sense of internalizing values). Some 
PVV press releases corroborate the impression that the PVV does not view certain EU 
officials from “new” member states as having sufficiently internalized the core values of the 
“Union” because of certain undesirable elements inherent in their nationalism. For instance, 
the EU budget commissioner Janusz Lewandowski is criticised for statements made during a 
Polish election campaign in connection with the provision of EU subsidies to Poland. 
Essentially, the national interest is seen to tactlessly take precedence over the interests of all 
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the member states of the Union and the PVV severely criticizes the nationalist undercurrents 
visible in the rhetoric of certain EU officials from CEE states.898 In addition, CEE states like 
Romania are deemed more likely to impulsively resort to unilateral actions, infringing the EU 
regulations, as evidenced by the PVV’s sharp critique of the Romanian authorities’ temporary 
refusal to allow for the transport of Dutch flowers into Romania, arguably as a way to get 
back at the Dutch government due to their decision to refrain from admitting the Balkan state 
into the Schengen area.899 
 
         The EU permissiveness towards Eastern Europeans due to allegedly ill-conceived Pan-
European sentiments is best demonstrated in the realm of environmental issues, where the 
Netherlands has the reputation as one of the most progressive and environmentally friendly 
EU member states. For example, incredulity was expressed that at the Durban environmental 
conference Poland was the EU delegation leader despite the country’s poor environmental 
record and reliance on outdated energy sources.900 Thus, to the PVV it hardly comes as a 
surprise that the EU supposedly suffers legitimacy losses in international relations due to 
including Eastern Europeans within its fold and pretending that they possess the same 
pedigree as Western Europeans.901 If the PVV is to consider countenancing pro-Europeanism, 
this would only be in the sense of accepting a “functional European identity” (in which the 
EU is conceptualized as an efficient problem-solver),902 but from their standpoint even the 
EU’s capacity to achieve basic economic or environmental aims has now been compromised, 
in part due to the EU becoming a “free for all” club that indulges the whims of the states that 
are on the periphery of the continent. This Dutch pragmatism and suspicion of unnecessary 
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posturing and obfuscation with regard to administrative matters also manifested itself during 
the 2005 referendum on the EU Constitution. It has been stipulated that one of the reasons for 
the rejection of the proposed European Constitution was due to its generic and flowery 
language, which made it difficult to reconcile with the much more parsimonious Dutch 
constitution.903 Along those lines, Janssen laments that the EU has not managed to evade the 
trap of Parkinson’s Law - because of its swelling bureaucracy and attempts to bring an 
inordinate number of areas of human activity under its wing, it is deemed to be no longer 
faithful to its original vocation.904 In essence, from the standpoint of the PVV, in terms of 
measurable performance, the EU has continued to deteriorate in recent years. 
 
         The cultural incompatibility annoyance factor in relation to Pan-Europeanism and 
Eastern Europeans generally seems to be lacking among the REP members. While the REP 
deems it essential to slow down the process of enlargement,905 the existence of ingrained 
mentalities within certain countries in Europe is only brought up in relation to economic 
matters, but is played down with regard to cultural differences or propensity to engage in 
corruption. The principal concerns voiced by interviewees are that EU enlargement and 
Schengen have encouraged the spread of criminal networks from Eastern Europe.906 REP 
party documents identify a number of additional grievances in relation to Eastern Europe. In 
previous years, there was some opposition expressed towards the EU membership of Central 
European countries due to “historical baggage” considerations – in the case of the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, the repudiation of the Beneš decrees (covering the post-WWII 
resettlement and expulsion of Germans within these countries) was viewed as a precondition 
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for their membership in the Union by the party functionaries.907 Similarly, the Polish state is 
urged to officially recognize that its past governments have implemented policies resulting in 
the persecution of German civilians.908 
 
         There is no indication that Eastern Europeans appear to invoke significant threat 
perceptions since their entry into the Union because of value incongruence and divergent 
mentalities. Eastern European countries are characterized as “practically integrated” and 
much more capable of proper integration than Turkey, as they are deemed to possess 
essentially the same culture as the Germans.909 There is also the prominent sentiment 
displayed that Eastern Europeans are an integral part of the Union and for this reason the 
contention is that it does not make sense to confine membership exclusively to Western 
Europe, especially given that (at time of interview) countries like Croatia were gauged to be 
almost fully prepared for membership.910 
 
         The sympathy for Eastern European members also manifests itself in the nature of the 
discourses pertaining to practical cooperation with Eastern European parties. The REP 
members view it as unfortunate that their party is currently not too successful in an electoral 
sense or politically influential in the domestic arena to be of much use to parties in Eastern 
Europe: 
 
         “We are not really attractive to Eastern European parties, because our results during the 
EP elections were far from impressive…however, Germany is a country that is located at the 
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heart of Europe, it is still likely to play a significant role at some point in the future if a 
coalition of right-wing parties with a commitment to democracy is to be established in the 
European Parliament.”911 
 
         A number of explanations could account for the REP’s sympathetic stance towards 
Eastern Europeans. On the one hand, Germany’s own experience of relatively late 
democratization compared to other Western European countries may explain their tendency 
to view the impacts of the communist legacy on Eastern European societies as reversible and 
their mentalities as “redeemable”. As implied above, German patriots’ continental (rather 
than Atlanticist) orientation and ethnicized conception of nationalism could also compel them 
to seek common ground and identify with Eastern Europeans.912 In a practical sense, 
Germany has been one of the countries with a high share of trade with Central and Eastern 
European states and even prior to enlargement there were strong expectations that CEE states 
would be supportive of Germany when it came to decision-making within the EU structures, 
while the Netherlands did not expect any significant benefits from the enlargement to the 
East.913 
         In addition, it has to be noted that while Germany has pursued a similar course to the 
Netherlands in terms of purging discussions on race from mainstream discourses,914 “colonial 
fantasies” are not deemed to have affected race relations in Germany915 and the place of 
Germany’s “colonial other” has at times been occupied by Eastern European ethnicities like 
Poles rather than “visible minorities”.916 Thus, for a party that is attempting to “clean its 
house” and sever connections with the extreme right like the NPD, the unwillingness to 
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engage in anti-Eastern European discourses also makes sense from a strategic standpoint 
given the legacy of the Holocaust in Germany in relation to Eastern European groups like 
Poles and Russians. Perhaps the REP party leader’s contention that Germany needs 
inspiration from “Eastern European battlegrounds” in order to restoke the fires of its own 
nationalism is another factor explaining the tendency to view Germany’s struggles as 
equivalent to those of the Eastern Europeans.917 On the contrary, the PVV members do not in 
any way concede that Dutch nationalism could be considered impotent and do not believe 
that they could learn anything useful from their Eastern European counterparts.918 
 
Hostility to a Common Foreign and Security Policy 
 
         The Pan-European frame could be confined to symbolic identity considerations, but in 
accordance with the alternative definitions presented in Chapter Two, it also encompasses a 
geopolitical dimension, in the sense of an elevated and unified profile of the EU in 
international affairs, perhaps enabling it to adopt a more independent foreign policy course 
when it comes to the United States. 
 
         With regard to Ataka, Alexandrov believes that a strong EU could theoretically function 
as a buffer against the United States. Along these same lines, most of the Ataka interviewees 
expressed hostility towards the United States for sowing the seeds of discord between 
Bulgaria and Russia and causing Bulgaria to incur too much expenditure due to NATO 
embroilment in far off military conflicts.919 The PRM also appears to display trust in the EU 
as a geopolitical actor that is lacking when the USA is discussed, as manifested in some of 
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Tudor’s pronouncements. For example, the party leader took umbrage at purportedly 
unwelcome interferences by Mark Gitenstein (US ambassador to Romania) in the internal 
affairs of Romania (fears are expressed that Romania could become another “colony” or 
“Guantanamo camp”) and threatens to involve the European Parliament.920 Tudor has also 
generally displayed a lack of trust in US judgments in the geopolitical realm.921 Similarly, 
other PRM members like Enăşoae and Cojan argue that “the United States should not 
interfere with European interests”.922 The section dealing with pan-national identifications 
reached the conclusion that despite the scepticism regarding EU membership, it retains its 
importance in the eyes of the CEE nationalist-populists as a validation of the other 
(established) countries’ acceptance of the European credentials of their states. Thus, it is not 
surprising that anti-Americanism trumps anti-European Union sentiment despite the many 
complaints regarding the purported unequal treatment of Bulgaria and Romania on the EU 
level and what has been surmised as the “United States’ higher degree of enthusiasm than the 
“EU average” when it came to the possibility of enlargement to the East”.923  
 
         By contrast, PVV members maintain that striving for a unified EU foreign policy is 
futile due to the perception of vastly divergent aims and priorities of the different EU member 
states (for example, because of the UK’s Atlantic orientation and France’s interest in Middle 
Eastern affairs).924 In addition, the potential strengthening of the EU is a geopolitical actor is 
viewed with suspicion, as the European supranational community appears to be less trusted as 
an international actor than the United States. There is marked sympathy expressed for the 
United States, as evidenced in Janssen’s pronouncements which emphasize the durable links 
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between the  Netherlands and the USA, with cooperation with the States conceptualized as 
“better serving Dutch interests than the fostering of ties with other countries in the EU.”925 
Wilders characterizes his views on the United States as follows: “I proudly regard myself as 
one of the most pro-American political figures in the Netherlands and one of the biggest 
Dutch admirers of the American spirit.”926 Madlener contends that it would be offensive 
(from a Dutch nationalist standpoint) to display even a tinge of support for an EU that 
portrays itself as a geopolitical challenger to the USA and characterizes his views as “almost 
unconditionally supportive of the States”.927  
 
         Not surprisingly, the PVV takes the side of the USA and China when it comes to the 
controversies generated by the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, citing the 
unacceptable violations of other countries’ national sovereignty (due to the possibility that 
foreign airlines flying outside of EU space could be taxed) and the negative impacts on the 
competitiveness of national airline industries within EU states.928 PVV MEPs also maintain 
that the EU political elites are committed to the creation of a United States of Europe with a 
European president (in the conventional sense). In their view, the underlying philosophy is to 
establish a powerful bloc, which could enable European countries to provide a check on the 
political and economic ambitions of China and the United States. However, the PVV regard 
such grand designs and a deepening of the Union as completely unnecessary from the 
perspective of the Netherlands.929  
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          Some recent studies have revealed that  elites in founding EU member states (like 
Belgium and Germany) are much more likely to consider close relationships with the United 
States to be a threat to the cohesion of the EU than are  elites in new EU member states (like 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia).930 Arguably, the strongly pro-American sentiments of 
PVV members could be interpreted as not only an internalisation of the charismatic party 
leader’s own attitudes, but also a way to challenge the still reigning somewhat pro-EU 
attitudes among Dutch elites. 
         As for the REP deliberations on the topic of geopolitics, the party representatives 
generally do not divulge any clear preferences when it comes to choosing between close 
foreign policy alignments with the EU or the United States: 
 
“The EU is not needed as a counterweight to the United States…we should be open to trade 
with the States [historically our business relations have been excellent] and not necessarily 
privilege other EU states when it comes to trade relations.”931 
 
         There is a stress on occupying the golden middle and choosing according to German 
national interests in specific domains on whether to pursue closer cooperation with the United 
States or EU neighbours.932 At this stage, the EU is gauged to be relatively impotent in 
foreign policy matters, as proven by the splits in opinion between [Eastern and Western] 
countries before the Iraq War.933  In this regard, it is frequently emphasized that the United 
States does not really have any reason to take the EU seriously [as a military entity].934 It is 
also pointed out that a more isolationist stance when it comes to German foreign policy may 
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be advisable, especially when it comes to exercising “hard power”.935 While there is a 
preference to engage in “soft power” exercises and shun military operations that do not 
concern the immediate geographical neighbourhood [of Germany], this does not manifest 
itself in some form of anti-Americanism.936 Thus, unlike in the Dutch case, the pan-European 
frame in geopolitics is considered capable of successfully coexisting with the mildly pro-
American one.937 This “middle ground” approach is also maintained in relation to economic 
issues, with a strong “euro” regarded as “theoretically likely to represent a nice alternative to 
the US dollar”, though it is also stressed that this is far from absolutely necessary or 
economically viable at this point in time.938 
 
Constraints on the expression of nationalism and ostracism by mainstream parties 
 
         The narratives covered up to this point dealt with the interplay between European and 
national identities within the framework of the European Union. The opinions and arguments 
expressed largely drew on symbolic aspects and historical analogies. The next section looks 
at the parties’ perceptions of actual constraints on nationalism emanating from the EU level, 
in a substantive rather than a largely symbolic sense. Thus, this part provides a glimpse into 
the connection between norms deriving from EU membership and interviewees’ perceptions 
that behaviour is constrained by the need for “political correctness” as well as the difficulty 
of finding coalition partners in an EU context where other parties are shy of associating 
themselves with nationalists. 
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         Framing of nationalism-related issues, dissemination of information on the EU, party 
coalition dynamics (Bulgaria) 
 
         To Ataka, Pan-Europeanism is conceptualized as an annoyance, as it is associated with 
unnecessary moralizing on the part of the EU when it comes to the nation-state. It is regarded 
as a way to attack traditional nationalism by creating an impotent substitute. This is believed 
to be inappropriate because countries do not actually need to be saved from “standard 
nationalism”. In essence, the pessimism regarding conventional nationalism is deemed 
unwarranted, as countries within Europe no longer hold on to the stereotypes of the past when 
interacting with fellow states and traditional nationalism is not a zero-sum game between 
states.939 
 
         “Political correctness” in relation to the way the topic of nationalism is approached and 
discussed in Bulgaria is generally not attributed to any direct influences emanating from EU, 
but is seen to be re-inforced by the EU bias of the political elite and media. Carefulness to 
avoid appearing nationalistic is generally viewed as an ever-present feature of the Bulgarian 
political landscape since the end of communism. Ataka members believe that other Bulgarian 
politicians are wary of nationalism due to the “misconception” that the Nazis were 
nationalists, so they are assumed to tread carefully around such issues.940 They say that even 
prior to EU accession in 2007 regular Bulgarians were extremely guarded about making 
pronouncements of a nationalist nature and this trend has continued under the wing of the 
EU.941  The party functionaries (with one exception) maintain that the media in Bulgaria 
display a markedly pro-EU bias. One of the main problems – in their eyes - is that while there 
is free speech on paper, all the media outlets sing the same tune and exercise self-censorship, 
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which also means that they portray the EU through rose-tinted spectacles.942 The reason for 
the perceived overemphasis on reporting about the positive features of the EU is that the 
Bulgarian elites themselves encourage such one-sided reporting. In addition, the same elites 
are thought to sacrifice patriotism for subservience to the EU.943 Hence the media are 
believed to have contributed towards the entrenchment of the perception that nationalism is a 
bad and dangerous ideology.944 
          In terms of conventions regarding the deliberations on the role of the nation-state, the 
EU is believed to have affected the nature of political discussions in an indirect way due to 
being used as a blueprint by the mainstream parties in Bulgaria. One example of that is the 
GERB party’s manifesto and its emphasis on “achieving economic development according to 
European standards” coupled with the lack of any mention of national interests.945 
 
         The media cordon sanitaire imposed on the party is regarded as being of paramount 
importance and in this regard the EU’s influence is only indirect.946 However, the EU is 
gauged to have played its part in isolating Ataka within the Bulgarian political system. 
Although Bulgarian mainstream parties are in any case assumed to have a national 
disposition not to cooperate with nationalists because of the abovementioned stigma attached 
to patriotism,947 Alexandrov maintains that during the course of 2009 there were a number of 
proclamations made by EU officials along the lines that it would be “shameful” for GERB to 
cooperate with Ataka. In his view, this muzzling of nationalists at the EU level is a universal 
phenomenon, as evidenced by the EU’s inaction on legislation in France (existing since 1982) 
that aims to reduce the number of representatives that the Front National could have within 
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the French Parliament.948 Punchev, however, ascribes a degree of autonomy to European 
party families, who are most to blame for ostracising nationalists, and does not seem to 
regard EU bodies like the Commission or Parliament as negatively disposed towards 
nationalism: 
 
“In 2006 and 2007 there were many attempts to impose a quarantine line on us…the fault for 
that was not of the EU as an institution, but of the European party families like PES, who 
clearly pressured Bulgarian parties to be careful with regard to their choice of allies. 
However, we have now earned ourselves a proper place within Bulgarian political circles and 
factions like GERB realize that we are valuable partners. We do not take offence when 
parties refuse to consider us as coalition partners, it is simply a natural part of politics”.949 
 
         Framing of nationalism-related issues, dissemination of information on the EU, party 
coalition dynamics (Romania) 
 
         PRM members generally tend to downplay actual EU-level constraints on nationalism 
and the indirect normative influences of the EU on Romanian politics As in the Bulgarian 
context, PRM politicians trace the Romanians’ general reluctance to engage in overt displays 
of nationalism to the decade prior to the country’s membership in the EU: 
 
         “After so-called revolution in 1989, it was in 1991 that I had an interesting experience – 
a Romanian national holiday was being celebrated in one of our major cities and the only 
Romanian national flag on display was perched on the window sill of a clothing store.”950 
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         It is also implied that when one discusses patriotism in Romania, there is always the 
risk of being labelled an extremist and it is assumed that the situation is even worse than in 
Germany in that respect.951 It is emphasized that Romanian intellectuals reinforce the 
negative stigma attached to nationalism and serve to create false parallels between patriotism 
and opposition to the EU.952 Thus, in an indirect way, the EU stifles nationalist expression, as 
it provides ammunition to the intellectuals to unfavorably compare patriotism with belonging 
to the supranational community. Ţîrnea maintains that most of the Romanian parties do not 
possess any kind of patriotism or at best a subdued one and it has been fashionable even for 
the politicians themselves to “make fun of Romania” both before and after accession.953 
Talau echoes this sentiment: 
          “I do not know the degree of our nationalism when we entered [the European Union]. 
Romanian nationalism already lost its way and became outmoded in the beginning of the 
1950s”.954 
 
         Still, some members like Fârşirotu maintain that in the aftermath of EU membership 
Romanians have become somewhat more willing to express pro-nationalist views, a 
testimony to that being the steep reduction in the membership figures of far left and social-
democratic parties.955  
 
         As for the role of the media, they are generally viewed as objective in their assessments 
of the policy impact of the EU, but only because EU membership has never been questioned 
too much by the members of the Romanian general public, so the media have not tended to 
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find fault with the EU.956 In fact, it is emphasized that media outlets are finely attuned to the 
changing dynamics within the EU and the intrusions of key EU figures like Jose Manuel 
Barroso and Viviane Reding in Romanian political discourses. A notable example was the 
January 2012 referendum when they are deemed to have attempted to instruct 8.5 million 
Romanians regarding which way they should vote.957 Because of such interference, EU 
officials are castigated for lacking tactfulness, as they do not seem to realize that minor 
opposition to the EU does not mean that Romania is against the EU in principle. It is assumed 
that any continued willingness on the part of EU actors to insert themselves in the political 
processes will eventually create suspicion among members of the press, which could mean 
that future coverage of EU-related issues may not be as benevolent.958 It is highlighted that 
the EU commissioners’ successful attempts to prevent Băsescu’s impeachment are frequently 
regarded as a “watershed moment”, as they are seen to have brought about the evaporation of 
any good will on the part of most Romanians towards the EU project.959 
 
          With regard to systemic constraints on nationalist parties, there is a high degree of 
awareness regarding the alleged tendency of mainstream Romanian parties to shun 
cooperation with the PRM. It is even implied that electoral rules have been tampered with in 
a non-democratic manner to the detriment of the party, as evidenced by last minute changes 
to electoral system regulations in 2008.960 EU measures directed against nationalist parties 
are thus regarded as superfluous, but the PRM has a particularly difficult time finding allies 
on the European level, as the chips are seen to be stacked against nationalist parties when it 
comes to creating political groupings. For instance, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is 
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alleged to consist of socialists and liberals with no interest in including nationalists.961 In 
short, the implication is that accommodating nationalists is never a priority from the 
standpoint of European-level actors and it is extremely laborious to pursue cooperation with 
like-minded patriots on the European level.962 
 
         Framing of nationalism-related issues, dissemination of information on the EU, party 
coalition dynamics (Netherlands) 
 
         The PVV members articulate less clear-cut opinions regarding the impacts of the media 
and the academic community regarding the ways in which EU issues are framed. Some see 
academics as pushing certain “overly liberal” agendas, while others emphasize that issues of 
that nature are usually dealt with in a balanced manner and there is no significant pro-EU bias 
among scholars within the Netherlands. The persistence of the European frame in Dutch 
discourses is also attributed to the EU’s regional policies and the extolling of the benefits 
arising out of them (when in fact The Hague is perfectly capable of providing the necessary 
support to other regions like Groningen). By receiving money from Brussels, the Dutch state 
is presumed to be having its hands tied in a rhetorical sense, as it is forced to be reluctantly 
grateful to the EU.963  
 
         PVV politicians are concerned that “propaganda” emanating from the EU level is too 
pervasive and incessantly paints false pictures. EU official publications are castigated for 
being preoccupied with the positives associated with the supranational community. Keeping 
nationally oriented parties out of the picture is also said to be a priority for any self-respecting 
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EU bureaucrat.964 In this regard, Van der Stoep relates how he was called a “Fascist” within 
the confines of the European Parliament after speaking out against continued immigration, 
stressing that the term is especially insulting in the Dutch context, much more so than in the 
German one, given the actual histories of the two countries.965  
 
          At the national level, anti-EU rhetoric appears on occasions to be utilized as a way to 
smear political opponents and question their commitment to the interests of the Dutch nation-
state. For example, proponents of what are perceived to be lax policies with regard to the 
naturalization of Turks are characterized as “in cowardly fashion laying their heads in the 
Europhile lap” and “traitorously squandering Dutch culture to Turkey and Europe”.966 Islam-
critical allies of Wilders like Somali-Dutch activist Ayaan Hirsi Ali depict the EU as a 
lynchpin for entities like the Organization of the Islamic Conference (through its adoption of 
resolutions against “hate speech”), the underlying aim of which is to stifle debate on Islam 
within the Netherlands.967 In that sense the EU could be regarded as directly promoting 
political correctness within the Netherlands, especially when it comes to sensitive religious 
discussions. 
 
         From the standpoint of the party, the PVV members who are in the European 
Parliament are assumed to be very well-attuned to the realities on the ground and are quite 
attentive to the issues that are on the radar of regional and national level representatives. 
There is the firm conviction on the part of PVV representatives that their upper level 
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colleagues have shunned socialization into EU cultural habits, even as they encounter EU 
officials and frequently deal with EU-related issues.968 
 
         In relation to the PVV’s relationship with other Dutch parties and the influence of the 
EU, the Haider saga was referred to by a number of the interviewees and criticized as an 
undemocratic bypassing of national regulations, as the PVV guarantee that they would extend 
support to any socialist party that found itself in such a position, as a matter of principle.969 
 
         However, the “domestic solidarity” frame, at least on the party level, is characterized as 
having remained untouched by messages emanating from the EU level. There is thus a high 
degree of trust in the other parties’ sense of “fair play” and commitment to the Dutch 
democratic principles, which is far from the case in the other three countries under scrutiny. 
Dutch parties are seen as likely to “close ranks” in the name of democratic and authentically 
Dutch values,970 though Koertenoeven is not that convinced that this will hold true for the 
future.971 In addition, the PVV depicts itself as a clean party that refrains from “saying too 
many strange things”, which makes the job easier for its counterparts from other Dutch 
parties. Still, Janssen emphasizes that foreign parliamentarians constantly display surprise 
that other Dutch parties cooperate with the PVV without unease or hesitation.972 While it is 
assumed that it is not totally out of the question that this mentality may change in the 
upcoming years, from his standpoint there is currently no indication that other Dutch parties 
would allow themselves to be influenced by the EU and refrain from cooperating with the 
PVV.973  
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         The EU constraints on the PVV’s scope for manoeuvre are thus mainly on the level of 
the European Parliament, but they do not trickle down to the party environment within the 
Netherlands, because of the commitment to certain unwritten rules subscribed to by all parties 
and the PVV’s experience in utilizing the right rhetorical devices. 
 
         The PVV’s belief that Dutch cultural mores will continue to work to their advantage is 
largely consistent with some of the sentiments expressed in relation to Pan-Europeanism – in 
contrast to their German, Bulgarian and Romanian counterparts, PVV representatives do not 
express concerns that Dutch nationalism is in a state of crisis. 
 
         Framing of nationalism-related issues, dissemination of information on the EU, party 
coalition dynamics (Germany) 
 
         As for the EU-related constraints on nationalist expression within Germany, they are 
generally viewed as secondary to national ones, but still somewhat significant. The problem 
is partly that there are already some question marks regarding the degree of German citizens’ 
attachment (and expression of it) to their country. In relation to the EU, it is lamented that 
Germany’s membership of the union helps the other countries to be constantly aware that 
Germany is emasculated in terms of its nationalism. The rest of the EU states are thought to 
be very smug about Germany’s indecisiveness when dealing with EU agents, so they no 
longer hold any respect for German nationalism.974  
 
          In that regard, the media climate in Germany is seen not to have helped matters. In 
Gärtner’s view, the media across all countries tend to be little more than mouthpieces for the 
elites and given the latters’ pronounced pro-EU orientation, this inevitably means that they 
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universally praise the EU and any negative impacts of the EU are consequently swept under 
the carpet.975 In particular, he firmly believes that Germany is in the clutches of a media 
dictatorship976 and the reporting of EU-related processes is accordingly more one-sided than 
in most other European countries.977 In particular, the main problem is that serious issues 
concerning the economy do not hit the front pages; thus, there is a tendency to gloss over the 
fact that Germany is the “biggest financial donor” within the Union, which is assumed to 
result in misperceptions among ordinary citizens regarding the economic realities in the 
country.978 Another viewpoint (held by Kohlmann) is that it would be difficult to assess the 
general EU conditioning effect on the German media, but the EU’s influence is suspected to 
be relatively important when it comes to one particular area - the “selection of personnel”. 
Thus, he implies that the media proprietors or moguls in Germany tend to toe the pro-EU line 
and this is presumably reflected in the nature of the appointments that they make; journalists 
who are enthusiastic regarding the EU may have an easier career path.979 However, overall, 
political correctness tends not to be attributed to the EU influences on the German political 
elites or the EU impacts on the media culture in Germany.980 
 
         On the issue of inter-party dynamics in Germany, it is clear that especially since the 
early 2000s die Republikaner have taken great care to distance themselves from political 
factions or movements that occupy the extreme or radical right of the German political 
spectrum. The party aspires to establish itself as a respectable and influential political entity 
on the communal, regional, and national levels and unlike the NPD does not appear to target 
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narrow constituencies.981 The REP have characterized parties like the NPD and the DVU as 
“ideologically incompatible” and have accused the former of trying to subvert the political 
processes within Germany because of their rejection of democracy, the desire to engender 
revolutionary transformations of the political system, their opposition to capitalism, and the 
virulence of the expressed anti-Semitic or anti-American sentiments.982 In addition, die 
Republikaner tend to ostracize factions like the Greens that are perceived to be too militant 
and thus enemies of democracy.983   
 
         While EU proddings are not needed in order to encourage other parties to isolate REP 
within the German political system, Gärtner maintains that EU-level officials do not even 
attempt to hide their unadulterated hostility towards nationalists during discussions organized 
by EU institutions. He details how on the three occasions visiting Strasbourg every effort was 
made to alienate and ostracize nationally minded actors, especially within the confines of the 
European Parliament.984 It is implied that patriotic parties at the EU level are bullied and 
intimidated and the commitment to free speech is only a rhetorical one, as only a select few 
are allowed to voice their opinions – and only if they are sufficiently skilled when it comes to 
Eurospeak.985  
 
         On the domestic level, as stated above, the EU impacts on coalition-making are 
superfluous, but only because domestic parties are perceived to have an aversion to 
nationalists:   
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“The EU is not needed in terms of encouraging other parties to isolate us….the SPD treats 





         Chapter Four analyzed the sentiments of nationalist-populist party members in the four 
countries with a specific focus on their understandings of the various facets of Pan-
Europeanism.  Pre-existing pan-national identifications remain quite entrenched in the case of 
the CEE populists and could be regarded as in-built triggers for Euroscepticism due to the EU 
being evaluated as naturally going against what is maintained to be the “dream positioning” 
of their countries within the European family of nations. In the Bulgarian case, the 
assessments surrounding the EU impacts on national identity are both positive and negative 
due to the tendency to intuitively view the EU as a representative of common “European 
peoplehood” that is still in principle exclusionary of countries like Turkey, but is also unfair 
in its treatment of “ancient protectors” (any Russian-related issues). It is clear that in this 
regard Pan-Europeanism is criticized for possessing tacit anti-Russian inclinations that are 
supposedly eagerly embraced by Bulgarian elites. Similarly, in the Romanian context, Pan-
Europeanism is framed as an exercise in exclusion and is associated with “double standards” 
in relation to Easterners versus Westerners and Latin vs. Germanic Europeans, with Romania 
having a clear sense of belonging to the Latin part of Europe that puts it odds with certain 
“unwritten rules” structuring the nature of its interactions with other EU members. While 
from the standpoint of the German party members their country’s identity does not render 
itself to an accurate positioning within a specific cluster of European nations, the exposure of 
                                                 
986
 Author’s interview with Rolf Schlierer. 
 288 
an allegedly emasculated German identity (that invites ridicule) to other Europeans due to the 
country’s EU membership, the supposed bias against German nationalism within the EU as 
well as Germany’s “donor” status (in an economic sense) predisposes them to view Pan-
Europeanism in a negative fashion. Ironically, the almost complete lack of transcendent 
nationalisms (with the possible exception of the interest expressed in solidifying the bonds 
between the Netherlands and the United States) similarly predisposes the PVV party to 
display principled opposition to the EU project and frown upon any Pan-European “grand 
designs” that attempt to encourage the European nations to act in concert in non-economic 
realms.  
 
         The current and potential issues with regard to the incorporation of “outsiders” within 
the European frame also possess a lot of explanatory power in terms of helping identify the 
rationale behind the parties’ negative attitudes towards the EU project. The PVV is somewhat 
unique among nationalist-populist parties, as it does not see the potential Turkish 
membership and the CEE enlargements as being fundamentally different from each other. 
Despite not generally regarding European identity as a concept that has much academic or 
practical utility, they are still keen on putting forth their own interpretations pertaining to 
what the acceptable boundary definitions of Europe should entail. Similarly, even nationalist 
parties like Ataka and the PRM that are very much alike in their overall policy agendas 
manifest significant differences regarding their views on expanding the boundaries of 
“Europeanness” , as testified by their dissimilar stances pertaining to Turkish accession – the 
PRM is conditionally supportive of Turkish accession (providing it settles its geopolitical 
disputes with countries like Cyprus), while Ataka is resolutely opposed to it. This chapter 
also offered a number of insights regarding the perceived connections between a strengthened 
Pan-European identity, national identity and “vulnerability to Muslim influences” (from the 
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standpoint of nationalist-populist parties). In the case of the PVV, the potential weakening of 
national identity (at the expense of the European one) at some point in the future is seen as 
likely to discourage Dutch citizens from opposing Islamization, while Ataka, REP and PRM 
members do not express a belief that their citizens’ elevated sense of Pan-European identity 
will make them susceptible to being “taken over by Islam”. 
 
         As for the equating of Pan-Europeanism with geopolitical power blocs, this persists as a 
particularly sensitive appendage of Euroscepticism from the standpoint of the PVV party and 
is one area in which the EU tends to be given a sympathetic reading by CEE populists, for 
whom suspiciousness of American foreign policy aims trumps any reservations regarding the 
EU’s heavy-handedness in exerting its influence on their countries.  
 
         Lastly, this chapter also dealt with more specific EU-level constraints on the nature of 
nationalist expression in the four countries that are the subject of analysis, detailing the 
populists’ perceptions regarding the nature of media reporting on EU issues, the EU’s 
involvement in redefining coalition parameters within their nation-states and the EU 
influence on the social desirability of expressing pro-nationalist sentiments. Generally the 
EU-imposed restrictions on nationalism and the changes to the domestic party environment 
are viewed in a negative light across the four different party contexts, but are mostly 
conceptualized as annoyances rather than threats to core nationalist domains. In particular, it 
is clear that nationalists in CEE countries do not blame the EU for having imposed novel 
understandings of what constitutes “appropriate nationalist discourses” and any grievances 




         Returning to the main question that provided the blueprint or the discussion – whether a 
EU-fostered “European community” could displace the nation-state as the principal object of 
attachment - the consensus among all parties is that Pan-Europeanism (manifested in any EU-
level cultural or legal initiatives) does not currently in itself pose a credible threat to 
conventional nationalism (premised on devotion to a single nation-state) by being likely to 
cause a transfer of citizen loyalties from the national to the supranational level. However, 
given the premium placed on meso-level identities by CEE populists as well as the REP’s and 
especially the PVV’s concerns that the EU centre of power is (undeservedly) shifting to the 
East  (with more enlargements in sight), issues connected to the lacking intra-European 

















Chapter Five: Discussions of Migration and Citizenship within 




         Having explored the coverage of the nationalist-populist parties’ disposition towards 
Pan-Europeanism in Chapter Four, in this chapter I examine some of the general and issue-
specific grievances of Ataka, the PRM, the REP and the PVV in relation to the ways in which 
the EU is assumed to exert its influence on the realms of migration and citizenship. This 
chapter will firstly focus on the nature of  the arguments in relation to the EU impacts on 
immigration and emigration dynamics (where relevant in the case of the latter) and will then 
proceed to offer a brief analysis of the nationalist-populist parties’ perceptions regarding the 
national citizenship rules in an era in which they are subject to EU influence. The notion of 
“multiculturalism” and the perceived role of the EU in its promotion is regarded as 
conceptually separate from that of “immigration”, as discussed in various sections of Chapter 
2. Thus, any EU-related concerns pertaining to multiculturalism will be analyzed in Chapter 
6, together with the minority empowerment theme.  
 
Immigration matters and perceived EU influences promoting immigration 
 
         My interviews included a specific question on immigration: “How are you disposed 
toward EU level initiatives (i.e. those with an emphasis on burden-sharing) that touch upon 
migration?” This question sparked discussion about a range of migration-related issues. From 
party documents and national media it is also clear that there are a number of dimensions to 
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the issue of immigration. Not all these dimensions could have been anticipated from my 
literature review.  
 
         Section 3 of Chapter 2 identified migration as an area of particular salience for 
nationalist-populists, suggesting that migration stood at the cross-section of Europeanisation 
and nationalism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, membership of the EU leads to the redefining of 
“insiders” and “outsiders”, and the mobility of EU citizens within the EU contributes to an 
overall trend towards increased immigration which inevitably poses challenges for those who 
view the “nation” in ethnic terms, as a closed community.  
 
         More specifically, there exist a number of areas that are likely to be deemed especially 
problematic by nationalist-populist party members. The first of these is the purported lack of 
effectiveness of the EU. As a supranational agency, it is in theory supposed to aid the nation-
state in controlling migration, but EU membership can be viewed as weakening the state’s 
control in this field. This is chiefly because EU membership leads to unchecked immigration 
of EU citizens, but also because the EU is perceived as ineffective in preventing the influx of 
migrants from other continents. Another area which Ch. 2 identified as problematic was the 
North vs. South (and the newly emerging East vs. West) divide when dealing with migration 
originating from countries external to the EU. In other words, North-West European countries 
at the “core” of the EU may have different preoccupations from those of other member states. 
Terrorism seems more threatening in the West than in the East, while Northern member-
states are less worried than their southern neighbours about the influx of economic migrants 
from Africa and are tempted to “free-ride”, evading obligations to pay for patrolling the EU’s 
southern borders. If the EU spends more money on concerns of primary relevance to its most 
powerful members, this can cause resentment towards the EU in other member-states. A third 
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area of concern identified in Ch. 2 was the supposed negative impact of migration from East 
to West within the EU. 
 
         The discussion in previous chapters of this thesis leads one to anticipate that the 
different nationalist-populist parties would have somewhat different approaches to migration. 
One basic difference is that, as suggested in Chapter 2, Bulgaria and Romania are primarily 
sending countries for migrants, while the Netherlands and Germany are primarily receiving 
countries. Hence one would suppose references to immigration to be more common among 
members of the PVV and REP. Chapter 3 identified a range of different immigration issues in 
the Netherlands and Germany. By contrast, my initial surveys of the case study countries did 
not suggest that immigration was politically salient in Bulgaria or Romania. Chapter 4 further 
identified some important differences even between Germany and the Netherlands, 
suggesting that German populists have a sense of pan-European and central European identity 
which can make them less antagonistic than their Dutch equivalents towards migrants from 
CEE. 
 
         Chapter 5 continues this theme by outlining some additional divergences regarding the 
ways in which CEE-related migration worries manifest themselves among PVV and REP 
functionaries, as to a degree in the nature of the discourses adopted by Ataka and the PRM. In 
the latter case, perceived double standards in relation to their countries’ treatment by the 
Westerners also inspired opposition to EU-led migration initiatives.  Sections 2.1-3 look in 
turn at the three predicted areas of grievance arising out of the countries’ membership in the 
EU and the arguments adopted in relation to them. It provides close analysis of the 
complaints expressed by party functionaries and politicians with regard to EU membership 
reducing the nation-state’s ability to control migration; unfair distribution of resources within 
 294 
the EU with regard to immigration control; and supposed negative economic impacts of the 
mobility of EU citizens. However, Sections 2.1-3 will also suggest the existence of worries 
not identified in my original review of the literature. Most notably, although the literature on 
nationalist-populist parties, being focused mostly on Western Europe, tends to highlight 
concerns about immigration, Ataka and the PRM not surprisingly emphasize the role of the 
EU in promoting emigration. However, the particular focus of their complaints – often 
relating to land tenure – would have been hard to predict. More generally, as demonstrated in 
both Sections 2.2 and 2.3, the worries expressed by nationalist-populists often seem to be 
decidedly irrational and seemingly far-fetched, and therefore hard to anticipate. 
 
         It is important to remember that there is not necessarily a direct link between the scale 
and impact of immigration and the extent to which populists adopt immigration as a political 
issue. As suggested by Chapter Two, much also depends on institutional structures of 
individual countries, which help determine how far populist causes can make political 
headway. Moreover, since politicians also behave opportunistically, immigration may be 
adopted as a cause for entirely cynical reasons. 
 
 
Concerns that the EU diminishes the state’s ability to control immigration 
. 
         In the case of the Ataka party representatives, the EU influence on the realm of 
immigration tends to be viewed in a universally negative light, even though immigration 
issues are not generally (the current fears tied to the fall-out from the Syrian refugee crisis 
notwithstanding) at the forefront of party concerns. In essence, the EU is blamed because its 
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supposedly ineffective attempts to control immigration flows are not viewed as likely to 
insulate Bulgaria from worldwide migration trends. 
            
         Any reservations with regard to the EU level regulation of migration tend to be 
magnified due to the party members’ contention that the current situation in Bulgaria 
pertaining to the issue of porous borders and illegal migrants is close to optimal. As Bulgaria 
is not thought to be plagued by any current issues in relation to immigration, once the country 
enters the Schengen area, immigration matters are assumed likely to become more 
problematic.987  Thus, as a result of the country becoming a member of the Schengen area, 
Ataka members deem it plausible that Bulgaria could become an attractive destination for 
immigrants from Africa and Asia, while at the same time retaining a relatively low level of 
economic affluence. 
 
          Opposition to EU governance in the realm of immigration is also justified based on 
arguments from history. In a general sense, serious doubts are expressed regarding the EU’s 
ability to keep Third World irregular migrants out of European states, given that the Soviet 
Union (which was not overly conscious when it came to the observance of human rights and 
was able to seal borders), is presumed not to have been too successful in achieving that task. 
Thus, resisting globalization phenomena through membership of a supranational community 
is conceptualized as futile, because most illegal immigrants are regarded as perfectly capable 
of evading almost any controls that are thrown at them.988 
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         From a normative standpoint, lack of trust is also displayed with regard to the 
professionalism of the EU police force989 and EU overregulation in the migration domain, 
which – perhaps paradoxically – is also a cause for complaint, and tends to be connected to 
the creation of a dependence or colonial relationship between Bulgaria and Western European 
countries.990 
        
         As for the PRM, immigration in Romania is not viewed as likely to be significantly 
shaped by EU policies, both in the present and in the conceivable future. 
  
         PRM members seem to assume that the dynamics of population movements have a 
degree of determinism to them, so it is viewed as fallacious to read too much into current 
trends, without paying attention to the historical underpinnings. In this regard, the nature of 
the migration of population groups is seen as likely to continue to continue to be from East to 
West (just like in ancient times) and it is thought to be unrealistic to assume that Romania 
could become sufficiently affluent any time soon in order for it to become a primary 
migration destination.991 In that sense, Romania’s EU membership is not deemed a significant 
contributory factor when it comes to making the country more vulnerable to migration flows 
from the East, but it is also gauged not to have improved matters when it comes to border 
security and similar suspicions to those voiced by their Bulgarian counterparts are voiced in 
relation to the legitimacy of EU migration agencies.992   
 
         Among Western European countries like the Netherlands and Germany, immigration 
remains an issue that evokes significant concerns. Anti-EU opinions attributable to the EU’s 
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supposedly detrimental influence on migration affairs are commonplace. The two case-
studies differ in the extent to which the EU is blamed directly, as opposed to the national 
government. One somewhat surprising finding is the tendency of the PVV to ascribe a much 
higher degree of determinism to the EU level and EU officials in the realm of immigration 
than its German counterpart. This is odd, given that the literature in Section 3 of Chapter 2 
established that Germany and the Netherlands have generally been analyzed as part of the 
same camp in terms of their ability to be pace-setters with regard to EU migration policy. In 
addition, the divergent Dutch and German historical trajectories pertaining to immigration, 
with the former being on the more liberal side in terms of policies and underlying mentalities 
(see Chapter 3) means that one might have supposed German populists to be more likely to 
blame an external entity like the EU for having entrenched “post-national and universalist 
frames” in this realm. However, the rhetoric employed by the PVV is suggestive of a 
tendency to accord primacy to the EU when looking for a culprit in this domain, which is 
lacking among the REP members.  
 
         From the standpoint of the PVV, the nation-state is depicted as having been almost 
entirely displaced by the EU in terms of its projected ability to set the policy agenda. Janssen, 
for example, affirms that the EU is crucial when it comes to transforming immigration 
dynamics, characterizing the evolution of the EU’s capacity to affect decisions pertaining to 
immigration and multiculturalism as follows: 
 
“Nowadays the EU is more at fault for immigration (and multiculturalism); in the 1960s and 
1970s our governments deserved most of the blame. Today the European Union has a big 
influence – we cannot decide for ourselves how many immigrants we want or not.” 993  
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         For the PVV, the most detrimental development associated with the EU’s freedom of 
movement provisions is thought to be the removal of visas, because they are thought to have 
provided governments with a rough idea regarding the number of people interested in 
entering their country. Thus, visas are characterized as serving as a useful preparatory tool 
that allows governments to be more informed regarding the process of policy-making when it 
comes to migration. In this regard, in addition to a loss of control over immigrants, the EU is 
assumed to have created an uncertainty among policy-makers due to ushering in new 
informational asymmetries.994 Furthermore, any tightening of the regulations in order to 
reduce migration flows always runs the risk of being overruled by the EU, which is another 
factor that – according to at least one PVV member - causes Dutch policy-makers to feel a 
degree of helplessness when dealing with such issues.995 
 
         In particular, the loss of control rhetoric is tied to the false promises of burden-sharing 
initiatives like Frontex. PVV members universally regard it as ineffective, as established 
democracies like the Netherlands are assumed to be left at the mercy of newcomers like 
Romania with dubious democratic credentials.996 Thus, the underlying assumption is that 
Eastern European countries (at least at this stage) do not deserve to be trusted with regard to 
border controls and monitoring: 
 
“You can pay them off [Romanian border authorities] in order to be let in [from Ukraine], but 
the EU closes its eyes about this reality and praises the Eastern European countries”.997 
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         Thus, Frontex tends to be dubbed as a facilitator of immigration instead of a fence-
maker.998 In addition, southern European countries like Italy are gauged to have very 
permissive and ineffective migration regulations, which are thus counterproductive to curbing 
migration flows.999 
 
         The problem of entrusting newly acceded or southern European member states with 
such responsibilities aside, having one’s own fully operational customs authorities is also 
regarded as a matter of national pride and is seen as an essential element of national 
distinctiveness. For this reason, even if EU level border checks were to add a welcome extra 
layer when it comes to border controls, they are regarded as insufficient unless Dutch 
migration authorities remain actively involved and are privy to all the proceedings.1000  
 
         Unexpectedly (given that it did not emerge from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2), a 
supposed shift in the incidence of crime from Eastern to Western Europe is an issue which 
particularly seems to concern PVV members and which leads them to blame Europeanisation 
and decry the abolition of border controls within the EU. The PVV displays a marked 
tendency to subject Eastern European immigrants to “crime framing”. For instance, 
Kortenoeven maintains that Eastern European states like Romania are “becoming safer every 
day”, while the Netherlands is “now more dangerous compared to before”, because CEE 
countries are successful in exporting their criminality due to the EU framework.1001 Thus, 
immigration is one area that puts the most sharply into perspective the different kind of 
“benefits” accruing to Easterners and Westerners as a result of their common membership in 
the supranational community. As summed up by Van Berkel, “the lessons from the 
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enlargement to the South in the 1980s never managed to sink in when it came to the EU 
officials”.1002 
 
         Van der Stoep sums up the role of the EU when it comes to this issue area as follows: 
 
         “The degree to which we will be successful in dealing with immigration in the future 
will depend on the influence of the EU; if the EU gains further influence on national 
legislation, it will be hard for the state to reverse some of the negative trends”.1003 
 
         It is difficult to speak of a general PVV opposition to the “free movement of people” 
principle, as this fundamental tenet of the EU is lauded in certain contexts, like in the 
pronouncements of the party leader1004 and some of the interviewees when speaking about 
educational opportunities.1005 
 
         However, as already mentioned, PVV members single out EU migration policy 
influences when it comes to the increase in immigration within the Netherlands, at least since 
the 1990s. For instance, Madlener gives credit to Mark Rutte’s government for its efforts to 
tackle immigration issues, but sees the EU as unabashedly promoting immigration and 
hindering the efforts of the national level authorities.1006 In relation to immigration 
potentialities, PVV press releases take affront at what is deemed to be the EU’s leniency with 
regard to family reunification, resulting in “overcrowding and negative effects on the 
economic situation within countries”. The EU is presumed to have a knack for encouraging a 
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“victim mentality” among migrants and is thought to most certainly conceptualize the 
interests of the nation-state as being secondary to those of the immigrants.1007 Specifically 
Wilders takes issue with the ECJ annulling Dutch legislation restricting family reunification 
for immigrants on welfare (March 2010) as well as a Dutch court decision (from August 
2011) declaring Dutch legislation obliging Turkish immigrants to the Netherlands to take 
classes on integration as invalid (with the Dutch court explaining its reasoning by drawing on 
EU rules).1008 
 
         In the German context, while opposition to immigration does not feature prominently 
among the 16 points of the party and is not frequently referred to in official publications, die 
Republikaner clearly take serious issue with the Schengen Agreement and the loss of border 
controls that it entails.1009 Increased criminality (specifically the creation of Eastern European 
mafia-like structures in relation to drug smuggling) is cited as a major concern.1010 In general, 
the current immigration policies of Germany (in part shaped by the EU) are deemed overly 
permissive and lacking any selectivity. The loss of a notion of control implies that the process 
of immigration policy in Germany proceeds in a reverse fashion to that in countries like 
Australia and USA. The reason is that Germany is afforded the opportunity to assess the 
degree to which immigrants are qualified and the exact gaps in the working force they need to 
fill only once they have arrived in the country. By contrast, one REP activist pointed out that, 
in the United States, prior screening and weeding out of immigrants is the norm, preempting 
unnecessary immigration, which is conceptualized as much more difficult under the EU 
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system.1011 One unfortunate repercussion – from a REP perspective - is that 65 % of the 
Turks who reside in Berlin deemed to lack any formal academic qualifications and unable to 
contribute to society in tangible ways.1012 A specific concern is also tied to the visa-free travel 
opportunities within the EU afforded to Turkish service providers and entrepreneurs as a 
result of ECJ judgments.1013 
 
         While the underlying dynamics are deemed to be to a large extent shaped by the EU, in 
contrast to the PVV members, REP representatives do however regard the national 
government as more actively complicit than the EU level when it comes to the pestilence of 
unbridled immigration.  Germany is characterized as country that is in principle very open to 
immigration, as part of its official policy, with the ingrained German mentality being 
summed up as “German money for the entire world” due to its overemphasis on the pursuit of 
altruism in international affairs, traceable to the decades prior to the 1990s. Thus, EU 
measures since the 1990s are thought to have provided an institutional structure and a higher 
degree of organization to migration, but not fundamentally altered German elites’ priorities in 
terms of letting in outsiders into the country.1014 The party leader is thus very clear that the 
nation-state apparatus is rotten from the inside with regard to the management of 
immigration, so it would only be fair to conceptualize the EU as a secondary culprit.1015 In 
addition, and despite German stereotypes about thieving Poles, the anti-CEE paradigm in 
relation to the freedom of movement opportunities engendered by these countries’ 
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membership in the community stops short of attaching a general criminal frame to the 
migrant groups from these newly acceded countries, in sharp contrast to the PVV.1016 
 
 Burden-sharing and resentments at perceived free-riding by certain EU member-states 
with regard to immigration control 
 
         The arguments espoused by REP members also suggest that the lack of intra-European 
solidarities (mentioned in relation to the euro) inevitably manifests itself in the realm of 
immigration – for instance, countries like Italy are blamed for not exercising diligence with 
regard to border checks and it is claimed that “without giving it a second thought simply 
redirect migration flows to Germany”.1017 In this regard, Germany’s EU partners are urged to 
open up to all the asylum seekers who ended up in Germany in the early 1990s in order to 
demonstrate their good will and ease the burden on the Germans.1018 Fears are also expressed 
in relation to new resettlement programmes proposed at the EU level, with Germany assumed 
to be one of the countries that is likely to become the primary recipient of refugees from 
crisis zones in Africa and Asia.1019 All in all, Germany is deemed to have been 
disproportionately affected by the migration flows within the EU in comparison to most other 
countries due to its level of economic development, with the implication being that there has 
been some semblance of a deliberate closing of ranks among other states, the implicit 
agreement being that the German state should be forced to deal on its own with any migration 
fall-outs. 
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         In terms of future potentialities, Frontex is evaluated as likely to remain ineffective, as 
the competing interests of different EU member states are unlikely to ever be reconciled with 
each other.1020  Thus, it will continue to constitute a “placebo” and represent agency that only 
serves to gobble up money and has limited effectiveness.1021 
 
         While the discussion so far has centred on issues that could be conceptualized as a 
natural outgrowth of the EU policies covering migration, the issue of burden-sharing (as far 
as one can tell from my interview data) also brings to light some specific grievances and 
divergences between the countries that are somewhat surprising and do not necessarily reflect 
the real (and intended) effects of EU regulations in this domain. In some cases they are linked 
instead to alarmist prognoses about future migration trends. 
 
         In the Bulgarian case, among some Ataka politicians, extremely pessimistic appraisals 
of the changing economic realities in Bulgaria as a result of EU influences shape their 
thoughts on immigration control. The negativity displayed towards the EU impacts on 
immigration policies is attributable to the perceived unwillingness on the part of the 
supranational community to “foot certain bills”. In contrast to the PRM case where the 
arguments put forth appear to be consistent with the literature and are quite migration-
specific, generic EU-related (mostly economic) fears are at the cornerstone of some of the 
anti-EU potshots that are taken in this domain.  
 
         Firstly, as an outgrowth of the previously expressed beliefs that the EU has adversely 
affected Bulgaria in terms of its economic development, EU officials are lambasted for not 
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being conscious of the need for Bulgaria to receive proper financial support in order to tackle 
illegal immigration. Bulgaria is envisioned as a country that currently is or is in the process of 
being transformed into a buffer zone of the EU.1022 For instance, given that the state is 
strategically located at the periphery of the EU, the expectation is that immigration flows 
between non-member Turkey and Greece would also affect Bulgaria in the future. The 
potential conflict that could occur between Syria and Iran is also associated with an increase 
in migration flows.1023 In this regard, the major criticism leveled at the EU is tied to the lack 
of sufficient funding provided to the Bulgarian authorities to deal with these eventualities and 
the prioritization of rhetorical posturing or the issuing of orders on the part of EU 
officials.1024 
 
         In particular, with regard to Bulgaria’s nature as a buffer state, scepticism is expressed 
pertaining to the legal obligation bestowed upon the country to join the Schengen Area at 
some future point, as in addition to the negative psychological effects of the waves of 
migration from conflict zones, the allocation of funds for the building of accommodation 
camps would be expected in order for living arrangements to be provided for these 
immigrants. Accordingly, the major concern is that Bulgaria would have its hands tied, 
because presumably most immigrants would be able to argue that their human and political 
rights have been violated in their countries of origin, so they will not simply end up to be 
temporary residents in the country.1025 
 
         Ataka politicians’ views on immigration do not appear to necessarily diverge 
significantly from those of the mainstream in Bulgaria. In the 1990s, when amendments in 
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legislation were made in Bulgaria (often under tacit EU pressure) to transform the country 
into a more accommodating destination for refugees and asylum seekers, these two groups 
were frequently depicted in popular discourses in a rather negative fashion and a stigma of 
criminality was attached to them.1026 Even liberally inclined experts whose primary role was 
to offer guidelines regarding the precise ways in which international standards pertaining to 
the protection of refugees could be applied to Bulgaria remained very conscious of the 
distinction between ethnically Bulgarian refugees and “those originating from virtually 
anywhere around the world”.1027 Such attitudes appeared to coexist with the pride not 
infrequently invoked that offering protection to and accommodating vulnerable nationalities 
is deeply rooted in the Bulgarian mentality, as in the cases of Bulgarian Jews fleeing the 
Spanish Inquisition and Armenians settling in Bulgaria during the early 20th century to escape 
Young Turks’ persecution.1028 
 
         Unlike in the case of the Ataka party, PRM members appear to be more ambiguously 
disposed towards the EU impacts on their nation-state in the realm of immigration and do not 
raise any substantial issues with regard to any perceived unwillingness of the EU to provide 
financial aid to vulnerable “frontier countries” like Romania. However, they emulate the 
Bulgarian-specific grievances by expressing a high degree of pessimism regarding the current 
and projected emigration trends, as discussed below. 
 
         It is worth speculating whether the lesser stigma attached to Orientalism in Romania 
and the more tolerant attitude towards Turkey (as discussed in Chapters Three and Four) 
could have also played a role in shaping the viewpoints of PRM party members with regard 
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to the perceived risks of Muslim immigration within the framework of the EU, as potential 
immigration issues arising out of geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East are generally 
discussed in a more sympathetic light by PRM party representatives than their Ataka 
colleagues.1029 
 
Economic impacts of East-West migration within the EU 
 
         The issues related to supposedly increased unemployment in certain industrial sectors 
affecting native Germans (i.e. due to “outsourcing”) are mentioned in REP party 
documents,1030 but the PVV and REP interviewees generally do not dwell on this matter or 
consider it especially problematic.1031 
 
         Unexpectedly, both Bulgarian and Romanian interviewees expressed anxiety about the 
economic impact of East-West migration in their own countries. These concerns tended to 
relate to worries about land ownership, reflecting common nationalist emotions towards the 
native soil. 
 
         In addition to not providing a check on the geopolitical ambitions of powerful states, 
Bulgaria’s EU membership is also thought to have reduced the Bulgarians’ attachment to 
ancestral lands and territories. It is stipulated that one of the reasons for that has been the 
increased emphasis on gaining quick profits on the part of some Bulgarians coupled with a 
desire to emigrate, which has enabled minorities like Turks to begin purchasing agricultural 
lots in Bulgaria at a much higher rate in the aftermath of membership. The fears pertaining to 
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the continued existence of the Bulgarian nation-state (connected to the supposed resurgence 
of Pan-Ottomanism, previously discussed in the geopolitics section of Chapter Four) are also 
brought to the forefront, as the rationale of the Turks when it comes to acquiring lands is 
assumed not to be grounded in economics- or subsistence-related considerations. On the 
contrary, more ulterior motivations are attributed to them: 
 
 “What our ancestors won through violent conquest [claimed by the Turks] is simply being 
purchased today.”1032  
 
         Party representatives invoke parallels between the settlement patterns during the early 
stages of the Israeli/Palestine conflict and the Turkish people’s interest in gaining ownership 
of certain lands, reiterating that the EU is impotent in its capacity to deter secessionists.1033  
 
         Furthermore, the reduction in the importance attached to land ownership among 
Bulgarians is also regarded as an outgrowth of the EU’s corrosive influence on Bulgarian 
agriculture – in part due to the EU-imposed requirements for the fulfillment of export quotas, 
it is assumed that by the year 2020 Plovdiv and Pazardzhik (currently the principal 
agricultural centers in Bulgaria) will likely experience significant losses in agricultural 
productivity and the agricultural sector as a whole is predicted to wane in importance.1034 
Thus, the ill-thought out agricultural policies in Bulgaria attributable largely to the EU level 
are associated with a dimishment of the prestige attached to the Bulgarians’ engagement in 
agricultural activities and subsequently are thought to have brought about a shift in 
Bulgarians’ attitudes when it comes to the ownership of land, which is regarded as a push 
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factor for emigration. As mentioned above, there is supposedly a reverse effect as well, with 
concerns expressed in relation to land ownership and the de-Bulgarization of Bulgarian areas 
attributable to trepidations associated with Bulgarian emigration, thought to have increased in 
the aftermath of membership, and sardonically characterized by one member as “the only 
benefit of EU membership”.1035 
         In short, in contrast to the seeming nonchalance with which EU impacts on immigration 
are initially approached by Ataka members, various current and potential EU effects in the 
realm of immigration appear to be tied to major existential concerns from the standpoint of 
the Bulgarian state, with the EU influences in these realms almost universally regarded as 
undesirable. 
 
         Similarly to the Bulgarian case, one of the avowed concerns in relation to the 
detrimental EU impacts has been the perceived dip in the appreciation that Romanians show 
for their native lands, with the selling of the land equated with the selling of the soul.1036 The 
main issue from the party’s standpoint is that lands are being offered to foreigners without 
people thinking of the long-term repercussions for the nation-state. For instance, in the 
aftermath of EU membership, Americans and Israelis are judged to have increasingly started 
to purchase agricultural lands in Romania.1037 In this regard, the decrease in the value 
attached to land ownership among ethnic Romanians is in part tied to the enhanced prospects 
for emigration since the attainment of membership. When it comes to this particular 
development, Traian Băsescu and his government bear the brunt of the criticism, as they are 
assumed not to have their priorities straight in terms of implementing proper policies and this 
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has resulted in people being discouraged from finding their happiness in Romania.1038 
However, blame is apportioned on the EU as an essential secondary actor.1039  
 
         While there is a degree of pride due to the Romanians émigrés’ enrichment of foreign 
societies (there is the emphasis on Romanian becoming the second most commonly spoken 
language in Silicon Valley after English), EU membership is strongly associated with a 
“brain drain” and a lack of any significant boost to Romanian research or an increase in the 
salaries of academics, which has caused pessimism regarding the current development path of 
the country.1040 Funar maintains that “the supranational community continues to rob us and 
steals the educated brains of those belonging to the younger generations”.1041 From both an 
idealistic and practical standpoint, the concerns tied to emigration are significant due to the 
expressed belief that only the Romanians who have returned from abroad could truly 
contribute to the country’s economic resurgence.1042 Academic studies published on the PRM 
website have corroborated the expressed views that the Romanians employed abroad have 
only made miniscule contributions to the country’s GDP; thus the new freedom of movement 
opportunities provided by EU membership have only brought about false hopes among 
members of the populace.1043 The perceived failure of major privatization deals and the rapid 
transition from Ceauşescu-style communism to untrammeled capitalism, in part triggered by 
the Romanian elites’ desire to catch the EU accession train, are also regarded as contributing 
factors to the emigration waves. For instance, as a result of the reverberations of the 
European economic crisis, Romanian debt is seen to have doubled since 2008 (when it stood 
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at 19.4 % of the country’s GDP)1044 and comparisons have even been made with Turkey, the 
latter being envisioned as being in a better shape than Romania due to its non-embeddedness 
into the supranational structures. 
 
Citizenship transformations 
      
         Section 2 of Chapter 2 focused on the EU’s ability to influence the framing of new 
citizenship laws. In conjunction with Chapter 3, it looked at how the supranational 
community specifically encouraged specific nationalities like Germans and Greeks to move 
away from a strict application of jus sanguinis towards incorporating elements of jus soli and 
jus domicili and the paving of the way for allowing dual nationality. It also examined how 
EU citizenship could over-ride national citizenship (especially in the realm of social 
citizenship). This section accounts for the views of the nationalist-populist party members in 
the four case study countries and identifies the possible rationale behind some of the main 
arguments that are put forth. 
 
         In contrast to immigration, EU effects on citizenship issues are generally regarded as 
relatively unimportant across the four national contexts. However, in accordance with the 
theoretical propositions and empirical studies within the existing literature as touched upon in 
Section 2 of Chapter 2, the removal of the primacy of the jus sanguinis principle when it 
comes to citizenship acquision in Germany is one of the reasons the REP take umbrage at the 
EU level impacts on national citizenship. Along these lines, the normalization of dual 
citizenship in Germany is also attributable to the country’s embeddedness in the European 
Union. Similarly, consistent with the literature on EU-induced convergence of citizenship 
                                                 
1044
 Greater Romania Party newspaper. Statul prinde viteza in spirala datoriilor (State debt spiral is picking up 
 312 
rules, the PVV invoke the EU level in accounting for the “dangerous ease” with which Dutch 
citizenship could be obtained. On the other hand, the findings in the CEE countries are 
somewhat less consistent with the expectations sketched out in the literature review, with 
relatively specific citizenship-related diasporic concerns overriding any trepidations 
pertaining to the generic impacts of EU citizenship on national legislation. 
 
         These sentiments apply mainly to Ataka’s appraisal of the situation in Bulgaria. On the 
one hand, the EU impacts on citizenship regulations in Bulgaria are on the whole gauged to 
be insignificant. While an increase in citizenship fast-tracking for certain nationalities is 
deemed to have occurred in professional sports in the aftermath of membership, there is a 
tendency to blame the national government rather than the EU for any such developments 
that reduce the representativeness of sports teams.1045 It is also seen as problematic that the 
language and knowledge of Bulgarian history components are increasingly deemphasized as 
prerequisites to the acquisition of citizenship, which is in part regarded as an outgrowth of the 
government’s emphasis on the liberalization of procedures in the aftermath of 
membership.1046 
 
         However, a major point of contention from the standpoint of Ataka is that the EU is 
deemed to have provided further ammunition to the national government’s natural inclination 
to be very selective and inconsistent with regard to the observance of the rules for granting 
Bulgarian citizenship. For instance, it is regarded as fundamentally unfair that Macedonians, 
who usually reject their Bulgarian identity and consider themselves a separate ethnicity, 
rarely identifying with Bulgaria as a cultural space, are able to be naturalized in an expedient 
fashion. It is claimed that quite a few apply for Bulgarian citizenship in order to be able to 
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travel freely within the EU. By contrast, Bulgarians in other countries like the Bessarabian 
and the Banat Bulgarians who are very proud of their roots and identify primarily with 
Bulgaria rather than Moldova or Serbia are subjected to very long waits.1047  
 
         In essence, the implication is that while Bulgarian citizenship has become more 
desirable once the country entered the EU, this has resulted in an increased willingness to 
acquire it for instrumental reasons, leading to it becoming somewhat cheapened. 
Macedonians are thus gauged to be accorded priority by the Bulgarian government due to it 
being conscious of the fact that they are on the EU’s radar to a larger degree than Moldovans 
(because Macedonia as a Western Balkan country is currently a prospective candidate for 
membership, unlike Moldova).1048 In this regard, Ataka’s concerns mirror those (covered in 
more detail in the section dealing with Pan-Europeanism) in relation to the perceived 
tendency of the national government to shun “true friends” of Bulgaria like Russia at the 
expense of opening its heart to “historically unfriendly” states like Turkey in order to portray 
itself as a model Europeanizer. The perception of the existence of double standards to the 
detriment of Moldova-based Bulgarians (and other “loyal” Bulgarians) is reminiscent of the 
EU’s alleged direct favoring of Muslim Bulgarians (and Turks) over Christian ones, as will 
be touched upon in Chapter 6. In short, EU membership has provided an excuse for the 
Bulgarian governments to continue their pursuit of instrumentality in relation to citizenship 
rather than reorient themselves and pursue pro-patriotic policies. From Ataka’s point of view, 
it is not deemed coincidental that the consulate that was set up by Bozhidar Dimitrov 
(Bulgarian historian and nationalist) with the aim of “greasing the wheels” when it came to 
the acquisition of Bulgarian citizenship in Moldova folded in the aftermath of the attainment 
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of EU accession, which is assumed to have left quite a few Bessarabian Bulgarians without 
proper representation.1049 Also, it has to be taken into account that Ataka functionaries’ 
interest in ending the practice of dual citizenship with the purpose of discouraging Bulgarian 
Bulgarian Turk émigrés in Turkey from voting for the MRF party could in theory conflict 
with EU citizenship legislation.1050  
              
         Like in the Bulgarian case, the EU’s current or purported impacts on Romanian 
citizenship procedures are also rated as innocuous and there is no concern expressed 
regarding the possibility of a standardization of citizenship regulations among EU countries 
at some point in the future. However, in line with their Bulgarian counterparts there is a 
desire to amend citizenship rules at the national level, as it is currently deemed too difficult 
for the “historically Russian-wrapped” Moldovans to become Romanian citizens.1051 Still, in 
contrast to the Bulgarian case, PRM members express no awareness of EU regulations having 
imparted the wrong sort of wisdom to Romanian governments and changed their pro-
nationalist calculations.1052 Two principal reasons could account for the PRM members’ 
stance. Firstly, unlike their Ataka counterparts who generally express a view that the “EU is 
here to stay” and will remain an entity to be reckoned with in the foreseeable future, 
prominent PRM members like Funar and Fârşirotu are not convinced of the durability of the 
EU and envision doomsday scenarios regarding the future of the supranational 
community.1053 Besides, there is a strong belief in the resilience of the Romanian people and 
the politicians’ capacity to make the appropriate adjustments. For instance, both Eminescu 
and Fârşirotu talk with pride about the Romanians’ ability to quickly switch from Euro-
optimism to Euro-pessimism due to “watershed moments” like the EU officials’ attempts to 
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prevent them from exercising their voice in relation to the attempted impeachment of 
Băsescu.1054 On the other hand, the consensus among Ataka members is that Bulgarians tend 
to be politically passive and are too absorbed into trivialities in order to be cognizant of what 
they claim to be the hypocricies of the EU.1055 Thus, from the standpoint of the PRM, at least 
in the realm of citizenship, it is too soon for the EU to have exerted any overly pernicious 
influences and there are many question marks regarding the continued existence of the 
supranational community to warrant too much speculation pertaining to the long-term effects 
on citizenship. 
 
         In accordance with the literature that discussed the EU proddings that brought about the 
evolution of Dutch nationality regulations, contemporary Dutch citizenship rules are as a 
whole viewed as lax by the PVV and the EU impacts are judged to be quite negative. In this 
regard, the preference displayed for the Swiss citizenship system rather than the 
contemporary Dutch framework is attributable to the ease with which a new nationality could 
be attained under the latter one. Accordingly, the European Convention on Human Rights is 
evaluated as likely to pose significant hindrances when it comes to any amendments of 
citizenship provisions.1056  Similarly, it has been condemned due to having opened the door 
for the so-called “anchor babies” and consequently orchestrated a shift in the demographics 
of Europe because of the provisions enabling immigrants to obtain a residency permit by 
having children, which essentially means that they are almost on an equal footing with the 
actual citizens.1057  
         In a more normative sense, the interaction between EU and national citizenship rules 
also serves to highlight the lack of any “legal self-determination” within the Union. Similarly 
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to the PVV’s interest in juxtaposing the US and EU “geopolitical mindsets” (as examined in 
the Pan-Europeanism section of Chapter Four), the EU is unfavorably compared to the United 
States, as from the PVV standpoint the US states could be considered to be more autonomous 
and sovereign than the actual ”independent” states within the EU. One example of that is the 
ban imposed on capital punishment all over the EU area, while some US states like Texas 
retain it and others like Maine have expunged it from their statute books. In essence, the USA 
has been characterized as more liberal in its constitution than the EU.1058 Thus, EU 
citizenship rules are another hallmark of the EU’s inherent inferiority to the United States and 
the inopportune ways in which it attempts to flaunt its powers and act with arrogant self-
assurance. 
 
         Consequently, the expectation is that in the near future Dutch citizenship rules may 
become exceedingly permissive because of the EU influences.1059 Not surprisingly, the 
USSR/Comintern parallel is also sometimes invoked to illustrate the hierarchical nature of the 
EU in relation to the nation-state when it comes to directives touching upon EU citizenship 
provisions.1060  
 
         It also needs to be stipulated that from the PVV standpoint EU citizenship regulations 
do not render themselves to easy separation from EU impacts on migration, especially in the 
case of intra-EU migration from the eastern side of the continent. For instance, Kortenoeven 
maintains that EU citizenship is a personification of the freedom of movement principle and 
CEE states are eager to cling to it, because it helps them justify the massive flooding of 
Western European countries. Thus, EU citizenship is chiefly an example of another great 
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equalizer, because it is quixotic in offering rewards on a silver platter to less deserving 
member states. Arguably, a contributing factor to the PVV’s reluctance to separate 
citizenship from immigration issues engendered by the EU is its tendency to view (unlike the 
other three parties) the EU level as the primary culprit with regard to immigration-related 
concerns rather than the national level authorities. Also, it is worth pointing out that PVV 
members profess a belief in the erosion of the distinction between residency and citizenship, 
as the former is already deemed to offer plenty of rights because of the neverending EU 
regulations; in essence, the differences between residency and citizenship benefits could be 
characterized as superficial, with the value of the latter increasingly becoming diluted.1061 
 
         Die Republikaner party’s pro-constitutionalist orientation inherently  puts it on the 
defensive when it comes to discussions of the EU legal order, with the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty seen as likely to compromise the democratic foundations of the German 
state1062 or even potentially a dissolution of the German nation.1063 For instance, one of the 
key issues is the erosion of the citizens’ trust in the German legal order which is seen as an 
outgrowth of the German state’s embeddedness into the supranational structures that are able 
to supersede the Basic Law.1064 While it is acknowledged that the German constitutional 
court self-sabotages in a number of respects, as some decisions are taken on a political (in 
response to political lobby groups’ demands) rather than legal basis, this evolution is thought 
to in part stem from its increasing disempowerment due to the pervasive influences of EU 
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legislation1065, i.e. because of the ECJ’s tendency to focus more on the rights of perpetrators 
rather those of the victims of crimes.1066 
 
         The continued standardization of the granting of citizenship procedures through the EU 
is viewed as quite undesirable from the standpoint of the nation-state because it will destroy 
the Eigendynamik (momentum of its own) with regard to the bestowal of citizenship rules, 
which is a mark of each country’s distinctiveness. Similarly, the imposition of economic 
embargos (an example of a conflict fought by non-military means) is conceptualized as 
increasingly problematic if a substantial proportion of the countries’ populations is made up 
of dual citizens who hold double loyalties. Thus, the EU’s paving of the way for the increase 
in the number of states offering dual citizenship is another way to limit the foreign policy 
options that are at each nation-state’s disposal and prevent them from taking decisive 
actions.1067 
 
         In addition, consistent with the literature review expectations, the transformative power 
of the EU has already been viewed with suspicion in the past, with some members crediting it 
as a major normative influence with regard to the shift from jus sanguinis to jus soli 
citizenship principle in Germany in the early 2000s, because it likely worsened the situation 
in Germany with regard to the opportunities for integrating immigrants, i.e. due to them being 
emboldened to flaunt German cultural tenets once they actually became citizens.1068  
         In a somewhat similar development to that in the Netherlands, the EU legal system is 
associated with the relaxation of standards when it comes to asylum seekers and is thought to 
have brought about the erasure of the distinctions between legitimate native German welfare 
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recipients and foreigners who have recently entered the country. Thus, in a practical sense 
citizenship rules are thought to matter less because of the additional layer provided by what 
has been described as Germany’s “centralized eurocracy”.1069 The German case fits neatly 
with the theoretical expectations outlined in Chapter Two, with the problems associated with 






         As established so far, there is an interesting dissonance between the PVV and the REP 
discussions in relation to the EU’s role in the promotion of immigration, both in a practical 
and normative sense, which could not necessarily be anticipated from the analysis presented 
in Section 3 of Chapter 2 and the examination of the historical development of nationalism in 
these two countries. In contrast to the arguments made by the PVV in relation to Pan-
Europeanism and their firm belief in the durability of Dutch cultural mores and the potency 
of Dutch nationalism (unlike the more pessimistic REP assessments with regard to German 
nationalism), it seems as if in the immigration domain, the Dutch party’s members are more 
inclined to conceptualize the EU as a threat in terms of bringing about pro-liberal shifts in 
their citizens’ mentality.  
 
         While it could be argued that the tendency to blame the EU as a primary actor with 
regard to immigration is attributable to the “more hardcore” Euroscepticism exhibited by the 
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PVV in comparison to the one subscribed to by the REP, as will be seen in the next chapter 
dealing with “minority empowerment”, there are important issue areas in which the REP 
members are actually even less likely than the PVV to be conciliatory and generous when 
assessing the role of the EU. To a degree the PVV’s more mainstream status in Dutch society 
(in comparison to the REP who have in recent years somewhat fallen off the radar in their 
ability to capture the German nationalist vote) could also be a factor in their tendency to be 
more forgiving of the role played by Dutch national governments and the inclination to view 
the EU rather than their own national elites as the main obsctacle for regaining some measure 
of control. The risks when it comes to migration control are also perceived as magnified due 
to the EU’s centre of gravity increasingly shifting to the East, which implies that Eastern 
Europeans will more frequently be in charge of making key decisions. This sentiment is 
generally not very pronounced among REP members, perhaps partly due to identity 
considerations – REP functionaries are comfortable at the present stage placing German 
identity within the “Central European” cluster and actually prefer not to define Europe in 
Western-centric terms. 
         As for the two CEE parties, it is clear that immigration-related issues have not yet 
ripened into fully-fledged grievances that tend to be analyzed through a EU prism, with the 
EU’s supposedly pernicious role as a catalyst for emigration remaining at the forefront of the 
nationalism-related concerns. It is not out of the question that once some semblance of 
economic parity with the EU mean is achieved (a major policy aim of the populists and the 
more mainstream parties) and the CEE countries become more attractive destinations for 
immigrants and asylum-seekers, nationalist politicians will increasingly start setting their 
eyes on the EU-level dynamics. Still, even based on the current realities, it is evident that 
CEE populists remain distrustful of the EU’s commitment to supporting them financially 
when the need arises for them to accommodate asylum seekers in their countries as well as 
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the supranational community’s effectiveness in  monitoring its external borders and 
stemming the tide of migration from the developing to the developed world. 
 
         Lastly, one could speak of a general disconnect in the realm of citizenship – in the case 
of the two NWE countries, the underlying issue is generally that national citizenship is 
supposedly too easy to obtain for culturally incompatible “others”, while the pendulum 
swings the opposite way in the case of the CEE parties, with the citizenship acquisition 
process rated as overly complicated for kin ethnicities or meta-ethnicities like Moldovans and 
Bessarab Bulgarians. In comparison to the other issue areas that were analyzed in the 
preceding chapter, the EU remains a relatively epiphenomenal actor in the eyes of the 





















         Chapters 1-3 of the thesis provided a detailed theoretical and empirical overview of the 
influence of the European Union in the realm of minority rights, suggesting that minority 
groups within countries that are members of the Union benefit in a variety of ways from EU 
influences in a number of different spheres, ranging from the legal to the cultural.  
 
         My interviews included a specific question on minority empowerment: “Do you believe 
that members of ethnic or cultural minority groups benefit from EU membership more than 
those belonging to the majority and can one speak of them being “empowered” due to the 
EU?” This question sparked discussion about a range of minority-related issues, all of them 
analyzed in relation to the EU framework, when the latter was deemed relevant. The 
narratives of nationalist-populist members revealed quite a few interesting country-specific 
dissonances. 
 
         Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 of Chapter 1 identified “minority empowerment” as an area 
that is likely to have particular salience from the standpoint of nationalist-populist parties. It 
was anticipated as likely to be perceived as more problematic by nationalists than any issues 
engendered by Pan-Europeanism. The chapter looked at the various instruments through 
which entities associated with the promotion of minority interests benefit substantively (and 
arguably disproportionately relative to more mainstream ones, focused on the promotion of 
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majority interests) because of EU normative influences or specific EU policies. Section 2.2 
covered the situation of ethno-regionalist parties as a special case and looked at the divergent 
ways in which the struggles of sub-national actors could be reframed due to a country’s 
embeddedness into the EU and garner the support of larger audience. As clarified in Chapter 
3, the empowerment effect in relation to ethno-regionalist parties is only relevant with regard 
to Romania and Bulgaria, as the Netherlands and Germany lack any influential ethno-
regionalist parties that could pose a challenge to the state’s territorial integrity and stoke the 
fears of majority nationalists. Section 2.3 analyzed the enhanced role of informal 
organizations that occupy themselves with advancing the interests of ethnic minorities by 
examining the support offered to them by the EU; the arguments raised here apply to all four 
of the target countries. Section 2.4 offered a historical overview of the evolution of the EU’s 
policies and practices in the promotion of minority rights and also brought to light the 
existence of discrepancies between the CEE and Western European cases (especially due to 
the Copenhagen criteria and the asymmetries inherent in EU membership conditionality) 
when it came to the supranational entity’s insistence on the observance of certain standards 
pertinent to the minority situations in countries. This section also served to highlight how EU 
attempts to influence minority-related issues could have a polarizing effect on East-West 
relations as well as creating antagonisms between the various CEE candidates for 
membership themselves. Section 2.4 thus provided the working assumption that nationalist 
actors in CEE countries are more likely to feel aggrieved due to EU interventions in the realm 
of minority rights than their Western European counterparts. 
 
         Attention was also drawn to some specific examples of EU successes in expanding the 
horizons for mobilization in the case of minority groups like the Roma and the Muslims. In 
addition, Chapter 3 added to this picture by examining the nature of the relationships between 
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minorities and majorities in each of the four focus countries from a historical standpoint and 
in the current political climate.  
 
         The following pages thus serve to illuminate the ways in which nationalist-populist 
factions across the four national contexts view the changed prospects for minorities within 
their countries in recent years and the degree to which the EU is subjectively regarded as a 
significant part of the equation when it comes to these dynamics and is regarded as culpable 
when it comes to the privileging of minority groups. This empirical chapter follows the same 
format as the preceding two by bringing to light perceived EU effects on minority rights and 
minority activism in a country-specific rather than region-specific context (though the 
concluding part takes into account the regional dimension, picking up on the theme of the 
divergences between Eastern Europe and Western Europe). During the course of the analysis, 
it refers back to the two facets of minority empowerment (regarded as micro-level 
manifestations of the two main strands of Europeanization introduced in Chapter One) – 
substantive/socio-economic and normative/attitudinal – and strives to keep the conceptual 
separation between them, where viable. In addition, the chapter briefly revisits the topic of 
the national self-appraisal of the members of the majority groups (touched upon in Chapters 
Three and Four) and shows how attachments to post-national (European) identities might 
affect the ways in which minority gains are evaluated (especially in the case of Romania). A 
more detailed overview of the chapter content is presented below. 
         Firstly, the viewpoints of party members pertaining to the current majority-minority 
relations in the countries are presented, so that some indication is provided regarding whether 
minorities are deemed to enjoy a privileged position within society, for reasons that are 
independent of or precede the actual impacts of the EU substantive or normative mechanisms. 
Secondly, the chapter discusses the perceived EU role in relation to any minority-related 
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grievances in each country, with a focus on the normative and socio-economic empowerment 
aspects (if applicable). Thirdly, the issues identified by party members are analyzed further 
by drawing on third party sources and any unexpected findings are given extra attention and 
probed for further explanations. 
 
         In particular, in the case of Bulgaria, attention is devoted to the refurbished playing 
field for Turks and Roma people due to their enhanced legitimacy with regard to the pressing 
for additional cultural and political rights in the aftermath of EU membership as well as their 
improved prospects for challenging exclusive understandings of Bulgarian nationhood. In a 
normative sense, the critique of the presumed tendency of Bulgarian minorities to 
“Europeanize” (Westernize) Bulgarian nationalism as a result of EU influences is noted as a 
novel element that is worth further scrutiny. One additional surprising finding which is 
discussed at length is tied to the prominence of the EU-induced socio-economic angle in 
relation to minority empowerment applicable to ethnically mixed regions. The rationale 
behind the viewpoints of Ataka members is brought to light and the insights gleaned from 
academic studies regarding the impacts of EU funding and local-level activism on specific 
Bulgarian regions are analyzed. Given the unexpected weight of this particular grievance 
(especially when directed against Turks in Bulgaria), a number of studies regarding the 
transformations in the self-perceptions and activism of Turks in the aftermath of membership 
are also expounded upon. 
         As for Romania, this subsection covers the supposed normative gains of ethno-
regionalist parties (DUHR) attributable to the EU and the degree to which minorities are 
portrayed as being able to alter the nature of the political processes in Romania. While these 
revelations were expected and in accordance with the theoretical and empirical literature, the 
arguments made in relation to the Hungarians’ supposed “special status” within the EU offer 
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some essential new insights into the mindset of the Romanian populists and are thus 
elaborated upon. In the concluding part of the subsection, some similarities and divergences 
with the Bulgarian case are extrapolated upon. 
 
         The narratives introduced in the section dealing with the PVV introduce a surprising 
twist, with the party’s inclination to outright dismiss the EU level when it comes to the 
minority situation in the country remaining a common feature among all interviewees. In 
essence, minorities are either conceptualized as more sympathetic than the EU itself or as not 
sufficiently aware of or unwilling to use the EU in order to press their claims. Moreover, the 
finding is discussed in the context of ethnic threat studies and Eurobarometer surveys 
regarding the changed prospects for minorities as a result of EU accession. 
 
         The German section starts off with the more predictable grievances related to the EU 
rhetoric of “rights” accorded to minorities and brings to light a number of additional 
dimensions – it details the EU’s purported future influence on the German legal order with 
regard to minorities and explains the nature of the powerful “behavior modification effect” 
with respect to German cultural symbols that some members identify in relation to minorities. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, a minority of members actually echo the sentiments of their Dutch 
colleagues, regarding the EU impacts on “minority empowerment” in Germany as negligible 
and not worth discussing. 
 
         As mentioned in the introductory part of the thesis, the late 2000s saw a revival of 
debates within many Western European countries regarding the ways in which 
multiculturalism could best be understood and whether it could even be considered the most 
viable and appropriate way to “order society”. The EU role in promoting multiculturalism 
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could also be regarded in an indirect way as a form of minority empowerment, though it is 
clear that it was understood as conceptually distinct by the interviewees. Thus, a separate 
section of the chapter (the final one) provides insights regarding the arguments made by 
nationalist-populist party members regarding the EU’s role in the promotion of 
multiculturalism. The section on multiculturalism does not open the lid on any drastically 
new revelations, but nonetheless touches upon the differences between Bulgarian and 
Romanian understandings regarding the EU role in the promotion of multi-cultural practices 
as well as some of the reasons behind the Dutch populists’ tendency to be more cognizant of 
the EU influence than their German colleagues. It is clear that the CEE populists are more 
likely to invoke parallels between the EU and past multi-ethnic empires when harping on the 
supposed unsustainability of multicultural societies, while their Western counterparts display 
concerns regarding concrete EU policies and the power of Muslim lobbies within the EU. 
 
 
Underlying dynamics within the states and perceptions of minority privileging 
 
         Among all the parties under scrutiny, there is a general sense of recent power shifts in 
favour of minorities or an existence of an entrenched culture in which certain minority groups 
are allowed more leeway when it comes to their day-to-day affairs, though this tends to be 
more evident in the case of the “new” EU member states. 
  
         In the Bulgarian context, Ataka members unequivocally regard certain minority groups 
in Bulgaria (mainly the Roma) as highly privileged mostly due to perceived government and 
private sector pandering to them. This favoring of minorities is thought to manifest itself in 
the economic, legal, and political realms. 
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         In an economic sense, the Roma people are branded as the main culprits, as there is a 
wide-ranging perception that ethnic Bulgarians have been forced to shoulder the economic 
burdens for the wider society, because they are expected to pay all their taxes in a timely 
fashion and rely on themselves to support their families, while many Roma people count on 
social support and allegedly display militant pride due to being confident that they do not 
have to give an account of themselves in front of government institutions.1070 
 
         From a legal standpoint, it is claimed to be dubious that a universal rule of law exists 
for everyone, because minority abuses are tied to their reliance on parallel legal structures 
like the meshere (an unofficial court which adjudicates disputes between members of the 
Roma community), with the added caveat that the Bulgarian media are presumed to generally 
refuse to highlight such issues.1071 In this regard, Roma overrepresentation in criminality is 
characterized as a particularly serious issue in the smaller towns and villages, where there is a 
lack of sufficient police presence and a population mostly consisting of elderly people is 
deemed to be inherently vulnerable.1072 Consequently, minority groups are considered to have 
been emboldened, mainly because of the climate of impunity reigning within Bulgaria, as a 
result of failings in the justice system.1073 Not surprisingly, one of the demands that is 
included in the “Programme Scheme” is for the creation of a new Roma-oriented government 
programme that could outline strategies which would put an end to or at least substantially 
reduce Roma criminality.1074 
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         From the perspective of political processes in the country, blame is apportioned to the 
Bulgarian political elites due to them purportedly granting illegal privileges to the citizens 
who belong to the Roma ethnicity.1075 For instance, since the mid 2000s, the Bulgarian 
governments are gauged to have really taken it upon themselves to be minority rights 
protectors, as evidenced by the statements of politicians like Tsvetan Tsvetanov, former 
Bulgarian Minister of the Interior, sometimes described as Boyko Borisov’s right-hand man, 
that “in 15 years’ time, the political importance of Roma people will increase”.1076 Such 
sentiments also stem from concerns on the part of the nationalists that the Roma people will 
represent an even higher percentage of the population in the future due to their above average 
fertility rate and the low birth rate and emigration of ethnic Bulgarians.1077  
 
         The grievances in relation to the Turkish minority come out clearly when the role of the 
MRF within the Bulgarian political system is discussed. For example, as fleshed out by 
Lakov, the fundamental issue is that in the early 1990s the Bulgarian governments and the 
constitutional court let the cat out of the bag by recognizing the Turkish minority party as a 
legitimate political actor.1078 The MRF is universally depicted as an irresponsible political 
actor that is not averse to stoking the fires of secessionism and caters to the interests of the 
Turkish minority, while also flourishing due to an overly accommodative media and the 
accompanying government comfort extended to it.1079 For instance, the MRF is regarded as a 
main actor when it comes to the concerted efforts to build mosques in areas that are only 
sparsely populated with Muslims in order to lay the groundwork for future secessionist 
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demands.1080 In one vituperative commentary, it is depicted as a “modern bashi-bazouk” 
[militias that supported the regular Ottoman armed forces and were known for committing 
atrocities against civilians] that serves as a vehicle of Turkish aggression against the 
Bulgarian state.1081 
 
         Thus, in addition to the sense of injustice felt due to the privileged status ascribed to 
minorities, trepidations that Bulgaria’s territorial integrity could be violated at some point in 
the future are never far from the surface. Due to the role of the MRF, Muslims in Bulgaria are 
regarded as a potential powder keg, because of them being a relatively capsulated community 
as well as the fact that Bulgaria - alongside Germany and France - has the highest number of 
Muslims as a percentage of the population among EU states.1082 More concretely, the main 
concern is that there could be a replication of the Kosovo issue in Bulgaria.1083 Along these 
lines, the Turkish state is viewed as complicit in encouraging Muslim Bulgarians or Pomaks 
to rediscover a supposedly non-existent Turkish identity.1084 
 
         In the case of the PRM, Hungarian-Romanian relations occupy the spotlight when it 
comes to the majority-minority dynamics. Some of the official publications depict 
Hungarians in an unflattering manner and are premised on rationalizations of moral and 
cultural superiority. For instance, Magyars are described as descendants of “barbarian 
hordes”, which settled in Central Europe at a time when Romanians had already made 
decisive contributions to European civilization.1085 
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         In a general sense, we can see a certain defensiveness when it comes to the minority 
situation, with an emphasis being placed on Romania’s willingness to go above and beyond 
the call of duty with regard to satisfying minority standards. Thus, minorities in Romania are 
perceived to be privileged compared to their counterparts in other European or Western 
countries. For instance, Craşmariu stresses that Romania is very open to minorities, as plenty 
of minority interest groups are currently plying their trade in the country, with 18 members 
representing 18 separate minority groups having entered the Romanian Parliament after the 
most recent elections.1086 In contrast, the claim is advanced that the 40 million Hispanics in 
the United States are severely underrepresented in the Senate and unlike the two million 
Hungarians in Romania they are seen as unable to influence proceedings within their national 
legislatures to any substantial degree.1087 Similarly, the claim that Western European 
countries provide a fertile soil for the satisfaction of minority demands is contested due to the 
absence of officially registered Romanian, Hungarian or Roma parties. In this regard, 
Romania is conceptualized as a poster child, with the addendum that the satisfaction of 
minority demands even at times results in institutional inconveniences – for instance, debates 
within the Romanian Parliament are regarded overly chaotic for the simple reason that too 
many cultural groups have a voice and it is exceedingly difficult to satisfy all of them.1088 In 
essence, the image of Romania as a relatively backward country when it comes to minority 
rights is contested. 
 
         As for ethno-regionalist parties, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania is 
viewed in very similar terms to the MRF in Bulgaria. The accession to the upper echelons of 
power of the DUHR (characterized as an inherently anti-Romanian faction) has been 
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regarded as an “accident of history” and attributed to the petty squabbles between the 
traditional parties representing ethnic Romanian constituents. The rise of the DUHR is 
alleged to have coincided with the increase in espionage activities in Romania to the benefit 
of Hungary, with the mainstream Romanian parties characterized as having turned into 
passive accomplices of the Hungarians.1089 For instance, Romanian governments have been 
castigated for turning a blind eye to cases involving electoral fraud committed by pro-
Hungarian activists.1090  
         DUHR is portrayed as the main threat to the country’s territorial integrity.1091 The 
reasons for that are attributable to it having a significant share of Romanian Parliament seats 
and openly pushing for secession of certain regions in the country.1092 For the first half of 
2012, it has been gauged to have been the main benefactor when it came to the amount of 
funds distributed by the Department of Interethnic Relations in Romania.1093 In this regard, 
its status as a proper political organization is disputed and it is thought to better fit the bill of 
a cultural organization (which purportedly only masquerades as a political one).1094 
 
         DUHR’s successes in elevating its profile within the Romanian political system have 
also been associated with the ushering in of discriminatory discursive frames towards ethnic 
Romanians. For instance, it has been claimed that in political discourses Hungarians are 
essentially “safe from negative stigmas” and could always escape the stigma of being labeled 
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as agents of ethnic discrimination.1095 Thus, Hungarians are assumed to have an almost free 
reign within the Romanian Parliament, frequently intimidating Romanian governments into 
passing laws in accordance with Hungarian interests, by drawing on the threat of withholding 
from cooperating with mainstream parties, which could affect the latter’s legitimacy in front 
of the international community.1096 Hungary’s role as a kin state is also gauged to have 
exacerbated certain issues, having encouraged double loyalties among non-ethnic Romanians 
by contributing to the phenomenon of some Romanian citizens identifying as “hyphenated 
Romanians” like Romanian-Hungarians or Romanian-Czechs”.1097 In this regard, it is also 
alleged that during the most recent referendum in Romania, the Prime Minister of Hungary 
instructed the Hungarians of Romania how they should vote and they followed suit.1098 
 
         The Roma issue is conceptualized as less salient, but similarly to the Bulgarian context, 
the Gypsy population’s low educational attainment is assumed to have transformed it into a 
“strategic resource” for political parties, due to its tendency to be easily swayed during 
election periods. Thus, the contention is that political parties in Romania recognize them as a 
powerful voting bloc due to their sheer numbers and lack of politically informed positions, 
which has resulted in frequent political pandering to them.1099  
 
         The majority-minority relations in Romania largely mirror those in Bulgaria, with two 
clearly identifiable ethnic minority groups assumed to be almost holding the wider society 
hostage due to their ability to co-opt key political figures and carve out a niche for themselves 
within the Romanian political system. 
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         In the Dutch context, a number of minority groups are also regarded as unduly profiting 
from the current political and cultural climate. 
  
         From a normative standpoint, the PVV subscribes to cultural universalism rather than 
cultural relativism, emphasizing the superiority of the Western culture over alien civilizations 
like the Islamic one and maintaining that not all cultural practices are equally moral. 
Referring mostly to the perceived negative effects of Muslim immigration, Wilders depicts 
the Netherlands as the first European country to “[have] ended up in the multiculturalist 
swamp”.1100 The election programme of the party (2010-2015) mentions “positive 
discrimination” as already having adversely affected and continuing to unduly burden 
majority groups like Dutch Christians.1101 More concretely, at the national level in The 
Hague, Machiel de Graaf laments the costs incurred by the city council because of the need 
for diversity training (through the putting together of courses and seminars for “cultural 
outsiders”) and allocates the blame to the “proponents on the left side of the political 
spectrum, whose dream of a multicultural reality was fulfilled”.1102 Similarly, some PVV 
functionaries at the national level take serious issue with the Dutch Anti-Discrimination 
Bureau’s assessment that Scheveningen traditional event Vlaggetjesdag (Flag Day) is “too 
white” and not geared towards the needs of national minorities.1103  
 
         The party’s ideological profile which combines nationalism with a strong support for 
progressive values, e.g. in relation to gender roles and sexual orientation, is seen to 
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intrinsically put it at loggerheads with minority groups like Dutch Muslims.1104 Thus, from 
their standpoint, a process of erosion of Dutch cultural norms has begun in order to make way 
for the value systems of cultural outsiders. In this regard, the Netherlands’ “forced 
engagement” with Islamic communities is thought to have disempowered vulnerable groups 
within the Netherlands like women and resulted in very serious set-backs in relation to the 
emancipation of the individual and the imbuing of society with liberal values.1105 The 
privileged position of (mainly) Muslim minority groups is thought to emerge the most clearly 
in mixed areas, where Dutch women and on certain occasions men are said to need to keep a 
low profile in order to be able to go about  their business without harassment or threats of 
violence.1106 
 
          The enlisting of a number of Dutch volunteers to fight in the ongoing Syrian Civil 
War1107 is regarded as a testimony to the lack of loyalty issue when it comes to Islamic 
immigrants and the Dutch state, as “their identity is transnational, not even European and 
could never be pro-Dutch or pro-French”.1108 In addition, on their return to the Netherlands 
from such theatres of conflict, these “Kalashnikov toting ruffians” are deemed likely to 
display the symptoms of battle-hardened soldiers, which could make them potentially even 
less susceptible to integration than before, resulting in further security issues for the Dutch 
population.1109 
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         At the same time, the PVV members are generally careful to emphasize that their 
opposition to Turkey or other Islamic countries joining the EU should not be equated with a 
rejection of the moderate Muslim population within the Netherlands, a substantial proportion 
of which is of Turkish and Moroccan heritage.1110 In addition, most interviewees tend to 
distinguish between “well-integrated” and “problematic” minority groups, with the former 
category encompassing “culturally compatible populations” like members of other Western 
ethnic groups, which the party claims to refrain from considering as true minorities. The 
rationale for this stance is tied to these groups’ support for the democratic principles of Dutch 
society, willingness to be included in the Dutch culture and ways of life and the low levels of 
criminality.1111 In this context, two PVV members admit that the category “indigenous Dutch 
people” is not always very clear-cut, thus they express their preference for judging others 
based on their work ethic and the interest displayed in following Dutch social mores.1112 
 
         In short, within the Dutch context, Muslim minority groups are regarded as enjoying a 
special position in society, mainly due to the recalcitrance of elites to recognize the “true 
issues”, which has an enabling impact in terms of supposedly encouraging such groups to 
strive for the displacement of Dutch culture. Perhaps an outgrowth of the emphasis on civic 
rather than a strongly ethnic nationalism in the Netherlands, the term “privileging” tends to 
be omitted in PVV discourses, though it is clear that the situation with regard to most Islamic 
groups is conceptualized as unsustainable and a serious security risk, with some members 
even expressing fears of a possible civil war within European countries in the upcoming 
decades.1113 
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         Opposition to multiculturalism is in the same vein an important part of the modus 
operandi of the REP faction and the discussion of the minority situation in Germany largely 
mirrors the way in which PVV representatives approach minority-related questions.  
         Islamic minorities top the list in terms of perceived threats to stability and German 
identity, mainly because Islam is assumed to show the characteristics of a dangerous political 
ideology premised on the subjugation of non-Muslims rather than merely constituting a 
religion.1114  
 
         In a general sense, cultural relativism, another byproduct of “false tolerance”, is 
frowned upon, as it is assumed to represent an illogical and intellectually dishonest 
philosophical and political stance.1115 This reigning “culture of excessive tolerance” is 
thought to have brought about the creation of “parallel societies” and defiant refusal to 
integrate on the part of Muslim immigrants. In this regard, mosques are perceived as offering 
separate societal centres for Muslims and are thus thought to defeat the purpose of 
integration, as they are deemed likely to encourage movements towards segregation.1116 In 
addition, the above average criminality of “problematic groups” like Turks and Arabs, said to 
be underreported by the media, and the economic burdens imposed on other German citizens 
due to a lower educational credentials are considered to be other ways in which minorities 
profit at the expense of the majority.1117 
 
         German policy-makers are also assumed to be tacitly encouraging minorities due to 
having an in-built fear of passing judgment on minority groups and being candid about issues 
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of criminality and a lack of willingness to integrate. Such attitudes of the political 
establishment are also traceable to naïveté and a lack of political astuteness on the part of the 
elite because of a false belief that such minority groups could ever evolve into loyal subjects 
of the German state.1118 The lack of Muslim loyalty is claimed to manifest itself clearly 
during sporting competitions involving German national teams and cultural events.1119 The 
“live and let live” mentality of the current German political institutions manifested through 
the lack of sufficient emphasis on integration is also blamed for the spilling over of intra-
minority rivalries into Germany due to newly arrived Turks and Arabs’ refusal to let go of 
certain historical baggages, which are seen to create negative externalities for the wider 
German society because of contributing to an atmosphere of general insecurity.1120 It also 
needs to be stipulated that in relation to ethnic Turks residing in Germany, the influence of 
minority kin states like Turkey is assumed to have increased in potency following the coming 
into office of Recep Erdoğan, with the Turkish president believed to be overtly discouraging 
expatriate Turks from pursuing integration within the host society.1121 
 
         Like their Dutch counterparts, REP members display a belief that the minority label 
may in certain instances carry a negative connotation and thus they emphasize that well-
integrated foreigners could not be considered a true minority group and definitely do not 
benefit at the expense of Germans. The Western Europeans and the Eastern Europeans fall 
within the this positive category, although Sicilians or Southern Italians as a whole were on 
two occasions depicted in somewhat ambiguous terms, as they are in some respects 
considered to constitute a borderline case.1122  
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         All in all, Islamic-related concerns are prominent from the standpoint of REP 
representatives and minority groups falling within the wider Islamic cultural community are 
widely believed to be exacting a serious toll on the German state, with the German political 
establishments viewed as unwitting accomplices. 
 
The EU dimension and perceived effects on minority empowerment 
        
         The previous section indicated that majority-minority relations between certain 
culturally distinct groups are viewed as disharmonious across the four different national 
contexts, with minorities seen to be supported by the national governments and in certain 
instances a myriad of pro-minority organizations. The next part of this chapter turns to the 
perceived EU impacts, in a variety of domains, when it comes to exacerbating the issues from 
the standpoint of the nationalist-populists. It touches upon the predicted and more unexpected 
grievances expressed by the populists in relation to the impact of the EU on the situation of 




         In understanding the degree to which the Ataka party members regard the EU as an 
important actor in bringing about benefits for minorities that are not shared by the majority, 
one should not lose track of the distinction between empowerment in a socio-economic and a 
normative sense, as established in various sections of Chapter 2 as well as in Chapter 3. 
While respondents maintain that the EU has propelled Bulgarian minorities into the spotlight, 
not all of them believe that the playing field (i.e. potential for minority activism) has been 
altered in a normative sense because of the country’s EU membership of the EU. In contrast, 
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economic factors tied to the improper distribution of EU funds are strongly associated with 
significantly improved prospects for minorities and actual net losses for members of the 
majority. 
         Firstly, in a general sense, there is an agreement among Ataka members that the EU has 
brought about an increased visibility of minority issues. This is largely consistent with the 
expectations outlined in Section 2.3 of Chapter 1 regarding the new opportunities afforded to 
NGOs invested in minority issues as a result of the EU effects on the domestic structures.  
 
         In the Bulgarian context, foundations like the Bulgarian Helsinki Committee that are 
considered to be affiliated with the EU organs are assumed to have become “slightly more 
assertive” (in the aftermath of membership) in drawing attention to the plight of the Roma 
population, as taking up pro-Roma causes has resulted in greater legitimacy dividends. For 
this reason, it has been claimed that law-abiding minorities like Armenians that are well-
integrated and contribute to society are never of much interest to these organizations, because 
their treatment could not be portrayed in a controversial way and tarnish the reputation of 
Bulgaria.1123 “Pseudo-organizations” like the foundations sponsored by American 
businessman and philanthropist George Soros, which are purported to invent racism claims 
and tilt at windmills in order to sustain themselves, are also assumed to have increased their 
pro-minority activism in the years since Bulgaria’s accession.1124 Furthermore, some Ataka 
members like Punchev, Lakov and others also affirm that the ordinary members of minority 
groups have become “a bit more vociferous” in pressing their claims and “developed an 
artificial sense of security” because of the country’s incorporation into the supranational 
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community; however, it is also their contention that such groups have always been very eager 
to clamor for rights and create “illusionary conflicts”.1125  
 
         The Ataka members see the EU impacts as going beyond the domain of formal 
organizations, suggesting that a trickle-down effect to the level of ordinary minority 
ethnicities’ citizens is also being observed in Bulgaria. Thus, Alexandrov, speaking in 
relation to the Dobrich, Shumen, and Targovishte regions of Bulgaria, introduces a legalistic 
dimension to the Bulgarian minorities’ sense of empowerment, emphasizing that minority 
groups like the Roma are very interested in launching complaints against Bulgaria to the 
European Court of Human Rights or the ECJ. In his view: 
 
 “It is frequently the case that members of minority groups [especially in ethnically mixed 
regions like Shumen and Targovishte] are more familiar with the EU avenues for launching 
complaints than with the exact procedures to be followed in order to obtain a national 
identification card in Bulgaria!”1126  
 
         In this context, Asenov takes umbrage at the European Liberal Party (ELP)’s meddling 
with the ongoing judicial process against a number of Bulgarian imams accused of promoting 
radical Wahhabi Islam. In his view, due to the warning uttered to the Bulgarian authorities 
that this trial could be a litmus test regarding the observance of human rights in Bulgaria, 
they are compromising the integrity of the judicial system in Bulgaria and exerting undue 
pressure on the judges before an actual sentence has been issued.1127 Another reason this is 
seen as a sensitive issue is because such statements made by ELP members could result in 
further legitimacy losses for the Bulgarian courts, which are seen not to have the best 
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reputation. In relation to the legal realm, Asenov thus laments that the EU is supposed to 
provide a level playing field, but also makes it evident that certain clearly identifiable groups 
like Muslims are apparently more equal than others.1128 
 
         Section 2.2 of Chapter 1 led one to anticipate that the EU could draw the ire of 
nationalist-populist politicians due to the extra symbolic and material resources provided to 
ethno-regionalist parties. The former dimension predictably manifests itself in the rhetoric of 
Ataka members. The complaints regarding the lack of an equal playing field have a 
prominent presence in discourses in relation to the ethnoregionalist MRF party. In the 
aftermath of EU accession, it is alleged to have enhanced its legitimacy, in part because of 
successfully scoring brownie points on the European scene – the contention is that the MRF 
has successfully deceived the EPP and PES that it is one of the most liberal parties in Europe 
and its post-accession gains on the international and European scene are rated as “huge”. The 
legitimacy dividends of the MRF are traceable to the unjust portrayal of Ataka (as early as 
2005) as a xenophobic party by the EU structures, with the MRF naturally conceptualized as 
the antipode of Ataka.1129 
 
         In a theoretical sense, in addition to the effects of EU membership on boosting the 
prospects for minority activism, the supranational community’s supposed lack of scruples 
when it comes to intruding and forcing its own understandings of multiculturalism on 
Bulgaria is also regarded as potentially dangerous in terms of stirring up anti-Bulgarian 
sentiment among members of ethnic minorities. For instance, in an article entitled 
“multicultural genocide” (referred to by Pehlivanov) posted on the party’s website, the “two-
                                                                                                                                                        
1126
 Author’s interview with Nikolay Alexandrov. 
1127
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faced EU bureaucrats and politicians’” chronic recitals of “mantras of minority rights” are 
directly tied to the Roma populations’ increased hunger for new demands to the detriment of 
Bulgarian citizens. The concerns identified in relation to that are twofold – on the one hand, 
such “imposed discourses” by the EU organs are seen as likely to prod Bulgarian politicians 
into intensifying their pro-minority policies when it comes to educational establishments, 
factory jobs, and so on. On the other hand, by emboldening the Roma with such statements 
that set the bar too high when it comes to the “utopian idea of integration” that is seen as 
being applied inconsistently within Western European states, feelings of relative deprivation 
among the Roma are thought to be likely to increase, which could trigger violent backlashes 
on their part. Thus, elevating “fallacious understandings of ethnic harmony” to the level of 
canon is regarded as likely to have adverse effects on inter-ethnic relations.1130 The perceived 
demographic threat because of the high birth rate of the Roma also factors into these 
concerns.1131  
 
         Vatashki introduces another caveat to the arguments outlined above – he characterizes 
EU policies in relation to minorities as increasingly poorly thought out and maintains that the 
EU-led discourses on minority rights tend to introduce false historical realities into Bulgaria 
by equating Western European nationalisms (seen as premised on colonialism) to the “non-
discriminatory” Bulgarian one.1132 Thus, in his view tensions are bound to rise for the simple 
reason that the European level could help rebrand the Bulgarian national model as an 
“intolerant” one and “market” it to minorities, which could amplify their existing grievances 
(which are at this stage thought to be quite ill-defined).1133 Such opinions are consistent with 
the tendency of the Ataka party to stress that in Bulgaria there is only “one nation” (if not in 
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an ethnic, then at least in a cultural and linguistic sense), as also stipulated in the Bulgarian 
constitution. For this reason, some interviewees prefer to speak of “ethnic or religious 
groups” rather than minorities.1134 In essence, there are clearly substantial concerns that in a 
rhetorical sense the EU could make the categories of “majority” and “minority” much more 
rigorous. A 2011 article by Lukova also posits that in the aftermath of EU membership the 
Bulgarian media have started to focus on topics related to ethnicity with greater frequency 
than before (and implies that this has increased the potential for ethnic conflict) and this is 
seen as an outgrowth of EU minority policies.1135 
 
         Aside from existing or potential normative shifts engendered by the EU which have 
been discussed so far both in connection to pro-minority organizations and minority parties, 
minority empowerment in terms of socio-economic aspects like the redistribution of 
resources holds special resonance from the standpoint of Ataka representatives. The direct 
and indirect role of ethno-regionalist parties like the MRF is stressed with regard to the 
successful use of loopholes in securing financial injections for its constituents. Those 
members who emphasize this point tend to be quite familiar with the regional level, 
especially outside the capital city of Sofia, but this concern also registers on the radar of 
members of the national parliament. 
         One of the underlying issues identified is that money originating from EU sources are 
distributed between hundreds of foundations that are presumed to be solely interested in 
advancing the interests of members of ethnic minorities. As there is no proper accounting, it 
is gauged to be quite difficult to publicize such abuses. The fairness standards are thus 
assumed to be compromised, not only from the standpoint of young Bulgarian families, but 
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also with regard to helping secure livelihoods for non-threatening minorities like 
Armenians.1136 In particular, the EU regional development programmes are regarded as a 
major vehicle for the allocation of funds for the construction of houses and apartments for 
Roma people who nonetheless are still deemed likely to voice complaints of discrimination. 
One estimate made by Asenov is that 70 government programmes and projects appropriating 
EU funds directly aid the Roma population in Bulgaria,1137 while Alexandrov maintains that 
82 different organizations operating within Bulgaria are concerned exclusively with minority 
rights and possess close ties with the EU structures.1138 In addition to being overly proactive 
in favor of the Roma, EU development programmes are thought to delicately brush off issues 
relevant to the indigenous Bulgarians. Asenov’s contention is that in accordance with the EU 
administrators’ platitudes it is virtually impossible to be an ethnic Bulgarian and qualify as a 
person who is below the poverty line.1139 As summed up by the regional party leader: 
 
“The EU demonstrates racism by providing funds exclusively for Roma integration while 
ignoring the plight of Bulgarian pensioners who are sometimes literally dying from 
hunger.”1140  
 
         He also points out that since the early 1990s Roma have been benefiting from 
affirmative action when it comes to police appointments in certain areas of the country and 
the EU has not attempted to do anything to reverse this trend.1141  
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         In addition to their supposedly discriminatory character, the EU-administered “minority 
integration” programmes are assessed as misguided due to the prevailing lax regulations and 
lack of oversight mechanisms when it comes to living arrangements.1142 For instance, Asenov 
draws attention to the construction of condominiums in Yambol (to be inhabited exclusively 
by Roma people) and Sofia financed by such programmes, in which horses are kept as pets 
and draft animals, despite some of these housing projects being located relatively close to 
police stations and major buildings. Thus, as an outgrowth of these developments, certain 
parts of Bulgarian cities (even those close to the city centers) could in his opinion no longer 
be considered modern by what he regarded as any reasonable person’s definition.1143 
 
         While the Roma privileging as a result of recent EU policies is associated with negative 
repercussions mainly within the economic realm, an even more salient concern is the way in 
which EU-level development initiatives play out in relation to more historically antagonistic 
groups like the Turks. For instance, Pehlivanov affirms that the distribution of EU funds in 
certain regions is conducted in a way that is to the detriment of ethnic Bulgarians: 
 
         “The municipal authorities there [in the Smolyan region in the southern part of 
Bulgaria] are members of the MRF [Turkish minority party in Bulgaria]. If your name is 
Georgi [typically Bulgarian name], they find a way to prevent you from accessing the EU 
funds, but if you are called Ahmed [Turkish name], then you are given the green light.” 
 
         The major issue is that the potential of Bulgarian entrepreneurs in such mixed regions is 
not harnessed, as there are limited opportunities for the creation of Bulgarian start-up 
companies because the EU funding hardly reaches them. As for the ultimate aim pursued, 




Pehlivanov’s contention is that Bulgarians are to be made to feel unwelcome and leave 
certain ethnically mixed regions.1144 A major barrier to the fledgling Bulgarian 
entrepreneurial spirit during Ottoman times was the lack of permission to own agricultural 
land as well as the stringent conditions for renting it, 1145 with Ataka members claiming that 
“history is starting to repeat itself”.1146 Interestingly, Pehlivanov refrains from using the 
rhetoric of “empowerment” when discussing minorities and the EU, but at the same time is 
keen to emphasize that the EU funds are used as an important MRF weapon to “de-Bulgarize 
Bulgaria”.1147 It has to be noted that the EU has also been  accused by Ataka members of 
indirectly promoting Islamization within Bulgaria through the encouragement of cultural 
initiatives like the European Cultural Corridor Chorlu-Sakar, with a significant proportion of 
the funds allocated by the EU thought to have been appropriated by the Turkish government 
for the purposes of fostering “Turkization” of certain Bulgarian regions.1148 
 
         To put the EU-induced socio-economic minority empowerment theme into perspective, 
all Ataka members who were interviewed expressed a belief in the economic aspects of 
membership being especially detrimental to the country. For instance, for every euro Bulgaria 
loses to the EU (due to the payment of a membership fee), only 70 cents are thought to be 
recuperated1149 and the rate of the absorption of the EU funds by Bulgarian governments is 
estimated to be a mere 22 %.1150 In particular, between January and August 2012, Bulgaria is 
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deemed to have managed to absorb and put to rightful uses a puny 12 % of the EU funds.1151 
To exacerbate matters, it is gauged that since 2007, the least economically affluent region in 
Bulgaria (the northwestern region, including cities like Vidin, Lom, Montana and Vratsa) has 
benefited the least from EU funds.1152 In essence, Bulgaria is assessed to occupy the last 
place among EU countries in terms of properly allocating EU funding.1153 Thus, the 
perception that the bulk of the funds that are put to actual use serve to advance minority 
agendas is an especially problematic issue from the standpoint of the party. Also, Zaharieva 
stipulates that for historical reasons socio-economic conditions have exerted a unique 
influence on the value orientations of Bulgarians, with economic security considerations still 
significantly exceeding the importance attached to values like solidarity and tolerance. 
Essentially, Bulgaria occupies one of the last places in Europe with regard to the degree to 
which post-material values have taken root among the younger generations.1154 Arguably, the 
uneven development associated with EU funding (potentially leading to a feudalization of 
Bulgaria in one member’s words)1155 also strikes a painful chord with Ataka representatives 
due to helping resurrect issues buried in the distant past. For instance, during the years 
preceding liberation from Ottoman rule, negative qualities tended to be ascribed to rich feudal 
lords and tradesmen of Bulgarian ethnic origin, because they were thought of as well-
disposed towards the Ottoman authorities and generally distanced themselves from the 
revolutionary zeal of the masses.1156 Simeon Radev identifies this period of imperial 
domination as having contributed to sowing the seeds for Bulgarians’ general suspiciousness 
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of hiearchical structures and of the flaunting of wealth and status.1157 The negative attitudes 
towards the “trading elite” during the final years of Ottoman rule are also gauged to have 
spilled over into the political realm and entrenched the perception of politics as a “playing 
field for morally bereft types”.1158 
         Sociological studies have suggested that Bulgarians do not like to compare themselves 
to other countries with regard to indicators like economic development (even if the states that 
are the subject of the comparison are objectively less well-off than Bulgaria) and such 
exercises lead to a reduction in national pride.1159 As alluded to previously, the EU 
membership is seen to invite frequent comparisons between European countries, in which 
Bulgaria usually ends up occupying the bottom spot, and the economic mismanagement from 
which the minorities are perceived to reap dividends further tarnishes the already grim 
picture. 
 
         In addition, the pessimism-riddled mindsets in relation to the “minority empowerment” 
in the economic sphere may have been given further validation due to some MRF members’ 
tendency to ride the “post-accession hooliganism” wave. This is a term coined by Venelin 
Ganev and refers to the post-membership erosion of informal practices guaranteeing 
institutional stability, a spirit of amicability as well as restraint during political deliberations 
that was typical of the period preceding accession.1160 For instance, former MRF leader 
Ahmed Doğan publicly declared in 2009 that he was sufficiently well connected to allocate 
EU subsidies as he saw fit, describing himself as “the real instrument of power” and 
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essentially admitting that he was not opposed to cronyism.1161 Political commentator Anton 
Todorov suggests that since 2012 the MRF has become much more adventurous in 
challenging the Bulgarian ethnic model and the democratic legitimacy of the Bulgarian 
constitution by actively pushing for the recognition of Turkish as a co-official language in 
Bulgaria.1162 On 26 May 2012, in a speech in front of party constituents given near Isperih, 
Doğan made a cryptic reference to the “new mobilization resources and tools available to the 
[MRF] party on the European level that could help usher in important changes [to the 
Bulgarian constitution]”.1163 
 
         Also, it is worth mentioning that the grievances pertaining to the EU funding mainly 
lining the pockets of minority groups did not register as especially problematic in relation to 
the capital city Sofia. The reasons for that are probably tied to Sofia benefiting 
disproportionately from the EU money transfers in comparison to other regions,1164 the city’s 
high degree of ethnic homogeneity (over 95 % of its citizens declare themselves to be ethnic 
Bulgarians compared to a 84.8 % average for the country)1165 and – it has been claimed - the 
much higher level of ethnocentrism attributable to its inhabitants, the assumption being that 
they would be more likely to bring minority abuses to light, either on the municipal or 
national level, than their counterparts in most other cities in Bulgaria.1166 Interestingly, 
Kardzhali (a region in Bulgaria with a high concentration of ethnic Turks) is also not 
mentioned in relation to the perceived EU subsidies abuses. This is possibly due to the fact 
that the high degree of political mobilization among Turks in Kardzhali region does not 
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correspond to a high level of economic mobilization. Besides, Bulgarians in Kardzhali tend to 
be very active within the local economy, for instance when it comes to start-up companies 
and from the very beginning have been avid participants in the European Union economic 
projects.1167 
 
         Besides, it needs to be indicated that the waiving of all the restrictions (expected on the 
1st of January 2014) with regard to the access to the European labor market for Bulgarians 
and Romanians might usher in another problematic development from the standpoint of 
Bulgarian (and Romanian) populists. Due to both countries’ poor absorption rates when it 
comes to the EU funding, some Bulgarian newspapers allege that a small proportion of the 
social funds that were initially supposed to be allocated to the two Balkan states, will actually 
be used to provide financial support to municipal authorities in Germany and the Netherlands, 
in order to aid them with the “poverty migrants’” (180, 000 is the 2014 estimate for the 
number of Bulgarians and Romanians who will emigrate to Germany alone) integration 
efforts.1168 This predicted paradigm shift (at least in the opinion of a number of Bulgarian 
analysts) on the EU level (the initial idea of encouraging such people not to emigrate in the 
first place by offering financial injections to their home countries is gradually being 
abandoned)1169 is likely to be perceived as especially detrimental by nationalist-populist 
parties. 
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         All in all, Ataka members raised quite a few substantive points in relation to EU-
induced minority empowerment in Bulgaria, with both the socio-economic and normative 
dimensions rated as quite salient in terms of the EU’s ability to alter the power balance 
between Bulgarians and certain minority groups. Ataka figureheads frequently stress that 





         In the case of Romania, minority empowerment tends to be viewed through the prism of 
the EU when it comes to the Hungarian ethno-regionalist party (DUHR), with the normative 
dimension appearing quite significant, though the EU is not believed to have hampered socio-
economic opportunities for the majority group due to indirectly privileging minority 
populations such as the Hungarians. 
 
         In terms of reframing issues, so that pro-Hungarian agendas could be pursued, the EU 
level appears to be a useful anchor for pro-Hungarian activists. Virtually all the EU-inspired 
legitimacy boosts to ethno-regionalist parties that were discussed in Section 2.2 of Chapter 1 
are alleged to be applicable to DUHR. For instance, Mihăescu maintains that it is not subject 
to doubt that the EU (specifically the EPP) favors DUHR, ignoring the fact that it is a cultural 
association rather than a political party as it discourages ethnic Romanians from joining its 
ranks.1171 In this regard, the EU is thought to have provided ammunition to ethnically 
Hungarian politicians interested in changing the nature of the administrative divisions within 
Romania. Harghita County Council member Borboly Csaba is believed to have justified his 
                                                 
1170
 Author’s interviews with various Ataka members. 
1171
 Author’s interview with Eugen Mihăescu. 
 353 
preference for the establishment of territorial-administrative regions that include the counties 
of Harghita and Mureş Covasna on the basis of attracting more EU funding.1172  
 
         The crucial region of Székely Land – an area inhabited by Székelys, a branch of the 
Hungarian ethnicity - is gauged to increasingly be exhibiting “features of co-sovereignty”( 
slipping under Hungarian control) because of the Romanian politicians’ reluctance to 
confront the issues surrounding the discrimination supposedly suffered by the ethnic 
Romanians residing in these territories.1173 Since the advent of the irredentist Orbán 
government in Hungary in 2010 Székely officials are accused of having become bolder in 
their separatist claims and are assumed to be keen to “internationalize the issue of 
independent  Székely Land” by gaining access to EU discussion forums.1174 In particular, 
László Tőkés’ appointment as Vice President of the European Parliament in 2011 has been 
viewed with apprehension due to the presumed increase of lobbying activities on behalf of 
Hungarians and the improved prospects for the international recognition of an ethnically 
distinct Székely Land.1175 Hungarians have been assumed to be skillful manipulators, 
employing a “small steps policy” with the intention of presenting Romania with a “fait 
accompli” within the European community in their desires to create another Kosovo.1176 
Consequently, political figures like Tőkés and Orbán are branded as “lobbyists” and 
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“Europeanists” and an accent is put on their prominent positions within European parties like 
the European People’s Party.1177 
 
         In addition to providing symbolic currency for the Hungarians, the perceived passivity 
on the EU and unwillingness to unconditionally support the preservation of Romanian 
territorial integrity has also drawn the ire of PRM members. On one occasion, the former 
party leader Vadim Tudor threatened that he would actively press for Romania’s withdrawal 
from the European Union if the European Parliament did not condemn in the strongest 
possible terms the Székely Land leaders’ secessionist aspirations.1178 
 
         In essence, the EU’s tendency to usurp some of the functions of the nation-state and 
underemphasize the salience of national borders in a rhetorical sense (as discussed at length 
in Section 2.2 of Chapter 1 of the thesis dealing with ethno-regionalist parties) is assumed to 
have been put to maximum use by DUHR politicians for the purpose of “selling secessionist 
claims” to their own constituents and the wider Romanian society, with the EU thought to be 
irresponsibly refraining from wading into the issues and confirming its commitment to the 
state indivisibility principle. 
 
         Beyond ethno-regionalist party empowerment, PRM functionaries also affirm that EU 
accession has ushered in concrete developments that have been overly beneficial to ethnic 
minorities like changes in the electoral system.1179 As an example of such transformations, in 
accordance with the generally strongly assimilationist stance of the party, the provisions for 
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minority language instruction in subjects like history and geography (government 
concessions brought about in part due to EU insistences) have been viewed with concern due 
to the possibility that they could contribute to the weakening of Romanian national identity. 
Such measures of accommodating minorities are associated with a reduced awareness of 
Romanian contributions to European history and civilization as well as potential loss of the 
sense of national dignity.1180  
 
         Pro-Hungarian groups and their constituents have not been the only beneficiaries from 
EU-imposed policies from the standpoint of the party. “European experts” have additionally 
been accused of double standards and being deliberately obtuse due to allegedly discouraging 
Romania from launching complaints against Serbia because of the treatment of the Romanian 
minority within the country. The PRM has advanced the claim that despite Romania’s 
restraint and “soft diplomacy” (through the use of proper EU channels) when it came to its 
attempts to improve the plight of Romanians in Vojvodina, the EU has on occasions 
attempted to unfairly silence Romania on the matter – the rationale being that the EU wants 
to reduce the number of obstacles to Serbia’s future accession into the Union (in order to 
wrest the country away from the Russian sphere of influence). In this sense, the party claims 
to be calling the moral bluff of the EU, as political and geo-strategic considerations actually 
seem to be higher priorities for the EU than a true commitment to ameliorating minority 
situations.1181 In this regard, the urging of Romania by EU officials to recognize the 
independence of Kosovo despite the sensitive situation within the country due to the 
                                                 
1180
 Greater Romania Party newspaper. Academician Dinu C Giurescu: Ce este national in “Legea educatiei 
nationale”? O putem socoti, cu temei, “Legea educatiei fara patrie” (Academic Dinu C Giurescu: What is 
national when it comes to “national education”? We can consider it to be a form of instruction that leads to a 
sense that one does not have a home), 19 May 2011. 
1181
 Greater Romania Party newspaper. Multimim de sfaturi, nu serbim. (Thanks for the advice, but not the 
actual service offered), 21 March 2012. 
 356 
secessionist claims of Hungarian minorities has also been characterized as totally lacking any 
semblance of political astuteness.1182 
         Similarly to the Bulgarian case, ethnic Romanian birth rates are quite low and concerns 
have manifested themselves among party members that current minority groups like Roma 
will constitute a majority at some point in the future.1183 In this regard, the Fundamental 
Rights and Citizenship EU Programme (funded by the European Commission) has also been 
negatively received by the PRM due to its supposedly negative implications for birth rates 
because of perceived overemphasis on the struggles of sexual minorities. It has been blamed 
for airing propaganda against the traditional nuclear family in Romanian schools.1184  
 
         Having outlined a number of the negatively perceived EU impacts that are associated 
with tilting the balance of power in favor of minority groups, it is also essential to identify the 
rationale behind the party’s beliefs that the Romanians find it difficult to curry favor with EU 
structures. 
 
         One of the reasons brought up is traceable to the PRM’s impression (explained in detail 
in the Pan-Europeanism section of the thesis) that the EU is not inclined to treat Romania as 
an equal and feels no compunctions in simply dumping its issues on the Balkan state:   
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“As a result of EU membership we are expected to obey without question when they [the EU 
institutions] say to us – we will give you money and it is your duty to integrate them [the 
Roma people].“1185  
 
         In essence, the European Union is accused of overemphasizing national distinctiveness 
and country of origin principle when it comes to Roma integration, placing the burden of the 
Roma expelled from other European countries on the Romanian state, but does not mention 
borders when the discussions revolve around petroleum and Romanian natural resources as a 
whole.1186 Thus, the Roma people, who are seen as major culprits in tarnishing the Romanian 
reputation abroad due to their reputation for criminality and similarly sounding ethnic 
designation,1187 are equipped with an even stronger belief than before that the Romanian state 
has a special duty to cater to them once they return home. They consequently continue to act 
with impunity.1188 Craşmariu mentioned in his interview that the similarity between the terms 
‘Roma’ and ‘Romania’ increases the West European tendency to neglect the differences 
between the two populations, and, according to academic studies, Romanians have suffered 
more than other East Europeans from the category conflation of “Roma” and “Romanian”.1189 
They have staunchly attempted to emphasize that their identity is highly distinct from the 
Roma one, which is possibly an additional contributing factor to the resentment displayed 
towards the Roma who are returned to Romania.1190 In essence, the EU’s supposed tendency 
to export its Roma-related issues to Romania interacts with the PRM’s resentment due to 
Romanians being allegedly “de-Europeanized” by Westerners because of being 
                                                 
1185
 Author’s interview with Romeo Craşmariu. 
1186
 Author’s interview with Vladimir Fârşirotu. 
1187
 Author’s interview with Romeo Craşmariu. 
1188
 Author’s interviews with various PRM members. 
1189
 Fox, Jon E., Laura Morosanu and Eszter Szilassy. The Racialization of the New European Migration to the 




conceptualized as equivalent to the Roma and thus automatically confined to the non-
European corner. 
 
         In the case of the Hungarians, the normative dimension is especially salient, as they are 
assumed to be much more of a “teacher’s pet” from the standpoint of core EU countries than 
the Romanians. While the EU is not always conceptualized as a major influence on minority 
issues, Hungarians are described as “interesting to the EU”, as Magyars are thought to have a 
noticeable presence in Western European countries like the UK. With regard to pro-minority 
organizations as surveyed in the literature in Section 2.3 of Chapter 1, the Soros foundation 
as well as key personalities such as Barroso are assumed to be naturally well disposed 
towards Hungary.1191  More concretely, the Hungarians’ relative connectedness at the EU 
level is deemed to place them in a perfect position to support their ethnic kin in Romania, 
because many EPP members are likely to engage in lobbying the appropriate channels on 
their behalf.1192 Mihăescu characterizes the EU policies in relation to minorities as a 
“communist way of ruling”, as the EU politicians have it as their underlying aim to use 
minorities against the majority, with the latter (Hungarians) regarded as “more equal” than 
Romanians in the eyes of the supranational community.1193 In addition, unlike the Ataka 
members who generally maintain that the Western European countries’ inclusive policies in 
relation to minorities will come to bite them in the back at some point in the future, PRM 
politicians like Funar hold the opposite opinion. In the view of the former mayor of Cluj and 
leader of the PRM, countries like France have it easy compared to Romania, because they 
practically lack minorities and do not have to deal with secessionist claims, as even visible 
minorities are said to be perfectly loyal to the state. Currently, the issue from the PRM 
standpoint is that the EU (in promoting minority rights in Romania) is oblivious to the actual 
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situation in the country and does not take into account that one particular minority (the 
Hungarians) could “never be loyal” to the Romanian state.1194 
 
         The social capital accumulated by the Hungarians among the EU level officials is 
attributable to their earlier initiation into the European family (they joined the EU three years 
prior to the Romanians) and the fact that they have always been close to Austria and 
Germany in a cultural sense and also in terms of their geographical location.1195 This 
perception is consistent with the somewhat negative views expressed in relation to 
technocratic EU countries like Germany in the Pan-Europeanism section of the thesis. 
Furthermore, the Magyars’ “sweet version of communism” that saw some capitalistic 
practices retaining their hold on the economy is assumed to have helped foster a certain bias 
in the minds of other EU members and caused them to view the Hungarians as distinct from 
the Bulgarians and the Romanians in the sense of being less connected to the Soviet bloc and 
more connected to the European mainstream.1196 
 
         Still, it has to be mentioned that political rivalries (between Liberals,  Socialists, and so 
on) in the EU arena are gauged as more important than those involving members of different 
nationalities and most EU officials are not characterized as exhibiting any obsessions with 
minority issues.1197 Especially in a socio-economic sense, there is also a degree of 
acknowledgment that it would be difficult to separate the gains made by minorities as the 
result of the EU with those made by the majority group: 
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“No, minorities have not benefited more [than Romanians] from EU membership, Romania 
should be looked as a whole when it comes to impacts from the EU, be it economic or 
political”.1198 
 
         Thus, during the course of the interviews, there was no indication that EU-sponsored 
development programmes were regarded as problematic in terms of frequently ignoring the 
plight of economically disadvantaged ethnic Romanians at the expense of Roma or 
Hungarians.1199 This finding represents a somewhat surpising point of contrast with the 
grievances identified in the Bulgarian case given that the economic effects of EU 
membership on Romania tend to be regarded as similarly negative1200 as those in its southern 
neighbor, for instance when it comes to the benefits accrued from EU funding1201 and DUHR 
are presumably more influential within Hungary than the MRF is in Bulgaria, as revealed by 
academic studies in Chapter 3 (Romanian section). In addition, Romania, especially in the 
immediate aftermath of membership, experienced serious issues with the proper absorption of 
EU funds. In October 2007, the EU Commission warned Romania that EU funding that was 
to be allocated to the agricultural development of the country could be withheld due to its 
lacking administrative mechanisms for the distribution of funds, while during the same time 
period Bulgaria’s progress in this regard was rated as “satisfactory”.1202 
 
         All in all, it would be fair to say that from a practical standpoint, Romanian nationalists 
assume that EU membership has not seriously affected the degree of activism and the 
influence exerted by non-party affiliated minorities like Roma to any substantial extent. The 
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ethnoregionalist DUHR is a major exception to that, as it is regarded as being constantly 
engaged in utilizing the EU structures for the sake of elevating its profile. Ataka members 
tend to ascribe a high degree of agency to individual ethnic minorities (viewing them as 
having a mind of their own, and not conflating them with the MRF umbrella organisation), 
while minority issues are consistently viewed through the prism of DUHR among the PRM 
politicians.1203 In somewhat of a contrast to the Bulgarian case, the normative frame of 
minority empowerment is much more salient than the socio-economic one, mainly because of 
the more overt secessionist aspirations of the DUHR party.1204 This is consistent with the 
arguments made in Chapter 3 (Romanian section) pertaining to the tendency of DUHR to be 
more outward-oriented and less reliant on the Romanian state (its host state) in terms of the 
distribution of resources in comparison to the MRF and Bulgaria. At the same time, the 
findings provided no validation to the contention introduced in Chapter 2 (section comparing 
Eastern European with Western European nationalisms) that ethnically inclined nationalists 
like the PRM are likely to attach a higher degree of importance to EU-triggered minority 
empowerment than the relatively civically nationalist Ataka. 
         Also, it is worth noting that the discussions in Bulgaria and Romania reveal that 
relatively more “privileged minorities” like Hungarians and Turks are deemed more likely to 
benefit from normative and socio-economic Europeanization, with the EU-induced threat 
potential of more downtrodden groups like the Roma viewed as lower. This is consistent with 
the thesis advanced by Kohler-Koch and Beyer (discussed in Section 2.3 of Chapter 1) that 
representational difficulties of minority organizations on the national level also tend to affect 
their performance on the European level. However, unlike the PRM members who pontificate 
regarding the Hungarians’ symbolic capital within the EU, the Turks’ capacity for activism 
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and advancement of minority-specific demands on the EU level is generally not regarded as 
especially problematic for Bulgaria by Ataka politicians.1205 These divergences in attitudes 
could be reflective of the Ataka members’ understanding of the special nature of the debates 
surrounding Turkey on the EU level, where influential countries like Germany are generally 
conceptualized as consistent “accession spoilers”, while Hungary’s European credentials are 
rarely challenged, even by nationalist-populist parties like the PVV. 
 
         Section 2.4 of Chapter 1 discussed Marc Weller’s assertion that minority representative 
groups in newly acceded states could make use of their new rights gained in the aftermath of 
membership in order to threaten the stability of their nation-state and in extreme cases push 
for secession of certain regions. This appears to be a more prominent concern from the 
standpoint of the PRM, but the more indirect minority empowerment effects with a socio-
economic dimension are generally rated as more salient by the members of the Ataka party. 
However, in relation to Ataka’s opposition to the Islamization of Bulgaria (concerns like that 
rarely register on the PRM functionaries’ radar), it needs to be pointed out that Ataka’s 
staunch rejection of Turkish membership could arguably also be associated with fears of EU-




         As for the PVV stances on the matter, it appears that minority empowerment is not in 
any way a significant trigger for Euroscepticism. No hidden agendas are ascribed to most 
minorities and they are unlikely to be viewed as a monolithic bloc or to invest in pursuing 
certain anti-Dutch agendas. For instance, left-wing parties are thought to exploit minorities 
for their own goals, but the reality is that the latter are not too interested in involving 
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themselves in politics, preferring to simply strive for improving their prospects in life.1206 
Similarly, another member asserts that minorities within the Netherlands are not too vocal 
and do not press for group rights, rarely relying on EU channels to attain resolution to their 
grievances.1207 Thus, it is claimed that even minority groups tend to acknowledge that the 
Dutch system of dispute resolution is superior to almost any other; in this regard, the PVV 
members’ understanding is that the ECHR is mostly relied upon by Italy and Spain and there 
are not too many Dutch complaints.1208 
 
         In relation to these sentiments, Van der Stoep sees the EU as forging a common bond 
between majority and minority populations. 
 
         “No, minorities do not benefit more from the EU compared to members of majority 
groups. All people from all groups within the Netherlands could unite against the EU.” 
 
         He maintains that the late Pim Fortuyn’s vision was the right one – the Netherlands 
should close its borders and deal with all its issues on its own and by being fair to both 
majority and minority groups. Getting rid of the EU is assumed likely to give a boost to 
integration efforts, as this disengagement from the supranational community could give all 
Dutch citizens a new feeling of pride, which will cut across both minority and majority 
lines.1209 Van der Stoep’s rhetoric is reflective of what has been characterized as the inclusive 
spirit of Dutch nationalism in its interactions with outsiders – from the standpoint of some 
Dutch scholars on colonialism, the Netherlands have always displayed a special concern for 
the predilection of indigenous/minority societies and have favorably compared their efforts to 
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give every minority their due with those of allegedly more brutal imperial regimes like the 
British and the French ones.1210 Thus, as this argument shows, the EU is conceptualized as an 
annoyance and in an indirect way stifles integration measures, which could be seen to be to 
the detriment of majority groups like Dutch Christians. 
 
         Somewhat along those lines, among some party members from the European Parliament 
like Madlener, the issue of minority empowerment as a result of EU influences does not 
register on their radar at all and EU impacts are dismissed as irrelevant and “inappropriate to 
talk about”.1211 While there is a general lack of willingness to view minority issues through 
the prism of the EU, one aspect which could be associated with the notion of “empowerment” 
has to do with the potential effects of the future Turkish membership in the EU on the 
Turkish communities within the Netherlands, which are predicted to be likely to form a “fifth 
column” within the Netherlands.1212 
 
         Among some lower level party functionaries, minority empowerment arising out of the 
EU influences is not seen as a serious issue, but the EU is blamed for playing a role in this, 
albeit in an indirect way. In this regard, Janssen maintains that one issue in relation to 
minorities is that the modus operandi or reactive capacity of the nation-state has been 
restricted in a myriad of ways: the national government is deemed to have become somewhat 
less successful in combating the excesses of certain problematic segments of the population. 
 
         For instance, punitive measures like taking away one’s Dutch nationality are essentially 
impossible due to the controls emanating from Brussels. Similarly, Dutch police are thought 
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to be unable to use all their tools, because of the illegality in engaging in ethnic profiling at 
airports and the possibility that it could raise eyebrows in the EU.1213  In addition, from a 
deterrence standpoint, while Janssen does not believe that capital punishment is especially 
moral, he hints that “having the option of reintroducing it” (which could only occur if the 
Netherlands left the Union) might be conducive to reducing crime rates and ending the 
climate of impunity supposedly reigning within certain minority communities.1214 
 
         Koertenoeven introduces another dimension to the minority-related grievances – in his 
view, the open border policy of the EU has brought about enhanced opportunities for 
planning and coordination of activities between radical Islamist groups operating within 
different European countries, with their aims often assumed to be to target the welfare of 
ordinary Europeans. At the same time, he cautions that while such Islamic groups benefit 
quite a bit due to the freedom of movement principle within the Union, they are not in any 
way sympathetic to Europe as a whole and attempt to as much as possible “avoid touching 
European issues”.1215 The rationale for their rejection of the EU is tied to the non-Islamic 
nature of the EU system, the conditioning effect of Al Jazeera broadcasts and the fact that 
they are already thought to have certain transnational “alternative supranational 
communities” like the Muslim Brotherhood at their disposal. Furthermore, since the early 
2000s such radical groups are assessed to have evolved in a more anti-EU direction due to 
some European countries’ participation in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.1216 Similarly, Van 
Hooff does not believe that specific minority groups in the Netherlands like Dutch Muslims 
benefit in any tangible way from the EU, as the potency of Islamic ideology is deemed so 
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pervasive in all their spheres of life that such groups do not need an extra ally to feel 
encouraged to defy the Dutch authorities’ integration efforts.1217 
 
          In essence, similarly to most PVV members, he remains convinced that there is no 
attachment to the Pan-Europeanism frame among most Islamic minority groups, which is one 
reason they are in no way inclined to give credit to the EU when it comes to ushering in 
system level developments favorable to them.  
 
          As hinted above, one interesting dissonance that is worth noting is that EP PVV 
members are more likely to distance themselves from the whole minority issue and regard the 
EU as an insignificant arbiter, while regionally based members are more aware of and willing 
to talk about “instrumental” gains by minority groups, albeit without providing too much 
detail. One possible explanatory factor for that is to be found by examining the different 
agent attitudes when it comes to the promotion of uniform culturalization in the Netherlands. 
There have at times been notable disconnects between the municipal officials who 
administered the cultural component of the naturalization ceremony (introduced in the mid 
2000s) and those who were higher-up the hierarchy and were actually in charge of designing 
the general policies. For instance, the Amsterdam naturalization ceremony (with the 
municipality playing a decisive role) emphasized the importance of Amsterdam within Dutch 
history, as it was at one point the center of the global economy, and stressed a narrowly 
defined Dutch identity: 
         “Dutch intellectuals were busy defining Dutch culture in terms of European civilization, 
but the naturalization ceremony [at the municipal level, organized by bureaucrats] linked it to 
nationalist history and local folklore”.1218  
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         In this regard, certain municipalities are gauged to have hijacked the ceremony and 
inserted their own nationalist message in it, creating a more exclusionary understanding of 
Dutch national identity.1219 These clear differences between Dutch officials sympathizing 
with the notion of “cultural essentialism within the Netherlands” suggest a tendency for 
lower-ranked functionaries within parties or the bureaucratic apparatus to be more inclined 
towards imposing conformity on minority groups. 
 
         However, in any case, the consensus established is that minority empowerment is 
certainly a relatively low salience issue from the standpoint of PVV party representatives. 
One of the reasons for that and the absence of a perceived socio-economic dimension of 
empowerment could be tied to most PVV representatives’ conviction that the EU has been 
and is still somewhat of an asset for the Netherlands in the economic realm (in marked 
contrast to in the case of the Bulgarian state). For instance, the PVV’s sentiments with regard 
to the economic influences of the EU run the gamut from recognition that the EU has 
contributed to the economic growth of the Netherlands since the 1950s in line with the Dutch 
identity as a trading country1220 to a willingness to concede that economic cooperation within 
the EU could still be desirable.1221 As summed up by Van der Kammen: 
 
         “The only thing Brussels is good for is making it possible that countries could trade 
without too many restrictions. The EU should be a way of letting our economies grow, no 
more”.1222 
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         Thus, despite the serious concerns expressed in relation to the propping up of the 
economies of more impoverished countries within the Eurozone, the Dutch economy appears 
to still be regarded as sufficiently competitive by PVV members and this likely predisposes 
them to view socio-economic gains made by minorities as a result of the EU influences in a 
less threatening light than their counterparts in the Eastern European countries, where 
economic under-development (relative to the EU mean) frequently tends to be brought up as 
an issue that needs addressing.  
         Nonetheless, despite the reasons identified for the PVV’s stances, this finding is quite 
noteworthy and goes against the theoretical expectations outlined in Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 
of Chapter 1 as well as in Chapter 3 in a variety of ways. For instance, although ethnic threat 
studies demonstrate that there is a very strong co-relation between ethnic fears and 
Euroscepticism on the level of ordinary citizens in the Netherlands (as presented in the 
country profile section), this right-wing party does not see the EU level in itself as having 
boosted the prospects for minorities. Interestingly, studies of Eurosymbols in countries like 
Denmark have demonstrated that visible minorities actively refer to Europe and regard the 
adoption of a European identity as a way to display defiance to a society that from their 
standpoint does not allow them to integrate.1223 The 2006 European Social Survey shows that 
across nearly all national contexts, minority populations are more likely to be supportive of 
further EU integration than their majority counterparts,1224 with this relationship holding the 
strongest for one particular minority group - Muslims.1225 However, from the PVV’s view, 
such sentiments among minority groups are definitely lacking. In the PVV’s estimation, it is 
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the Muslims themselves who are deemed the least likely to embrace a European identity in 
the Netherlands.1226  
 
         As alluded to in Chapters 4 and 5, the downplaying of EU-induced minority gains in the 
Netherlands could also arguably be attributable to Eastern Europeans having filled the niche 
as the Dutch people’s “other”, at least from the PVV standpoint.  
            
 
           German situation 
 
         Somewhat similarly to the Dutch party members’ attitudes, the EU-induced minority 
empowerment theme does not significantly register on the radar of most REP party members. 
Gains made by minorities are usually evaluated as being formalistic and a natural outgrowth 
of the freedom of movement provisions and new EU legislation. For instance, Schlierer does 
not believe that the changed nature of the EU membership (since the early 1990s) has 
fundamentally affected the nature of the relationship between majority and minority rights, 
but believes that minorities in Germany do benefit from the Union citizenship, as it enables 
them to participate in additional elections and thus increase their visibility within the wider 
society.1227 In a legalistic sense, the EU influence has been regarded as conducive to the 
overturning of legislation that affects minority interests: 
 
         “One could say that minorities are benefiting indirectly from the EU influences, as the 
recent decisions of Baden-Württemberg courts could have helped stem the tide of family 
unification, but unfortunately they have been overruled at the European level”.1228 
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         Thus, the major issue from a REP standpoint is that the German state has its hands tied 
when it attempts to interfere decisively (in relation to immigrants or minority groups like the 
Roma), as the EU is gauged to have the inclination to appear out of the blue and broach the 
subject of the freedom of movement principle. The awareness on the part of foreign criminal 
elements that they could not be deported by the German state is magnified due to the EU 
influences and this encourages them to see themselves as virtually untouchable.1229 In 
particular, Muslim subgroups are deemed to have unduly benefited because of EU 
regulations. For example, Krisch asserts that German Kindergarten have been forced to 
change their dietary requirements and avoid the display of Christmas symbols and 
decorations in order not to offend Muslim communities. Furthermore, there is also the 
concern that Shari’ah law could soon become an accepted part of the German legal order and 
no one could do anything to stop it, with the assumption being that the EU could clamp down 
on the German state and issue condemnations if objections to cultural diversity are made.1230 
In relation to that, the argument is also raised that investigations of semi-legal unconventional 
cultural practices like polygamy are only conducted if an ethnic German is the offender.1231 
The existence of a supranational legal order is gauged to have opened the floodgates for the 
societal acceptance of unofficial alternative legal arrangements and entrenched double 
standards to the detriment of ethnic Germans. It is also stipulated that other minority groups 
like the Danes in Schleswig-Holstein would not attempt to take advantage of such 
loopholes.1232 In a more general sense, the EU commitment to the promotion of 
multiculturalism is in itself conceptualized as a form of minority empowerment, as it trickles 
down to the legal order and plays a part in shaping the sentiments of ordinary German 
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citizens in a pro-liberal direction.1233 Thus, while the German state is regarded as primarily at 
fault for the lack of proper policies to tackle criminality, the EU is assumed to be never too 
far behind in their capacity to exacerbate the situation.1234 
 
         Similarly to some of the opinions expressed in the Dutch context, while minorities like 
radical Muslims are assumed to lack loyalty to the German state and likely to have no 
hesitation in using the EU legal and political avenues against Germany, their general 
ghettoisation and isolation within the wider society has – it is claimed - caused them to be 
relatively inattentive to EU-related developments. So Muslim groups are assumed not to be 
overly proactive in launching complaints, because they are not too politically savvy and tend 
to watch Turkish and Arab satellite channels which depict the European Union in an 
unflattering fashion. And while the network of EU resources to help minorities is regarded as 
vast by the REP representatives, the supposed beneficiaries of them are currently not in the 
best position to use them.1235 The EU institutions are also characterized as responsible actors 
and are not thought to have tacitly encouraged Turkish attempts to mobilize their “ethnic kin” 
in Germany.1236 
 
         From a normative standpoint, the REP functionaries also emphasize the social 
conditioning effects of the EU since the early 1990s as having brought about a “new safety 
net for minorities”. More concretely, the rhetoric of EU-level judges is regarded as 
problematic, as they constantly mention minority rights, but conveniently refrain from 
mentioning duties like not stealing, going to school and being productive members of 
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society.1237 For instance, Gärtner is convinced that constantly lobbying for new rights has 
almost become like a game for minority groups, because they are aware that the supranational 
structures are on their side.1238 Consistent with the sentiments expressed in relation to the 
other EU members’ implied tendency to mock German nationalism, Germany is 
characterized as being in a special position within the EU because of the German historical 
guilt still being exploited in EU circles. Thus, for largely normative reasons, any German 
government-led measures that could mirror the Sarkozy government’s expulsion of Roma 
people would be absolutely unthinkable.1239 
 
         In this regard, it is speculated that the degree of minority disrespect currently alleged to 
be displayed towards German identity symbols and the intimidation of Germans would not be 
at such elevated levels without the EU being in the picture. Minorities are claimed to 
frequently make statements along the lines of “them soon going to be in charge of the country 
and be the ones in control”.1240 In that regard, Gärtner believes that minority groups are 
cognizant of the fact that Germany is not a fully-fledged nation-state because of the EU and 
find it easier to justify their anti-German stances or visceral reactions and bring them out in 
the open.1241  
 
         All in all, the minority empowerment theme is not rated as significant by most REP 
members in the socio-economic sense, but a number of voices within the party attach a high 
degree of importance to the normative impacts of the EU since the 1990s, which are assumed 
to have increased the self-confidence of minorities (their self-esteem assumed to be already at 
quite a high level) to calculatedly insult German cultural tenets. 
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Multiculturalism and the EU level 
 
         Having examined in detail the nature of the discourses in relation to the EU-triggered 
rises in the fortunes of minority groups, it is also necessary to consider the perceived EU 
impacts on the promotion of multiculturalism. This is viewed as conceptually separate from 
minority empowerment, as it could be construed as an ideology that aims to restructure 
societal models of integration and explicitly targets both majorities and minorities as a whole. 
 
         In terms of Bulgaria’s adoption of a more liberal and multicultural societal blueprint 
due to the standardization engendered by the EU, this is viewed as unlikely by Ataka 
members, but only possible if the Western countries manage to retain the current 
multicultural framework. 
 
         Firstly, the multicultural model in Western European countries tends to be disparaged as 
being ineffective and an inappropriate system for Bulgaria to emulate. For instance, Monev 
maintains that “he would not want to imagine living in a multicultural state”.1242 Other 
members also maintain that multicultural countries are an aberration and “were already given 
the time of day during the 19th century”.1243  In Bulgarian historiography, “Ottoman 
nationalism” has been regarded as exhibiting features of an “administrative and politically 
shaped patriotism drawing on support for modernization through the the adoption of 
progressive legal codes and a lack of intention to create a fully-fledged Ottoman ethnicity.1244 
In certain respects, the anti-imperial and anti-multiculturalism stance of Bulgarian (and other 
Eastern European) nationalists have been seen as attributable to the perceived need to 
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distance the contemporary expression of nationalist sentiment from the edifice upon which it 
was constructed in the case of imperial entities like the Ottoman state. In addition to the 
Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary has been cited as an example of an inherently 
unsustainable state due to the presence of “28, if not more separate ethnicities” within its 
borders.1245 Thus, there is a high degree of suspicion expressed regarding the viability of any 
multicultural state, even if it incorporates only nominally Christian or culturally Western 
ethnicities. 
 
         By the same token, the inherent pessimism regarding multicultural societies is part of 
the reason why EU membership is not conceptualized as likely to lead to an adoption of a 
multicultural model in Bulgaria resembling the one within Western European countries. 
Thus, some Ataka members cling to the hope is that the EU will not succeed in homogenizing 
member state policies on the integration of immigrants and historical minorities, because the 
Western European multicultural paradigm that provides the blueprint for the EU will soon 
crumble and new policies will inevitably start to take shape in the ”old” member states.1246 
For instance, Western Europe is gauged to be in a constant state of flux and there are already 
some signs that certain processes are eating away at its foundations. This is supposedly 
illuminated by the fact that minority groups like the Arabs in France are frequently confined 
to “ghetto areas” and feel discouraged from pursuing proper education, as well as the Roma 
people deportations from France during the Sarkozy presidency, are assumed to testify to the 
failure of multiculturalism in the case of Western European countries.1247 Similarly, another 
reason why Western-inspired multiculturalism is assessed as a failure has to do with the 
continued threat of Islamic terrorism and susceptibility to joining radical cults on the part of 
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second and third generation Muslim citizens of Western states.1248 In addition, the 
specificities of the Bulgarian nationalist trajectory are thought to guard against the coming 
into fruition of a true multicultural model. In this regard, it is maintained that Bulgaria still 
essentially sees itself as one nation, while Western countries continue to subscribe to the 
“divide and conquer” principle in the international (as well as in their domestic) affairs, but 
will be unsuccessful in exporting some of their insecurities on Bulgaria.1249 
 
         However, among those members who fault the EU as a major accomplice in the 
creeping in of multicultural practices within Bulgaria, the future prospects are evaluated as 
rather grim. For instance, one argument that is raised is that the current deficiencies in 
governance (the loopholes existing and the lack of consistency in policy implementation) 
when it comes to Bulgaria could result in even more dangerous consequences than in the 
West if a multicultural model is adopted in the Balkan country. Thus, the assumption is that 
EU-led standardization could result in the adoption of “an unchecked multicultural model” 
due to the nature of the Bulgarian mentality remaining unchanged:  
 
“All the integration initiatives [like those in Western European countries] will be adopted 
without being accompanied by any of the restrictions in the French context, to take one 
example [bans on the wearing of the burqas]. We will be swamped by alien cultural 
practices”.1250 
 
         The validity of this viewpoint is indirectly corroborated by Lakov who regards most 
Bulgarians as not being too informed on political issues and lacking a willingness to seriously 
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engage when it comes to discussions of relevant phenomena pertaining to nationalism.1251 
Thus, the implication is that once EU-induced Western liberalism in relation to minorities 
gains a foothold in Bulgaria, it will become extremely entrenched in society and the 
government and regular citizens will not feel like demanding compliance from minorities 
when it comes to respecting the basic cultural sensitivities of the majority. The key 
assumption is that most Bulgarians will still subscribe to the “live and let live” mentality (as 
they do today) and will not become sticklers for the rules, which will disproportionately 
benefit minority groups.1252 
 
         Specifically, a number of Ataka respondents also profess a belief that multicultural 
practices have already entered Bulgaria in the aftermath of membership, even if they are not 
officially endorsed by the national government. For instance, the issue of “Gypsyization” is 
regarded as a very serious one and the EU is criticized for putting Bulgaria on the spot due to 
purportedly not doing enough about the socio-economic integration of Roma people.1253 
“Gypsyization” is associated with the Roma people’s supposed general refusal to behave in 
accordance with Bulgarian cultural norms and the militant lack of interest displayed in 
pursuing proper integration.1254   
         While Alexandrov does not believe that parties like the MRF will commonly start 
taking part in governing coalitions if Bulgaria develops more inclusive electoral rules as a 
result of the adoption of a multicultural model, he maintains that since 2007 multicultural 
practices are already starting to make their mark at the lower municipal levels of governance.  
For instance, he draws attention to the situation in the Nikola Kozlevo municipality, where it 
is claimed that the mayor of the village of Valnare does not speak Bulgarian and openly 
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models himself on the Turkish nationalists. Similarly, it is also alleged that there a gradual 
creeping in of pro-multicultural attitudes in certain industries within Bulgaria, for example 
because knowledge of the Bulgarian language is sometimes not regarded as a prerequisite in 
order to gain employment. In particular, it is stipulated that in the case of the Shishendzhal 
factory in Targovischte, work advertisements make it clear that fluency in the Turkish 
language is compulsory in order to be considered for a position.1255 Asenov cites similar 
examples, expressing a concern that there are serious efforts under way to transform 
Bulgarian society into a multicultural one, with the EU regarded as a major part of the 
problem, which is one of the reasons he advocates leaving the supranational community.1256 
 
         When discussing the possibility of Western-like liberal multicultural models being 
adopted within Romania as a result of EU-led standardization measures, there is a high 
degree of confidence amongst interviewees that Romanian society would never subscribe to a 
model of multiculturalism similar to those practiced in Western European countries. Having 
historical minorities within one’s borders is conceptualized as being rather different from 
fitting the definition of a properly cosmopolitan country. In this regard, the professed belief 
that Romanian politicians are well aware of the Romanian mentality is seen as one important 
guarantee that they would refuse to pay lip service to or support the introduction of a 
multicultural model within Romania, even under EU pressures.1257  
 
         With regard to the linkages between the EU initiatives and the promotion of a 
multicultural society, there appear to be divergent views among the PVV party members. The 
European Commission has been urged to “cease its investment in the multicultural drama” 
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and “explicitly distance itself from the pursuit of a multicultural society”.1258 Wilders 
assesses the EU’s actions in the realm of multiculturalism and immigration as quite 
suspicious and premised on an “informal pact with Islam”. Quoting Bat Ye’or, Wilders 
regards the 1973 oil crisis as the turning point, as it is then that EC leaders began building an 
alliance with the Islamic world to ensure Europe’s oil supply. It is implied that the terms of 
this alliance included a commitment on the part of the EC elites not to oppose the spread of 
Islam in Europe, to refrain from insisting that Muslim immigrants assimilate and instruct 
European schools and media outlets to heap praise upon this faith and portray it in a positive 
fashion”.1259 The tendency of elites to be overly receptive to Islam is thought to be 
exemplified in the proclamations of political figures who are accorded a high degree of 
respect by the supranational community. For example, Wilders condemns Daniel Cohn-
Bendit (then leader of the Green group in the European Parliament)’s declaration that the 
Swiss people would need to “vote again” following the November 2009 Swiss referendum 
which resulted in a rejection of the construction of minarets.1260 Pro-Islamic lobbies are 
thought to be nested in quite a few European countries, with the EU being a facilitator when 
it comes to these developments; one example cited are the e-mails sent directly from the 
Turkish government’s offices to Turkish organizations and individuals in the Netherlands, 
instructing them to vote for Democrats 66 and Fatma Koşer Kaya during the 2006 
elections.1261 
 
         Lower level functionaries also express a firm belief that the EU promotes 
multiculturalism and is a significant barrier when it comes to the nation-state’s efforts to 
make decisions over the ways in which their societies should be structured. However, some 
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members like Van der Kammen are not too sure whether the “EU does it [the encouragement 
of multiculturalism] purposefully”, though at the same time it is assumed to be immaterial to 
dwell on this particular aspect, as the pernicious effects of the multicultural ideology are in 
the picture anyway.1262  
 
         From a theoretical standpoint, in a more roundabout way, the very essence of the EU 
(since its founding) is also assumed to have indirectly shaped Dutch (and other European 
nation-states’) permissive mentalities when it comes to immigration and multicultural 
policies. In this regard, Kortenoeven maintains that from the supranational community’s 
beginning, the bureaucratic mechanisms of the EU have been wedded to the political and 
psychological notion of avoiding confrontation at all costs, not only between countries, but 
also within states. This has resulted in a tendency to downplay the voices claiming that 
“conflict is already here” (in relation to culturally alien groups like Muslims inhabiting 
European societies).1263 As a consequence of these dynamics, today’s EU is forced to skirt 
around issues pertaining to immigrant access and immigrant integration in the case of 
“problematic groups”, because it is not willing and is unable to develop counter-measures 
that could tackle the root causes of the failed multicultural experiment due to being overly 
committed to passing legislation, but lacking any backbone for decisive action. The general 
reluctance among EU ‘higher-ups’ to own up and acknowledge the realities within countries 
is also tied to the decadency and overemphasis on “feel good” feelings among the EU 
hierarchy, in contrast to the still realistically (in a geopolitical sense) inclined United 
States.1264 This argument also ties in nicely with the PVV’s tendency to regard the EU as an 
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emasculated version of the United States,1265 despite the latter’s open endorsement of Turkish 
membership in the European community.1266 
 
         In essence, there has supposedly been a gradual trickle-down process from the elite 
level to the one of the general population with regard to the promotion of self-defeating 
tolerance when it comes to culturally incompatible groups, which is deemed to have paved 
the way for the contemporary issues with immigration. 
 
         As for the REP in Germany, in terms of apportioning blame for the promotion of 
multiculturalism, the EU is very much regarded as a secondary actor, with the German media 
bearing the brunt of the criticism. The main media outlets are depicted as having fallen 
prisoners to “leftist agendas” and are envisioned as pivotal agents of the national government 
in its striving to portray Germany as an unquestionably multicultural country.1267 Still, 
without membership of the EU, it is assumed that the German state would have been much 
better equipped to reduce immigration waves and also shown less pedantism in upholding the 
tenets of the multicultural ideology.1268 Mirroring the PVV leadership’s views, certain 
ideologues affiliated with the REP party like Ulfkotte maintain that the mollycoddling of 
“dangerous” minority groups like Islamic immigrants is aligned with EU hidden agendas: 
 
         “On the European level, the increase in Muslims in Europe and the Islamization is not 
only accepted, but also desired”.1269  
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         This quotation is in relation to a 30 May 2006 statement made by Jose Manuel Barroso, 
in which the European Commissioner emphasizes that “Europe is big enough in order to 
incorporate Islam as well”.1270 
 
          Thus, since the early 1990s, the EU’s influence in the realm of multiculturalism has 
been rated as quite significant, though it has still not dislodged the national government as the 
principal entity that is associated with the promotion of a post-national society. Unlike in the 
case of the PVV, the national government and elites are envisioned as being fully attuned to 





         As Chapter 6 demonstrated, despite all the parties having virtually the same overall feel 
for the current situation of select “culturally alien” ethnic minorities in their nation-states, 
perceiving them as either privileged or threatening to local culture and society, the views 
espoused in relation to the EU impacts are widely divergent. In the Dutch case, the notion of 
EU-related “minority empowerment” is consistently rejected and a number of prominent 
members even sympathize with minorities due to them being likely to “sink with the same 
EU ship” as the majority. By contrast, the REP party deputy leader as well as some lower-
ranked politicians emphasize the symbolic capital of the EU as having brought about an 
alienation of minorities from their host state or improved the prospects for the passing of pro-
minority legislation in the foreseeable future. At the same time, PVV members appear more 
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likely to be suspicious of the role played by the EU (perceiving it to be rather meek) in 
relation to Turkish involvement in Western European countries’ integration policies, while 
REP politicians like the party leader do not see any kowtowing by the EU with regard to 
Turkey and characterize it as a generally responsible actor in its interactions with the Islamic 
state. 
 
         In the case of the two CEE countries, the belief that the effects of EU membership are 
germane in explaining minority gains is more clearly enunciated. In Romania, the normative 
dimension of minority empowerment is deemed particularly salient in relation to Hungarians, 
with the DUHR party supposedly having become emboldened in pressuring for the break-up 
of Romania in the aftermath of the country’s entry into the Union. Among Bulgarian 
nationalists, the two largest minorities in the country - Roma and Turks - are assessed to be 
benefiting disproportionately in comparison to Bulgarians due to the distribution of EU funds 
regarded as a zero-sum game, the rules of which are purportedly tilted against the majority. In 
this regard, Ataka members generally display a higher degree of pragmatism in their 
evaluations of the plight of minority groups than their Romanian counterparts. However, one 
less conventional argument made by an Ataka member is normatively grounded – Western 
nationalisms are perceived as more aggressive than Eastern ones, thus once Bulgarian 
nationalism starts to be regarded as Western due to the country’s involvement with EU-level 
structures, minorities are deemed likely to begin feeling more justified in attacking its 
credentials. Interestingly enough, there was not a single mention regarding the processes of 
conditionality and their impacts on minorities and the nationalist politicians were keen to 
speak about the post-accession rather than pre-accession-related “minority gains”. 
         It is not out of the question that the predominance of ethnic nationalism in CEE realm 
may have contributed to the nature of the framing of the interaction effects between 
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minorities and majorities – while CEE members appeared to be more willing to emphasize 
the ancient roots and unique elements of their ethnicity, in both Western European countries 
minorities and majorities were not necessarily regarded as acutely distinct groups without a 
cultural overlap. Accordingly, there has arguably been a lower degree of socialization when it 
comes to the adoption of Eurospeak in relation to minorities among party members in the 
Bulgarian and Romanian contexts. In the Romanian case, the new freedom of movement 
accorded to Roma is also a concern, because the bill for their transgressions is supposedly 
always picked up by Romania rather than the Roma ethnic group; it is only the majority 
group which has to come to grips with its loss of status in the eyes of the international 
community. As the chapters dealing with Eastern vs. Western nationalisms highlighted, 
Western Europe has been characterized as suffering from a “shortage of memory”, while 
Eastern Europe has been accused of going the opposite way  by being too focused on past 
historical events that create vulnerabilities.1271 In a sense, some of the “vulnerabilities” felt by 
respondents in the CEE case in relation to the EU’s alleged favoring of minorities may indeed 
be tied to the feeling that painful historical episodes are being replayed thanks to certain EU 
policies in the minority realm. 
 
         Also, it is worth noting that across all the four national contexts, culturally or ethnically 
related groups (like Armenians in Bulgaria or Germans in the Netherlands) did not factor into 
the equation when it came to discussions of “minority empowerment”, which is generally in 
accordance with ethnic threat studies. 
         What is evident is that the EU remains important for understanding majority-minority 
relations and populists are attentive to its potential to provide moral guidance pertaining to 
the development of more equitable intra-societal relations that guard against ethnocracy 
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practices. At the same time, even extremely Eurosceptic parties like the PVV clearly do not 
feel a need to scapegoat minorities or invent claims against them in order to score points 
against the EU project. In addition, popular level sentiments about minorities and the EU 
impacts do not necessarily translate into similar views among populists and it would be 
fallacious to attempt to draw quick conclusions regarding the degree of alignment between 
the viewpoints of nationalistically inclined citizens and nationalist politicians. Still, while this 
disconnect seems to hold true when one takes into account the deliberations on minority 
issues in the Netherlands, this does not seem to be the case in CEE countries like Romania 
and Bulgaria. Also, as stipulated in Chapter Three and the concluding section of this one, 
nationalist-populist politicians’ views on multiculturalism and the role of the EU in its 
promotion in the Netherlands and Germany appear to largely overlap with those of ordinary 















Chapter Seven: General Conclusion     
   
         This thesis has mainly focused on the power of perceptions, striving to uncover how the 
EU’s transformations of the political and cultural space within nation-states are evaluated on 
the level of nationalist-populist parties. It utilized “Europeanization” as an umbrella term for 
the European Union’s substantive and normative influences on countries and it is these 
influences which were investigated. (The actual motivations of EU actors and their rationale 
for adopting certain policies are beyond the scope of the thesis). Interviewing nationalist-
populist figures and engaging in document analysis resulted in a variety of very context-
specific revelations, which could be properly understood only by taking into account the 
specific political situations in the different nation-states and the EU impacts on particular 
realms.  
         The following conclusion will attempt to tie together the variety of thematic strands 
followed throughout the thesis and returns to the original question – the nature of the 
Europeanization-related divergences between parties in the East and parties in the West.  In 
this regard, the first part of the conclusion will put the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2 
(which probe the differences between Eastern and Western Europe) to the test in light of the 
nature of the findings. The second part will reiterate how some of the insights discovered are 
rather novel and enrich the knowledge and understanding of Europeanization within a 
number of scholarly disciplines. Lastly, the final part provides some suggestions regarding 
the follow-up research other scholars could undertake – both in relation to specific parties and 





1. Comparisons between the complaints of Eastern and Western nationalist-populists 
 
         This thesis has covered a multitude of different domains pertinent to Euroscepticism 
and analyzed the attitudes of nationalist-populist parties in four countries, attempting to 
remain attentive to local peculiarities. Nonetheless, despite the four parties’ very divergent 
attitudes towards Europeanization, Chapters 4-6 also identified some points of similarity 
between Bulgarian and Romanian populists on the one hand, and Dutch and Germans on the 
other. The first part of this concluding chapter summarizes the points of comparison already 
identified, and explores the implications of the East-West divides.    
 
         The hypotheses set out in Chapter 2 suggested that: 
 
Hypotheses 1 and 5 (conjoined hypotheses because substantive and normative effects do not 
always render themselves to clear distinctions from each other): Nationalist-populist 
members are disillusioned with the EU, as they perceive that it unduly supports minorities 
through specific legislation, although their Euroscepticism is mostly unconnected to such 
perceptions; minority groups across both sides of the continent are believed to perceive the 
EU as an ally and draw on a “normative cushion” from the supranational community. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Minority empowerment in a socio-economic sense or in terms of legislation 
changes is more likely to be viewed as an EU-related issue on the eastern side of the 




Hypothesis 3: Immigration and citizenship are perceived as being in some respects outside 
the control of the national government, especially on the Western side of the continent, with 
the EU conceptualized as an important player in this realm given that EU member-states must 
abide by rules about mobility of EU citizens. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Pan-Europeanism is unlikely to be regarded as a threat despite the EU’s 
conscious or unconscious efforts in promoting a supranational identity. 
 
It was also hypothesized that (despite the East-West differences anticipated in Hypotheses 2 
and 3): 
Hypothesis 6: A certain process of convergence is beginning to take place between CEE and 
Western European parties in relation to the ways in which minority, immigration and 
citizenship issues are discussed. 
 
         To begin the discussion with EU-level effects promoting Pan-Europeanism (H 4): it is 
clear that this is generally not viewed as posing a direct threat in itself to the continued 
preference of citizens to identify primarily with their nation-state. This is equally true for 
Eastern and Western populists. 
 
         However, for populists in CEE there is an extra reason not to object to Pan-European 
agendas. Contrary to what was hypothesized at the end of Chapter Two, what emerges is that 
even among the CEE populists – as among the rest of the population - the EU appears to have 
largely succeeded in appropriating Europe as a political space. Thus, CEE nationalists regard 
it as exceedingly difficult to reject the EU as a whole without simultaneously being forced 
into the trap of admitting that they oppose their country’s reclamation of its rightful place 
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within the confines of the European family. Indeed, the acceptance of an overarching EU 
identity is further manifested in the tendency of CEE populists to support the EU over the 
United States on a symbolic level or as a matter of principle. Of course such views may also 
be reflective of the conspiratorial and anti-globalization thinking that is a notable feature of 
such populisms, with the USA (deemed to be the “major promoter of globalist ideology”) 
likely to be viewed as an entity aspiring to control the “junior partner” – the EU.  
 
         In contrast, among Western European populists, Europe (and by extension EU 
membership) is far from needed as a locus of identity in order to help them make a proper 
statement regarding their brand of domestic nationalism. Pan-Europeanism at the EU level is 
thus largely an inconvenience that only distracts from other pursuits and is associated with 
the EU’s alleged proclivity to dictate the nature of the interactions among its constituent 
countries. Chapter One suggested that the EU institutional environment might even promote a 
sense of pan-European identity among nationalist-populists, but the thesis did not find that 
the EU provided nationalist-populist members with significant networking opportunities and 
right-wing cooperation has remained relatively limited, as evidenced by the short lifespan of 
the ITS group in the European Parliament or the Dutch populists’ tendency to perceive 
cooperation with Eastern European members as self-defeating with regard to their underlying 
ideological aims. 
 
         At the same time, and partly in line with Hypothesis 4, Pan-Europeanism remains a 
contested term that invokes negative images in the minds of CEE populists due to its 
continued association with double standards in favor of the more developed West attributable 
to the perceived lack of equality of treatment by the EU core (see below, with regard to 
minority rights). The attitudes of Western European populists, by contrast, reflect 
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defensiveness because of the EU’s presumed tendency to overdo itself in accommodating the 
Easterners by either making them the “international faces of the supranational community” as 
a result of being too generous in including them in all its supranational activities, or refusing 
to hold them to the same standard as the affluent West in the economic realm.   
 
         As for immigration and emigration (H 3), the former has retained its hold on public 
consciousness in Western Europe and remains the issue area that is the most likely to be 
blamed on “Europeanization” by Western populists. Startin and Krouwel opine that anti-EU 
stances among far right leaders are frequently attributable to strategic reasons – they are often 
a camouflage or a proxy for anti-immigration sentiments (being overtly anti-immigrant rather 
than explicitly anti-EU could decrease electoral support due to the former’s associations with 
racial intolerance and xenophobia on the level of the popular consciousness and reduce the 
prospects for cooperation with mainstream right parties).1272 However, as the thesis 
demonstrated, it is also the case that among the REP and PVV leaders, there is a genuine 
belief that the EU’s actual involvement when it comes to migration matters is especially 
problematic in comparison to other nationalist domains. 
 
         By contrast, the EU’s unlocking of emigration waves towards the Western part of the 
continent continues to be deemed especially worrisome by CEE nationalists. This latter 
concern is not very apparent from the Western academic literature, but the interviews 
revealed that – as hypothesized in Chapter Two – emigration does present certain concerns to 
populists in CEE. Included among them are the trepidations that lands left vacant by émigrés 
will be settled by “ethnic others” from within and outside the EU, the belief that post-2007 
the economic contributions (i.e. in terms of remittances) of expatriate Bulgarians and 
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Romanians to their mother country’s GDP are marginal, as well as some measure of 
conspiratorial thinking which suggests that Western countries are not interested in narrowing 
the economic gap with the East and are keen to encourage the educated Easterners to forego 
their original identity and join their ranks. 
         It is not very likely that a swap between the East and West (with regard to the 
importance placed on these issue areas) will occur any time soon, though some PVV 
members increasingly imply that Europe (in large part because of the supposed failed policies 
of the EU and the national governments of the various states) will in the next decades become 
a continent of emigration. It is also conceivable that immigration and asylum issues will start 
occupying the spotlight among CEE populists if their countries receive significantly greater 
numbers of refugees from conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa - conflicts which 
populists may blame the EU for stoking or at least failing to resolve. 
         One stark contrast between CEE and Western European populists is to be found in their 
inclination to engage in the “Europeanizing” of minority rights issues. This was to be 
expected and Hypothesis 2 suggested that the reasons could be the greater prevalence of 
ethnic nationalism in CEE, as well as the tendency of Western populists to be less concerned 
about settled ethnic minorities because they were more worried about immigration. In 
accordance with expectations, in the case of Ataka and the PRM, minority-majority relations 
tend to be viewed in antagonistic or essentialist terms, with the EU generally conceptualized 
as a clear ally of the “minority underdog”. This understanding is also tied to the tendency 
attributed to the EU to present Eastern European nationalisms as inherently less legitimate 
than Western European ones. 
         A more nuanced picture is presented in the Western case, to a degree in contrast to the 
expectations laid out in Hypotheses  1 and 5. The rigidity of the minority-majority category 
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boundaries is less frequently emphasized among Western populists (with regard to ethnic 
minority communities in Germany and the Netherlands), which is in accordance with the 
initial predictions, but the EU effects are sometimes also regarded as so very detrimental to 
the population as a whole, that the hardships that they allegedly create are seen to affect 
majorities and minorities alike. One indication of the greater defensiveness accompanying 
discussions of minority issues in Eastern Europe is perhaps the determination (common 
among both Ataka and PRM members) to prove that the minority situation in their countries 
is objectively better than in most other European or non-European states; in contrast, Western 
European populists appear to be less interested in comparing their minority situations to the 
“EU mean” or are more likely to downplay the salience of EU officials’ rhetoric touching 
upon minority rights. In essence, the PVV’s stances on the matter represent added proof that 
“hard” Eurosceptics may regard the generic EU influences on the nation-state as extremely 
damaging, to the extent that they eclipse any concerns pertaining to the changing power 
relations between majorities and minorities (as discussed in Chapter Three). 
 
         It is also notable that the degree to which a party proclaims itself to be “Eurosceptic” 
does not necessarily translate into a tendency to view all the “principal nationalist domains” 
as having become “highly Europeanized” under the influences of the EU. 
         For instance, in the case of the PVV, neither Pan-Europeanism (which is not perceived 
as being anywhere close to outstripping Dutch loyalty to their nation-state in the hierarchy of 
collective identities) nor EU-induced “minority empowerment” - which could engender 
feelings of relative deprivation on the part of members of the majority and negatively affect 
their perceptions of their own nation-state - register as especially alarming. 
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         In contrast, the PRM is keen to highlight how what they see as “German Europe” is 
interfering with Romanian attachments to “Latin identity” and views the EU-attributable 
“minority empowerment” in relation to Hungarians as quite significant, but is nonetheless not 
as eager to embrace the “Eurosceptic” label as its counterpart in the Netherlands, with a few 
members like Ţîrnea even describing themselves as positively excited regarding the EU. 
Thus, it is fair to make the assumption that the “hardness” or “softness” of party 
Euroscepticism does not correlate neatly with the extent to which the EU is deemed to have 
made problematic inroads into “core nationalist domains”.  
 
         Hypothesis 6 suggested that there is likely to be a convergence of concerns between 
Eastern and Western European parties in relation to the non-economic facets of 
Euroscepticism. While the extent to which this is true is difficult to measure through 
qualitative means, it is evident that the nature of the discourses of Eastern and Western 
populists is still manifestly different. Three indicators of that are their different receptivity to 
future enlargements (for instance, CEE populists are more supportive of upcoming 
enlargements despite their reservations regarding the EU’s modus operandi and emphasize 
historical rivalry rather than economic reasons when expressing caution pertaining to the 
membership prospects of Serbia); the nature of their deliberations with regard to minority 
issues; and the still strong emigration-immigration divide. In addition, Eastern and Western 
Eurosceptics are keen to acknowledge that they do not see eye-to-eye with regard to the 
future direction of EU integration – Eastern European populists are less likely to push for 
radical restructurings of the EU system given that their countries are likely to end up with an 




2. Contribution to knowledge 
 
         In accordance with the cross-disciplinary nature of the research conducted, the thesis 
managed to offer contributions on a number of different levels. 
 
         Firstly, it filled a gap within the scholarship on right-wing political groupings by 
providing a detailed examination, based largely on qualitative data, of the discourses adopted 
by four nationalist-populist parties. By considering their statements on minority rights and 
citizenship it shed light on a number of domains that are of proven relevance for nationalists  
but are generally regarded as somewhat epiphenomenal by researchers of Euroscepticism or 
analyzed within a solely domestic framework, without the EU influences necessarily being 
invoked. The time period (2011-2013) under scrutiny coincided with an economic and 
cultural solidarity crisis within the European Union, which helped propel EU issues into the 
spotlight for both nationalist party members and ordinary citizens. The thesis thus adopted the 
approach (recently popularized by Simon Usherwood) that anti-EU groups do not represent 
inflexible mavericks that are unlikely to drop their opposition to the Union as a matter of 
principle, but are actually constructive agents that could be useful in explaining 
Europeanization-related processes.1273 
 
         On a theoretical level, the thesis provided further conceptual clarity to the “minority 
empowerment” phenomenon by analyzing both concrete measures and normative 
transformations emanating from the EU in relation to the CEE and Western European 
countries. In the process it highlighted how the term is more likely to be utilized in relation to 
Eastern Europe. “Minority empowerment” is an umbrella term, but the thesis looked more 
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closely at the actual types of perceived empowerment which generate nationalist concerns. 
Drawing on the notion of “minority empowerment”, the thesis not only explored predictable 
concerns about the EU’s role in enhancing the power of minority Turkish and Hungarian 
political parties in Bulgaria and Romania, but also managed to uncover a number of salient 
grievances in relation to the alleged EU impacts on nation-states, grievances that had been 
missed by researchers focusing on these particular parties. In the case of Ataka and Bulgaria, 
the thesis highlighted the special salience of the socio-economic dimension of minority 
empowerment and indicated how it could be an essential trigger for Euroscepticism by 
connecting it to past insecurities attributable to the country’s forced incorporation into an 
empire-like entity. By the same token, it also introduced the reader to the paradoxes of the 
PVV position in relation to minority issues and offered guidance as to the reasons behind its 
reluctance to view minority empowerment through the EU prism. Briefly, these reasons 
proved to be a genuine belief that minorities are generally satisfied with the Dutch state’s 
own conflict-resolution mechanisms, the minorities’ presumed low level of attachment to the 
EU, the unwillingness to identify majority vs. minority dividends (unlike in the Eastern case) 
as well as a reluctance to regard them as more threatening than new immigrants from Eastern 
Europe. Similarly, the thesis drew attention to the divergent discourses within the REP and 
the legalist reading of “minority empowerment’, while also indicating how the Romanian 
nationalists’ generally negative self-identification with regard to Hungarians is further 
amplified due to the actions taken by EU actors in a practical and normative sense. For 
instance, Hungarian etho-regionalist actors are assumed to garner electoral support due to 
EU’s alleged inaction on guaranteeing territorial integrity. Also, Hungarians are presumed to 
be successful as infiltrators of supranational structures, allowing them to dictate the policies 
of the EU. In that regard, they are thought to be deriving benefits from not being “too 
Eastern” (more Central European), unlike the Romanians. 
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         The four parties discussed in the thesis are usually labelled as being ‘soft’ Eurosceptic, 
even if recently the PVV has become ‘harder’. It was therefore possible to explore in some 
detail what actually constitutes ‘soft’ Euroscepticism.  One unexpected finding, with regard 
to ‘soft’ Euroscepticism and the nationalism of the interviewees, was that objections to 
Europeanisation often seemed to stem not from concerns about specific nations but rather 
from a sense that traditional sub-groupings within Europe and international friendships were 
disrupted by the EU project. In the case of Ataka, these sub-groupings encompass the Slavic 
countries (especially Russia), while PRM members include Southern European (and 
sometimes Eastern European) states among them. Transcendent identities are less important 
from the standpoint of Western European populists, but the PVV position is that Dutch-US 
bilateral ties could be unduly compromised if the EU continues to expand its competences. 
As for the REP, the EU is appraised  as a culprit in indirectly tarnishing Germany’s 
reputation among traditionally friendly states like Greece. 
         In general, the analysis of the attitudes towards the EU exhibited by CEE parties 
testifies to the reality that hardcore Euroscepticism (implying a total rejection of the 
European integration project itself and often of the democratic system of governance 
associated with it) seems to be lacking fertile ground for developing in Eastern Europe – even 
those party functionaries who are the most adamantly opposed to EU membership imply that 
the acknowledgement and prestige that accompanies EU accession remains important and 
provides an essential moral recognition that serves as a counterweight against the often 
chequered national history of these countries. 
 
         With regard to the PVV in particular, by gaining access to a number of prominent, but 
elusive personalities within the PVV hierarchy, the thesis demonstrated how despite the 
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recent attempts by Geert Wilders to inspire a broad-based coalition against the EU with the 
involvement of Western and Southern European nationalist-populist parties (the PVV leader 
suffered a setback during the summer months of 2013,1274 but by the end of the year garnered 
some success in ensuring the tacit commitment of the Front National and other Eurosceptic 
parties such as the Italian Northern League for an anti-EU alliance in the European 
Parliament to be officially crafted in the aftermath of the 2014 EP elections),1275 the 
underlying ideology of the party is actually premised on a cautious opposition to the 
deepening of intra-European solidarities. 
 
         In relation to the CEE parties, the thesis also showed that nationalists themselves state 
that in the aftermath of accession the playing field for parties of their ilk has opened up or at 
least there has been no added impetus for mainstream actors or ordinary citizens to silence 
discussions of nationalism. Similarly, among the representatives of the Western European 
parties, the consensus is that the EU actors have generally been unsuccessful in setting the 
tone for the way in which nationalism-related issues are approached or affected the rules on 
coalition-making, so as to bring about the isolation of parties that are recognizably 
nationalist.  
         Throughout my research the term “Europeanization” generally proved to be a useful 
shorthand for the description of a variety of (not always interrelated) phenomena due to its 
multidimensionality and because of enabling me to keep my focus on the EU level as the 
driver of a variety of policy processes. In addition, the concept reflects the difficulty of 
disentangling EU-related effects and those that are the outgrowth of “common 
understandings and conventions” set out by nation-states outside the framework of the EU. 
One drawback is that while it is not as highly charged a concept as terms like “colonialism” 
                                                 
1274
 Euractiv. Eurosceptics snub Wilders’attempt to form European far-right party, 28 August 2013. 
 397 
and “imperialism”, it has a somewhat similar connotation of taking away the prerogatives of 
a nation-state and allowing the supranational level to reign supreme. 
 
         In short, the thesis contributed to the wider literature on Europeanization through both a 
theoretical and empirical prism. With regard to the former, it provided additional clarity to 
two specific features of Europeanization - Pan-Europeanism and “minority empowerment” – 
by illustrating the ways in which they are embedded into the discourses of nationalist-
populist parties. In addition, from an empirical standpoint, the thesis presented some specific 
insights into the workings of four nationalist-populist parties by highlighting the degree to 
which concrete minority groups (Hungarians, Muslims and so on) and super-order identities 
(Western, Slavic) fit into the abovementioned theoretical frames. Lastly, during this whole 
process, the thesis managed to stay faithful to its main research question in terms of providing 
insights into the different Eastern vs. Western readings of Europeanization on the level of 
nationalist-populist parties. 
 
3. Suggestions for further research 
 
         The thesis touched upon a variety of different dimensions of Euroscepticism and drew 
comparisons between the substance of the arguments behind the rhetoric employed by 
members of four different parties operating within the confines of specific national and 
international contexts. It raised issues related to super order and sub-order identities, 
ethnicization and patterns of immigration and citizenship transformations within the 
framework of the EU that could be subjected to further empirical tests by adopting a 
quantitative approach or expanding the scope of the qualitative framework. 
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         Firstly, it would be particularly revealing to conduct a second study on the Ataka party 
(in the period between 2015 and 2017) that touched upon some of the same topics that I 
emphasized as part of my research. I managed to interview the Ataka members prior to the 
most current parliamentary elections (held on 12 May 2013) and it is generally acknowledged 
by political scientists that in the period between 2011 and May 2013, Ataka (while not able to 
truly unify the nationalist vote in Bulgaria) was generally somewhat successful in keeping its 
nationalist credentials intact. However, its decision to implicitly pave the way for the 
formation of a BSP-led government (which was also backed by the MRF party) by boycotting 
the parliamentary vote (rather than voting against the socialists) in the aftermath of the 
elections resulted in serious doubts being raised regarding its “nationalist integrity”1276 and 
suspicions were manifested as to the degree to which its previous proclamations regarding its 
commitment to keep the MRF party from playing a role in the governance of the country 
were genuine.1277  Ironically, it also drew the ire of more liberally minded Bulgarian citizens 
(taking part in protests against the  Plamen Oresharski government), who sent out a petition 
to European Commissioner for Justice, Viviane Reding, (who had already made a statement 
in support of the Bulgarian opposition),1278 in which they expressed their concern that an 
“extreme right-wing anti-European” party is currently at the helm of the country and in a 
viable position to influence proceedings.1279 Thus, it could be argued (as also revealed by its 
slump in ratings since June 2013) that Ataka has been a major casualty of the anti-
establishment turn among Bulgarian citizens following the developments of May and June 
2013 and has also lost its way with some segments of its traditionally nationalist niche, given 
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that it is no longer conceptualized as being part of the opposition and is criticized for “selling 
out to the MRF for self-serving reasons”.1280 In this regard, it is not out of the question that in 
the near future Ataka may be enticed to start dabbling with “hard Euroscepticism” (it 
currently tends to sympathize with the viewpoint that the Europe flag waving protesters have 
been brainwashed by “globalist agents” like George Soros)1281 in an attempt to recover its 
reputation with nationalists or alternatively try to rebrand itself as a respectable party that no 
longer envisions itself as Eurosceptic. Consequently, probing Ataka’s views on issues like 
Pan-Europeanism and EU influence on the prospects of minorities in Bulgaria in two or three 
years’ time could constitute a worthwhile endeavor and provide important insights pertaining 
to the nature of Ataka’s evolution as a political party. 
 
         In a general sense, the thesis opens up another new avenue for further research when it 
comes to Euroscepticism in the four countries that were the focus of my analyses. Given that 
I looked at particular issue areas that are relevant to Euroscepticism from the standpoint of 
parties that are not firmly nested within the mainstream of the selected countries’ political 
system, it may be tempting to undertake comparative studies between mainstream 
conservative parties in the Netherlands and Germany (which are increasingly incorporating 
facets of Euroscepticism into their official rhetoric) focusing on the degree to which the 
perceived EU structuring of the relationship between Pan-Europeanism and national identity 
as well as majority and minority relations are viewed as problematic by them.  
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         In addition, extensive studies that touch upon Eastern European mainstream 
conservative parties could also be conducted, as such research endeavors will provide fresh 
insights on whether the gulf in opinions between mainstream and radical right (when 
evaluating Europeanization-related dynamics) is more pronounced in CEE or Western 
European countries. The consensus in the scholarship generally holds that CEE centre-right 
parties that are considered to be fully within the political mainstream are somewhat more 
likely to experiment with “quasi right-wing” rhetoric and venture into the radical right realm 
while discussing nationalism-related issues than their counterparts in Western European 
states, who tend to be more inhibited and are conscious of the risks inherent in eroding the 
line of separation with fascist-like entities. One additional reason for that is tied to the 
presence of well-organized and politically active minorities within a country without a long 
tradition of independent statehood (a phenomenon more common to Eastern Europe), which 
is thought to have eroded the legitimacy of “moderate nationalists” – a nationalist who is 
overly accommodating to ethnic minorities is essentially seen as an oxymoron.1282 For 
instance, the centre-right CEDB that was the governing party in Bulgaria between 2009 and 
2013 has not been shy in engaging in bombastically nationalist discourses and has on 
occasions crossed over into the Ataka-like turf, as evidenced by a number of controversies 
involving the party leader, Boyko Borisov, who in 2009 in a speech delivered to Bulgarian 
expatriates in the United States referred to Roma and Turks as “bad human material”.1283 The 
“mainstreaming of right-wing discourses” has of course not been absent in Western European 
countries, with some semblances of this phenomenon occurring among conservative parties 
in France and the United Kingdom, to take two examples, particularly in relation to 
immigration-related issues. 
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         Furthermore, taking into account the nature of the party profiles of the two CEE parties 
that were examined, future researchers may be well-served by employing a similar 
methodology to the one that I adopted and look into the nature of the discourses of the 
nationalist Slovakian L’S-HZDS party pertaining to the various manifestations of 
Europeanization. Slovakia is a country in which majority-minority rivalries constitute an 
important part of the political landscape (specifically the dynamics of the Slovakian-
Hungarian relationship dyad)1284 and fears that the Southern region (where Hungarians are 
concentrated) could be susceptible to secessionism pressures from the Hungarian state remain 
vivid.1285 
         Lastly, in light of the future potentialities of EU accession (Macedonia submitted a 
membership application in 2004 and is currently among the five candidate countries), 
Macedonian populists could constitute a worthwhile object of study. Ultranationalist 
Macedonian political parties (like TMORO-VEP) tend to be opposed to the EU membership 
of the country, while Albanian nationalist parties (in part due to the perceived favorable 
treatment of the Kosovo issue by the EU as evidenced by the 8 July 2010 resolution by the 
European Parliament encouraging other states to recognize Kosovo)1286 are in general likely 
to welcome the Republic of Macedonia’s incorporation into the supranational community.1287 
Inter-ethnic relations in the Republic of Macedonia (especially between the ethnic 
Macedonians and the Albanian-Macedonians which constitute roughly a quarter of the 
country’s population) remain strained and radicals on both sides have on past occasions 
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proven more than capable of fomenting violent unrest between both communities. Thus, 
applying the “minority empowerment” framework to the Macedonian situation and obtaining 
information regarding the Macedonian nationalists’ expectations for the ways in which the 
inter-ethnic situation will play out in the aftermath of accession could set the stage for a 

























- What are your views on your country’s membership of the EU, is it beneficial or rather to the detriment 
of your state? 
- Which aspect of the EU would you regard as representing a main area of concern when it comes to your 
nation-state? 
 
Cluster 1 (EU identity) 
 
- How are you disposed toward EU initiatives that aim to crystallize and strengthen the expression of a EU 
cultural or political identity (Pan-European nationalism)?  
- To what extent do you regard dual attachments to the nation and Europe (or the EU as an entity) as 
problematic? 
- Do you see the EU as providing a check on the geopolitical aspirations of the United States and if yes, 
would you characterize it as a desirable development? 
- Do you feel that the EU has brought about a strengthening of your state’s international bargaining 
position/increased its influence in the world/improved its international reputation? 
- How are you disposed towards the potential EU membership of Turkey? 
 
Cluster 2 (Perceived Minority Empowerment) 
 
- How do you see the current status of ethnic and/or cultural minorities within your country? 
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- From the perspective of your nation-state, do you think that the EU has altered the status quo in the case 
of your core group and minority groups? (has it brought about a worsening or improvement in relations 
between them, has it strengthened or weakened the allegiance to the state felt by minority groups, and 
so on) 
- Do minority groups benefit more from EU membership compared to the majority population? 
- Do you feel that the EU has strengthened or weakened the territorial integrity of your nation-state? 
- How do you view the Kosovo developments in relation to the future activism of the minority groups 
within your state? The EU as a whole has refrained from adopting a clearcut position regarding 
Kosovo’s status, but do you think that it should have handled matters differently? (mainly relevant in 
the case of the CEE states). 
 
Cluster 3 (Europeanization of Migration, Citizenship, Normative Aspects) 
- How are you disposed toward EU level initiatives (i.e. those with an emphasis on burden-sharing) that 
touch upon migration? 
- To what extent do you tend to associate discourses promoting multiculturalism with the influence of the 
EU (as opposed to that of your national government)? 
- Do you regard the more permissive citizenship regimes that are in part induced by Europeanization as 
likely to make your country a more attractive destination for immigrants in the future? 




Cluster 4 (Procedural Aspects) 
 
- Do you feel unwelcome or intimidated about expressing your nationalist views during discussions in EU 
and other transnational fora? 
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- In the pre-accession phase, did you experience unusual difficulties in terms of finding coalition partners 


























- Was sind Ihre Ansichten über die EU-Mitgliedschaft Ihres Landes? 
- Welcher Aspekt oder Aspekte der EU betrachten Sie als äußerst oder besonders problematisch?  
Teil 1 (EU Identität) 
 
- Was ist Ihre Meinung bezüglich der verschiedenen kulturellen Massnahmen, die für die Stärkung der EU-
Identität geeignet sind?  
- Wie verstehen Sie das Phänomen des Pan-europäischen Nationalismus? Glauben Sie, dass die Stärkung der 
EU-Identität zu doppelten Loyalitäten führen wird und potenziell eine negative Auswirkung auf den 
Patriotismus der deutschen Bürger haben kann?  
 
- Kann die Europäische Militärmacht als Gegengewicht zu den Vereinigten Staaten wirken und wäre das eine 
wünschenswerte Entwicklung von der Perspektive Deutschlands?  Im Allgemeinen sind die deutschen 
politischen Prioritäten auf internationaler Ebene im Einklang mit denen der EU oder mit denen der Vereinigten 
Staaten?
 
- Hat die EU Mitgliedschaft zur Stärkung der internationalen Verhandlungsposition Deutschlands beigetragen? 
Im Allgemeinen sind deutsche nationale Interessen im Rahmen der Europaischen Union gut vertreten oder ist es 
besonders schwer deutsche nationale Interessen in der EU durchzusetzen? 
- Was ist Ihre Meinung bezüglich der zukünftigen EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei? 
Teil 2 (Minderheiten und die EU) 
 
- Wie beurteilen Sie den heutigen Stand der Beziehungen zwischen Mehrheitsgruppen (Deutsche) und 
ethnischen und kulturellen Minderheitsgruppen (z.B. Muslime und Osteuropäer)? Sind Sie harmonish oder nicht 
sehr harmonisch? Gibt es Bereiche, wo es “positive Diskriminierung” existiert?  
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- Wie verstehen Sie die Rolle der Europäischen Union? Ist es richtig zu sagen, dass die EU-Mitgliedschaft 
(besonders seit Anfang der neunziger Jahre, nach dem Vertrag von Maastricht)  zu einer Ermächtigung der 
Minderheiten und Benachteiligung von Deutschen (z.B. in Bezug auf verschiedene Rechte) beigetragen hat?
 
- Wie beurteilen Sie die Position der EU in Bezug auf die Kosovo-Frage? 
 
Teil 3 (Europäisierung von Migration, Staatsbürgerschaft, normativen Aspekten) 
  
- Wie betrachten Sie deutsche Migrationspolitik und die Prozesse der Europäisierung des Politikfeldes? 
- Assoziieren Sie die Förderung von Multikulturalismus in Deutschland mit den Einflüssen der EU oder mit 
denen der nationalen Regierung? 
- Wie schätzen sie die normative Wirkung der EU auf die deutsche Medien und Ausbildung ein? 
- Inwieweit hat Europäisierung die Basis für eine Änderung der Einbürgerungsprozeduren geschafft?  
- Die Regionalpolitik der Europäischen Union verfolgt das Ziel den wirtschaftlichen und sozialen 
Zusammenhalt innerhalb der Europäischen Union zu stärken. Haben Bundesländer wie Bayern davon profitiert 
oder ist es der Fall, dass die Auswirkungen der EU bezüglich der Regionalpolitik eher negativ sind?  
 
Teil 4 (Prozedurische Aspekte) 
- Gibt es besondere Vorurteile/sollen Sie mit Vorurteilen gegenüber nationalistischen Parteien rechnen während 
Diskussionen auf der EU-Ebene? 
- Glauben Sie, dass die EU die interne Koalitionspolitik in Deutschland zu beeinflussen versucht und 





List of interview questions (Bulgarian) 
Общи въпроси 
 
- Смятате ли, че членството на България в Европейския съюз е по-скоро положително или по-скоро 
отрицателно от гледна точка на българските национални интереси? 
 
- Кой аспект на българското членство в Евросъюза е от ваша гледна точка в най-голям ущърб на 
българските национални интереси? 
 
- Смятате ли, че (като цяло) България е третирана като пълноправен член на ЕС от останалите държави, 
които са част от общността? 
 
Клъстър 1 (Европейска идентичност) 
 
- Какво е вашето мнение по отношение на евроинициативите, които целят да засилят Пан-европеизма? 
 
- Заплаха ли е за България Пан-европеизмът от гледна точка на рисковете за създаване на двойнствена 
лоялност и свеждане до минимум на привързаността към националната идея? 
 
- Смятате ли, че за България е по-добре ЕС да е достатъчно силен, за да е в състояние да бъде коректив 
на САЩ? Предпочитате ли САЩ да останат по-влиятелни от ЕС в глобален план?  
- Какво е Вашата гледна точка по отношение на евентуалното присъединяване на Турция към ЕС? 
 
Клъстър 2 (ЕС и малцинствата) 
 
- Какво мислите за сегашната ситуация на малцинствата в България? Може ли да се говори за тяхна 
привилегированост спрямо българите? 
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- Смятате ли, че от 2007-ма насам има някакво засилване на влиянието на малцинствата в България? 
Може ли да се твърди, че са по-склонни да потъпкват определени български норми? Извличат ли повече 
дивиденти от ЕС на фона на българите? 
 
- Има ли основание да се твърди, че членството в ЕС е допълнителна гаранция за запазването на 
териториалната цялост на България?  
- Каква е вашата гледна точка във връзка с казуса Косово и позицията на ЕС? Изпитвате ли чувство на 
солидарност с други източноевропейски страни като Сърбия по отношение на сходни вътрешни 
конфликти? 
 
Клъстър 3 (Имиграция, граждански процедури, нормативни аспекти) 
- Как оценявате влиянието на ЕС върху мерките, които се взимат по отношение на миграцията към 
България? 
- Считате ли, че западни модели на мултикултурното общество скоро ще бъдат приложени и в България 
и каква роля би изиграл Евросъюзът що се отнася до едно подобно стечение?  
- Смятате ли, че медиите в България обикновено предоставят обективни анализи по отношение на 
Евросъюза? 
- По ваше мнение как влияе членството в ЕС върху процедурите за издаване на българско гражданство? 
- Как оценявате влиянието на ЕС върху политиката на регионално развитие в България? 
 - Имате ли причини да смятате, че влиянието на България в глобален план и престижът и ще нараснат 
покрай членството и в ЕС? 
 
Клъстър 4  (Процедурни аспекти) 
 
- Смятате ли, че националистите се третират некоректно при разисквания в Европейския парламент и 
различните транснационални форуми към евроструктурите? 
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- Мислите ли, че ЕС влияе върху коалиционните параметри в България и окуражава леви, центристки и 






















List of Interview Questions (Romanian) 
 
 Intrebări generale 
 
- Care este parerea ta in legatura cu intrarea Romaniei in Uniunea Europeană? A avut un effect positiv sau 
negative asupra tarii?  
- Care aspect al Uniunii Europene crezi ca pune probleme șării tale?  
 
Partea întâi  (Identitatea UE) 
 
- Crezi ca Uniunea Europeană promovează pan-europenismul ? 
- Crezi ca acest lucru este o ameninșăre la adresa identitășii nationale in Romania?  
- Ai prefer sa ai o Uniune Europeană puternica sau ai prefer că o tara ca Statele Unite puternica? 
- Ai prefer ca UE sa fie mai puternica ca si actor global decat Statele Unite?  
- Nu mai suport intra Turcia în Uniunea Europeană? 
 
Partea a doua (Uniunea Europeană și minoritășile) 
 
- Care crezi ca e situatia actuala a minorităţilor la tine in tara?  
- Consideri ca UE a influentat anumite minoritati sa devina mai vocale si mai puternice impotriva 
majoritatii din Romania?  
 412 
- Crezi ca minorităţile beneficiază mai mult in UE decat populatia majoritară  a uneiţări membre?  
- Cum vezi situaţia din Kosovo și poziţia UE in legatura cu aceasta situaţie?  
 
Partea a treia (Imigrașie, aspecte normative, cetășenie) 
 
- Ce parere ai in legatura cu influenţa UE asupra imigrarii in România?  
- Consideri ca UE ajuta sau dâuneazâ integriţâtea teritoriala a României?  
- In ce mâsurâ asociezi discursurile care promoveaza multiculturalismul cu influenţa UE?  
- Crezi ca UE influenţează presa din România?  
- Consideri ca politicile permisive in legâturâ cu acordarea cetâţeniei (politici influenţate de UE) vor avea 
ca efect cresterea imigranţilor ce vor veni in România in viitor?  
 
Partea a patra (Aspectelor procedurale) 
 
- Cum crezi ca politicile de dezvoltare regional din UE afecteazâ România? 










Main Facts and Characteristics of the Parties 
 
Политическа партия “Атака” (Ataka political party) 
 
Party leader, founder and chairman: Volen Siderov (b. 1956) 
 
Alternative names: Also known as Национален съюз “Атака“ (National Union “Attack”) during its first 
participation in domestic parliamentary elections in 2005. 
 
Media associated with the party: Skat TV (based in Bourgas) until 2009, when Skat’s founder Valeri 
Simeonov has formed an alternative party with a similarly nationalist orientation – National Front for the 
Salvation of Bulgaria; Alfa TV (based in Sofia) since 2011. This is the first political party in Bulgaria with its 
own television channel. The official newspaper Ataka has been in circulation since the 17th of October 2005. 
 
Established: 17 April 2005 (officially registered with the courts in July 2005). 
 
Meaning of Name and Symbolism: The name “Ataka” (literally “attack”) encapsulates the national 
assertiveness subscribed to by the party and the need for past Bulgarian glories to be recaptured. Specific letters 
like “A” are associated with Bulgarian Christian symbolism (the party is strongly pro-Christian in its 
orientation) and are believed to represent new beginnings as well as spiritual rejuvenation. A Christian cross is 
also part of the logo of the party. It has been suggested that the name “Ataka” mirrors that of a newspaper in 
Bulgaria with pro-Nazi leanings that began circulation on 25 May 1932, 1288 but this is far from universally 
acknowledged. The “Ataka” programme on Skat TV (hosted by Siderov) preceded the establishment of the 
party. 
 
                                                 
1288
 Lilov, Grigor. Най-богатите българи – Политиците Парите! Мръсните тайни! (The richest 
Bulgarians – the politicians, their wealth and the dirty secrets) (2013), p. 319. 
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Party membership: 5500-6000 members at the time of registration; no official information released, but current 




Andonova, Zdravka and Lidiya Tsacheva, trud newspaper. 350 000 българи в партиите (350 000 Bulgarians 
are registered as party members), 12 November 2012. <http://www.trud.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=1632304>, 
Retrieved 29 April 2013. 
Lilov, Grigor. Най-богатите българи – Политиците Парите! Мръсните тайни! (The richest Bulgarians – 
the politicians, their wealth and the dirty secrets), 2013. Retrieved June 2014. 
Ninova, Maria. Година преди изборите – нови партии никнат като гъби (One year prior to the elections, 


























# of seats 
won 
Rank 
2005 296 848 8.93 21 (out of 
240) 
4th 
2009 395 733 9.36 21 (out of 
240) 
4th 




Sources:   
2005 Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, official directory.  <http://pi2005.cik.bg/results/> 
2009 Parliamentary elections in Bulgaria, official directory. 
 <http://pi2009.cik.bg/results/proportional/rik_00.html>   <http://pi2009.cik.bg/results/mandates/rik_00.html> 











Performance in Presidential elections (Volen Siderov, with Pavel Shopov as vice-























2006 597 175 21.49 2nd 649 387 24.05 2nd 
2011 122 466 3.64 4th - - - 
 
Sources:  
Official website of the 2006 Bulgarian presidential elections. <http://pvr2006.cik.bg/results_1/index.html, 
http://pvr2006.cik.bg/results_2/index.html> 



























275 237 14. 20 3 (out of 18) 4th 
2009 308 052 11. 96 2 (out of 18) 4th 
2014 66 210 2.96 0 (out of 17) 8th 
 
    
 
    
 
 
On the European level, Ataka used to have close links with the PRM, currently there is sustained cooperation 
with the Freedom Party in Austria and the Front National. 
 
Sources:  
2007 European Parliament elections in Bulgaria, official directory (CIK). <http://ep2007.cik.bg/results/> 
2009 European Parliament elections in Bulgaria, official directory (CIK). <http://ep2009.cik.bg/results/> 
2014 European Parliament elections in Bulgaria, official directory (CIK). 
<http://results.cik.bg/ep2014/rezultati> 
 
The Ataka party EP parliamentarians used to be a member of the far right Identity, Tradition and Sovereignty 





Additional sources consulted: 
 
Ataka official website. Символи на партия Атака (Symbols of the Ataka party). 
<http://www.ataka.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=395&Itemid=86>, Retrieved 31 March 
2013. 
 
Blagov, Krum. Името “Атака” е взето от Гьобелс (The name “Ataka” has been borrowed from Goebbels), 
<http://www.krumblagov.com/investigations/ataka.php>, Retrieved 7 April 2013. 
 
Capital newspaper. Избори 2013: Атака -Най-важното от кампанията и обещанията на партията за 
парламентарния вот (2013 elections Ataka – the most important proceedings of the campaign and the election 
promises), April 2013. 
<http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/izbori2013/2013/04/24/2047396_izbori_2013_ataka/>, 
Retrieved 1 April 2013. 
 
Darik news. Избори 2013: Атака профил (2013 elections: profile of the Ataka party), April 2013 
<http://dariknews.bg/izbori2013t.php?itid=20&pcid=1>, Retrieved 3 April 2013. 
 
Dnevnik bg. СКАТ - телевизията със собствени избиратели (Skat – the TV with its own voters), 8 November 
2011, Retrieved 24 May 2013. 
 
Nikolova, Tanya. Речник на политическите партии в България 1989-2009. Хроника на събитията (A 
dictionary of political parties in Bulgaria 1989-2009: A Recount of the events), p. 240, 2012.  
 
Skandalno.net. Капка и Димитър Стоянов патентоват марката “Партия Атака”. (Kapka Siderova and 
Dimitar Stoyanov will try to patent the name “Ataka”), 12 December 2011. (Retrieved 29 March 2013). 
 
Vsekiden newspaper. Строй се, преброй се (Let’s count ourselves), 30 April 2009.  
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<http://www.vsekiden.com/50200/%D1%81%D1%82%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%B9-%D1%81%D0%B5-




Partidul România Mare (Greater Romania Party) 
 
Party leader and chairman: Gheorghe Funar  (b. 1949) (since 27 July 2013), previously Corneliu Vadim 
Tudor (b. 1949) 
  
Founding members: Corneliu Vadim Tudor, Eugen Barbu, Mircea Musat, Alexandru Munteanu, Theodor 
Paraschiv 
 
Party newspaper (since 1991): Ziarul Tricolorul  
 
Established (and officially registered with the courts):  20 June 1991 
 
Meaning of Name: The name of the party testifies to its nationalist orientation and the desire to see the clock 
turn back to the status quo between 1918 and 1940 when Romania reached its greatest territorial expansion and 
saw all the territories with an ethnic Romanian majority become part of one state. The party members regard the 
Moldovans as a subset of the Romanian ethnicity. 
 







Performance in elections for the Romanian Chamber of Deputies 
 
 
Election Years # of total votes % of overall 
vote 
# of overall 
seats won 
Rank 
1992 424 061 3.89 16 (out of 341) 6th 
1996 546 430 4.46 19 (out of 343) 5th 
2000 2 112 027 19. 48 84 (out of 345) 2nd 
2004 1 302 724 12.93 48 (out of 332) 3rd 
2008 217 595 3.15 0 (out of 333) 5th 
2012 92 382 1.24 0 (out of 412) 5th 
 
Performance in elections for the Romanian Senate 
 
 
Election Years # of total votes % of overall 
vote 
# of overall 
seats won 
Rank 
1992 422 545 3.85 6 (out of 143) 6th 
1996 558 026 4.54 8 (out of 143) 5th 
2000 2 288 483 21.01 37 (out of 140) 2nd 
2004 1 379 789 13.63 21 (out of 137) 3rd 
2008 245 930 3.57 0 (out of 137) 5th 





Essex UK, Election Results Romania, 1992-2000. 
<http://www2.essex.ac.uk/elect/database/indexCountry.asp?country=ROMANIA&opt=elc> 
Biroul Electoral Central (Main Election Bureau). Alegeri pentru Camera Deputatilor si Senat, 30 noiembrie 





Biroul Electoral Central (Main Election Bureau). Alegeri Parlamentare – 30 Noiembrie 2008. Situacia 
Voturilor Valabil Exprimate Pe Competitori Electorali (Legislative Elections – 30 November 2008. Finalized 
Results). 
Biroul Electoral Central (Main Election Bureau). Alegeri pentru Camera Deputatilor si Senat, 11 decembrie 







































1996 597 508 4.72 5 - - - 
2000 3 178 293 28.34 2 3 324 247 33.17 2 
2004 1 313 714 12.57 3 - - - 
2009 540 380 5.56 4 - - - 
 
Sources:  
Statistica Electorala 1992-2004. (Romanian Election Statistics Database, 1992-2004). 
<http://www.insse.ro/cms/rw/resource/stat_electorale.pdf?view=true> 












Performance in elections for the European Parliament 
 
 
Election Years # of overall 
votes 
% of overall 
vote 





212 596 4.15 0 (out of 35) 7th 
2009 419 094 8.65 3 (out of 33) 4th (shared with 
DUHR) 
2014 150 484 2.70 0 (out of 32) 8th 
 
    
 
    
 
Sources: 




Biroul Electoral Central (Central Election Bureau). Rezultate finale - situația voturilor valabil exprimate 
(Final results of the vote for European Parliament held on 25 May 2014) 
<http://www.bec2014.ro/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Situatia-voturilor-valabil-exprimate.pdf> 
5 members of the PRM served as observers and after their country joined the EU, they acquired the status of full 
MEPs until the 2007 election. The PRM party EP parliamentarians used to be a member of the far right Identity, 
Tradition and Sovereignty (ITS) Group within the European Parliament between January 2007 and November 
2007, when it was dissolved. 
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Additional sources consulted: 
 
Greater Romania party official website. Istoric (History). <http://prm-central.ro/istoric/> Retrieved 30 March 
2013. 
 
Greater Romania Party official website (Cluj). <http://www.prmcluj.ro/despre-noi/>, Retrieved 10 April 2013. 
 
Machiavelli, Romanian Portal on Political Parties. Partidul România Mare profile. 
 
<http://www.machiavelli.ro/partide.php>, Retrieved 30 March 2013. 
 




Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom) 
 
Party leader and chairman: Geert Wilders (b. 1963) 
 
Founding members: Geert Wilders, Martin Bosma 
 
Established (and officially registered):  22 February 2006 (the Wilders Group was formed on 24 November 
2004) 
 
Meaning of Name: The name chosen by the party likely stems from the commitment expressed by its leader to 
tackle perceived authoritarian tendencies in Dutch politics through a strong emphasis on freedom of speech and 
opposition to the excesses of Islamization. Wilders is seen to have been particularly affected by the murders of 
freedom of speech advocates Pim Fortuyn (2002) and Theo van Gogh (2004), the latter event sometimes 
regarded as the Dutch 9/11. 
 425 
 
Party membership: The party leader, Geert Wilders, is technically the only member of the party, which makes 
it an unusual entity in Dutch politics; PVV supporters are not permitted to register as members and the PVV also 
does not have an official youth organization. 
 
Performance in the elections for the Dutch House of Representatives 
 
 
Election Years # of total votes % of overall 
vote 
# of overall 
seats won 
Rank 
2006 579 490 5.89 9 (out of 150) 5th 
2010 1 454 493 15.45 24 (out of 150) 3rd 
2012 950 263 10.08 15 (out of 150) 3rd 
 
Source:  Kiesraad. Databank verkiezingsuitslagen (Official repository of election results), 













Performance in elections for the European Parliament 
 
 
Election Years # of overall 
votes 
% of overall 
vote 
# of overall 
seats won 
Rank 
2009 772 746 16.97 4 (out of 25) 
5 (out of 26) in the 
aftermath of coming 
into force of Treaty 
of Lisbon 
2nd 




Note: The Lisbon Treaty raised the cap on the number of seats to 750 (the maximum being 96 and the minimum 
6). In accordance with the "degressively proportional" distribution, the Netherlands gained one seat, which was 
allocated to the PVV party in December 2011. 
 
On the European level, the PVV has close ties to the Belgian Vlaams Belang. 
 
Sources:  
Official website 2009 European Parliament elections – Results by country. 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/00082fcd21/Results-by-country-(2009).html?tab=18> 
Infonu Netherlands. Europese verkiezingen 2009 in Nederland: definitieve uitslag (2009 European elections in 
the Netherlands – final results) <http://mens-en-samenleving.infonu.nl/politiek/37270-europese-verkiezingen-
2009-in-nederland-definitieve-uitslag.html> 
Parool Netherlands. Europees Parlement – Resultaten Nederland (European Parliament – Results for the 




The PVV members within the European Parliament are part of the Non-Inscrits (are not affiliated with a 
recognized political group). Has close links with the Belgian Vlaams Belang. 
 
Additional sources consulted: 
 
Dutch Centre for documenting political parties. Ledentalen Nederlandse politieke partijen per 1 Januari 2010, 
2011, 2012 (Membership figures for Dutch political parties, for 2010, 2011 and 2012), October 2012. 
<http://pub.dnpp.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/root/DNPPledentallen/2012.pdf> 
 
European Parliament Press Release. Composition of the European Parliament after European elections in June 
2009, 12 October 2007 (Retrieved 23 May 2013). 
 
Party for Freedom official website. Partij voor de Vrijheid Verkiezingsprogramma 2012 - Hun Brussel, Ons 
Nederland (2012 Electoral Programme of the Party for Freedom - Their Brussels, Our Netherlands), Retrieved 
29 March 2013. 
 




Nu Netherlands newspaper. Ook subsidie voor PVV en Verdonk (The PVV and Verdonk could benefit from 
subsidies), 28 April 2009 (Retrieved 9 April 2013). 
 
Voerman, Gerrit. Persbericht Documentatiecentrum Nederlandse Politieke Partijen (Press Report of the Dutch 




Die Republikaner (The Republicans) 
 
Party leader and chairman: Rolf Schlierer (b. 1955) 
 
Founding members: Franz Handlos, Ekkehard Voigt, Franz Schönhuber 
 
Established (and officially registered):  27 November 1983 
 
Party newspaper: Neue Republik (from April 2009) 
 
Meaning of Name: The name chosen by the party reflects its commitment to a republican system of governance 
that is characterized by an emphasis on patriotism – the message is that patriotism is perfectly capable of 
thriving in a country which remains faithful to democratic principles. For instance, German politicians Kurt 
Schumacher and Ludwig Erhard who remained committed to the Weimar Republic ideas during the Nazi era are 
thought to exemplify the possibility of a successful blend between patriotic feelings and attachment to social 
democracy. 
 
Party membership figures: 4000 (in 1986), a peak of 23 000 (mid 1990s), 6800 (in 2009), 5959 (at the end of 










Performances in Bundestag/Parliamentary elections 
 
 
Election Years # of total votes % of overall 
vote 
# of overall 
seats won 
Rank 
1983 - - -  n/a 
1987 - - -  n/a 
1990 987 269 2.1 0 (out of 662) 7th 
1994 875 239 1.9 0 (out of 672) 7th 
1998 906 383 1.8 0 (out of 669) 7th 
2002 280 671 0.6 0 (out of 603) 8th 
2005 166 101 0.6 0 (out of 614) 8th 
2009 193 396 0.4 0 (out of 622) 10th 
2013 91 660 0.2 0 (out of 630) 12th 
 
Sources:    
Der Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer). Ergebnisse der Bundestagswahlen 1949-2009 (Results of the 
Bundestag elections 1949-
2009).<http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/fruehere_bundestagswahlen/> 
Der Bundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer). Wahl zum 17. Deutschen Bundestag am 27. September 2009 
(Elections for the 17th Bundestag  held on 27 September 2009).< 
<http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_09/ergebnisse/bundesergebnisse/index.ht
ml> 





Performances in elections for the European Parliament 
 
 
Election Years # of overall 
votes 
% of overall 
vote 
# of overall 
seats won 
Rank 
1984 - - - n/a 
1989 2 008 629 7.1 6 (out of 81) 5th 
1994 1 387 070 3.9 0 (out of 99) 5th (shared) 
1999 461 038  1.7 0 (out of 99) 6th (shared) 
2004 485 662 1.9 0 (out of 99) 7th (shared) 
2009 347 887 1.3 0 (out of 99) 7th  
2014 109 856 0.4 0 (out of 96) 14th 
 
    
 
On the European level, the party has close links with the Vlaams Belang, the Front National and the Austrian 
Freedom Party. 
 
Sources:      
DerBundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer). Ergebnisse der Europawahlen von 1979 bis 2009 (Results of 
the elections for the European Parliament between 1979 and 2009) 
<http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/europawahlen/fruehere_europawahlen/> 
DerBundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer). Europawahl am 7. Juni 2009 (European Parliament elections 
held on the 7th of June 2009) 
<http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/europawahlen/EU_BUND_09/ergebnisse/bundesergebnisse/> 
DerBundeswahlleiter (Federal Returning Officer). Vorläufiges Ergebnis der Europawahl 2014 (Results of 
European Parliament elections held on 25 May 2014) 
<http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/de/europawahlen/EU_BUND_14/ergebnisse/bundesergebnisse/> 
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Additional sources consulted: 
 
Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Die Republikaner Partei (The Republicans), 
<http://www.bpb.de/methodik/VZGVY5,0,0,REP.html> (Retrieved 31 March 2013). 
 
Lotta Zeitung. NRW: pro NRW auch finanziell nicht attraktiv für Republikaner (A stance that is in favor of the 
NRW will result in financial costs for the Republicans), 3 April 2012. 
<http://nrwrex.wordpress.com/2012/04/03/nrw-%E2%80%9Epro-nrw-auch-finanziell-nicht-attraktiv-fur-
%E2%80%9Erepublikaner/> (Retrieved 31 March 2013) 
 
REP official website. Bundesparteiprogramm der Republikaner (REP Party Manifesto), 2009. (Retrieved 1 
April 2013). 
REP official website. Die Republikaner – Entstehung und Entwicklung der Partei (The Republicans – Origins 
and Development of the Party). <http://www.rep-nrw.de/?ArticleID=aa2753a9-24f8-44db-aa07-1bfc988286bc> 
(Retrieved 31 March 2013) 
REP official website. Entstehung der Partei (Origins of the Party). <http://www.rep-
bayern.de/content.aspx?ArticleID=3043196b-a8dc-4538-bb4f-cc17c0e1a9ff> (Retrieved 31 March 2013) 
Statista Deutschland. Rechtsradikale Parteien in Deutschland: Entwicklung der Mitgliederzahlen von NPD, 
DVU und Republikanern von 2005 bis 2011 (Radical right parties in Germany: changes in membership figures 
of the NPD, DVU and REP between 2005 and 2011). 
<http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/4760/umfrage/entwicklung-der-mitgliederzahlen-von-














Ideological Positioning of the Parties 
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Source: graph created based on classifications in Karasimeonov, Georgi (ed.). Barometer - the political parties 
of Bulgaria, Friedrich-Ebert Bureau for Political Analyses, Issue 1, January – March 2013. 
 




BL - Българската левица (The Bulgarian Left) 
 
BSP – Българска социалистическа партия (Bulgarian Socialist Party) 
 
MRF – Движение за права и свободи (Movement for Rights and Freedoms) 
 
UDF – Съюз на демократичните сили (Union of Democratic Forces) 
 
DSB – Демократи за силна България (Democrats for a Strong Bulgaria)  
 
NMSII - Национално движение за стабилност и възход (National Movement for Stability and Progress) 
 
BCM – Движение “България на гражданите“(Bulgaria for Citizens Movement) 
 
BWS – България без цензура (Bulgaria Without Censorship) 
 
CEDB – Граждани за европейско развитие на България (Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria) 
 
Ataka - Политическа партия Атака (Ataka political party) 
 
NFSB – Национален фронт за спасение на България (National Movement for the Salvation of the 
Fatherland) 
 
Note: The DSB, UDF and three other parties participated in the 2014 European Parliament elections as part of 














                                                                                                           










Source: graph created drawing on information from Boamfa, Ionel and Raluca Horea-Serban. Continuities and 
breaches in the electoral behavior at the local elections in Romania after 1990, University of Iasi project, 2009 
(Retrieved 29 April 2013) and Popica, Dan. Dreapta Civica & Politica (Civic and Political Right), Politicstand, 








PCR - Partidul Comunist Român (Romanian Communist Party) 
 
UDMR - Uniunea Democrată Maghiară din România (Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania) 
 
PSD – Partidul Social Democrat (Romanian Social Democratic Party) 
 
PNL – Partidul National Liberal (National Liberal Party of Romania) 
 
PDL – Partidul Democrat-Liberal (Romanian Democratic Liberal Party) 
 
FC - Forța Civică (Civic Force) 
 
PC – Partidul Conservator (Conservative Party of Romania) 
 
PP-DD - Partidul Poporului – Dan Diaconescu (The People’s Party – Dan Diaconescu) 
 
PRM – Partidul Romania Măre (Greater Romania Party) 
 
















Source:  graph taken from Krouwel, André. The polarized nature of the Dutch party system and the volatility 
of the electorate ensure that any “victory for the centre” is likely to be short-lived, the London School of 









         Note: Conservatism in the Netherlands (like in other countries) is associated with a maintenance of the 
status quo and particular viewpoints on issue areas like immigration. However, it has been argued that in 
contrast to neighbouring Western European states (for example, Germany), an especially negative stigma 
attached to conservatism pervades mainstream Dutch discourses and conservatism is equated with sympathy for 
authoritharianism. In some respects, the PVV party also ticks the box of “secular progressivism”, as unlike some 
other populist parties, strong opposition to feminism and gay rights does not constitute an important facet of its 
identity and there is strong acceptance of the notion of secular governance. 
 
         The Dutch have a natural opposition to anything resembling ideological extremes (which was lamented 
by some interviewees like Kortenoeven, who emphasized that many parties in the country do not have a 
coherent ideological profile and are a “mixed bag”; a “liberal-conservative” party is viewed as an 
oxymoron).1289 In 1956, the headquarters of the Dutch Communist Party in the Netherlands were destroyed in a 
rare instance of political violence in the country, reflective of some left-leaning intellectuals’ disillusionment 
with the “Eastern European face” of communism (the trigger event being the Soviet response to the 1956 
Hungarian Revolution).1290 
 
Additional sources consulted:  
 
Van der Dunk, Herrmann. Conservatism in the Netherlands  (1978) 
 
Jansen, Giedo, Nan Dirk de Graaf and Ariana Need. Class voting, social changes and political changes in the 
Netherlands 1971-2006 (2011) 
 
Schuh, Cora, Marian Burchardt and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr. Contested Secularities – Religious Minorities and 





                                                 
1289




SP - Socialistische Partij (Socialist Party) 
 
PvdD - Partij voor de Dieren (Party for Animals) 
 
GL - GroenLinks (GreenLeft) 
 
PvdA - Partij van de Arbeid (Labour Party) 
 
50+ - 50PLUS 
 
PVV – Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for Freedom)  
 
CU - ChristenUnie (Christian Union) 
 
CDA - Christen-Democratisch Appèl (Christian Democratic Appeal) 
 
SGP - Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij (Reformed Political Party) 
 
D66 - Democraten 66 (Democrats 66) 
 
VVD - Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (People’s Party for Freedom and 
Democracy) 
                                                                                                                                                        
1290
 Arblaster, Paul. A History of the Low Countries (2006), p. 285. 
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 Left                                                                     Center                                            Right                                                                          
 
 
Sources:  modified from Infratest ARD Deutschland Trend. Verortung auf dem Links-Rechts-Kontinuum” 
(Positioning of political parties within the left-right spectrum), April 2012. <http://www.infratest-
dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/ard-deutschlandtrend/2012/verortung-auf-dem-links-rechts-
kontinuum/> (Retrieved 29 April 2013) 
Also based on information obtained from Klett digital. Infoblatt Parteienlandschaft in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland – Kurzcharakteristik aller Parteien (Information pertaining to the political landscape in Germany – 
brief characterizations of all the parties), 2012. (Retrieved 29 April 2013) 
 
 




Die Linke – The German Left 
 
Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (The Greens – the Green Alternative) 
 
SPD - Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany) 
 
FDP – Freie Demokratische Partei (The Free Democratic Party) 
 
CDU - Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (The Christian Democratic Union of Germany) 
 
CSU - Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern (Christian Social Union in Bavaria) 
 
AfD – Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) 
 
DVU – Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union) 
 
NPD – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (National Democratic Party of Germany) 
 

















Mario Punchev (b. 1962) – 2007 candidate for the Sofia City Council, Ataka representative 
for the 24th Sofia district; 26 April 2012, Sofia, Bulgaria. 
 
Ventsislav Lakov (b. 1962) – Member of the 41st and 42nd National Assemblies of Bulgaria; 
24 April 2012, Sofia, Bulgaria. 
 
Nikolay Pehlivanov (b. 1972) - Member of the 41st National Assembly of Bulgaria, 
candidate for mayor of Sofia in 2007; 19 April 2012, Sofia, Bulgaria. 
 
Nikolay Alexandrov (b. 1986) - Member of the 42nd National Assembly of Bulgaria, 
member of the general party council; 20 November 2012 (telephone interview). 
 
Galen Monev (b. 1986) - Member of the 42nd National Assembly of Bulgaria, member of the 
general party council and delegations to the European Parliament, former regional 
coordinator for Southern and Central Bulgaria; 18 February 2013 (telephone interview). 
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